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Knowledge Gap Effects in a Health Information Campaign

JAMES S. ETTEMA, JAMES W. BROWN AND RUSSELL V. LUEPKER

THE knowledge gap hypothesis has important implications for public information campaigns. The hypothesis as originally formulated by Tichenor, et al. (1970) holds that "as the infusion of mass media information into a social system increases, segments of the population with higher socioeconomic status tend to acquire this information at a faster rate than the lower status segments, so that the gap in knowledge between these segments tends to increase rather than decrease" (p. 160). The hypothesis thus implies that projects which disseminate information through the mass media will always benefit higher SES audience segments more than lower SES segments. Such projects cannot, then, equalize the distribution of information within a social system.

These implications are more clearcut than the support for the hy-

Abstract The evaluation of a campaign to increase cardiovascular health knowledge indicates that within the treatment community, education was a significant predictor of knowledge before the campaign but was not a significant predictor after the campaign. Two variables related to motivation to acquire information about cardiovascular health (age and perceived threat of heart attack) were not significant predictors of knowledge before the campaign but were significant predictors afterwards. These results suggest that the infusion of information into a social system via the mass media can close as well as open knowledge gaps and that motivation to acquire information in a specific knowledge domain is a factor controlling gap effects.

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pothesis itself, however. To support the original formulation of the hypothesis Tichenor and his associates (1970) reviewed several studies which reported a relationship between information gain and socioeconomic status. Among them was a study by Star and Hughes (1950), which reported that an information campaign about the United Nations tended to reach only the better educated segments of the audience. Similarly, a study by Budd, et al. (1966) found that knowledge of a news event diffused more rapidly to higher SES individuals than lower SES individuals. In a later study Tichenor and his associates (1973) found that in a number of small communities heavier newspaper coverage of national news events was associated with stronger correlations between education and knowledge. This did not hold for local news events, however.

In contrast to these results several studies suggest that knowledge gaps do not always widen as a result of an infusion of information into a social system. The Star and Hughes findings are counterbalanced by those of Douglas, et al. (1970), which showed that an information campaign on the topic of mental retardation was most effective among those with less education. Similarly, the Budd, et al. study is countered by Larson and Hills (1954), who found that slightly more people in a working-class neighborhood had heard of a news event than people in a professional neighborhood. In addition, Shingi and Mody (1976) reported a narrowing of a gap in agricultural knowledge among Indian farmers after an information campaign. Galloway (1974), also working in India, found that gaps in agricultural and health knowledge tended to narrow as a result of an information campaign.

Several attempts have been made to explain these inconsistent results. Ettema and Kline (1977), for example, suggest that the relationship between knowledge and socioeconomic status (usually indicated by education) is probably due less to a deficiency of information processing skills on the part of lower SES population segments than to differences between higher and lower SES segments in interest and use for the information being disseminated. That is, the sort of information disseminated by the mass media and typically studied by communication researchers (e.g., basic news and public affairs) is *not* so complicated that it requires highly sophisticated information processing skills. This information is, however, probably of more interest and use to higher SES individuals. Simply stated, the argument is that gaps in knowledge disseminated through the mass media will open among those who are differentially motivated to acquire that knowledge but will not open among those who are equally motivated.

Ettema and Kline's arguments are built, in part, upon those presented by Donohue, et al. (1975), who were required to reconsider the

original formulation of their hypothesis when confronted with the inconsistent results of their research (i.e., Tichenor, et al. 1973). In the 1973 study the authors found that the knowledge gap narrowed for local events information but widened for national events information as a result of heavy newspaper coverage in a number of small communities. The authors argued that the local events were highly conflict-ridden and thus quite salient to everyone in the small communities. This, in turn, equalized motivation to acquire information about these events across the various population segments. By comparison, the national events were less salient, motivation to acquire information about them remained unequal, and the gap widened.

Working along these same theoretical lines, Genova and Greenberg (1979) compared the correlations between education and knowledge of two continuing news stories to correlations between interest in those stories and knowledge of them. The authors found that early in the life of the stories, interest correlated slightly more strongly with knowledge than did education. Later in the life of the stories, however, interest was significantly more strongly correlated with knowledge than was education. These relationships held for both "factual knowledge" (knowledge of simple facts such as names and dates) and "structural knowledge" (knowledge of the relationships among persons and events). The knowledge gap these authors found after continued media coverage was, then, between those population segments more and less interested in the stories.

In overview, these attempts to explain the apparently contradictory results of research on knowledge gap phenomena all emphasize one key concept: motivation to acquire information in the knowledge domain under study. Gaps widen when there is a difference in motivation among population segments. Gaps narrow or do not open in the first place when motivation is equalized across these segments. Motivation to acquire information within any given audience segment can, of course, vary across knowledge domains. Some knowledge domains are of more interest and use to higher SES segments. Public affairs knowledge as typically studied by mass communication researchers is, no doubt, such a domain. Other domains, however, are likely to be equally interesting and useful to higher and lower SES segments but differentially interesting and useful to various population segments identified by age, lifestyle, or other such factors. For such domains, then, the effects of motivation would be likely to overpower the effects of education as facilitators of knowledge acquisition.

The present research provides the opportunity to study knowledge gap effects in a domain other than public affairs. Specifically, the

study focuses on an information campaign which set out to promote cardiovascular health by increasing knowledge and eventually changing behavior. It is reasonable to expect that motivation to acquire information in this domain cuts across all levels of education but is strongest among those for whom cardiovascular disease is perceived as an immediate threat. In this knowledge domain it may be hypothesized, then, that the information campaign would not widen the gap between higher and lower SES segments (if a gap existed at all). A gap would, however, open or further widen between those segments more and less motivated to acquire this information as indexed by variables related to perceived threat of cardiovascular disease. In short, motivation would overpower education as a predictor of knowledge gain.

The Information Campaign

With the exception of very high blood pressure, risk factors related to premature heart attack and stroke are virtually accepted as societal norms. Only modest public and professional concern is attached to moderate overweight, lack of regular vigorous physical activity, and "driven" lifestyles. And, of course, cigarette smoking is still accepted as normal behavior. Thus, much of society is at risk, which suggests that health education efforts should be directed not only to medical patients or especially high risk groups but to everyone. With these considerations in mind, the National Institutes of Health have funded a large-scale demonstration program on cardiovascular disease prevention which includes health education via the mass media. This program is now under way. A preliminary study has been conducted in two paired communities in southwestern Minnesota. This study is complete and provides the data reported here.

One of the two communities in the study was selected as the site for an experimental public information campaign on cardiovascular health while the other community served as the comparison community. To begin the campaign, the program's goals were explained to the civic, medical, and other leaders in the communities. After the cooperation of the community leaders was obtained, a 20-week media campaign concerning the risk factors associated with cardiovascular disease was begun in the treatment community. A science writer produced columns for the local newspaper and public service announcements (PSA's) for the radio station. The newspaper columns and the PSA's were closely coordinated and were changed weekly. The sequence and number of newspaper columns were:

Topic	*Number*
Risk concepts and atherosclerosis	4
Exercise	4
Exercise and weight control	1
Smoking	4
Eating habits and nutrition	5
Hypertension	1
Making changes—a family effort	1

In addition to these 20 columns, three feature articles were prepared about people from the community who were already exhibiting behavior conducive to good cardiovascular health. These people were a bicyclist, an ex-smoker, and a runner. Paralleling these articles, the local radio station aired two talk shows about physical activity and smoking.

After a brief hiatus a second 20-week information campaign was begun. This campaign was similar to the first except that it emphasized in-depth knowledge and addressed specific questions from readers and listeners. In addition, a series of 12 half-page newspaper articles sought to teach the principles of behavior modification in the areas of nutrition and smoking. These articles were bordered by dotted lines and readers were encouraged to clip and save them for future reference.

The comparison community received no special attention other than surveys and health screenings identical to those in the treatment community.

Assessing the Effects of the Campaign

To assess the effects of the campaign, a series of surveys was conducted in both the treatment and comparison communities before the first campaign, between the first and second campaigns, and again after the completion of the second campaign. The populations sampled in these surveys were defined by the geographic boundaries of the two communities. Telephone directories supplemented by tax and utility records and site visits by research staff were used to generate a list of all occupied dwellings in each community. Households to be contacted were randomly selected from this list. One individual from each household between the ages of 25 and 64 was then selected as the respondent. In the first wave of interviews approximately 250 respondents were selected, and of these approximately 100 were designated as a panel to be recontacted in the second and third waves. Interview completion rates were 89 percent

and 86 percent for the treatment and comparison communities (respectively) in the first wave and 95 percent and 92 percent for the cohort in the third wave.

All of the respondents were surveyed for their knowledge about and attitudes toward cardiovascular health as well as their health-related behavior such as eating habits and smoking. The standard demographic information was also recorded. In addition to the interview, respondents were invited to visit a local health screening center where a number of physiological measures (e.g., blood pressure, serum cholesterol) were made. The knowledge measures included in the survey focused primarily on the relationship between eating habits and cardiovascular health. The respondent's answer to each of 10 items in this knowledge domain were scored as either correct or incorrect, and the correct answers were summed to provide an index of knowledge which serves as the dependent variable in this study.

Results

The first step in the analysis of the effects of the information campaign was to compare the knowledge gained over the course of the study in the treatment and comparison communities. Table 1 presents the mean scores on the knowledge index from the first wave (pretest) and the third wave (posttest) for the panel in each community. Inspection of the means reveals that knowledge scores did indeed increase in the experimental community though they also increased in the comparison community. Paired t-tests on the mean difference between pretest and posttest (i.e., gain scores) show that the gain in both communities is statistically significant. The significant knowledge gain in the comparison community is due perhaps to a testing effect of the survey and screening procedures at the pretest which made the limited available information on cardiovascular health more salient.*

It is also clear, from Table 1, that the knowledge increase in the treatment community is larger than that in the comparison commu-

Table 1. Levels of Knowledge in Treatment and Comparison Communities

	Treatment Community			*Comparison Community*		
	Pretest	*Posttest*	*Gain Score*	*Pretest*	*Posttest*	*Gain Score*
Mean	5.36	6.41	1.06*	5.52	5.86	0.35*
SD	1.40	1.42	1.81	1.35	1.68	1.58
N	87	87	87	95	95	95

* Gain scores are significantly different from zero ($p < .035$).

nity. An analysis of covariance was performed to determine if the increase in the treatment community was significantly greater than that in the comparison community (Cook and Campbell, 1979). The ANCOVA comparing the posttest means in the two communities (with the pretest means serving as the covariate) indicates that the difference between the two communities at posttest (adjusting for preexisting differences) is indeed significant ($F_{(1,179)} = 7.80$, $p = .01$). Thus it may be concluded that the media campaign was successful in promoting knowledge about eating habits and cardiovascular health.

Because the information campaign increased knowledge it also had the potential to produce knowledge gap effects of one sort or another. The most intuitively appealing analysis of knowledge gap effects is to simply segment the respondents by level of education and to compare the mean knowledge scores of the segments at various points in time. Table 2 presents just such an analysis.

From these data it is clear that in the treatment community a knowledge gap (i.e., a statistically significant difference in mean knowledge scores) between more and less educated segments existed at the time of the pretest. This preexisting knowledge gap was, however, virtually wiped out by the time of the posttest. These data also show that in the comparison community, the gap between segments with more and less education was not statistically significant at the time of the pretest but had become significant by the time of the posttest. This widened gap in the comparison community may well be another manifestation of the sensitization effect noted previously.

To further examine these knowledge gap effects a procedure similar to that of Genova and Greenberg was employed. The ability of education to predict knowledge was compared to the ability of motivational variables to predict knowledge at the pretest and posttest in the treatment community. For this analysis two variables were selected as indicators of motivation to acquire information in this knowledge domain. One of these was the standard demographic variable of age.

Table 2. Mean Levels of Knowledge in Treatment and Comparison Communities Segmented by Education

	Treatment Community		*Comparison Community*	
	Pretest	*Posttest*	*Pretest*	*Posttest*
More educated (some college)	6.09	6.64	5.68	6.31
Less educated (no college)	5.14	6.36	5.46	5.55
Gap between more and less educated	.95*	.28	.22	.76*

* Differences between mean knowledge scores of more and less educated segments are significant ($p < .035$).

The second was a "psychographic" variable not unlike Genova and Greenberg's interest variable. This variable, called "perceived threat of heart attack," was measured with a single survey item in the first interview wave which asked respondents to rate on a scale of one to ten "how close or distant you feel from a heart attack or stroke." These two variables were chosen for this analysis not only because intuition suggested that they would serve as adequate indicators of motivation to acquire information in this domain, but also because they are examples of variables which might reasonably be used by information campaign planners and managers to segment their audience for the purpose of targeting messages and/or monitoring effects.

The dependent variable (knowledge) was regressed on the three predictor variables (education, perceived threat, and age) using first the pretest data and then the posttest data from the treatment community. Table 3, which gives the results of this regression analysis for the pretest data, reveals that education was a significant, if modest predictor of knowledge before the campaign began (beta=.26, p=.005), while age (beta=.10, n.s.) and perceived threat (beta=.10, n.s.) were not significant predictors.

This result corroborates the typical finding in mass communication research that education is related to knowledge (e.g., Robinson, 1972) but seems to be at odds with the Genova and Greenberg finding that interest measures were as powerful predictors as education early in the coverage of a news event.

The posttest data offer findings somewhat more in line with those of Genova and Greenberg. Table 4, which presents the posttest data, indicates that education is not a significant predictor of knowledge after the information campaign (beta=.05, n.s.), while age (beta=.23, p=.02) and perceived threat (beta=.18, p=.05) are significant predictors.

Thus, at the posttest a knowledge gap existed not between the more and less educated but rather between those more and less motivated to acquire the information offered by the campaign.

For purposes of comparison, the regression analysis was also conducted with the data from the comparison community. The pretest

Table 3. Pretest Regression Analysis in Treatment Community

Variable	*Beta*	*P-value of beta*
Education	.26	.005
Age	.10	n.s.
Perceived threat	.10	n.s.

Multiple R = .27.

Table 4. Posttest Regression Analysis in Treatment Community

Variable	*Beta*	*P-value of beta*
Education	.06	n.s.
Age	.23	.02
Perceived threat	.18	.05

Multiple $R = .30$.

data (Table 5) reveal, first, that the power of education to predict knowledge before the campaign was weaker than in the treatment community (beta=.15, $p=.08$). As in the treatment community, however, neither age (beta=.12, n.s.) nor perceived threat (beta=.09, n.s.) was significant as a predictor of knowledge at this point.

The posttest data from the comparison community (Table 6) differ little from the pretest data and therefore differ a good deal from the posttest data for the treatment community. That is, the posttest data for the comparison community show education to be a significant predictor of knowledge (beta=.19, $p=.05$) while age (beta=.06, n.s.) and perceived threat (beta=.04, n.s.) are not.

Discussion

The results of this knowledge gap analysis indicate, first and most significantly, that this information campaign on cardiovascular health did not create or widen a knowledge gap between more and less well-educated segments. Rather, the campaign virtually eliminated an existing gap between these segments. The campaign can be credited with both increasing the overall level of knowledge and decreasing SES-related differences in knowledge within the treatment community. Both of these are, or ought to be, major criteria in evaluating the success of public information campaigns.

These results join the results of other recent studies of knowledge gap effects to suggest that the pessimistic predictions of the original knowledge gap hypothesis are not inevitable. The infusion of information into a social system via the mass media can close as well as

Table 5. Pretest Regression Analysis in Comparison Community

Variable	*Beta*	*P-value of beta*
Education	.15	.08
Age	.09	n.s.
Perceived threat	.12	n.s.

Multiple $R = .19$.

Table 6. Posttest Regression Analysis in Comparison Community

Variable	*Beta*	*P-value of beta*
Education	.19	.05
Age	.06	n.s.
Perceived threat	.04	n.s.

Multiple $R = .23$.

open gaps between the more and less well-educated population segments. The motivation to acquire information in the specific knowledge domain under study is, however, a significant factor mediating gap effects.

Based on this analysis, further research can be fruitfully directed toward defining key knowledge domains, measuring the motivation to acquire information in these domains, and mapping out the potential knowledge gap effects in them. For example, the motivation to acquire knowledge in the domain of cardiovascular health, as measured in this study at least, is significant but quite modest. That is, the motivational variables of age and perceived threat are significant but modest predictors of knowledge after the information campaign though not before. These results suggest that motivation to acquire knowledge in this domain is not powerful enough to generate active searches for information when such information is not readily available, as was the case before the campaign began. When, however, information is made easily available, as during the campaign, motivation is strong enough to generate at least some processing and retention of the information.

Before concluding that motivation to acquire information in the domain of cardiovascular health is, in general, modest, further attention must be given to the more basic issue of how motivation to acquire information is conceptualized and measured. Dervin (1980) has argued that such motivation arises out of the particular life situations in which individuals find themselves. She maintains that cross-situational variables such as demographics are likely to be less powerful predictors of motivation to acquire information than more situationally sensitive variables. Dervin and her associates (1980) have attempted to demonstrate the proposition by developing a sophisticated procedure for diagnosing situations which motivate patients to seek information from their doctors. In this procedure patients are interviewed concerning their health situation, and their responses are content-analyzed to create a "situation-movement state" variable. This, in turn, is used to predict the nature of questions asked of the doctors.

In the study reported here, the perceived threat variable represents our own, less elaborate procedure for assessing situations which motivate individuals to acquire information from, in this case, the mass media. Our data indicate, however, that this variable was no more powerful as a predictor of knowledge than the traditional demographic variable of age. It may well be that the perceived threat variable would not meet Dervin's high standards for truly situation-sensitive variables as set by her own "situation-movement state" variable. On the other hand, it may well also be that Dervin's procedure would not meet information campaign planners' and managers' standards for variables which usefully and efficiently segment the audiences for mass mediated information. Resolving any conflict between the goal of maximizing the situation-sensitivity of variables and the goal of maximizing usefulness of variables for applied communication research should be high on the research agenda. Without powerful *and* practical ways of measuring the motivation to acquire information (or segmenting the information market) the task of mapping out potential knowledge gaps effects in key knowledge domains will be stalled.

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Anonymous Versus Identifiable Self-Reports of Adolescent Drug Attitudes, Intentions, and Use

JANET H. MALVIN AND JOEL M. MOSKOWITZ

ALTHOUGH the predominant method of gathering information about drug use and attitudes is self-report, many researchers are unconvinced of the validity of drug surveys. One assumption underlying this sentiment is that respondents may perceive that they are at risk of censure. In order to reduce this perceived risk, respondents may deliberately misrepresent their behavior by reporting that they use fewer drugs, or use drugs more infrequently than they do in actuality.

Because invalidity of self-reports is linked with respondent fear of self-incrimination, it is common practice to disguise the identities of respondents or to assure them of the confidentiality of their responses. Several methods of identity protection are currently used to increase the response validity of self-report data. However, the researcher must accept certain limitations on the research design that is dictated by some of these methods.

Questionnaires that are responded to anonymously, i.e., with no

Abstract It is generally believed that under conditions that are not completely anonymous subjects try to suppress potentially incriminating information. This response tendency was investigated in a study comparing the effect of identifiability versus anonymity on reported attitudes, intentions, and use of drugs. It was predicted that greater reporting of pro-drug attitudes, intentions, and behaviors would occur in the anonymous condition. Twenty eighth and ninth grade social studies classes were stratified by teacher and grade level. Half were randomly assigned to receive questionnaires with students' names on them. The other half were provided questionnaires with no identifying information on them. Means were computed separately for each sex and analyses of variance were performed on the class-level data. Two results contradicted the hypothesis; but for current use of selected substances, the results tended to support the hypothesis. Most surprising was the overall lack of significant differences in self-reporting between experimental conditions. The findings justify continued confidence in identifiable drug surveys of adolescents.

Janet H. Malvin was a Senior Research Associate and Joel M. Moskowitz was Co-principal Investigator on the Napa Project of the Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation, Napa, California, when this paper was prepared.

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identifying information whatsoever, are often used because they are considered the least likely to be biased. However, data collected anonymously preclude the possibility of linking survey data to follow-up data. Alternatively, respondent-created code numbers have been used as a method for gathering survey data that preserves the possibility of a follow-up with no risk of respondent identification. Respondents are given a series of rules for generating a unique pseudonym or code number which they can recreate given the same rules on another occasion. In practice, however, attrition of data has been substantial where this method has been used. In one study, 34 percent of the surveys collected at pretest could not be matched to surveys collected five to six months later (Kandel, et al., 1978); in another study 31 percent of the surveys could not be matched to one-year follow-up questionnaires (Groves, 1974). Furthermore, this technique is of no value in studies where it is necessary to link self-report data with other measures.

The present study was concerned with the relative validity of data obtained from precoded, identifiable questionnaires. A precoded questionnaire has an identification number on it that is linked to a subject's name on a list kept confidential by the researcher. This procedure allows for the linking of pretest and posttest data although it compromises the subject's protection to some extent. Precoded questionnaires also afford the investigator the greatest flexibility in terms of research design because subjects' self-reports can be both linked over time and linked to other sources of data (e.g., public records).

King (1970) compared anonymous with precoded drug usage questionnaires in a mailed survey of undergraduates and found no statistically significant differences between the two groups with respect to number and percentage of returns, or admissions of use of marijuana and LSD. A study by Luetgart and Armstrong (1973) also found no significant differences between anonymous and coded questionnaires on reported past or current use of marijuana by undergraduates. However, when both questionnaire conditions were compared with an interview condition, the lack of anonymity in the interview led more subjects to classify their usage as past rather than recent. Although there was no effect of anonymity in the questionnaire comparisons, the manipulation of identifiability in the coded condition was weak for two reasons: subjects receiving both questionnaires were equally assured of anonymity, and the coded version left ambiguous the question of whether respondents could actually be linked to the code numbers. Other methodological weaknesses in this study (e.g., non-

random assignment to conditions) leave the authors' conclusions open to question.

Because the evidence supporting the validity of precoded self-reports is limited, the prevailing notion is that they are probably biased. Ideally, a validation study would examine respondent reports in relation to external validity data. Unfortunately, as Bachman and O'Malley (1981) point out, such validation data rarely exist for individual respondents in drug use surveys.

The purpose of the present study was to compare, experimentally, the influence of identifiability versus anonymity on reported attitudes, intentions, and use of drugs. The population of interest was junior high school students, because they are often the targets of primary prevention programs and many studies routinely employ identifiable self-reports with this age group. The hypothesis under investigation was that greater reporting of pro-drug attitudes, intentions, and behaviors would occur in the anonymous condition.

Method

DESIGN AND SUBJECTS

This study was conducted in a junior high school (grades 7–9) in a predominantly white, middle-class, suburban public school system in Northern California. Twenty eighth- and ninth-grade social studies classes were randomly assigned to the identifiable or the anonymous condition after stratifying the classes by teacher and by grade level. There were five eighth-grade and four ninth-grade classes in the identifiable condition (n = 203) and five eighth-grade and six ninth-grade classes in the anonymous condition (n = 277).

MEASURE

The Drug and Alcohol Survey (DAS) was administered in both conditions. The psychometric properties of the DAS are discussed in Moskowitz, et al. (1981); copies of the instrument may be obtained from the present authors. The DAS is a group-administered, self-report questionnaire that measures: general drug attitudes; positive and negative utilities for alcohol, marijuana, and "pills"; drug knowledge; attitudes toward use of specific drugs; perceived peer attitudes toward use of drugs; perceived peer prevalence of drug use; lifetime use of drugs; current use of drugs; and intentions to use drugs. The specific drugs included in the questionnaire are alcohol, cigarettes, marijuana, inhalants, barbiturates or tranquilizers, amphetamines or

stimulants, cocaine, PCP, LSD or psychedelics, and heroin or morphine. For most drugs alternate and "street" names were provided.

Four variables thought to be most sensitive to an anonymity manipulation were investigated. The variables were attitudes toward drugs, lifetime drug use, current drug use, and drug use intentions. For each of these variables only the most prevalently used substances (those currently used by a minimum of 5 percent of junior high school students) were examined. These substances were alcohol, cigarettes, marijuana, barbiturates (tranquilizers), amphetamines (stimulants), and cocaine. See the Appendix for the questionnaire items and response formats.

PROCEDURES

Four substitute teachers administered the questionnaires during regularly scheduled class sessions of 45 minutes on April 26, 1979. In the identifiable condition, the administrator distributed prelabeled questionnaires with students' names on the cover page and identification numbers on page one. The administrator read a prepared statement to the students regarding the purpose of the survey. Students were told that some researchers were interested in the ways in which "students' attitudes change over the school year" and therefore, identification numbers, but not names, of students were necessary to link student questionnaires with questionnaires given at another time. The administrator stressed that completed questionnaires would "never be shown to teachers, parents, police or anyone else" except the researchers. In order to emphasize confidentiality, students were asked to tear off the cover page that displayed their names.

In the anonymous condition, students were provided with questionnaires that did not have names or identification numbers on them. Students were told that the purpose of the survey was to find out "what students think and what they do" with regard to drugs and alcohol. They were also told that their answers would be anonymous; that is, no one would be able to identify them personally, and no "teachers, parents, police or anyone else" would ever be shown the completed questionnaires. Students were instructed not to put their names on the instrument.

In both conditions the survey administrator answered the students' questions individually as they worked, but the administrator did not circulate around the room. The completed questionnaires were collected and sealed in an envelope before the administrator left the room. It was not possible to keep the administrators blind to the experimental manipulation because each was required to administer questionnaires in both conditions. However, standardization of pro-

cedures was accomplished by having the administrators follow a script. Furthermore, the design was counterbalanced in terms of assignment of administrators to both anonymous and identifiable classes.

DATA ANALYSIS

Because the unit of assignment to the two conditions was the classroom, the analysis strategy involved comparisons of anonymous and identifiable classes. Previous research has indicated that subject sex affects reported drug use and drug attitudes (Johnston, et al., 1979); therefore, a modified class-level analysis strategy was adopted. Classroom means were computed separately for each sex on each item yielding class/sex units for analysis. Although this approach artificially inflates the degrees of freedom and increases the chance of a Type I error, it enables examination of the effects of student sex on the dependent variables.

Three-way analyses of variance were performed on the relevant attitude, life use, current use, and intentions measures, to investigate the hypothesis that greater pro-drug attitudes, intentions, and drug use would be reported on the anonymous drug survey. Factors in the design were condition (anonymous vs. identifiable), grade (8 vs. 9) and sex (male vs. female). Levels of significance for all analyses were set at .05.

Results

Results from analyses of variance are summarized in Table 1. The results presented are limited to those effects involving condition. Where significant interactions were obtained, the appropriate simple effects for condition were examined, and the significant effects are reported below.

There was one significant effect on the attitude items; a condition-by-sex interaction was obtained on attitudes toward marijuana. Anonymous females (M = 2.33) were 1.05 standard deviations lower than identifiable females (M = 2.68), t (18) = 2.34, $p < .05$. This effect is contrary to our hypothesis, indicating that less unfavorable attitudes toward marijuana were reported in the identifiable condition.

Two effects were obtained on the lifetime use items. There was a significant condition-by-grade-by-sex interaction on reported lifetime use of cigarettes. Eighth-grade girls in the anonymous condition (M = 2.70) were 1.48 standard deviations lower than eighth-grade girls in the identifiable condition (M = 3.31), t (8) = 2.33, $p < .05$. This finding also contradicts an underreporting bias for the identifiable

Table 1. Summary of ANOVA Main Effects and Interactions Involving Condition

Measure	F_A[a]	$F_{A\times B}$	$F_{A\times C}$	$F_{A\times B\times C}$
Attitudes				
Alcohol	2.545	<1	1.351	<1
Cigarettes	1.116	3.219	<1	<1
Marijuana	<1	<1	7.998*	<1
Barbiturates (tranquilizers)	<1	<1	<1	<1
Amphetamines (stimulants)	<1	<1	1.890	<1
Cocaine	<1	<1	2.554	<1
Life Use				
Alcohol	<1	1.428	3.490	1.618
Cigarettes	<1	2.361	1.218	6.469*
Marijuana	<1	<1	7.615*	<1
Barbiturates (tranquilizers)	1.696	<1	<1	<1
Amphetamines (stimulants)	<1	<1	<1	<1
Cocaine	1.256	<1	<1	<1
Current Use				
Alcohol	<1	<1	2.167	<1
Cigarettes	2.062	5.148*	<1	7.098*
Marijuana	<1	<1	7.326*	<1
Barbiturates (tranquilizers)	1.407	<1	<1	<1
Amphetamines (stimulants)	<1	<1	<1	<1
Cocaine	5.432*	<1	1.454	<1
Intentions				
Alcohol	<1	1.102	2.224	2.364
Cigarettes	1.353	3.372	1.569	3.639
Marijuana	<1	<1	4.046	<1
Barbiturates (tranquilizer)	1.644	<1	<1	<1
Amphetamines (stimulants)	<1	<1	1.863	<1
Cocaine	1.142	<1	<1	<1

NOTE: Degrees of freedom for all F's are 1 and 32.
[a] Subscripts are as follows: A = condition, B = grade, C = sex.
* $p < .05$.

condition. A significant condition-by-sex interaction was obtained on lifetime use of marijuana although planned comparisons revealed no significant simple effects.

The evidence for current drug use consistently supported the hypothesized bias. Condition-by-grade and condition-by-grade-by-sex interactions were obtained on reported current use of cigarettes. Ninth-grade girls in the anonymous condition (M = 2.63) scored 1.79 standard deviations higher than ninth-grade girls in the identifiable condition (M = 2.04), t (8) = 2.78, $p < .05$, on a measure of recent cigarette use.

A condition-by-sex interaction was obtained on current marijuana use. Mean reported marijuana use for boys was 1.01 standard deviations higher in the anonymous condition (M = 1.96) than in the identifiable condition (M = 1.63), t (18) = 2.26, $p < .05$. Finally, there was a main effect for condition on reported current use of cocaine.

Students in the anonymous condition (M = 1.10) scored .78 standard deviations higher than students in the identifiable condition (M = 1.03), F (1,32) = 5.43, $p < .05$.

Analysis of the "intentions to use" items revealed no significant main effects or interactions for any substance.

The pattern of results for the most sensitive, or usage, items can be seen in Table 2. Although only two mean differences reached significance for boys (current use of marijuana and cocaine) all means were lower in the identifiable condition. This pattern suggests that there was a nonsignificant tendency for boys to report greater use of all substances when they were anonymous. The pattern of means for girls was less consistent.

Discussion

The results of this study provide evidence that boys report less drug use on an identifiable questionnaire. However, this bias appeared to operate only on the most "sensitive" items (i.e., current drug use). Not surprisingly, of the four most prevalently used drugs among boys, the effect was found for the two illicit drugs, marijuana and

Table 2. Means and Pooled Within-Cell Standard Deviations for Usage Items, by Sex and Condition

	Male		*Female*		*Pooled Within-cell SD*
	Anon	*ID*	*Anon*	*ID*	
Alcohol					
Life use[a]	3.54	3.31	3.18	3.43	.41
Current use[b]	1.96	1.86	1.81	2.02	.33
Cigarettes					
Life use	2.33	2.13	3.23	3.29	.41
Current use	1.48	1.24	2.22	2.15	.33
Marijuana					
Life use	2.85	2.48	2.48	2.96	.48
Current use	1.96	1.64	1.80	2.04	.33
Barbiturates					
Life use	1.16	1.08	1.27	1.18	.21
Current use	1.02	1.01	1.10	1.03	.10
Amphetamines					
Life use	1.26	1.18	1.30	1.36	.23
Current use	1.08	1.04	1.12	1.17	.15
Cocaine					
Life use	1.33	1.17	1.27	1.26	.24
Current use	1.12	1.02	1.08	1.05	.09

[a] Scale values are: 1 = never; 2 = once or twice; 3 = 3–9 occasions; 4 = 10–39 occasions; 5 = 40–99 occasions; 6 = 100 or more occasions.

[b] Scale values are: 1 = none; 2 = once or twice; 3 = 3–9 occasions; 4 = 10–19 occasions; 5 = 20 or more occasions.

cocaine, and not for alcohol and cigarettes. Hence, identifiability affected the willingness of boys to report illicit drug use even though confidentiality was assured.

The pattern of findings for girls is less systematic. On the current drug use items there is evidence for less reporting of cocaine and cigarette use in the identifiable condition, with the latter finding holding for ninth-grade girls only. An apparent counter-bias was obtained for lifetime cigarette use (eighth grade only) and attitudes toward marijuana; girls reported more lifetime cigarette use and more favorable attitudes toward marijuana in the identifiable condition.

There is no satisfactory explanation for the two unexpected results found for girls on marijuana attitudes and lifetime cigarette use. However, since girls underreported their current cocaine and cigarette use (ninth grade only) in the identifiable condition, there is evidence that girls respond to more self-incriminating stimuli in the same manner as boys.

The present findings underscore the complexity of the response validity issue. The general similarities among the means for usage contradict the assumption that the investigator must forfeit respondent honesty with an identifiable questionnaire. Bias in self-reporting appears to be a dual function of subject characteristics and item sensitivity.

One data collection technique that may reduce response bias under identifiable conditions is the "bogus pipeline" (Jones and Sigall, 1971). With this technique, the experimenter attempts to convince subjects that false answers can be detected by a (usually) bogus physiological measure that is taken in conjunction with the self-report measure. Self-reported cigarette smoking of eighth graders was greater with this technique in one study (Luepker, et al., undated). However, there is a risk that subjects may liberalize their definitions of given behaviors rather than simply report more honestly. Also, because of the use of deception, this procedure complicates the evaluation of primary prevention or treatment programs which rely on trust between participants and staff.

A limitation of the present study is that response bias was addressed in the absence of a prevention or treatment program. Yet, programs under investigation may create demand characteristics that interact with subjects' response biases. This condition would seriously confound a research design. For example, if underreporting on sensitive measures was differentially associated with experimental condition, effects that are attributed to a program may be spurious.

In sum, there was a slight tendency for junior high students to report less current drug use on an identifiable survey. The extent and

nature of this bias seemed to depend on subject characteristics (e.g., sex, grade) and item sensitivity. Overall, the effects of the bias were not so great as to outweigh the relative utility of a precoded questionnaire for research requiring linkable measures.

Appendix
Questionnaire Items and Response Formats

3. I *THINK* that (—) is a very bad thing, a bad thing, not good or bad, a good thing, a very good thing.
   a. drinking alcohol (beer, wine, liquor)
   b. smoking cigarettes
   c. smoking marijuana (grass, pot, hash)
   e. taking barbiturates or tranquilizers (sleeping pills, downers, barbs, tranks, soapers)
   f. taking amphetamines or stimulants (pep pills, uppers, beans, speed, crank)
   h. sniffing cocaine
40. In your WHOLE LIFE, on how many occasions have you (—): never, once or twice, 3–9 occasions, 10–39 occasions, 40–99 occasions, 100 or more occasions.
   a. drunk alcohol (beer, wine, liquor)?
   b. smoked cigarettes?
   c. smoked marijuana (grass, pot, hash)?
   e. taken barbiturates or tranquilizers (sleeping pills, downers, barbs, tranks, soapers)?
   f. taken amphetamines or stimulants (pep pills, uppers, beans, speed, crank)?
   h. sniffed cocaine?
41. During the *LAST FOUR WEEKS*, on how many occasions have you (—): none, once or twice, 3–9 occasions, 10–19 occasions, 20 or more occasions.
   a. drunk alcohol (beer, wine, liquor)?
   b. smoked cigarettes?
   c. smoked marijuana (grass, pot, hash)?
   e. taken barbiturates or tranquilizers (sleeping pills, downers, barbs, tranks, soapers)?
   f. taken amphetamines or stimulants (pep pills, uppers, beans, speed, crank)?
   h. sniffed cocaine?
42. During the *NEXT YEAR*, how often are you likely to (—): not at all, once or twice, occasionally, frequently.
   a. drink alcohol (beer, wine, liquor)?
   b. smoke cigarettes?
   c. smoke marijuana (grass, pot, hash)?
   e. take barbiturates or tranquilizers (sleeping pills, downers, barbs, tranks, soapers)?
   f. take amphetamines or stimulants (pep pills, uppers, beans, speed, crank)?
   h. sniff cocaine?

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The Polls:
Ethnic Social Distance and Prejudice

TOM W. SMITH AND GLENN R. DEMPSEY

(S)tereotypes are loaded with preference, suffused with affection or dislike, attached to fears, lusts, strong wishes, pride, hope. Whatever invokes the stereotype is judged with the appropriate sentiment. Except where we deliberately keep prejudice in suspense, we do not study a man and judge him to be bad. We see a bad man. We see a dewy morn, a blushing maiden, a sainted priest, a humorless Englishman, a dangerous Red, a carefree bohemian, a lazy Hindu, a wily Oriental, a dreaming Slav, a volatile Irishman, a greedy Jew, a 100 percent American.

—WALTER LIPPMANN, *Public Opinion* (1922)

AMERICA'S attitude towards its multitude of ethnic groups follows the credo of Animal Farm, "All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others." We proclaimed that all men are created equal in the Declaration of Independence but recognized slavery in the Constitution, opened the golden door to the "huddled masses" but barred the entrance with national origin quotas and gentlemen's agreements, promised equal protection of the laws but in law and custom discriminated against minorities, and declared with Justice Harlan, "There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind," but upheld Jim Crow laws. Even when our laws have lived up to our ideals of ethnic equality, our folkways have been ethnocentric, replete with negative stereotypes, discrimination, and social exclusiveness.

Two main principles explain most of the variation in the social ordering of ethnic groups. First, race breaks ethnicities into two large distinct groups, Europeans and non-Europeans; there is virtually no overlap between these groups, with Europeans filling all the top and middle positions and non-Europeans making up the bottom third. Second, within the large European group, the period of predominant immigration orders ethnicities. At the top of the lists are the members of the old stock, host culture—the British and derivative WASPs who dominated the initial waves of colonial immigration, supplied the Founding Fathers, and established their culture and institutions as the cornerstone of American society. Next come the middle stock groups such as Germans, Irish, and Scandinavians who immigrated to America in the mid-nineteenth century, also largely from the northwest quadrant of Europe. They are followed by Europeans from the three remaining quadrants, the Italians, Greeks, Poles, Russians, and Jews who came to America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth

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centuries. The Europeans are followed by nationalities from other continents—Asians, Africans, and Hispanics.

In broad outline this ordering of ethnicities has prevailed throughout this century. Although ethnic preferences and prejudices have an enduring quality, certain notable shifts have occurred in both the overall structure of rankings and the standing of individual groups. First, the absolute level of expressed prejudice has declined. The mean level on Bogardus's social distance scale has moved down from 2.14 in 1926 to 1.93 in 1977.[1] The proportion willing to vote for a presidential candidate from a racial, religious, or ethnic minority has increased steadily at least since the late fifties. Shorter time series in the seventies point to increased tolerance of miscegenation and decreased "anti-" group feelings. Second, the range of distances between groups has narrowed. Bogardus's social distance scale shows a decline in the distance between the top and bottom groups from 2.85 in 1926 to 1.38 in 1977. Similarly the ratio between whites and blacks on the Michigan feeling thermometer fell from 1.3 in the mid-sixties to 1.2 in the seventies, and the ratio between Protestants and Jews dropped from 1.27 to 1.15. Likewise, the largest ratios between Jews, blacks, Catholics, atheists, and Baptists as presidential candidates were in 1958 and the lowest ratios at their most recent time point. While differences have not vanished, distances have narrowed.

There have also been some significant shifts in the rankings level of particular groups. Russians fell in rankings from 1946 to 1956 and since then have been the only European nationality consistently put into the non-European cellar. This decline and unusually low ranking appears to result from antipathy to Russia rather than a change in attitudes toward Russians in the United States.[2] A similar reaction accounts for the increase in social distance and drop in relative position in 1946 of three nationalities that were U.S. enemies in World War II—the Germans, the Italians, and especially the Japanese. Two other groups showing absolute and relative drops were the Czechs, perhaps also because of dislike of the Czechoslovakian government, and the Scots. Several groups also rose in public esteem. Italians have moved up steadily and have become the first European group to break into the top of the scale dominated by the old and middle stock immigrants from northwest Europe. The 1977 Bogardus scale ranked them fifth and in 1981 they were ranked as the group that

[1] It is unfortunate that the most complete and lengthy time series is based on the national convenience sample of students who were administered the Bogardus scale. The data from the 1948–49 adult and student samples by Roper suggest, however, that student samples may closely duplicate the relative rankings of groups although most assuredly not the absolute social distance and levels of prejudice. Likewise, while they are not a national probability sample of students, it is possible that the nonrepresentative biases were constant and therefore still able to track relative change over time. The close agreement in the rank of groups and in trends with other questions suggests that the Bogardus data are generally reliable, if imperfect indicators. Data for the Bogardus social distance scale are found in Bogardus (1928, 1947, 1958, 1964) and Owen, et al. (1981). For other studies of ethnic social distance see Simpson and Yinger (1972).

[2] We have intentionally excluded studies that rated other countries (e.g., Nincic and Russett, 1979, and Russett and Deluca, 1981); studies of stereotypes of different nationalities in their own countries (Eysenck and Crown, 1948, Lydgate, 1944, and Buchanan and Cantril, 1953); or both (Willis, 1968).

should be most encouraged to immigrate. Another scale in 1982, while ranking Italians at the top of the non-northwestern Europeans, placed them marginally below the English, Irish, Germans, and Jews in terms of contributions to America.

Even more dramatic was the advance in the relative standing of blacks during the seventies. As late as 1966 Bogardus found blacks in next-to-last position, leading only Asian Indians. Similarly NORC in 1965 found the social standing of blacks ahead only of gypsies. By 1977 Bogardus's scale placed blacks at the bottom of the European range. Similarly by the seventies the Michigan feeling thermometers showed blacks much closer to establishment reference groups such as whites and Protestants than they had been before. However, majorities still object to black-white intermarrige, and sizeable minorities are opposed to black neighbors. There is also some indication that American Indians may have risen in rank during the seventies.

Some changes that have resulted from specific historical events are of interest. In 1950 and again in 1954 Puerto Ricans headed a list of Communist-leaning groups by a wide margin but in 1953 they ranked fourth on the same list. The apparent reasons for the public concern over Red Puerto Ricans in 1950 and 1954 were the assassination attempt against President Truman in 1950 and the attack on the House of Representatives in 1954. While these effects were quite fleeting, another event permanently reordered public perceptions. Kennedy's election in 1960 immediately reduced reluctance to vote for a Catholic for president by 12 percentage points and hastened the development of consensus on the suitability of a Catholic president.

Given the great diversity of dimensions that ethnic groups have been ranked on (social contact, social standing, contributions, disloyalty, excessive power/influence, suitability as presidential candidate, etc.), the various orderings have been remarkably consistent. Those differences that occur do not seem to indicate unreliability in social rankings of various groups, but rather reflect ethnic group stereotypes and the many distinct dimensions that groups can be evaluated on. The cases of Jews and blacks are instructive on these points.

Jews in general rank about where one would expect a predominantly Eastern European ethnic group on the social distance and social standing scales and rank even higher than other Eastern European groups on the contribution scale. However, from the forties to the present Jews have been repeatedly singled out as having too much power or influence. To some extent this is merely resentment of success, but it is noteworthy that while other groups such as WASPs are also believed to hold a disproportionate share of power, influence, and position, they are not similarly criticized. It appears that prejudice promotes objections to Jewish power rather than WASP power. Jews have also usually appeared on the disloyalty lists although never heading these lists and only chosen (as most groups were) by small minorities. While people as a whole do not rank Jews conspicuously low, there appears to be a small segment of the population concerned about Jewish achievements and, to a lesser extent, alleged Jewish subversion.

In addition to ranking near the bottom of the social standing and distance scales until recently, blacks have often been high on the disloyalty lists, usually either first or second to the foreign-born or atheists. Likewise, they have ranked at the bottom in the presidential preference questions, except for

atheists. While not ranked high in the public mind as overrepresented among important economic sectors (except for sports and popular entertainment/music), they topped several lists since 1979 as having too much influence or power. (The only data point between 1950 and 1979 shows a rather mixed pattern, with blacks first compared to Jews and Catholics on both the too much *and* too little distributions.) While Jews are stereotyped as overambitious, blacks are criticized as pushy. Blacks also are singled out as not being family-oriented.

Ethnocentrism in both its milder forms of ethnic pride and in-group cohesion and in the more virulent forms of bigotry, discrimination, and xenophobia is still prominent in America (as in other societies). While more pronounced manifestations such as lynchings, de jure segregation, and national origin quotas are gone, significant forms persist in the de facto segregation of schools and neighborhoods, popular stereotypes of minorities, and remnants of WASP elitism.

Two somewhat conflicting social forces are reducing the social distance between groups and weakening ethnic prejudice. "God's Crucible, the great Melting-Pot where all the races of Europe are melting and reforming," is working more slowly and selectively than Israel Zangwill (or Michel Guillaume Jean de Crevecoeur) imagined. But acculturation and amalgamation are steadily and continually eroding ethnic differences, not perhaps as in the "roaring and bubbling" of Zangwill's melting pot, but as separate mountain peaks are weathered down into sediment. It is instructive that the groups that Crevecoeur mentioned as making up America's "strange mixture of blood," the English, Dutch, and French, are now all considered similar members of the highly ranked old and middle stock groups.

While acculturation and amalgamation reduce social distance and ethnic prejudice by eliminating or at least intermingling the groups themselves, cultural pluralism is striving toward the same goals by preserving groups but attacking ethnocentrism. By advancing the doctrines of cultural relativism, intergroup tolerance, and ethnic equality, cultural pluralism eliminates the negative aspects and consequences of group distinction and probably actually hastens the blurring of those distinctions via cultural and marital intermingling. While still far short of the brotherhood of man, America is moving toward that ideal.

Questions were compiled with the assistance of the Roper Center, University of Connecticut; the Louis Harris Data Center, University of North Carolina; the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research, University of Michigan; and the National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago. Case bases are at least 1,200 except as noted. For the availability of these data please contact the appropriate survey organization or archive.

GALLUP — Gallup Poll
NORC — National Opinion Research Center
SRC — Survey Research Center, University of Michigan
ROPER — Roper Organization
ORC — Opinion Research Corporation
HARRIS — Louis Harris and Associates
ABC/WP — ABC News/Washington Post

Social Distance and Personal Contact

BOGARDUS Ethnic Distance Scale[a]: (1) In order to keep Scale anonymous, do not sign name, but give yourself as much freedom as possible; use only check marks. (2) Please give your *first feeling reactions* in every case. (3) Give your feeling reactions to each ethnic group in terms of the chief picture or stereotype you have of entire group. Mark each group even if you do not know it. (4) Check as many of seven columns in each case as your feelings dictate. (5) Work as rapidly as possible.

1 Would marry into group	2 Would have as close friends	3 Would have as next-door neighbors	4 Would work in same office	5 Have as speaking acquaintance only	6 Have as visitors only to my nation	7 Would debar from my nation
1926		*1946*	*1956*	*1966*		*1977*[b]
English 1.06	Americans 1.10	Americans 1.04	Americans 1.08	Americans 1.07		Americans 1.25
Americans 1.10	(U.S. whites)	(U.S. whites)	(U.S. whites)	(U.S. whites)		(U.S. whites)
(U.S. whites)	Canadians 1.13	Canadians 1.11	Canadians 1.16	English 1.14		English 1.39
Canadians 1.13	English 1.13	English 1.13	English 1.23	Canadians 1.15		Canadians 1.42
Scots 1.13	Irish 1.24	Irish 1.24	French 1.47	French 1.36		French 1.58
Irish 1.30	Scots 1.26	Scots 1.26	Irish 1.56	Irish 1.40		Italians 1.65
French 1.32	French 1.31	French 1.31	Swedish 1.57	Swedish 1.42		Swedish 1.68
Germans 1.46	Norwegians 1.35	Norwegians 1.35	Scots 1.60	Norwegians 1.50		Irish 1.69
Swedish 1.54	Hollanders 1.37	Hollanders 1.37	Germans 1.61	Italians 1.51		Hollanders 1.82
Hollanders 1.56	Swedish 1.40	Swedish 1.40	Hollanders 1.63	Scots 1.53		Scots 1.83
Norwegians 1.59	Germans 1.59	Germans 1.59	Norwegians 1.66	Germans 1.54		Indians
Spanish 1.72	Finns 1.63	Finns 1.63	Finns 1.80	Hollanders 1.54		(American) 1.84
Finns 1.83	Czechs 1.76	Czechs 1.76	Italians 1.89	Finns 1.67		Germans 1.87
Russians 1.88	Russians 1.83	Russians 1.83	Poles 2.07	Greeks 1.82		Norwegians 1.93
Italians 1.94	Poles 1.84	Poles 1.84	Spanish 2.08	Spanish 1.93		Spanish 1.98
Poles 2.01	Spanish 1.94	Spanish 1.94	Greeks 2.09	Jews 1.97		Finns 2.00
Armenians 2.06	Italians 2.28	Italians 2.28	Jews 2.15	Poles 1.98		Jews 2.01
Czechs 2.08	Armenians 2.29	Armenians 2.29	Czechs 2.22	Czechs 2.02		Greeks 2.02
Indians 2.38	Greeks 2.29	Greeks 2.29	Armenians 2.33	Indians		Negroes 2.03
(American)	Jews 2.32	Jews 2.32	Japanese	(American) 2.12		Poles 2.11
Jews 2.39	Indians	Indians	Americans 2.34	Japanese		Mexican
Greeks 2.47	(American) 2.45	(American) 2.45	Indians	Americans 2.14		Americans 2.17
Mexicans 2.69	Chinese 2.50	Chinese 2.50	(American) 2.35	Armenians 2.18		Japanese
Mexican	Mexican	Mexican	Filipinos 2.46	Filipinos 2.31		Americans 2.18
Americans ——	Americans 2.52	Americans 2.52	Mexican	Chinese 2.34		Armenians 2.20
Japanese 2.80	Filipinos 2.76	Filipinos 2.76	Americans 2.51	Mexican		Czechs 2.23
Japanese	Mexicans 2.89	Mexicans 2.89	Turks 2.52	Americans 2.37		Chinese 2.29
Americans — –	Turks 2.89	Turks 2.89	Russians 2.56	Russians 2.38		Filipinos 2.31
Filipinos 3.0[illegible]	Japanese	Japanese	Chinese 2.68	Japanese 2.41		Japanese 2.38
Negroes 3.28	Americans 2.90	Americans 2.90	Japanese 2.70	Turks 2.48		Mexicans 2.40
Turks 3.30	Koreans 3.05	Koreans 3.05	Negroes 2.74	Koreans 2.51		Indians
Chinese 3.36	Indians	Indians	Mexicans 2.79	Mexicans 2.56		(of India) 2.55
Koreans 3.60	(of India) 3.43	(of India) 3.43	Indians	Negroes 2.56		Turks 2.55
Indians	Negroes 3.60	Negroes 3.60	(of India) 2.80	Indians		Russians 2.57
(of India) 3.91	Japanese 3.61	Japanese 3.61	Koreans 2.83	(of India) 2.62		Koreans 2.63
Mean 2.14	2.12	2.12	2.08	1.92		1.93
Range 2.85	2.57	2.57	1.75	1.56		1.38

[a] Nationwide collection of student convenience samples. Wording varies somewhat across administrations. Wording above is from ninth edition.

[b] Carried out by Owen et al. (1981).

ROPER: These are some of the different kinds of people making up our population: Italians, Catholics, Negroes, Protestants, Chinese, Jews, Mexicans, and Filipinos. Would you prefer not to work with any of these kinds of people if they had an equal position to yours and worked side by side with you, or would it make no difference to you? IF "Prefer Not," ASK: Which kinds of people would you prefer not to work with? Any others?

	9/1948 *% Choosing*	*10/1949* *College Students*
Negroes	41.3%	13.8%
Mexicans	24.6	5.6
Filipinos	18.0	2.8
Chinese	14.2	2.5
Jews	13.2	4.2
Italians	7.2	1.2
Catholics	2.2	0.3
Protestants	0.2	0.0

Would you prefer not to have any of these kinds of people move into your neighborhood to live, or would it make no difference to you? IF "Prefer Not," ASK: Which kinds of people would you prefer not to have move into your neighborhood? Any others?

	9/1948 *% Choosing*	*10/1949* *College Students*
Negroes	62.9%	42.4%
Mexicans	41.1	19.2
Filipinos	32.0	11.7
Chinese	28.4	10.4
Jews	21.6	8.5
Italians	14.4	4.4
Catholics	2.8	0.3
Protestants	0.2	0.1

Would you prefer not to have any of these kinds of people as a guest in your home? IF "Prefer Not," ASK: Which kinds of people would you prefer not to have as guests in your home? Any others?

	9/1948 *% Choosing*	*10/1949* *College Students*
Negroes	57.1%	26.6%
Mexicans	34.4	8.7
Filipinos	28.6	6.1
Chinese	23.9	5.9
Jews	14.5	4.4
Italians	10.5	2.0
Catholics	2.1	0.2
Protestants	0.2	—[a]

Would you prefer not to have any of these kinds of people marry a near relative of yours, or would it make no difference to you? IF "Prefer Not," ASK: Which kinds of people would you prefer not to have marry a near relative of yours? Any others?

	9/1948 *% Choosing*	*10/1949* *College Students*
Negroes	80.8%	75.5%
Chinese	66.2	43.0
Mexicans	64.7	37.3
Filipinos	64.7	38.3
Jews	46.8	23.8
Italians	33.4	12.5
Catholics	21.2	11.0
Protestants	3.9	4.8

[a] Less than 0.1%.

ABC/WP: Now I'd like to ask you a few questions about immigrants. Here are some groups which have recently been immigrating to this country. For each, please tell me if you feel that the government should encourage them to enter this country or discourage them from doing so.

	White Respondents			*Black Respondents*		
2-3/1981	*Encourage*	*Discourage*	*DK*	*Encourage*	*Discourage*	*DK*
Cubans	18%	78	4	18%	73	8
Iranians fleeing their country	16	79	5	17	75	9
Iranian students	21	75	5	22	68	10
Vietnamese	27	67	6	25	66	9
Haitians	27	63	11	27	59	14
Russian Jews	36	56	8	23	66	11
Northern Europeans, i.e. Germans French, Danish, Swedish, etc.	40	53	7	25	65	10
Italians	41	52	7	34	55	11

ROPER: Some people feel it is better to live in neighborhoods where people are all pretty much the same so that they will have interests and values in common. Others feel it is better to live in neighborhoods with different kinds of people, so that they are exposed to different kinds of thinking, lifestyles, etc. Here is a list of some different types of people. (Card shown respondent.) Would you go down that list and for each group tell me *ideally* how many of that group you would like to see living in this neighborhood—none, just a few, about one-fourth of the people living here, about one-half of the people living here, ¾ of the people living here, or all in this neighborhood?

3/1978[a]	*None*	*A Few*	*¼*	*½*	*¾*	*All*	*DK*
Puerto Ricans or Mexicans	25%	51%	7%	2%	--%	1%	14%
Blacks	25	48	7	4	3	2	11
Jews	8	63	11	3	1	2	13
Italians	8	61	11	4	1	2	13
Whites	1	31	8	12	18	22	8

[a] On this and other questions nonethnic groups included in the question were omitted.

YANKELOVICH: How would you feel about having (READ FIRST GROUP ON LIST) in your neighborhood? Would you like to have some (name of group) neighbors, wouldn't it make any difference to you, or would you prefer *not* to have any (name of group) neighbors? (Asked of respondents not members of the group in question.)

2/1981[a]	*Black Americans*	*Japanese Americans*	*Jews*	*Italian Americans*
Like to have some	5%	4%	5%	6%
Make no difference	61	82	87	85
Prefer not to have any	31	10	6	6
Not sure	3	4	2	3

[a] Total *N* in cross section = 1072, black/Jewish over sample = 143, *N*s with groups excluded not given.

GALLUP: On this list are various groups of people. (Survey respondents were handed a list of nine groups.) Could you please sort out any that you would NOT like to have as neighbors?

12/1981	*% Not Wanted as Neighbors*
Cults, sects	30%
Cuban refugees	25
Hispanics	18
Vietnam refugees	17
Religious fundamentalists	11
Jews	2
Catholics	1
Protestants	1

GALLUP: Do you approve or disapprove of marriage between: (1) whites and blacks? (b) Catholics and Protestants? (c) Jews and non-Jews?

	10/1972			*7/1978*		
	Approve	*Dis-approve*	*No Opinion*	*Approve*	*Dis-approve*	*No Opinion*
Whites and blacks	29%	60%	11%	37%	54%	10%
Jews and non-Jews	67	14	19	70	14	17
Catholics and Protestants	72	13	15	74	13	14

YANKELOVICH: Suppose you had a child who wanted to marry a (READ FIRST GROUP ON LIST) who had a good education and came from a good family. How would you feel about this—would you object strongly, somewhat, a little, or not at all? (Asked of respondents not members of the group in question.)

2/1981	*Black Americans*	*Japanese Americans*	*Jews*	*Italian Americans*
Object strongly	53%	23%	14%	10%
Somewhat	17	18	14	12
A little	11	14	15	10
Not at all	37	37	51	62
Not sure	5	8	6	6

YANKELOVICH: Do you think (READ FIRST GROUP ON LIST) tend to be very family-oriented or not that family-oriented? (Asked of respondents not members of the group in question.)

2/1981	*Black Americans*	*Japanese Americans*	*Jews*	*Italian Americans*
Very family-oriented	46%	68%	74%	77%

SRC/CPS: There are many groups in America that try to get the government or the American people to see things more their way. We would like to get your feelings towards some of these groups—our first group is . . . where would you put them on the thermometer?[a]

	1964[b]	*1966*	*1968*	*1970*	*1972*	*1974*	*1976*	*1980*	*1982*
Jews									
Mean	62.5	65.1	64.5		66.4		57.3		
Negroes[c]									
Mean	63.8	63.2	64.7	61.8	64.0	65.5	60.8	64.2	63.8
Southerners									
Mean	64.1		61.3		65.9		62.2	66.2	
Catholics									
Mean	66.7	65.7	65.3		68.2		63.2		

Protestants									
Mean	80.4	78.2	79.0		74.3		66.1		
Whites									
Mean	84.7	84.4	81.1	77.1	78.2	79.1	73.7	77.4	72.8
Chicanos[d]									
Mean							55.5	57.8	
Easterners									
Mean	65.7								

[a] Wording varies. Consult American National Elections Studies codebooks.

[b] The highest non-missing value for the surveys in 1964–1976 was recoded to 100 since a "100" category was not available to respondents in those years. Cross-section study only in 1964, 1968, and 1970; 1974 and 1976 weighted because of panel design.

[c] "Blacks" replaces "Negroes" beginning in 1972.

[d] "Hispanics" replaces "Chicanos" in 1980 survey.

NORC: We would now like to get your feelings about some groups in American society. On this card is what we call a "feeling thermometer," because it measures your feelings towards these groups. (HAND CARD 5) If you don't feel particularly warm *or* cold towards a group, then you should place it in the middle of the thermometer. If you have a *warm* feeling for a group, or feel favorably toward it, you would place this group somewhere toward the *top* of the thermometer. On the other hand, if you don't care too much for a group, or feel *cool* toward it, you would place it somewhere toward the *bottom*. READ EACH ITEM.

12/1973	*Mean Score*
Irish Catholics	57.9
Jews	58.8
Blacks	59.1
Poles	60.1
Italians	61.9

SRC: This is a list of some of the groups we talked about earlier in the interview. Please read over the list and tell me the letter for those groups you feel particularly close to—people who are most like you in their ideas and interests and feelings about things. (MARK ALL MENTIONS)

11/1980	*% Choosing*
Southerners	19.9%
Blacks	18.4
Hispanics	7.4

GALLUP: (HAND RESPONDENT SCALMETER CARD A) You will notice that the 10 boxes on this card go from the highest position of plus five—for someone or something you have a very *favorable* opinion of—all the way down to the lowest position of minus five—for someone or something you have a very *unfavorable* opinion of. How far up or how far down the scale would you rate the following?

	3/1981[a]
Jews	7.96
Catholics	8.23
Protestants	8.63

[a] Scale recalculated as +5=10 . . . −5=1.

Social Standing and Contributions

NORC: America is a land made up of many different kinds of people. Some of these groups of people have higher social standing than others do. Here is a card with the names of one such group on it. (HAND RESPONDENT FIRST "ETHNICITY" CARD.) (a) Please put the card in the box at the top of the ladder if you think that group has the highest possible social standing. (b) Put it in the box at the bottom of the ladder if you think that group has the lowest possible social standing. (c) If it belongs somewhere in between, just put it in the box that comes closest to representing the social standing of that particular group of people. (AS BEFORE, OBSERVE THE RESPONDENT'S PLACEMENT OF THE CARD AND REPEAT THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS FOR HIM IF HE APPEARS UNCERTAIN AS TO HOW TO PERFORM THE TASK.) (d) Here are a few more groups (HAND RESPONDENT "ETHNICITY" CARDS). As you did before, just put them in the boxes on the ladder which match the social standing you think those groups have. Place them the way you think people actually treat these groups, not the way you think people *ought* to treat them. If you want to, you can change your mind and move a card to a different box.

5/65 N =401–447	*Mean Score*	*5/65 N =401–447*	*Mean Score*
Native white Americans	7.25	Italians	5.03
Protestants	6.59	People of foreign ancestry	4.84
British	6.37	Spanish Americans	4.81
Catholics	6.36	Jews	4.71
People of my own ethnic background	6.16	Hungarians	4.57
Irish	5.94	Poles	4.54
French	5.73	Lithuanians	4.42
Scotch	5.73	Czechs	4.40
Germans	5.63	Greeks	4.31
Dutch	5.60	Latin Americans	4.27
Swiss	5.50	American Indians	4.04
Norwegians	5.48	Japanese	3.95
Swedes	5.41	Russians	3.88
Southerners	5.25	Chinese	3.44
Danes	5.20	Mexicans	3.00
Finns	5.08	Puerto Ricans	2.91
French Canadians	5.08	Negroes	2.75
Austrians	5.06	Gypsies	2.29

NORC: There are many religious groups in America. Some of *them* have a higher social standing than others do. Here are some cards with the names of religious groups on them. (HAND "RELIGION" CARDS TO RESPONDENT.) (a) Please put a card in the box at the top of the ladder if you think that religious group has the highest possible social standing. (b) Put it in the box at the bottom of the ladder if you think it has the lowest possible social standing. (c) If you think it belongs somewhere in between, just put it in the box that matches the social standing of that particular religious group. (AS BEFORE, OBSERVE THE RESPONDENT'S PLACEMENT OF THE CARDS AND OFFER TO REREAD THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN ABOVE IF HE APPEARS UNCERTAIN AS TO HOW TO PERFORM THE TASK.) (d) If you want you can change your mind about where a group goes, and move its card to the box that matches its social standing.

5/64 N =377–446	*Mean Score*	*5/64 N =337–446*	*Mean Score*
People of my religious affiliation	6.94	Greek Orthodox	4.77
Catholics	6.87	Christian Scientists	4.63
Protestants	6.84	Unitarians	4.57
Methodists	6.63	Reformed Church	4.41
Presbyterians	6.62	Mormons	4.27
Baptists	6.36	Disciples of Christ	4.13

Episcopalians	6.17	Pentacostal	4.09
Lutherans	6.07	Seventh Day Adventists	4.08
Congregationalists	5.38	Spiritualists	3.34
Salvation Army	5.13	Jehovah's Witnesses	3.12
Jews	4.96		

ROPER: Since the beginning of our country people of many different religions, races, and nationalities have come here and settled. Here is a list of some different groups. (Card shown respondent.) Would you read down that list, and thinking both of what they have contributed to this country and have gotten from this country, for each one tell me whether you think on balance they've been a good thing or a bad thing for the country?

3/1982	*Good Thing*	*Mixed Feelings (vol.)*	*Bad Thing*	*Don't Know*
Cubans	9%	22%	59%	10%
Haitians	10	26	39	26
Puerto Ricans	17	29	43	11
Vietnamese	20	31	38	11
Koreans	24	31	30	15
Mexicans	25	32	34	10
Chinese	44	27	19	10
Blacks	46	31	16	7
Japanese	47	26	18	9
Poles	53	25	12	11
Italians	56	25	10	9
Germans	57	23	11	8
Jews	59	24	9	8
Irish	62	22	7	9
English	66	21	6	8

Negative Feelings and Experiences

SRC: In election campaigns, different groups work for one candidate or another. Are there any groups on this list (GIVE CARD) that you particularly trust—that is, would you be more likely to vote for candidates they recommend? Which group? Are there any groups on the list that you don't trust, that is, would you be more likely to vote against candidates that they recommend? Which groups?

	10/1956			*10/1960*		
	Trust	*Not Selected*	*Distrust*	*Trust*	*Not Selected*	*Distrust*
Negro groups	4.6%	79.5%	15.9%	2.7%	84.4%	13.0%
Catholic groups	9.0	79.9	11.1	3.8	83.6	12.6
Jewish groups	2.3	88.6	9.1	1.0	91.9	7.1
Protestant groups	19.1	79.7	1.2	12.5	84.9	2.6

ROPER: It is human, even if not always admirable, to be "anti-something." Would you go down this list and call off all the things where you are inclined to feel anti? (Card shown respondent.) Just call off the letters.

	% Choosing	
	2-3/1974	*2/1979*
Anti-Negro	6%	5%
Anti-Jewish	2	3
Anti-Catholic	2	3
Anti-Protestant	1	1
Anti-white	1	1
Anti-southern	1	2
Anti-"Yankee"	1	2

GALLUP: Have you or your family ever had any unpleasant personal experiences that might have made you dislike:

5/1979	*Yes*	*No*	*Don't Know*
Jews	2%	96%	2%
Catholics	2	97	1
Protestants	2	97	1

Disloyalty and Subversion

ORC: In general, do you feel that any of the following people are doing less than others for national defense? (HAND CARD TO RESPONDENT AND ASK HIM TO GIVE THE LETTER OR NAME TO YOU)

11/1941	*% Choosing*
Foreign-born	10.8%
Jews	5.6
Negroes	3.2
Catholics	1.8
Protestants	0.7

ROPER: Are there any organizations in this country which you feel might be harmful to the future of the country unless they are curbed? Are there any groups of people?

9/1948	*% Mentioning*
Negroes, Negro organizations	4.5%
Foreigners, aliens, foreign organizations, societies	4.2
Jews	3.8
Anti-religious and racial groups	1.9
Catholics, Catholic organizations	1.2
Jehovah's Witnesses	0.3
Japanese	—[a]

[a] Less than 0.1%

NORC: In your opinion, are there any nationality, religious or racial groups in this country that are a threat to America? IF YES: Which? Any others?

	11/1954	*11/1955*[a]
Catholics	3%	3%
Puerto Ricans	3	—
Negroes	2	4
Jehovah's Witnesses, Amish, Mennonites, pacificist religious sects	1	2
Jews	1	1
Russians	1	2
Misc., Japanese, Italians, foreigners, etc.	3	3
Foreigners generally, DP's, refugees (unspecified)	—	1
Southern whites, Ku Klux Klan, segregationists	—	2

[a] Misc. category listed "Germans, Chinese, organized labor, McCarthyites, Chinese [sic], Italians, NAACP, etc."

NORC: In your opinion, are there any nationality, religious or racial groups in this country that cannot be trusted as much as others in time of danger to America? IF "YES," Which ones? Any others?

11/1954	*% Mentioning*
Russians	3%
Catholics	2
Foreigners, foreign people generally	2
Jehovah's Witness, Amish, Mennonite, pacificist religious sects	2
Jews	2
Japanese	1
Negroes	1
Puerto Ricans	1
Misc. (Italians, Atheists, Mexicans, Chinese, Germans, those preaching white supremacy, Fundamentalist religious cults, etc.	4

NORC: Can you think of any kinds or groups of people in the United States who are more likely than others to be Communists? IF "YES": Which? Any others?

	11/1950[a, b]	*6/1953*	*11/1954*[a]
Foreigners, aliens, immigrants (general)	13%	8%	4%
Negroes, colored people	3	4	4
Specific minority group: Italians Puerto Ricans, etc.	7	4	3
Jews	4	2	2
Atheists, people with no religion	4	1	3
Russians, Chinese	—	—	3
Immigrants, DP's	—	—	3

[a] Can you think of any kinds or groups of people in the United States who are *more* likely than others to be Communists? IF "YES": Which? Any others?
[b] White Christians.

NORC: In this country, do you think any of the people listed here are more likely to be Communists than others? (HAND RESPONDENT CARD)

	11/1950[a]	*6/1953*	*11/1954*
Negroes	14%	11%	10%
Americans of Italian descent	9	8	5
Jews	11	8	6
Puerto Ricans	25	6	26
Americans of Polish descent	7	5	3
New Yorkers	11	5	4
Catholics	2	3	2
Protestants	—[b]	1	1

[a] White Christians.
[b] Less than 0.5%.

NORC/GALLUP: What kinds of people in America are most likely to be Communists? What racial or religious groups are they most likely to be in? (probe one)

6/1954	*% Mentioning*
Irreligious people—those without religious background	12.0%
Negroes	10.1
Jews	4.8
Other religious or ethnic groups; including "foreigners" (often meaning "Un-American")	25.4

NORC: (Hand respondent Card B) In this country, do you think any of the people on this card are more likely than other Americans to be Communists?

10/1964	*% Choosing*
Foreign-born	19.6%
Negroes	14.3
Jews	3.0

Power and Influence

NORC: Do you think there are any racial or religious groups that have too much power in this country? IF "YES": Which ones?

11/1943	*% Mentioning*
Jews	12.4%
Catholics	9.6
Whites	2.4
Negroes	2.0
Protestants	0.7

ROPER: Are there any groups of people you think are trying to get ahead at the expense of people like you? IF "YES": Which ones?

9/1948	*% Mentioning*
Jews	3.8%
Negroes	1.3
White people	0.8
Foreigners	0.5

GALLUP: In this nation, do you think these groups have MORE power than they should really have or LESS power than they should really have . . .

6/1961	*More*	*About Right*	*Less*	*Don't Know*
Negroes	23%	28	34	15
Catholics	17	52	8	23
Jews	16	46	12	26

ROPER: The United States is made up of people who come from all parts of the world and from many different backgrounds. It has been said that certain groups of people tend to go into certain types of occupations more than into others. Here is a list of some of the groups in our population. (Card shown respondent.) I'm going to name some occupations and for each one tell me if you think any of those groups have become overrepresented in it in proportion to their numbers in the population?

12/1974	*White-Anglo-Saxons*	*Italians*	*Mexicans*	*Irish*	*Blacks*	*Jews*	*None/DK*
Medicine	38%	2%	1%	1%	2%	14%	47%
Law	36	3	1	2	3	16	46
Popular music and entertainment	12	8	1	1	41	5	41
Politics	46	5	1	7	5	5	40
Newspapers	39	2	1	2	3	6	53
Television	34	4	1	2	13	9	48
Banking and finance	36	2	—	1	2	22	43
Retailing	20	4	1	1	1	35	44
Farmers	38	4	10	4	2	1	47
Farm labor	9	2	49	1	8	—	37
Police work	31	5	1	18	7	1	48
Big business	39	4	—	1	1	24	38
Sports	14	2	1	2	50	1	38
Teaching	42	2	1	2	6	4	51

GALLUP: Do you think the (Catholics/Protestants/Jews) are trying to get too much power in the U.S. or not?

5/1979	*Yes*	*No*	*Don't Know*
Jews	13%	74%	13%
Catholics	10	79	11
Protestants	5	82	13

ROPER: Of course, the job of running the country is given to the President and Congress. However, there are those who say that other groups in our society also have power and influence over how our country is run. Here is a list of groups and institutions in our society. (Card shown respondent.) First, would you call off the groups on that list that you feel have too much power and influence over our country's policies?

	9/1979	*9/1982*
The blacks	21%	12%
The Jews	12	14
The Catholic Church	10	8
The Eastern establishment	9	10
The Spanish-speaking (Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, Cubans)	9	8
The WASPs (White Anglo-Saxon Protestants)	8	8

YANKELOVICH (Asked of respondents not members of the group in question): Do you think that (READ FIRST GROUP ON LIST) have too much power in the United States? Do you think (——) are trying to push in where they are not wanted? Do you think that on the average (——) have more money than most people, less money or about the same? Do you think of (——) as being more ambitious than other people, less ambitious, or about the same?

2/1981	*Jews*	*Black Americans*	*Italian Americans*	*Japanese Americans*
Too much power	20%	14%	12%	8%
Push where not wanted	16	45	13	15
More money than average	56	4	13	17
More ambitious than most	45	6	15	34

YANKELOVICH (Asked of respondents not members of the group in question): Now I'd like you to look at this card and tell me in which of these areas, if any, (name of group) have too much influence? Just call off the letters.

2/1981 *Areas*	*Jews*	*Black Americans*	*Italian Americans*	*Japanese Americans*
Average all 12	13%	9%	7%	4%
Business	34	4	13	16
Banking	21	2	4	3
Medicine	15	1	3	7
Legal profession	15	2	6	1
Real estate	14	2	6	3
Politics	11	10	11	2
Government in general	11	11	8	3
The movies	11	5	8	2
Newspapers	9	4	5	—[a]
Education	8	8	3	4
Unions	7	8	17	2
Sports	3	50	4	2

[a] Less than ½%.

Voting for President/Vice-President

GALLUP: If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for President and he happened to be a —— would you vote for him?

	7-8/1958[a]	9/1958[b]	12/1959[b]	8/1961	8/1963[c]	7/1965	4/1967[c]	3/1969[c]	10/71[c]	7/1978[d]
Atheist										
Yes	17.9%	18.3%	21.6%							39.3%
No	74.8	76.6	73.8							54.1
DK	7.3	5.1	4.6							6.6
Negro										
Yes	37.3	37.7	48.7	50.5%	47.8%	59.1%	53.0%	67.1%	69.6%	75.8
No	52.7	54.3	46.0	41.0	45.1	34.2	40.9	23.1	23.6	18.4
DK	9.9	7.9	5.4	8.5	7.1	6.7	6.0	9.8	6.9	5.8
Jew										
Yes	62.0	63.4	71.8	68.2	76.9	79.7	81.9	86.9		81.0
No	27.6	29.2	22.1	23.2	16.8	15.2	12.8	7.4		12.5
DK	10.4	7.4	6.1	8.6	6.2	5.0	5.3	5.7		6.4
Catholic										
Yes	68.7	66.9	70.3	82.1	83.6	86.7	90.1	88.6		91.1
No	24.5	26.8	24.8	13.1	13.5	10.4	7.7	6.9		4.6
DK	6.8	6.3	4.9	4.8	2.9	3.0	2.2	4.5		4.4
Baptist	92.2									
Yes	2.5	92.9	94.4				95.4			
No	5.3	3.6	3.5				2.6			
DK		3.5	2.2				1.9			
Quaker										
Yes							78.0			
No							14.8			
DK							7.1			
Mormon										
Yes							75.1			
No							16.8			
DK							8.1			

[a] Between now and 1960, there will be much discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates. If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for President, would you vote for him—if he happened to be a ——.

[b] Between now and 1960, there will be much discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates—the education, age, religion, race, and the like . . .

[c] There's always much discussion . . .

[d] Between now and the time of the convention in 1980 there will be more discussion . . . Black used instead of Negro.

HARRIS: Would you strongly object, object only somewhat, or object only a little to having (READ LIST) as vice-president of the United States for the next four years?

5/1976	*Strongly Object*	*Somewhat Object*	*Object a Little*	*Not Object (Vol.)*	*Not Sure*
Black	13%	6%	6%	72%	3%
Spanish-American	8	5	7	76	4
Jew	9	5	6	76	4
Italian-American	6	6	5	79	4
Polish-American	6	5	6	80	3
Catholic	4	3	5	85	3

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Political Correlates of Television Viewing

GEORGE GERBNER, LARRY GROSS, MICHAEL MORGAN, AND NANCY SIGNORIELLI

THE DECLINING salience of political parties and the concurrent shift to candidate-centered media campaigns and voting patterns have raised fears of growing manipulation and instability in American politics. The mass media have usually been blamed for the apparently increasing "rootlessness" of the electorate and its abandonment of traditional voting patterns. Yet the evidence attributing these shifts to the media has been inconsistent.

A recent review of research on "voter volatility" (Bybee, et al., 1981) concluded that "the volatility literature suggests that the emerging pattern of television as the dominant source of political information has contributed to growing electoral instability" (p. 81). But the authors' own study found no support for the hypothesis. If anything, television viewing was associated with lower rather than higher levels of volatility.

Abstract This study examines relationships between amount of daily television viewing and political self-designations. It is based on the assumption that television's impact on the political front is not limited to news and specifically "political" programming, but that the entire dramatic structure of network television may contribute to viewers' underlying political orientations. The analysis is based on nine independent data bases, yielding a combined N of 14,067 respondents. The findings show that those who watch more television are significantly more likely to call themselves "moderate," and to avoid the labels of "liberal" or "conservative." The implications of the effects of television viewing on the political process are discussed.

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A study of "candidate voting" (Wattenberg, 1982) found that while party salience *is* declining, and television is particularly indifferent to party labels, strong local party organizations can reverse the decline. Research on the role of media in children's political socialization (Conway, et al., 1981) found that children's media use and level of political knowledge contributed more to political behavior than did gender, grade in school, instructional method, or parental media use, but knowledge had a negative relationship to supporting the party system. The authors called for "greater attention to the creative effects of observation and vicarious experience made possible through the news media" (p. 176).

But what kind of attention? Our long-standing project on television's contributions to viewers' conceptions of reality (e.g., Gerbner, et al., 1980a) points to significant gaps in previous research attention to the media's role in the political process. First, the effects of television may be fundamentally different from, if not counter to, those of other media. Unlike other media, television is used relatively nonselectively and in massive doses. Therefore, it has the potential of exposing viewers to stable content configurations that they do not get from other media.

Secondly, the politically significant content of television is not limited to, and may not even primarily reside in, news and public affairs. The "news and public affairs viewer" that most studies of political influence purport to study is a rare breed. Few turn on *only* news and public affairs. Many of those who respond that they "frequently" view news and public affairs are simply heavy viewers of television. Thus whatever they get out of their exposure can also be attributed to dramatic fare, which makes up the bulk of viewing, and which, with its portrayal of crime, courtrooms, and conflict-ridden urban life, may well be a principal contributor to basic political orientations.

Finally, the declining salience of and support for political parties per se does not necessarily mean the disappearance of politically relevant labels. On the contrary, one can frequently observe the characterization of political—and other—personalities as "liberal," "radical," "conservative," and endowed with other designations that carry political meanings.

The theory we are testing and developing is based on these considerations and on the previously reported results of our ongoing research into political orientations (Gerbner, et al., 1982). It postulates relative standardization, homogeneity, and stability as the most pervasive associations with television viewing. It views television as different from other media (although more inclusive of the cultural

mainstream) in that most viewing is an essentially time-governed ritual. For most viewers who watch several hours a day, the different types of program selections make relatively little difference. We also consider television a pervasive cultivator of significant labels and self-designations, and thus a powerful new force on the political scene.

The world portrayed on network television—the mediated world most viewers attend to most often—is fashioned under the imperatives of mass market appeal. Content analyses of television (Gerbner and Gross, 1976; Gerbner, et al., 1978, 1979) and studies of the medium's institutional processes (Barnouw, 1975; Cantor, 1980; Tuchman, 1974) suggest that those imperatives tend to favor the portrayal of conventional, "balanced," middle-of-the-road images and values.

Avoiding extremes has long been television's preferred strategy for survival, as networks and advertisers have come to expect attacks from vocal groups on the right and the left. Faced with such conflicting pressures, the television industry takes the obvious way out—navigating between the extremes, safely in the mainstream, in the comfortable and supposedly nonideological middle ground that holds the largest possible audience.

This suggests that while liberals find television too "conservative," and conservatives find it too "liberal," the truth of the matter probably lies—literally—somewhere in between. But where "in between" does television steer its course? Our analyses (Gerbner, et al., 1982) suggest that television's mainstream runs well to the right of center on political issues and closer to traditional liberal positions on demands for government services to a consumer-oriented economy. At the same time, the official media ideology of balance, objectivity, and moderation leads us to expect that heavy exposure to the relatively homogenized presentations of most television fare should cultivate generally "moderate" self-perceptions among viewers.

Competition for the largest possible audience at least cost means striving for the broadest appeals; the underlying demography, action structure, values, and ideology are stable and long-lasting. In news, "balanced objectivity" means, in practice, that the "moderate" center of the visible political spectrum is portrayed as the normal, nonideological solution to controversial and sensitive issues. In general, divergent or deviant positions are presented as mostly to be shunned or suppressed—their proponents are readily dismissed as extremists who are generally canceled out by their balancing opponents on the other side of the moderate "center."

Our research, called Cultural Indicators, has been mapping the

stable and recurrent features of the world of television and relating them to viewers' conceptions of social reality since 1967. We have consistently found that those who spend more time watching television are more likely to express views, beliefs, and assumptions that are congruent with television's portrayals of life and society. Amount of television viewing has been found to make an independent contribution to a wide range of conceptions of reality within and across relatively homogeneous subgroups. These conceptions include images of violence and mistrust (Gerbner, et al., 1979, 1980a), aging and age roles (Gerbner, Gross, Signorielli, and Morgan, 1980), sex role stereotypes (Signorielli, 1979; Morgan, 1982), racial and sexual minorities (Gross, 1982), science and scientists (Gerbner, et al., 1981a), health-related beliefs and practices (Gerbner, et al., 1981b), and other issues. Some of this work has been critiqued by Hughes (1980) and Hirsch (1980, 1981a, 1981b); for our responses, see Gerbner, et al. (1980b, 1981c, 1981d). (For an extended discussion of some of these points, including independent confirmations, see Hawkins and Pingree, 1982).

We have recently begun to investigate relationships between television viewing and political orientations (Gerbner, et al., 1982). This work, based on four years of the NORC General Social Surveys, suggests that those with greater immersion in the world of television are indeed more likely to present themselves as politically moderate. In this paper, we replicate, extend, and refine that study, using data from the 1982 General Social Survey and four additional data bases, including three large national surveys.

Mainstreaming

Television's associations with outlooks and behaviors need not be unidirectional or of equal intensity across the board. Rather, the patterns depend on the different social, cultural, and political contexts in which people live. In many cases, television seems to diminish or override the influence of these other social forces. This is what we call "mainstreaming:" a convergence of conceptions and attitudes held by the heavy viewers of different groups who share little besides television. If the television mainstream can be thought of as the aggregate common patterns of images and values that pervade television, then mainstreaming is the expression of that shared consciousness by heavy viewers in those groups whose light viewers hold divergent views. Mainstreaming thus reflects a specific kind of systematic interaction between television and background factors, one

which generally results in a narrowing of differences among subgroups.

The key to the notion of mainstreaming rests on the fact that relatively lighter viewers in different groups do *not* share common perspectives. While those who watch more television are more likely to perceive the world as it is presented on television, the beliefs of those who watch *less* television are more diversified and are more affected by other social and cultural influences. In other words, while television may cultivate notion Y among groups whose light viewers are more likely to believe X, it may *also* cultivate Y among groups whose light viewers are more likely to believe Z.

We are not suggesting that television content can or need be directly traced to a specific issue or phenomenon in order to study the possibility of political mainstreaming. Rather, we are asking whether the correlates of heavy viewing include the tendency to see the political world in a manner generally consistent with television's repetitive conventional portrayals.

It should be stressed that our use of the term "correlates" in this discussion has deliberate implications. First and foremost, our data are from cross-sectional surveys, thereby preventing the possibility of drawing conclusions about temporal causality, as in before-and-after experiments. But perhaps more fundamentally, we wish to avoid the classic concern with "causality" as a unidirectional and unidimensional notion. (In strict time-order terms, television is the factor which "comes first," since children are now born into a television environment and begin to watch well before they can read or even speak—and certainly well before they adopt political labels.) The critical question is whether television's associations with these labels are independent of other factors which are plausible sources of spuriousness. We believe that both television viewing and political self-designation occur within a dynamic, ongoing system. Heavy viewing is an integral aspect of certain styles of life, characterized by specific ways of looking at the world. Ritualistic exposure to television's repetitive fare can be expected to sustain, nourish, confirm, and strengthen—i.e., cultivate—these orientations, perspectives, and behaviors.

In sum, we are arguing that heavy television viewers should be more likely to approach the political world in more homogeneous and conventional terms than light viewers living under similar conditions. If these assumptions are valid, then we should be able to find systematic relationships between amount of television viewing and the tendency to designate oneself as "moderate," just as we have found

such relationships between television viewing and other relatively homogeneous, mainstream perceptions of the world (Gerbner, et al., 1980a).

Methods

SAMPLES OF RESPONDENTS

The following analyses are based on nine separate data bases, representing 14,067 respondents (unweighted). These are all the datasets in our archives which contain appropriate questions on both television viewing and political self-designations. Five of these are the National Opinion Research Center's General Social Surveys (NORC/GSS) for the years which included a question on amount of television viewing (1975, 1977, 1978, 1980, and 1982). About 1,500 respondents took part in hour-long personal interviews each year (between February and April), for a combined *N* of 7,526. The 1975 sample was drawn through a combination of block quotas and probability sampling; the other four years are full probability.

Three of the other datasets are also large national surveys. One was conducted for the Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company by Research and Forecasts, Inc., between September and November, 1980. This sample consists of 1,610 respondents selected through random-digit-dialing procedures, representative of Americans aged 14 and older, and an oversample of 408 teenagers, older people, and blacks. The general public and the oversampled responses were weighted to match census figures (on age, ethnic origin, gender, education, and family income) to produce a weighted *N* of 1,610.

Another was conducted by The Roper Organization for Virginia Slims, Inc., in October 1979. This sample represents a multistage stratified probability design at the block level with quotas for sex; personal interviews were carried out in respondents' homes with 2,960 women and 984 men aged 18 and over.

Another national personal interview survey was conducted in 1979. This survey, with 1,635 respondents, was concerned with public attitudes toward science and technology (see Miller, et al., 1980; Miller and Prewitt, 1983).

Finally, for variety, we include data from a small sample of adolescents (eighth graders) from rural Minnesota. Self-administered questionnaires were filled out in class by 294 students, in groups of about 20–25 at a time, under teacher supervision. The data were collected in November 1981.

MEASURES

The independent variable in this research is average amount of daily television exposure, taken from responses to survey questions. Question wordings and response categories varied somewhat among the nine data bases analyzed here, and we made adjustments to increase comparability across samples. For example, the NORC/GSS television question deals with hours on an average day. The Virginia Slims question is coded in minutes, so we divided responses by 60; the Science and Technology question deals with hours in an average week, so we divided responses by seven. More important, this measure is not interpreted as providing absolutely accurate reports of actual number of viewing hours, but is used to differentiate viewers with relatively more or less exposure to the world of television.

When not used as a continuous variable, amount of average daily viewing was trichotomized to allow the comparison of relatively light, medium, and heavy viewers. The divisions were made at the points which provided the closest approximation of an even three-way split within each survey. In general, this translated to one hour or less (light viewers), two or three hours (medium viewers), and four hours or more (heavy viewers).

The dependent variable is political self-designation, along the liberal-moderate-conservative dimension. We are assuming that these labels are salient and meaningful to respondents, owing in part to the generally accepted and frequent use of the terms.

Items measuring political self-designation also varied across surveys. Respondents in the NORC/GSS and Science and Technology surveys were asked to place themselves on a seven-point political scale (with "political" emphasized), ranging from "extremely liberal" to "extremely conservative." The Virginia Slims question specifically asked respondents about their general outlooks, "politically and socially," placed on a five-point scale. The Connecticut Mutual survey simply asked whether respondents were liberal, moderate, or conservative on most political matters, and a five-point scale was used with adolescents. Except for the Connecticut Mutual survey (which used only three response categories), we recoded respondents as simply either liberal, moderate, or conservative.

Table 1 presents the mean amount of viewing and the percentage in each political self-designation category across samples. These variables are relatively stable across time and surveys, but there are some interesting variations. Across the five NORC/GSS samples, amount of viewing shows no linear trend, but significant deviations from linearity ($p<.01$); mean viewing levels declined from 1975 to 1978 and have

Table 1. Amount of Viewing and Political Self-Designation by Sample

	TV Viewing		*% Who Are*		
Sample (N)	*Mean*	*s.d.*	*Liberal*	*Moderate*	*Conservative*
NORC/GSS					
1975 (1,490)	3.05	2.12	30.1%	40.0%	29.9%
1977 (1,530)	2.93	2.18	28.9	38.8	32.3
1978 (1,532)	2.79	2.16	28.2	38.3	33.5
1980 (1,468)	2.93	2.22	25.5	40.7	33.7
1982 (1,506)	2.98	2.29	26.9	40.8	32.3
Science and Technology (1,635)	2.73	2.41	25.6	38.2	33.6
Virginia Slims (3,944)	2.59	1.86	22.4	34.4	43.2
Connecticut Mutual (1,610)	3.18	1.79	23.5	45.9	30.7
Minnesota Adolescents (294)	4.26	2.08	13.9	65.7	20.4

increased since. The percentage who call themselves moderate has been particularly stable in the NORC/GSS surveys, varying between 38.3 percent and 40.8 percent; neither linear nor nonlinear trends are significant. There is a significant negative linear trend in the percentage who call themselves liberal ($p<.01$), even though this proportion increased a bit in 1982. The percentage of conservatives steadily increased from 1975 to 1980 but declined slightly in 1982; neither linear nor nonlinear trends are significant.

Connecticut Mutual respondents and, not surprisingly, the Minnesota Adolescents, report higher amounts of viewing. Virginia Slims respondents were more likely to say they are conservative, perhaps because the question emphasized "political and social" outlooks. Connecticut Mutual respondents were more likely than others to say they are moderate, perhaps because only three response categories were used. Finally, it is interesting to note the rather high proportion of adolescents (65.7 percent) who chose the moderate label, even with a five-point scale.

CONTROLS

Ten basic controls were used in the analysis: sex, age, education, income, occupational prestige, area of residence (urban/nonurban), race (white/nonwhite), frequency of church attendance, union membership, and political party affiliation. No other factors which appear in most of the surveys seemed relevant. These background demographics also varied in wording and response categories across surveys. As a result, different cutoff points had to be used for subgroup analyses in different surveys, particularly for such variables as income and area of residence. Every attempt was made to match

categories as closely as possible, and we feel they are sufficiently similar to allow meaningful comparisons.

The availability of these measures also differed among samples. All 10 appear in the Connecticut Mutual and NORC/GSS surveys (except for union membership in the 1977 and 1982 GSS). Church attendance is missing in both the Virginia Slims and Science surveys, and the latter has no measure of party affiliation. For Minnesota adolescents, we used only sex, age, and the education and occupational status of the respondent's father. Altogether, we were able to analyze 198 distinct but overlapping subgroups (including overall comparisons).

Results

Overall, there is a consistent tendency for those who watch more television to call themselves "moderate." Table 2 shows the percentage of light viewers in each political self-designation category and the percentage spread between them and the heavy viewers in that category. (Medium viewers are omitted for purposes of space.) This difference is referred to as the cultivation differential, or CD. For example, the top row of Table 2 shows that in the 1975 GSS, 32 percent of the light viewers said they were "moderate"; since the CD = +12, we see that 44 percent of the heavy viewers said they were "moderate." In all nine surveys, heavy viewers are more likely than light viewers to choose the "moderate" self-designation, and the re-

Table 2. Simple Relationships Between Amount of Television Viewing and Political Self-Designation

	% Who Say They Are								
	Liberal			*Moderate*			*Conservative*		
	%L	*CD*	*Gamma*	*%L*	*CD*	*Gamma*	*%L*	*CD*	*Gamma*
NORC/GSS									
1975	30	+3	.05	32	+12	.15*	39	−16	−.22*
1977	31	−4	−.06	36	+7	.09*	33	−3	−.04
1978	33	−6	−.10*	30	+15	.20*	37	−9	−.12*
1980	28	−3	−.05	35	+11	.14*	38	−9	−.11*
1982	26	+1	.03	37	+5	.05	37	−6	−.08*
Sci. and Tech.	29	−6	−.11*	33	+12	.16*	38	−5	−.08
VA Slims	25	−3	−.06*	32	+4	.06*	44	−1	−.01
Conn. Mut.	28	−4	−.03	40	+7	.07*	32	−3	−.05
Minn. Ad.	21	−9	−.19	57	+14	.20*	22	−5	−.13

NOTE: %L = % light viewers in category. CD = Cultivation Differential: % heavy viewers in category minus % light viewers in category.

* $p < .05$.

lationship is significant in all but the 1982 GSS.[1] While there are variations across samples and years, the simple association appears in these nine independent samples.

It is worth noting at this point that the tendency for heavy viewers to call themselves moderate seems to be a specific correlate of television, and not of general media use. These surveys include various questions on newspaper reading, radio listening, and so on. As can be seen in Table 3, other media variables relate to political self-designation in strikingly different ways than does television. In par-

Table 3. Simple Relationships Between Political Self-Designation and Use of Other Media

	% Who Say They Are								
	Liberal			*Moderate*			*Conservative*		
	%L	*Diff*	*Gamma*	*%L*	*Diff*	*Gamma*	*%L*	*Diff*	*Gamma*
NORC/GSS									
Newspaper									
1975	34	−6	−.12*	40	0	.01	26	+5	.11*
1977	31	−3	−.06	40	−3	−.08	29	+6	.14*
1978	31	−5	−.12*	40	−1	.02	30	+5	.09*
1982	30	−6	−.12*	41	−1	−.01	29	+6	13*
Radio									
1978	26	+5	.09*	38	0	−.00	36	−6	−.09*
1982	26	+2	.04	39	+4	.05	35	−6	−.09*
Science									
Newspapers	24	+1	.01	42	−6	−.09	35	+3	.09
Radio	20	+8	.14*	42	−6	−.08	38	−3	−.04
VA Slims									
"Reading"	20	+5	.10*	36	−5	−.08*	43	0	.00
Conn. Mutual									
Newspapers	26	−5	−.10*	46	0	.00	29	+3	.09
Minn. Ad.									
Movies	13	+3	.12	64	+3	.06	27	−6	−15
Books	10	+7	.29*	72	−11	−.26*	20	+8	.21
Radio	11	+5	.24	66	+2	.06	27	−8	−.22
Newspapers	14	+3	.10	68	−5	−.08	21	+3	.06

NOTE: For Adult Samples:

Radio: low = 0,1 hours; medium = 2,3 hours; high 4 hours or more.

Newspaper: low = under once a week; medium = a few times a week; high = every day.

For Virginia Slims, "Reading" = time spent reading books, magazines, and newspapers (single question).

For Adolescent Sample: All dichotomizations (median split).

%L = % in "Low Use" Group in Category.

Diff = Spread between % in "Low" and "High" Use Groups.

* $p < .05$.

[1] Preliminary analysis of the 1983 GSS, in which the political self-designation question was addressed to half the sample, shows a resumption of the pattern seen in all previous years: heavy viewers are somewhat less likely to describe themselves as liberal and much less likely to describe themselves as conservative.

ticular, relationships with the "moderate" category are negative or zero; there are three weak positive associations, but *none* is significant. Since heavy users of either of these media show no greater tendency to perceive themselves as moderate, we can conclude that the observed relationship between television viewing and self-designation is not a general media use phenomenon, but a pattern unique to television.

In general, heavy newspaper readers are more likely to say they are conservative, while heavy radio listeners tend to say they are liberal. In any case, these data strengthen our contention that television is fundamentally different from other media.

How does the relationship between television viewing and political self-designation vary among subgroups? Which groups tend to show the basic pattern and which tend to deviate? Table 4 presents aggregate results for each subgroup, *averaged* across the nine surveys (or across as many surveys as include a given control variable), and

Table 4. Average Within-Group Relationships Between Television Viewing and Political Self-Designations (Weighted by Sample Size)

	% Who Say They Are								
	Liberal			*Moderate*			*Conservative*		
	%L	*CD*	*Gamma*	*%L*	*CD*	*Gamma*	*%L*	*CD*	*Gamma*
Overall	29	−3	−.06	35	+10	.12	37	−6	−.09
Male	30	−2	−.03	32	+9	.12	39	−7	−.10
Female	27	−4	−.06	38	+9	.11	36	−5	−.08
Young	40	−5	−.07	32	+9	.13	28	−4	−.06
Middle	27	−4	−.06	34	+10	.14	39	−7	−.10
Old	18	0	.02	38	+7	.10	43	−8	−.11
Lo Educ.	23	+1	.02	39	+7	.09	38	−7	−.10
Hi Educ.	38	−4	−.08	33	+8	.11	35	−5	−.03
Lo Income	29	−4	−.05	35	+8	.11	36	−5	−.06
Md Income	28	−2	−.04	35	+11	.14	37	−9	−.12
Hi Income	31	−4	−.08	32	+10	.12	37	−6	−.06
Lo Occup.	27	−2	−.03	37	+8	.10	36	−6	−.09
Md Occup.	30	−7	−.10	36	+10	.12	35	−4	−.05
Hi Occup.	29	−2	−.02	31	+9	.11	40	−8	−.10
White	28	−5	−.09	34	+11	.14	38	−5	−.07
Nonwhite	35	+4	.05	33	+5	.08	32	−9	−.14
Urban	35	−5	−.08	33	+7	.10	32	−3	−.04
Nonurban	24	−2	−.03	35	+11	.15	41	−9	−.13
Union	30	−2	−.01	35	+11	.13	35	−9	−.15
Nonunion	29	−4	−.07	33	+10	.13	38	−6	−.08
Democrat	37	−6	−.07	37	+6	.07	27	+1	.00
Independent	32	−7	−.10	36	+9	.12	32	−3	−.05
Republican	14	+5	.12	30	+11	.15	57	−16	−.19
Lo Attend.	36	−8	−.10	36	+9	.10	28	−1	−.02
Hi Attend.	23	+2	.04	34	+10	.13	44	−13	−.17

NOTE: *%L* = % light viewers in category. CD = Cultivational Differential: % heavy viewers in category minus % light viewers in category.

weighted by the number of cases in each sample to adjust for the wide range of sample *N*'s.

The relationship between amount of viewing and the tendency to choose the moderate self-designation (middle columns of Table 4) reveals very few differences worth noting. In all 24 subgroups, on the average, heavy viewers are more likely to say they are moderate. The association is weakest among nonwhites and Democrats. But all of the other average CD's are between +7 and +11, with gammas ranging from .09 to .15—again, the across-group variations in this pattern are not particularly pronounced.

The data for the percentage of conservatives also reveal a highly consistent pattern across subgroups. All coefficients are negative except among Democrats, and the average relationship is particularly strong among Republicans and high church attenders (the two groups in which light viewers are most likely to be conservative). Thus, these variations illustrate the notion of mainstreaming as a convergence among heavy viewers of counterpart subgroups.

Relationships in the liberal column, on the other hand, are smaller and less consistent. While most of the average within-group associations are negative, in four subgroups (those with less education, nonwhites, Republicans, and high church attenders) heavy viewers are slightly *more* likely to be liberal. Except for the case of nonwhites, those three positive associations also reflect a convergence among heavy viewers. The groups whose light viewers are most likely to be liberal show negative associations, while the groups whose light viewers are least likely to be liberal are the ones showing positive associations. For example, there is a spread of about 23 points between light viewing Democrats and Republicans in the tendency to choose the liberal label; this is reduced by about half, to 12 points, between heavy viewing Democrats and Republicans. Similar patterns hold in terms of age, education, and church attendance, but this paradigm clearly does *not* fit the differences between whites and nonwhites.

In sum, across all major subgroups in each of the nine samples, heavy viewers are consistently more likely to present themselves as moderate. They are also generally less likely to say they are either liberal or conservative, although the relationships between amount of viewing and the percentage of liberals tend to be weaker and show more exceptions.

The tendency for heavy viewers to choose the moderate label holds up under more stringent controls. We analyzed partial correlations between amount of viewing and the tendency to choose each of the three political self-designations under single and multiple simulta-

neous controls within every available subgroup in each of the nine surveys. This yields 1,628 first-order partials and 198 nth-order partials for each political self-designation category.

Table 5 summarizes the results. The table shows how many partial relationships between television viewing and each political self-designation category are positive or negative and how many of these are significant.

The most important finding is the paucity of negative relationships in the "moderate" column. About 80 percent of the correlations are positive under either single or simultaneous controls. Of these, about half of the first-order partials and about 40 percent of the nth-order partials are significant—far more than could be attributed to chance. In contrast, *none* of the negative correlations between amount of viewing and the tendency to choose the moderate label are significant under simultaneous controls. Thus, with considerable consistency, heavy television viewers are more likely to say they are moderate. Strictly speaking, of course, the within-sample tests are not independent since respondents belong to more than one subgroup, but the stability of the basic pattern under controls is impressive.

This again shows that the tendency for heavy viewers to see them-

Table 5. Summary of Within-Group Partial Correlations Between Amount of Viewing and Political Self-Designation

	Partials Between Amount of Viewing and % Who Are:		
	Liberal	*Moderate*	*Conservative*
First-Order Partials			
Positive	43.2%	84.2%	17.9%
(*N*)	(703)	(1371)	(291)
% Sig.	15.6	49.7	5.8
(*N*)	(110)	(682)	(17)
Negative	56.8	15.8	82.1
(*N*)	(925)	(257)	(1337)
% Sig.	23.1	1.2	47.3
(*N*)	(214)	(3)	(632)
Nth Order Partials			
Positive	38.4%	78.3%	30.3%
(*N*)	(76)	(155)	(60)
% Sig.	5.3	39.4	13.3
(*N*)	(4)	(61)	(8)
Negative	61.6	21.7	69.7
(*N*)	(122)	(43)	(138)
% Sig.	21.3	0	34.8
(*N*)	(26)	(0)	(48)

NOTE: First-order columns each based on 1,628 correlations, representing all possible first-order partials within all available subgroups in each sample.

Nth-order columns each based on 198 correlations, representing simultaneous implementation of all available controls within all available subgroups in each sample.

selves as moderate generally reflects a narrowing on both ends of the political spectrum. The majority of relationships between viewing and choosing either the liberal or the conservative label are negative. (Multiple controls increase the percentage of negative associations in the liberal column but decrease the percentage in the conservative column.) Compared to the positive correlations in the moderate column, these negative relationships are less likely to be significant. Still, the trend is clear: heavy viewers are generally less likely to choose either the liberal *or* the conservative label. Moreover, relatively few of the positive associations between viewing and choosing either the liberal or conservative labels are significant.

These findings reflect aggregate patterns across all nine surveys. There are, however, some important variations among the samples. Table 6 summarizes the nth-order simultaneous partials between

Table 6. Nth-Order Within-Group Partial Correlations by Sample (Multiple Simultaneous Controls)

		Relationships Between Amount of Viewing and % Who Are:					
		Liberals		*Moderates*		*Conservatives*	
	(N)	*Pos.*	*Neg.*	*Pos.*	*Neg.*	*Pos.*	*Neg.*
NORC/GSS							
1975							
Total	(25)	12	13	20	5	2	23
Sig.		2	1	10	0	0	11
1977							
Total	(23)	2	21	16	7	16	7
Sig.		0	5	2	0	5	0
1978							
Total	(25)	1	24	23	2	8	17
Sig.		0	13	17	0	0	5
1980							
Total	(25)	12	13	25	0	8	17
Sig.		0	3	9	0	0	5
1982							
Total	(23)	10	13	3	20	20	3
Sig.		0	1	0	0	3	0
Science							
Total	(20)	8	12	18	2	3	17
Sig.		1	0	7	0	0	9
VA Slims							
Total	(23)	18	5	21	2	2	21
Sig.		1	0	8	0	0	8
Conn.							
Total	(25)	7	18	20	5	7	18
Sig.		0	3	7	0	0	6
Minn.							
Total	(9)	6	3	9	0	1	8
Sig.		0	0	1	0	0	0

amount of viewing and political self-designation for each survey. Within each sample, the bulk of relationships in the moderate column are positive, with one striking exception: the 1982 GSS. In this, the most recent survey in this study, 20 out of 23 partial associations between viewing and choosing the moderate label are *negative*, and the same number of relationships in the conservative column are *positive*.

A somewhat similar pattern occurs in the 1977 GSS, but only in the conservative column. Relationships between television viewing and the tendency to choose the liberal label also vary over time and across surveys. But the 1982 relationships are the clearest and most drastic exception to the general rule. Although none of the 1982 negative associations between viewing and choosing the moderate label is significant, these data reflect a complete reversal of the trends found in all other datasets. It is certainly too early to determine whether this signals a real shift in the pattern observed between 1975 and 1980 (all our other adult samples fall between these dates), or a temporary fluctuation which will disappear in subsequent years. In any case, heavy viewers in 1982 are generally more likely to call themselves conservative.

Conclusion

The amount of time people spend watching television relates systematically and consistently to how they position themselves along the liberal-moderate-conservative political continuum. These data show that heavy viewers are more likely to present (and presumably, perceive) themselves as "moderate, middle-of-the-road."

This conclusion must be tempered somewhat by the results in the 1982 GSS, where we find an almost complete reversal from the otherwise consistent pattern of self-proclaimed moderation. It is possible that these data merely reflect random fluctuations and that subsequent surveys will replicate the dominant patterns. As we noted in footnote 1, the 1983 GSS data show the previous pattern of heavy viewers describing themselves as moderate, thus supporting the possibility that 1982 was a temporary fluctuation rather than a shift in the political climate.

In any case, our primary finding does not seem to be spurious, at least in terms of the demographic subgroups we considered. The question of the *direction* of any causal association between television viewing and political self-designation would be moot if the relationship were to be explained by any of these variables. Of course, radical leftists and ultra-conservatives probably do not watch much television, and no one would argue that their light viewing "causes" their

political outlooks. But this does not explain or negate our interpretation of these data, unless the approximately three-fifths of the adult population that call themselves liberal or conservative can be considered particularly "extreme."

The notion that heavy viewing is merely symptomatic of some set of "moderate" predispositions cannot, of course, be ruled out on the basis of cross-sectional data, but it seems far-fetched. In fact, that explanation cannot easily account for the exceptions found in the 1982 GSS, unless one argues that suddenly conservatives are watching more television. Whether we are seeing the effects of political transformations or subtle changes in television content—or both—we prefer to conclude that television is part and parcel of these constellations which it helps to maintain.

Except for the 1982 data, these findings may be part of a more general phenomenon: the cultivation of homogeneous, "average" self-perceptions. Ongoing analyses (Gerbner, et al., 1982) reveal that people whose objective social class is low and who watch more television are more likely to call themselves "middle class"; among high SES respondents, however, heavy viewers are more likely than light viewers to call themselves "working class." In addition, heavy viewers are more likely to say they have "average" incomes, particularly as real income increases. Again, these patterns may be traced to general program policies or conventions and they may stem from long-term, cumulative exposure to shared, common imagery among large and otherwise heterogeneous publics.

In general, television cultivates "moderate" self-designations and a convergence upon the political mainstream. But that does not necessarily mean that television is a force for genuine moderation. Again, the actual positions on issues taken by heavy viewers under these labels (Gerbner, et al., 1982) does not fit the image of political centrality or moderation. Viewing seems to blur traditional differences and to blend them into a relatively homogeneous mainstream that is less volatile in terms of extremes and openness to alternatives. It is typically perceived as "moderate"; whether that conception is shifting and the label "conservative" is becoming a more acceptable label for the mainstream, possibly replacing "moderate," we do not yet know. But we know from previously reported data that the mainstream bends to the right on issues dealing with minorities and personal rights, reflects the anxieties and mistrust of television's violent "mean world," and tilts to expansive populism on some welfare economic issues. A volatility of substantive orientations may hide behind the relatively stable and bland political label that television tends to cultivate.

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Politics from the Pulpit: Religiosity and the 1980 Elections

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THE CONSTITUTIONAL doctrine of separation between church and state is deeply ingrained in U.S. political culture. Religion in the U.S., compared to other democratic countries, generally has been a weak political cleavage (Rose, 1974). When voting for political candidates, Americans usually have felt that they should rely on their individual judgment rather than on religious group obligation (Lenski, 1963; Patel, et al., 1982).

Despite widespread popular acceptance of the principle of separation between religion and politics, empirical evidence demonstrates that religion has played a major role in some elections. In 1960, for example, the two major parties nominated presidential candidates on opposing sides of the Catholic-Protestant cleavage. Although both candidates publicly sought to minimize the visibility of their church affiliations, religious denomination still had an important effect on the outcome of the 1960 election (Converse, 1966). Since 1960, however, the Protestant-Catholic religious cleavage has declined (Wattenberg and Miller, 1981:359), along with a corresponding reduction in the

Abstract The extent to which fundamentalist religious beliefs influence political attitudes and behavior among whites is explored using data from the University of Michigan 1980 National Election Study. The analysis reveals that strong fundamentalists are particularly conservative and hold distinct attitudes on various issues of public concern, especially those dealing with questions of morality and lifestyle. New Christian right supporters also participated at a higher rate in the 1980 election and voted more heavily for Republican candidates. Contrary to earlier studies, our findings show that conservative religious groups played a noteworthy role in the defeat of Democratic congressional candidates in 1980. The study suggests that the new Christian right may have a greater impact on the outcome of low turnout contests such as congressional elections than on presidential elections.

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correlation between religious preference (Protestant, Catholic, or Jew) and the vote (Miller, et al. 1980:345).

The recent emergence of evangelical groups such as the Moral Majority, however, raises the possibility of renewed religious influence in the political arena. While these groups are unlikely to restore the historic polarization between Protestants and Catholics, they do represent the potential development of a new religious cleavage—one that cuts across traditional denominations, dividing the electorate according to individual religiosity, i.e., the extent of fundamentalism in one's religious beliefs.

The leaders of the new evangelical groups have appealed to members of all religions to vote for candidates who they feel stand for a return to traditional moral values in American life. Following the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, the Republican capture of a majority of Senate seats, and significant gains for the Republicans in the House, new Christian right groups claimed considerable credit for these conservative victories and for subsequently altering the direction of governmental policy.

Their opponents argued that the Moral Majority and other conservative Christian groups had little impact on the 1980 election (see, for example, Lipset and Raab, 1981). Some have displayed their assessment of both the impact and size of the Moral Majority in the bumper sticker which reads, "The Moral Majority is Neither"—that is, the new Christian right is a limited, narrowly based group which has little possibility of expanding either its membership or its political influence. Disputing the implications of the bumper sticker, Richard Viguerie (1981) contends that conservative organizations are growing rapidly and will increase their membership four- to fivefold by 1984.

This paper assesses the extent of public support for evangelical religions and the degree to which such religious orientations influence political attitudes and behaviors. National survey data are used to examine the impact of evangelical religious group identification on individual electoral choices.[1] We measure attachment to these groups not on the basis of official group membership, but in terms of three criteria: positive affect toward the group, a feeling of closeness to the group expressed as a cognitive awareness of shared interests, and

[1] The data used throughout this report are from the University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies national election survey of the 1980 elections. The National Election Study of 1980 was made possible by a long-term grant from the National Science Foundation. The data were gathered through pre- and postelection interviews with 1,614 individuals selected through a multistage probability sampling procedure. The exact wording for each of the survey questions used in the analysis can be found in the 1980 codebook distributed by the University of Michigan Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.

similarity of religious beliefs. These three criteria will be employed to form an index of religiosity which categorizes survey respondents according to the strength of their fundamentalist attachment.

After measuring the extent of fundamentalism we examine its demographic correlates. Next, we investigate the association of fundamentalist identification with policy preferences and liberal-conservative political ideology to determine if religious orientation has come to influence public opinion on issues—many of which go well beyond the realm of values and morals. Finally, we explore the impact of fundamentalist identification on the vote choice and political participation in the 1980 election.

Religious Beliefs and Identification in America: A Theoretical Framework

The relative importance of religion as a factor influencing elections depends upon a process of political translation by which religious interests are connected with political objects and choices. This translation process is heavily dependent upon the initiatives of religious group leaders to propagate certain standards of expected behavior for group members. Even in the absence of explicitly communicated expectations by group leaders, group interests can become connected with electoral choices if the candidates personify group differences, as they did in 1960. Clearly, the politicization of religious beliefs is a group-related phenomenon.

The process by which religious beliefs and identification with groups such as the new Christian right become translated into political action can be more broadly understood, therefore, through reference to the general theoretical framework of social categorization (Tajfel, 1981). The major components of a conscious identification with a group specified by this theory consist of a positive sense of affect toward the ingroup, shared interests, and a feeling of belonging to a group which one perceives as distinct from other groups.

In addition, recent work on social categorization has differentiated between group identification and politicized group consciousness (Jackman and Jackman, 1973; Gurin, et al., 1980). Beyond merely identifying with a group, the notion of group consciousness involves a *political* awareness of the group's distinctiveness, the belief that the group has legitimate grievances regarding areas of vital interest, and a willingness to engage in politics as a means of attaining the group's aims. As a concept, therefore, group consciousness provides an explanation for the way in which group identification becomes linked with the world of politics. Moreover, it directs our attention to the

fact that when group identification is politicized, it can result in a commitment to collective action aimed at realizing the group's interests (Miller, et al., 1981).

Although the new Christian right groups do not form a single organized collectivity, the literature on social categorization suggests that they potentially may act as a cohesive group out of a common identification and shared interests. Through the use of television, conservative preachers such as Jerry Falwell have been able to make appeals to a wide audience. If their viewers come to identify positively with the religious right and to perceive that they share beliefs and interests in common, then the seeds are sown for the potential mobilization of these people on the basis of their common religious identification.

The Distribution of Religious Beliefs in the Population

In the fall of 1980, evangelical groups such as the Moral Majority received relatively unfavorable ratings from the American public. Using a "feeling thermometer" ranging from zero degrees as the most unfavorable rating to 100 degrees as the most favorable score, the Moral Majority was rated 45 degrees on the average, as compared with an average of 67 for all 22 categorical groups included in the survey. Even "people on welfare" were rated higher (mean rating of 52) than the Moral Majority. Only "radical students" and "black militants" received lower average ratings than did the Moral Majority (attaining mean ratings of 30 and 29 degrees, respectively).

The limited appeal of conservative religious groups active in politics is also strikingly evident from data on the proportion of respondents who "felt close" to the Moral Majority. Only 6 percent of the survey respondents said they felt particularly close to the group in terms of shared ideas and interests. In fact, of all the groups asked about in the survey, evangelical groups received the lowest level of endorsement. Other groups were considerably higher by comparison, for example, 65, 41, and 26 percent felt close to middle-class, poor people, and conservatives, respectively. Evidently, very few people in 1980 felt either a positive affective tie or a cognitive affinity with the politically active elements of the Christian right.

Of course, it could be argued that many more people than indicated by ratings of the Moral Majority share the religious beliefs espoused by the new Christian right, but that their beliefs have not yet been fully politicized. In other words, they express the same belief in the Bible and feel that religion is a very important part of their life, but for one reason or another they do not translate these values into political

attitudes or actions. Although no active connection between religious orientation and politics has yet occurred for these respondents, such a translation process is quite possible by virtue of these shared religious values. Clearly, this possibility holds considerable potential for the religious right. A substantially larger segment of the public currently shares the religious beliefs of the Christian right than shares its *political* commitment. Three out of every four Americans indicated that religion played an important part in their lives and nearly half felt that the Bible is God's word, but less than one-third felt positively about activist evangelical groups like the Moral Majority (see Table 1).

It is also evident from Table 1 that blacks tend to be more fundamentalist in their religious orientation than whites. Nevertheless, fundamentalist blacks are significantly more liberal in their political preferences than are white fundamentalists, presumably because their racial identification moves them in that ideological direction. Combining whites and blacks in the same analysis would therefore confound the results. On the basis of Table 1, and other evidence, we have chosen to present data in the remainder of this report for whites only so as to remove the confounding effects of race.[2]

Although Table 1 demonstrates that fundamentalist religious beliefs are more pervasive than support for politicized groups like the Moral Majority, it does not necessarily follow that these beliefs form the basis for potential political mobilization. Indeed, support for fundamentalist beliefs and for the politicized religious groups may be two very separate phenomena. Those individuals who are strongest in their fundamentalist beliefs may be distinct from those who can be mobilized to act politically on the basis of their beliefs. The possibility

Table 1. Percentage Agreeing with Items Indicating Fundamentalist Religious Orientation for Total and by Race

	Total	*White*	*Black*
Religion an important part of one's life	75	73	92
The Bible is God's word and all it says is true	45	44	64
Religion provides a *great deal* of everyday guidance	35	28	46
Positive affect toward evangelical groups such as the Moral Majority	32	30	45
Born again	26	21	41
Feel close to evangelical groups active in politics such as the Moral Majority	6	6	7

[2] Unfortunately, the limited sample size of the 1980 survey provides too few blacks for an accurate analysis of blacks separately. With some of the variables of analytic importance, after missing data are taken into account, as few as 50 black respondents remain for analysis purposes. While it would be interesting to undertake a comparable investigation with blacks alone, this is not possible given the data limitations.

for political mobilization would be evident, however, if support for the Moral Majority and religious beliefs were positively intercorrelated.

In fact the data do reveal significant correlations among the six items of Table 1 (see Table 2). Moreover, a factor analysis of the six measures suggests a unidimensional structure underlying the responses to the items. Although the skewed distribution of the Moral Majority questions could be expected to reduce the correlations of these two items with the other beliefs, the items all load firmly on the same factor. The substantive implication of this unidimensional structure is that support for politically involved religious groups like the Moral Majority is not indicative of a separate political dimension; rather, it reflects a politicized *extension* of religious beliefs.

Methodologically, the factor analysis results allow us to construct a fundamentalism scale combining all six items. The scale as formed runs from least to most fundamentalist in religious orientation as determined by the number of survey items with which the respondent was in agreement.[3] Those who agreed with all six items (4 percent of all whites) were the most "politicized" fundamentalists while those agreeing with none of the questions (21 percent of whites) were the most secular.[4] Such a scale allows us to explore both religious fundamentalism's impact in the 1980 election and the characteristics and behavior of the most politicized supporters of the Moral Majority.

Table 2. Interitem Correlations and Factor Loadings for Religiosity Questions, Whites Only

	Correlations					*Factor*
Item	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*Loading*
1. Thermometer rating of Moral Majority	—					.51
2. Feel close to Moral Majority	.39	—				.49
3. Religion important in life	.27	.18	—			.63
4. Religion provides daily guidance	.28	.30	.57	—		.73
5. Born again	.31	.33	.34	.46	—	.56
6. Bible is God's word	.30	.22	.38	.35	.30	.52

[3] A Guttman scale program was used to construct this measure of fundamentalism. A maximum of two errors and two pieces of missing data were allowed. The coefficient of reproducibility was more than satisfactory at .925.

[4] The distribution of fundamentalist beliefs as indicated by the index is very similar to that found with a comparable scale in a study conducted by the Roper Organization in the summer of 1981. The Roper scale found 5 percent strong fundamentalists and 25 percent secular, thus indirectly validating the CPS data. Moreover, the Roper study showed that strong fundamentalists were more likely than secular respondents to approve of the active involvement of religious groups in politics, thereby adding support to our interpretation that the strongest fundamentalists were the most politicized.

The Demographics of Religiosity

While the most highly politicized supporters of the new Christian right comprised only 4 percent of white adults in 1980 (see total in Table 3), their potential for growth by mobilizing others who share their religious beliefs is evident and worthy of serious consideration. Given that they are such a small group, however, it might be assumed that they are a very narrowly defined subpopulation which is unrepresentative of the public more generally. If the mobilizing efforts of the new Christian right leaders are in fact appealing to only a few narrowly defined demographic groups, it would be unlikely that religiosity could form the basis for a widespread movement in the future.

Even a cursory examination of the relationship between religiosity and demographic characteristics reveals that strong fundamentalists

Table 3. Demographic Characteristics by Strength of Fundamentalist Beliefs, Whites Only

	Least Fundamental			*Most Fundamental*[a]	
	0 %	*1* %	*2–4* %	*5* %	*6* %
Grade school	4	6	16	14	2
High school	45	42	56	51	47
College	51	51	28	35	51
	100	100	100	100	100
18–29 years	35	27	24	19	29
30–49 years	33	39	31	33	37
50–64 years	21	21	22	23	18
65+	11	12	23	25	16
Male	58	45	40	28	41
Female	42	55	60	72	59
South	21	28	37	47	43
Non-South	79	72	63	53	57
Average working	32	29	44	46	47
Upper working	12	12	9	7	4
Average middle	40	44	39	36	38
Upper middle	16	15	8	11	11
Reformation Protestant	18	21	19	14	8
Pietistic	16	15	22	24	39
Fundamentalist	3	2	9	20	12
Southern Baptist	3	4	9	18	16
Other Protestant	3	4	6	7	12
Mormon	0	3	1	4	4
Catholic	18	36	26	10	6
Jewish	8	3	2	1	0
No religion	24	8	3	2	2
Other misc.	7	4	3	1	0
Total	21	26	38	11	4
(*N*)	(262)	(323)	(452)	(133)	(49)

[a] For ease of tabular presentation respondents falling into the middle three categories of the index have been combined.

look more like a cross-section of the population than a group defined by a limited set of social or geographic categories. Contrary to the popular stereotype, conservative Christians are not predominantly less well educated, elderly, lower class, or Southern. In general, they tend to be relatively well educated, middle-aged, and very similar to the rest of the population in terms of social class (see Table 3). To be sure, strong fundamentalists are somewhat more likely than the rest of the sample to be from the South, yet more than half of them are non-Southern. As expected, strong fundamentalists report having memberships in predominantly Pietistic and Southern Baptist churches, but a significant proportion of them did attend other churches. In short, demographically, strong fundamentalists were similar to the remainder of the population.

In many respects the group of respondents who are most unusual sociologically are not the highly religious but rather those who reject all of the religious beliefs incorporated in the fundamentalism scale. The most secular citizens form a substantial 20 percent of the total adult population, but are nevertheless quite distinctive. As a whole, these citizens are better educated than the population generally. They are predominantly male, non-Southern, relatively young, upper-middle-class people who more than any other segment of the population report no formal religious affiliation. The secular and the strong fundamentalists are very similar with respect to age and education but differ significantly in terms of sex, region, social class, and formal church membership.

In contrast to what is occurring among the fundamentalists, however, no cadre of elites is attempting to mobilize the secular segment of society. Nor does their *lack* of religiosity provide them with any shared interest around which they might coalesce. Nonetheless, they might react to the Moral Majority as a negative reference group, thereby potentially offsetting any political influence the new Christian right may hope to wield in the future.

On the other side of the spectrum, the politicized fundamentalists are clearly *not* so distinctive sociologically as to suggest that there is little possibility for expanding the size of the group. Mobilizing broader support on the basis of shared religious beliefs would, however, imply increasing support primarily among a somewhat older, less well-educated population, i.e., those in the adjoining categories of the fundamentalism scale. Currently the new Christian right appears to be a phenomenon that is most appealing to a younger generation of well-educated conservatives who see politics as lacking Christian values. Although political support among religious elders could be mobilized on the basis of shared fundamentalist beliefs, Table 4 sug-

Table 4. Issue Orientation by Fundamentalism, Whites Only[a]

	Least Fundamental			*Most Fundamental*			
	0 %	*1* %	*2–4* %	*5* %	*6* %	*r*	*Partial*[b]
Conservative	38	40	48	62	80	.23	.21
Against abortion	21	45	66	83	85	.40	.35
Against equal role for women	11	14	25	30	41	.26	.24
Against ERA	25	39	44	63	80	.25	.22
For school prayers	42	70	84	92	96	.36	.33
For increased defense spending	65	70	77	74	86	.10	.05
Against detente	35	35	35	41	54	.07	.03
For reduced government services	38	39	35	35	58	.03	.02
For fighting inflation rather than unemployment	37	33	27	29	28	.02	.01
For 30% tax cut	38	33	41	39	52	.06	.03
Against government guaranteed jobs	52	56	47	60	64	.04	.01
Government too powerful	78	82	74	84	86	.02	.02

[a] All percentages are based on only cases with valid data on the issues, i.e., "Don't Know" respondents have been eliminated.

[b] The partial correlation indicates the relationship between the respondent's issue preference and strength of fundamentalism after controlling for party identification, political ideology, age, education, sex and region.

gests that the size of the group would nonetheless remain small relative to the proportion of nonreligious citizens. Moreover, demographic limitations are not the only potential barriers that the Moral Majority must overcome in attempting to expand its *political* influence. In order to form the basis for a broader political movement, fundamentalists must come to perceive a connection between a diverse set of political preferences and religious values.

Religiosity and Politics—Do They Connect?

Any new political interest group must be able to redirect the attention of the group members to the issues with which the group is most concerned and then persuade them that they should vote on the basis of group interest rather than along traditional partisan lines. First, a group needs a constituency which will strongly support its most important issue stands. Second, it needs to make the issues with which it is most concerned highly salient in the minds of those who agree with their point of view. And finally, these issue stands must become important factors in the vote choice by these individuals. Each of these three steps will be examined below.

Himmelstein (1983) has written that the leadership of the new

Christian right espouses a tripartite combination of social traditionalism, militant anticommunism, and economic libertarianism. This sense of overarching conservatism of the new right's leadership is reflected in the relationship between ideology and religious fundamentalism in the electorate. Those higher on the religiosity scale were more likely to accept the label of conservative: 80 percent of those at the most fundamentalist end of the scale considered themselves as such, compared to only 38 percent at the most secular end (see Table 4).

Since the most militant positions taken by the Moral Majority and other evangelical groups have been on matters of social policy such as school prayer, abortion, the equal rights amendment and women's place in society, it should not be surprising to find that public attitudes on these issues are strongly related to religiosity even after controlling for demographic characteristics and political ideology. Generally, support for conservative policy preferences on social issues was found to increase linearly with religiosity—strong fundamentalists were most highly cohesive and conservative in their views on these various issues. More than three-quarters of them, for example, are opposed to both abortion and the Equal Rights Amendment, and they overwhelmingly favor prayers in public schools (see Table 4). By comparison, the least fundamentalist respondents are cohesive in support of women's rights, but are almost evenly divided on the question of school prayer.

New Christian right ministers and leaders have taken strong stands on many of these issues, arguing that they are related to the moral fiber of the American family. Yet the policy positions on women's issues favored by the most fundamentalist respondents are not simply profamily but are strongly antifeminist as well. Interestingly, female fundamentalists were more likely to express antifeminist sentiments than were their male counterparts. For example, among strong fundamentalists 83 percent of the women as opposed to 75 percent of the men were against the ERA. Similarly, 48 percent of the females but only 32 percent of male fundamentalists thought women should stay at home rather than having an equal role with men in society and the workplace. The degree of antifeminist sentiment expressed by fundamentalist women is somewhat surprising, considering that they are relatively young and well educated, two characteristics generally associated with support for feminist views. Apparently the Christian right emphasis on family values has fostered the acceptance of traditional gender roles, especially among female fundamentalists. Of course, any male-female differences in attitudes among the Christian right pale by comparison with the immense differences found between

the least and most fundamentalist respondents. Given that these differences persist even after controlling for demographic characteristics and ideology, the cohesiveness evident among fundamentalists on these social issues suggests a high degree of success for the new Christian right leadership in conveying its position on values and lifestyles.

However, the extent to which nonreligious-oriented issues are connected with fundamentalism provides the critical test for how effectively the new Christian right philosophy has permeated public opinion. Here we find a much more limited effect than might be expected from the ideological differences across the fundamentalism scale. While the most politicized fundamentalists are distinct from the rest of the population on the questions of defense spending, détente, and reducing government services, the differences are not nearly as striking as on social issues (see Table 4). Generally, religious attitudes are only *weakly* related to conservative stands on the economic and foreign policy questions which dominated the agenda during the first two years of the Reagan presidency. Although the leaders of the Christian right strongly endorsed Reagan's proposals for reducing government services, cutting taxes and increasing the defense budget, these data indicate that support in the 1980 electorate for such policies was not particularly limited to, or unusually concentrated among, people with fundamentalist religious beliefs.

Besides attempting to influence how people feel about key issues, evangelical leaders also seek to structure the issue agenda by focusing attention on what they perceive to be the most important problems facing the country. Without their vocal pronouncements on social issues such as abortion, it is doubtful that these matters would have received nearly as much media coverage as they have in recent years. Yet, only a small fraction of the population in 1980 felt that a social issue was the most important problem of concern for the government in Washington. Overwhelmingly, people concentrated on the more traditional concerns of economic prosperity and national defense in their responses. Nevertheless, the most fundamentalist respondents were three times as likely as the nonreligious to mention a value-laden issue as the most important problem facing the government (11 and 3 percent, respectively). Furthermore, almost half of the strong fundamentalists mentioned national defense as compared with about 30 percent of the secular respondents. Thus, the rhetoric of evangelical leaders about the necessity for a stronger foreign policy may have had some impact on the saliency of these issues for their followers.

On the other hand, there is little evidence to suggest that the most fundamentalist segments of the population felt more strongly—pro or

con—than the most secular segments about the key economic elements of the Reagan program. In fact, it is the most religious respondents who assign the least importance to the questions of reducing government spending, fighting inflation versus fighting unemployment, and cutting taxes by 30 percent. Given the new right's lack of concern about conservative economic policy, it is not surprising that Ronald Reagan in his 1983 State of the Union address announced his support for a constitutional amendment to permit prayers in public schools so as to please this vocal constituency. For maximum political impact, such an endorsement was clearly aimed at a policy which would be very salient to the new Christian right.

The data on issue stands and the perceived importance of these issues indicate that the effects of religious orientation are most readily apparent on questions of social and individual values but are limited when it comes to long-standing traditional economic and foreign policy concerns. Of course, there is a good deal of self-selection in religious orientation. The cohesiveness on moral issues may not, therefore, have been *caused* by the preachings of the new Christian right leaders. On the contrary, it could be argued that the correlations between the strength of fundamentalist beliefs and policy positions on social issues simply reflect the types of people who are fundamentalists rather than the preachings of the church. Yet, it is quite evident that these correlations are equally strong even after controlling for sociological characteristics and political ideology. The strength of these partial correlations (see Table 4) gives greater credence to the claim of a real religious impact—for which the mechanism is the message delivered by the church clergy. While the question of causality cannot be conclusively answered, we would expect fundamentalist preachers to at least reinforce these beliefs and to play a major role in politicizing and connecting religious ideas to particular candidate choices.

Religiosity and the Vote

It will be recalled that after the 1980 election the Moral Majority made national headlines by claiming that as a group they had been the decisive factor in Reagan's election and the defeat of several liberal members of Congress. The most obvious and initial question, therefore, is whether there was any direct correlation between religious beliefs and the presidential or congressional vote. Table 5 demonstrates that respondents who were strongest in their fundamentalist beliefs did indeed vote more heavily for Ronald Reagan. The substantial Reagan vote among the most politicized fundamentalists fits well

Table 5. Vote for President and Congress by Fundamentalism, Whites Only

	Least Fundamental			*Most Fundamental*			
	0 %	*1* %	*2–4* %	*5* %	*6* %	*r*	*Partial*[a]
Voting for Reagan	47	55	62	55	85	.10	.02
Voting Republican for Senate	39	45	54	55	73	.24	.14*
Voting Republican for House	41	46	51	62	67	.21	.11*

[a] Correlation between fundamentalism index and vote after controlling for party identification, liberal-conservative ideology and Senate or House incumbency.
* $p < .01$.

with the finding that 77 percent of these individuals believed that Reagan would work for the interests of their group. None of the other groups investigated in the survey expressed such a unified belief that one of the candidates would clearly benefit *their* group. Apparently, the supporters of the Moral Majority had no difficulty in linking their group interests with the election of a particular presidential candidate.

Nevertheless, the relationship between religious beliefs and the vote for president is not linear, nor is it particularly strong. The difference in Reagan's support among the most and least fundamentalist categories is quite striking, and it is clearly the staunch fundamentalists who were most distinct from the majority of voters in their unexpectedly high Republican vote. Yet, in spite of the substantial difference in the presidential vote cast by the most and least fundamentalist respondents, religiosity as an overall dimension did *not* contribute to the vote decision *independent* of its overlap with party identification and liberal-conservative ideology (see partial correlations in Table 5).

Religiosity did, however, have a *significant and independent* effect on the vote for both Senate and House candidates. For these races, Table 5 reveals a more linear relationship which remains significant even after controlling for the effects of party identification, ideology, and incumbency. Indeed, religiosity had a significantly greater impact on these races than did liberal-conservative orientation (beta coefficients of .04 and .07 for the Senate and House, respectively). These data substantiate the claim that the Moral Majority and other conservative religious groups played a noteworthy role in the defeat of at least some liberal congressional candidates in 1980.

Although religiosity did not have an independent, direct effect on the presidential vote choice, it was indirectly important. Miller and Wattenberg (1981) have argued that the impact of policy stands on the presidential vote was far below that of candidate performance as-

sessments in 1980 and that the impact of social issues was particularly slight for the electorate as a whole. Religious fundamentalism, however, was found to be an important mediating variable in determining which factors have the most influence on the vote choice. Social issues, for example, were a far more significant predictor of the vote for people with politicized fundamentalist beliefs than for those at the secular end of the scale (regressions coefficients of .21 and .02, respectively, after controlling for candidate performance, party identification, and issues in the economic and foreign policy areas). Apparently the personal relevance of social issues such as abortion and school prayers increased the importance of these issues in the vote choice of the strong fundamentalists while the remainder of the population voted on the basis of other concerns.

Finally, one other possible behavioral effect needs to be explored—that of participation. Any interest group active in politics seeks to maximize political participation among its members. Indeed, it has been argued by some that evangelical groups are more influential than their numbers might imply because of the supposed ability of evangelical leaders to stimulate political action from their followers. Empirical evidence does in fact suggest that religiosity increased the likelihood of both voter turnout and efforts to persuade others how to vote in 1980 (see Table 6). Beyond these two activities, however, the data displayed in Table 6 demonstrate that the relationship between religiosity and other forms of participation was virtually nonexistent. Religious fundamentalism does not seem to be at all related to attending political meetings, working for a candidate, wearing campaign buttons or displaying campaign bumper stickers, belonging to a political organization, or contributing money for political purposes. Most notable of the items on which there is no relationship with fun-

Table 6. Participation in Politics by Fundamentalism, Whites Only

	Least Fundamental			*Most Fundamental*	
	0	*1*	*2–4*	*5*	*6*
Reported turnout	71	77	67	78	82
Attempt to persuade others	40	36	34	40	47
Attend meetings	7	8	6	7	8
Work for a candidate	3	4	5	5	3
Wear button or display sticker	9	5	6	7	6
Belong to political organization	4	4	3	4	5
Contribute money to:					
Candidates	6	7	7	6	6
Parties	4	5	3	4	4
PACS	7	8	7	5	6

damentalism is contributions to political action committees. Much has been made of the vocal new right PACs, but the 1980 election study data show that liberals were actually more likely to contribute to PACs than conservatives (13.3 compared to 6.6 percent) and that religious fundamentalism was completely unrelated to this form of participation. Of course, these data say nothing about the amount of the contributions, only the incidence of giving. Strong fundamentalists may have contributed more money although the percentage contributing was no higher than for other groups.

In short, although the new Christian right advocates were not more actively engaged in campaign activities or making contributions than less religious citizens, they did vote at higher rates and were clearly more involved in persuading others how to vote. This greater electoral involvement is far from insignificant in a period when participation is low, and it may be of even greater importance in off-year congressional or gubernatorial elections when turnout can be expected to be much lower than in presidential elections.

Conclusion

Contrary to what Andrew Greeley (1981) has written, the Moral Majority does exist. It is not simply "a ghost, a spook, a bogey man, . . . a fiction of the paranoia of some segments of the liberal media elite . . . ." It clearly is not a majority, but neither is it a narrowly based, sectarian group that can be readily dismissed as a political chimera.

Our research has isolated a small but significant subset of the population for whom religious beliefs have become politicized. Along with their common religious orientation, they share similar social policy preferences, believe that conservative candidates will favor their group, and are motivated to act collectively to bring about political changes which they believe are in their collective best interests. While the Moral Majority does not encompass all these individuals, it is representative of new Christian right groups.

The conservative Christians represent a unique political group in U.S. electoral politics. During a period of generally declining participation, the new Christian right appears highly involved in electoral activity. Moreover, these people are not simply voting their conservative or Republican predispositions—their religiosity has provided the basis upon which a small but solid voting bloc is being forged. The cohesiveness evident in their political attitudes and voting behavior suggests a unique impact attributable to shared religious interests and, by inference, the mobilizing influence of the new Christian right

leadership. Conservative religious leaders have been very effective in translating questions of morality and social values into political choices among their followers. However, thus far they have been unsuccessful in connecting religion with policy preferences on economics, social welfare, or foreign relations, thereby restricting the scope of their political influence.

Through television and other means of mass communication, the leaders of the new Christian right have been unique in making the connection between religion and politics more explicit and public than has been the case in recent memory. However, in many ways they are no different than other special interest groups which have proliferated during the past decade. Direct mail, specialized magazines and newspapers, as well as the use of television have provided these groups with the ability to quickly and effectively mobilize their constituents. Increased capabilities for direct communication with farflung group members have made it more difficult for political parties to aggregate these diverse groups into broader coalitions, and have contributed to an increased degree of volatility in American politics.

The emergence of the new Christian right also raises broader questions about the functioning of democracy in America. The U.S. Constitution expressly stipulates the doctrine of separation between church and state. Yet empirical evidence from the 1980 election, as well as from previous elections, demonstrates that religious beliefs in this country are frequently politicized and do play a role in electoral outcomes. If politics is concerned with the allocation of values, as Easton (1953) suggests, then it is hardly avoidable that one of the key sources of values, i.e., religion, should sometimes guide political choices. Nevertheless, attempts by fundamentalist preachers to overtly connect religion and politics, and to institutionalize this link, run counter to a historical sensitivity to the separation of church and state.

The old relationship between established denominations and partisan alignments may be gradually waning, but religion is *not* disappearing from politics. If the new Christian right continues to grow, traditional religious cleavages may be replaced by a new association between religiosity and politics.

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Religious Preference and Practice: Reevaluating Their Impact on Political Tolerance

KATHLEEN MURPHY BEATTY AND OLIVER WALTER

ALTHOUGH surveys conducted in the 1960s and 70s have produced evidence of the public's increasing political tolerance, some scholars have questioned those findings and the methods that produced them. At the same time, visible political action by religious groups and their leaders has created renewed interest in the connections between religious beliefs and practice on the one hand and political beliefs and actions on the other. These two areas of study—political tolerance and religion—are not unrelated. Political tolerance has long been linked to religion, but that linkage has been defined only vaguely. We explore the relationship, examining both religious denomination and church attendance as correlates of political tolerance. This investigation differs from prior studies in looking at political tolerance within rather precise denominational groups and by evaluating the effects of church attendance within denominations. Our findings shed light on the nature and sources of political tolerance, while also suggesting

Abstract This study assesses the impact of religious denominational affiliation and attendance on tolerance. In light of new findings about the group-relatedness of tolerance, we examine tolerance for least-liked groups by denomination to see whether denominational rankings on political tolerance change using that strategy. The findings demonstrate that denominational differences in political tolerance are substantial, and that frequent religious service attenders in each denomination are less tolerant than nonattenders, although the magnitude of the impact of attendance varies by denomination. These relationships remain strong even when we control for SES. Finally, we find that some religious denominations are less tolerant than others across the board—regardless of the object of intolerance. In conclusion, new questions are raised about the effects of religious preference and practice on political attributes.

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that religious preference and practice have important effects on political attributes.

Beginning with Stouffer's landmark study (1955), investigators have recognized a connection between religious denomination and attendance and political tolerance. In general, Jews have scored highest on tolerance scales, followed by Catholics and Protestants (Stouffer, 1955; Nunn, et al., 1978:Ch. 8). The same studies note that regular church attenders exhibit less political tolerance than infrequent attenders. Piereson, et al. (1980) add a note of caution to these findings, arguing that content bias in tolerance measures may account for observed denominational differences. When they allow survey respondents to define their own objects of intolerance (for Jews, usually Nazis), Piereson, et al. note no significant difference in tolerance among Catholics, Protestants, and Jews. Tolerance differentials between attenders and nonattenders, however, persist.

One problem with these studies and one that is present in almost all research using religion as a variable is the tendency to collapse denominational preference into three broad categories.[1] At best, Protestants have been divided into a small number of very large and crude categories. The rationale for collapsing denominational categories probably lies in the small number of respondents found in each denomination in survey samples. But this very common practice well may hide important denominational differences. For example, Glock (1970) has shown that among major Protestant denominations there is a wide disparity in religious beliefs. We will demonstrate that similar (and perhaps related) differences also exist with regard to tolerance.

A second problem with previous research is that church attendance and denomination are seldom examined in tandem. The results of this failure are two. First, it is certainly possible that for some denominations the more committed are the most tolerant; that is, attendance may have a differential effect by denomination. Second, the percentage of those regularly attending church varies widely by denomination. Members of the Assembly of God Church, for example, are more likely to attend church than are Methodists. It may be misleading, therefore, to compare denominations without taking into consideration frequency of attendance. We will show that frequent attendance encourages less tolerance for all denominations, although the strength of the relationship is variable.

Third, we will deal with the question of whether religious differences in political tolerance are simply the result of socioeconomic

[1] Lenski (1963), for example, examines Protestants, Catholics, and Jews.

differences among different denominations.[2] For our samples, although socioeconomic variables are clearly related to tolerance, both denomination and attendance remain important to the explanation of tolerance after SES controls are imposed.

Finally, the paper turns to research issues raised by Lawrence (1976) and Sullivan, et al. (1979), who argue that tolerance is issue- and group-related. Sullivan, et al. argue that virtually all studies of tolerance direct survey inquiries toward Communists and related left-leaning extremist groups, even though a broader range of groups (including perhaps civil rights groups, feminists, and others) may be more likely targets of contemporary political intolerance. Because of an increasingly diverse issue agenda in the late 70s and early 80s, the targets of intolerance are likely to be more diverse. The solution posed by Sullivan, et al. involves allowing survey respondents to define their "least-liked" group from a long list of possible objects of intolerance. Having identified a group, respondents proceed to answer a series of questions assessing tolerance toward the group.

Although we do not have data that are completely analogous to those of either Sullivan, et al., or to Lawrence, we find that in spite of the variations resulting from changes in the focal point of intolerance, some religious denominations are more intolerant than others. This finding raises the possibility that the Sullivan strategy of measurement, while it responds to a clear flaw in earlier strategies, may mask important characteristics of political tolerance by looking only at attitudes toward a least-liked group.

Data

The data in the paper are from the NORC General Social Survey (GSS) Cumulative File, 1972–1980.[3] The strength of this data set is that it allows the researcher to combine surveys over eight years and thus increase the number of respondents in categories ordinarily too small for analysis. For our purposes, combining surveys yields the rare opportunity to examine opinion differences among religious denominations.

Questions concerning tolerance were asked in all but two of the GSS survey years. We chose to use only three of these years because all three have consistent questions and all three include questions on

[2] See, for example, Erikson, et al. (1980:170) and Middleton (1973).

[3] The General Social Survey is a series of eight independent surveys conducted between 1972 and 1980. The principal advantage of these surveys lies in the continuity of questions asked.

what generally are considered to be right-wing objects of intolerance: racists, and those advocating a military government (see Appendix I for question wording). Besides these two groups the surveys include questions on Communists, homosexuals, and atheists. For each of these five groups, respondents were asked if a member of the group should be allowed to speak in the community, should be allowed to teach in a college or university, and whether a book written by the unpopular individual should be removed from the local library.

Even though the NORC surveys include numerous denominational categories, for some groups denominational distinctions remain too general. For example, the three surveys do not distinguish between Southern and American Baptists or between Missouri Synod and American Lutherans. Glock (1965) has shown that Southern Baptists are considerably more conservative than American Baptists, and the same distinction is true of Missouri Synod Lutherans and American Lutherans.

The survey years used are 1976, 1977, and 1980. We are, of course, assuming that few significant changes in tolerance took place from 1976 to 1980, and, in fact, we found only insignificant differences from year to year. Since our interest was in assessing denominational effects on political tolerance, all denominations having at least 20 respondents were included in our analysis as separate categories. We included 16 Protestant denominations (listed in Table 1), Catholics, Jews, and nonaffiliates in our analysis.

Although the design effects associated with the GSS sampling procedure make ordinary tests of statistical significance inappropriate, especially since some divisions may be rather highly correlated with sample clusters, we report them in the tables that follow as a rough guide to the significance of results.

Measuring Political Tolerance

Sullivan, et al. (1979:785) define political tolerance as "a willingness to 'put up with' those things that one rejects." In adopting that definition of the concept, we also agree that "one is tolerant to the extent one is prepared to extend freedoms to those whose ideas one rejects, whatever these might be" (Sullivan, et al., 1979:784). Thus, at the very least, survey respondents should be presented with a variety of different types of groups toward which they can express intolerance; their choices should not be limited to a few left-leaning groups. The Sullivan approach of allowing respondents to identify their own least-liked groups, however, was not available to us in the NORC surveys.

Table 1. Average Tolerance Scores for Various Religious Categories[a]

	Tolerance Object							
Denomination	*Atheists*	*Communists*	*Homosexuals*	*Militarists*	*Racists*	$\bar{X}$	*Least-Liked Group*	*N*
None	1.48	1.98	1.52	1.70	1.61	1.66	2.48	312
Congregationalist	1.86	1.81	1.86	1.92	1.78	1.85	2.62	37
Jewish	1.69	1.96	1.48	1.97	2.08	1.83	2.68	94
Episcopalian	1.84	1.91	1.62	2.05	2.04	1.89	2.73	127
Presbyterian	2.07	2.10	1.93	2.30	2.11	2.10	2.87	222
Mormon	1.95	2.17	2.00	2.32	2.16	2.12	2.90	38
Jehovah's Witness	1.65	2.19	2.38	2.15	2.00	2.07	3.03	27
United Church of Christ	2.12	2.00	2.19	2.39	2.28	2.20	3.03	64
Catholic	2.20	2.23	2.05	2.42	2.20	2.22	3.08	1122
Lutheran	2.31	2.16	2.08	2.46	2.29	2.26	3.08	332
Methodist	2.45	2.35	2.35	2.65	2.45	2.45	3.21	525
Other Protestant	2.41	2.31	2.42	2.68	2.33	2.43	3.21	179
Christian	2.32	2.17	2.44	2.69	2.25	2.37	3.28	53
Church of Christ	2.84	2.47	2.81	2.93	2.73	2.76	3.34	64
Seventh Day Adv.	2.19	2.40	2.18	2.33	2.45	2.31	3.23	22
Baptist	2.69	2.47	2.61	2.77	2.61	2.63	3.38	931
Assembly of God	2.88	2.69	3.06	3.03	2.74	2.88	3.47	32
Pentecostal	2.91	2.55	2.98	2.69	2.91	2.81	3.50	66
Church of God	3.18	2.43	3.08	3.05	2.78	2.90	3.63	38
F =	23.1	13.6	21.6	14.9	14.5		20.4	
Eta =	.30	.24	.29	.25	.24		.28	

[a] Denominations are listed in order of tolerance (most tolerant listed first) on the least liked group scale. All equations are significant at .001 level.

We constructed six tolerance indices. One index was constructed for each survey respondent for each of the five target groups. A 1 on an index is awarded to a person who gives no intolerant responses to the three tolerance questions directed toward each target. A 2 indicates one intolerant response; a 3 two responses; a 4 three responses. The sixth index, a "general tolerance index," indicates the respondent's tolerance score for his or her least-liked group. In other words, any respondent's general tolerance score is the highest (least tolerant) score selected from his or her atheist score, Communist score, and so forth. This strategy allows us to compare the tolerance scores of different religious denominations without requiring that one target group be selected for all members of a particular denomination.

Results

Table 1 displays mean tolerance scores for each denomination on each index of tolerance. The average scores across the five individual

indices also are reported. Past studies have revealed that Protestants were least tolerant, Catholics were next, and Jews were the most tolerant. Nonaffiliates consistently have been the most tolerant (Stouffer, 1955; Nunn, et al., 1978). Our data note wide variation in the tolerance scores of Protestant denominations.[4] Although 10 Protestant denominations in our surveys are less tolerant than both Jews and Catholics, others display tolerance similar to that of Jews and higher than that of Catholics (e.g., Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians). Catholics are in the middle of the rankings, while Jews are not substantially different from the Episcopalians or the Congregationalists. As in other studies, those giving no religious affiliation are the most tolerant as a group.

It might be argued that the differences among the Protestant groups are consistent with the traditional fundamentalist-mainline split. This appears to be partially correct. Denominations usually characterized as fundamentalist tend to be less tolerant than mainline denominations. But there are exceptions. Although Methodists are generally considered mainline Protestant, their tolerance levels are closer to the Baptists' than to the other mainline churches—Lutheran, Presbyterian, or Episcopalian. The tolerance levels of several of the smaller denominations are also of interest, although these findings must be viewed with great caution.[5] Two interesting examples are the Mormons and Jehovah's Witnesses. In recent years, the Mormon Church has been linked with fundamentalist denominations and their support for right-wing causes such as opposition to the ERA. But the Mormons are among the most tolerant denominations. The same is true of Jehovah's Witnesses, who have been characterized as fundamentalist.

In sum, the data presented in Table 1 suggest that the use of the traditional categories of Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, and None obscure important denominational differences in political tolerance. Table 1 also raises the possibility that even the Protestant categories of mainline and fundamentalist may be insufficient.

Frequent attenders of religious services also have been distinctive in their political tolerance, exhibiting lower tolerance than infrequent attenders (Table 2). The same is true of respondents to the NORC surveys. On each of the five indices and on the overall measure of tolerance, tolerance decreases with increasing attendance. But again, this approach may oversimplify the religion-tolerance connection,

[4] Piereson, et al. (1980) do differentiate among a few Protestant denominations; but they find depressed levels of political tolerance only among Baptists.

[5] Interpretation of differences among these smaller denominations must be conservative, because these findings are particularly susceptible to the problems of design effects mentioned above.

Table 2. Tolerance Levels by Frequency of Church Attendance[a]

	Atheists	*Communists*	*Homosexuals*	*Racists*	*Militarists*	*Least-Liked*	*N*
Never	1.94	2.13	1.93	2.00	2.20	2.91	570
At least once a year	1.95	2.13	1.88	2.02	2.16	2.88	367
Once a year	2.08	2.19	1.97	2.12	2.32	2.95	633
Several times a year	2.19	2.26	2.09	2.28	2.41	3.06	641
Once a month	2.22	2.19	2.13	2.28	2.50	3.13	316
Two or three times a month	2.41	2.31	2.29	2.34	2.50	3.19	352
Nearly every week	2.56	2.37	2.47	2.48	2.63	3.28	262
Every week	2.50	2.30	2.38	2.43	2.63	3.23	933
More than once a week	2.78	2.56	2.86	2.79	2.94	3.40	362
F =	27.1	9.3	26.1	19.7	16.5	17.7	
Eta =	.22	.13	.21	.19	.17	.18	

[a] All equations are significant at .001 level.

since the effects of attendance may vary for different denominations. It might be expected, for example, that in the more tolerant denominations such as the Episcopalian or Jewish, high attendance may lead to greater tolerance, whereas attendance in the less tolerant denominations, such as the Pentecostal and the Baptist, may lead to decreased tolerance.

To test this hypothesis, we broke attendance into three categories: those attending services about once a year or less, those attending several times a month, and those attending nearly every week or more often. For each denomination the mean tolerance score for the high attenders was subtracted from that of the infrequent attenders. The resulting mean difference should be a rough indicator of the impact of church attendance. The results are presented in Table 3. We display

Table 3. Difference in Mean Tolerance Scores Between Infrequent Attenders and Frequent Attenders by Denomination[a]

Denomination	*Gamma*[b]	*Mean Difference*	*Low Attenders*	*High Attenders*
Episcopalian	.13	.23	2.62	2.86
Presbyterian	.06	.13	2.88	3.02
Catholic	.09	.17	2.94	3.12
Lutheran	.07	.12	2.97	3.09
Methodist	.04	.08	3.20	3.27
Other Prot.	.42	.56	2.92	3.47
Baptist	.23	.32	3.23	3.56

[a] The *F*-test for the effect of denomination on tolerance, controlling for attendance is 15.1. The *F* for the effect of attendance, controlling for denomination is 61.1. The overall *F* is 19.1.

[b] Gamma tests the relationship between the frequency of attendance and political tolerance for each denomination.

the mean differences only for our larger denominations, those with 100 or more respondents, and even for these denominations, results should be interpreted with caution because of small subcategories. The impact of church attendance does appear to vary by denomination, but only in magnitude. For every denomination displayed (and for every denomination not displayed for which we have cases in every category), those who attend more frequently are also the more intolerant. In addition, attendance seems to have a greater impact (as measured by gamma) on the tolerance of the less tolerant groups.

One possible explanation for these findings is, of course, the possibility of socioeconomic bias in denominational preference. All of the early studies of political tolerance note a close association with education, and the question inevitably arises: Are the relationships noted in this paper artifacts of the education/tolerance relationship? In order to investigate that possibility, we utilized multiple classification analysis, entering religious denomination and attendance as factors, education and occupational prestige as covariates or control variables. The results are displayed in Tables 4 and 5. Although the

Table 4. Multiple Classification Analysis for Least Liked Group by Religious Grouping Controlling for Attendance, Education and Occupation Prestige[a]

Religious Group	*Unadjusted Mean*	*Mean Adjusted for Controls*
None	2.48	2.72
Congregational	2.62	2.79
Jewish	2.68	2.92
Episcopalian	2.73	3.00
Presbyterian	2.87	2.98
Mormon	2.90	3.07
Jehovah's Witness	3.03	2.84
United Church of Christ	3.03	2.88
Catholics	3.08	3.01
Lutheran	3.08	3.08
Methodist	3.21	3.22
Other Protestants	3.21	3.18
Christian	3.28	3.26
Church of Christ	3.30	3.20
Seventh Day Adventists	3.23	3.22
Baptist	3.38	3.22
Assembly of God	3.47	3.26
Pentecostal	3.50	3.22
Church of God	3.63	3.50

F for religion controlling for attendance, education and occupational prestige = 6.62 $p = .001$. Beta = .16.

[a] When the same method of analysis is used controlling for father's occupation and education when respondent was 16 years of age, the results were as follows:

F for religion, controlling attendance, father's education and occupational prestige = 8.169. $p = .001$. Beta = .21.

Table 5. Multiple Classification Analysis for Least Liked Group by Frequency of Church Attendance Controlling for Denomination, Education and Occupation Prestige[a]

Frequency of Attendance	*Unadjusted Mean*	*Mean Adjusted for Controls*
Once a year or less	2.89	2.93
Several times a year	3.00	3.07
Nearly every week or more	3.26	3.24

F for attendance controlling for religion, education and occupation prestige = 41.33. Significant to .001. Beta = .14.

[a] When the same method of analysis is used controlling for father's occupation and education when respondent was 16 years of age, the results were as follows:

F for religion, controlling attendance, father's education and occupational prestige = 45.88. $p = .001$. Beta = .12.

relationship between education and tolerance is a strong one for this sample, controlling for education and occupational prestige does not reduce the relationships between denomination and tolerance or between attendance and tolerance to insignificance.[6] The ordering of denominations by tolerance remains relatively stable, with sizable differences between the scores of more and less tolerant denominations, and the same is true of infrequent and frequent attenders.

Another issue that arises in the investigation of the tolerance/denomination connection is that of content bias. Piereson, et al. (1980:173) note that when individuals are allowed to identify their own targets of intolerance, there are no differences in political tolerance among Catholics, Protestants, and Jews. Although our own measure of tolerance does not allow respondents to identify their least-liked group, it does offer respondents a choice of five groups toward which intolerance could be manifested, and those groups include both left-wing (e.g., Communist) and right-wing (e.g., racist) representatives.

Our analyses point to two important findings. First, the targets of intolerance do vary as we move from denomination to denomination. Jews, for example, are least tolerant toward racists, Episcopalians toward militarists, Jehovah's Witnesses toward homosexuals. But the ordering of religious groups by tolerance tends to be similar *regardless* of the target of intolerance. For example, although Jews are more tolerant of homosexuals than of racists, their ranking among denominations remains similar as we move from one object group to another (note both the average score and the score on the least-liked group). Even though the tolerance of Jews is much lower when respondents' least tolerant score is selected for them, Jews remain more tolerant than most other groups across most objects. Put simply, if a religious

[6] Another possibility is that childhood SES is the determining factor. The footnotes to Tables 4 and 5 report the relevant statistics when childhood SES is controlled.

group is among the least tolerant toward one object, it also tends to be intolerant toward the others regardless of the ideological disposition of the object. This tendency is demonstrated in Table 6, where the values from the five indices are correlated.

Here the interesting finding is that intolerance toward the right-wing objects is so highly correlated with intolerance toward the left-wing objects. It appears, in other words, that tolerance may not be quite as issue- or group-dependent as Piereson, et al. suggest.

Conclusion

This paper had four objectives. First, we attempted to demonstrate that on the question of tolerance there are important differences among Protestant denominations and that past practices of lumping all Protestants together or even dividing the denominations between mainline and fundamentalist categories hid these differences. Our research suggests that denominational differences are substantial and might be even more pronounced if we could separate, for example, Southern from American Baptists or examine larger subgroups in some of the smaller denominations.

Second, we examined the effects of religious service attendance. Frequent attendance reduces political tolerance in all denominations for which we have adequate data, but the magnitude of its impact does vary from one denomination to another. Controlling for attendance did not erase denominational differences in tolerance.

Third, we controlled education and occupational prestige to see whether denominational and attendance differences were artifacts of socioeconomic status differences. Differences in political tolerance remained after controls were imposed.

Finally, our data show that although content bias obviously is present for various religious denominations, some religious groups are more intolerant no matter what the object. This finding suggests that the battle over the most correct operationalization of political tolerance is not over. The Sullivan measurement strategy adds an important dimension to our understanding of political tolerance. But it also

Table 6. Correlations (R) Among Five Tolerance Items

	Atheists	*Communists*	*Homosexuals*	*Racists*	*Militarists*
Atheists	1.00	.49	.64	.64	.63
Communists		1.00	.48	.38	.44
Homosexuals			1.00	.50	.58
Racists				1.00	.55
Militarists					1.00

hides what appear to be strong general tendencies toward intolerance among some groups.

Perhaps the most important contribution of these findings is to raise anew some questions about religious preference and practice and their effects on political attitudes. Why are frequent service attendance and denominational preference related to intolerance? Here we can only speculate about the answers and encourage others to pursue research in this area. We suspect that religious theology, intolerant leadership cues, and a history of persecution for religious beliefs may interact to create distinctive denominational patterns of tolerance. Others have argued that religious orthodoxy or fundamentalism foster a belief that one's chosen religion is the only true religion and that its teachings represent absolute truths (Glock and Stark, 1966; Corbett, 1982). Such a view leaves little room for tolerance of views that conflict with religious doctrine. Intolerance also might be transmitted from the pulpit by ministers who lash out against groups in violation of a denomination's beliefs. And finally, a history of persecution inflicted upon a denomination may encourage tolerance of other groups. This explanation has been applied to higher tolerance of Jews (Corbett, 1982), but our data suggest that it may also explain what appear in our surveys to be higher levels of tolerance among at least two other denominations: Mormons and Jehovah's Witnesses. A more complete understanding of the relationship between religious preference and practice and political tolerance awaits the exploration of these hypotheses.

Appendix 1

Tolerance Questions

There are always some people whose ideas are considered bad or dangerous by other people. For instance, somebody who is against all churches and religion. . . .

1. If such a person wanted to make a speech in your community against churches and religion, should he be allowed to speak or not?
2. Should such a person be allowed to teach in a college or university or not?
3. If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote against churches and religion should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book or not?

The same three questions are asked for: A person claiming that blacks are inferior, a Communist, a person who advocates doing away with elections and letting the military run the country, and a homosexual.

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The Polls:
Gender and Attitudes Toward Violence

TOM W. SMITH, EDITOR

Come, you spirits
That tend on mortal thoughts, unsex me here,
And fill me from the crown to the toe top-full
Of direst cruelty! make thick my blood;
Stop up the access and passage to remorse.
That no compunctious visitings of nature
Shake my fell purpose, nor keep peace between
The effect and it! Come to my woman's breasts,
And take my milk for gall, you murdering ministers. . .

—Lady Macbeth, *Macbeth*, I: v, 41–49

CONSIDERABLE attention in the media and social science community has been focused on the gender gap in President Reagan's popularity. In large part this gap may come from underlying differences between men and women toward violence and the use of force. Women and men differ both in their use of violence and in their approval of violence across a wide range of social conditions including foreign affairs, social control and law enforcement, and interpersonal relations, and the difference is reasonably stable across time. Looking at 285 data points we found that men were more supportive of the violent or forceful option in over 87 percent of the readings.[1] The results were ambiguous in 7 percent of the cases, with men more in favor of both the most *and* least forceful response and women leaning toward a middle alternative. Finally, in only just over 5 percent of the cases did women favor the forceful response more than men.

The tendency of men to back violent options is moderately strong, averaging over 9 percentage points and ranging up to over 30 percentage points. The difference is largest on topics that are closely linked to major differences in socialization, including gun ownership, hunting, gun control attitudes, and attitudes toward boxing. Differences averaging about 10 percentage points are found on most questions dealing with law enforcement and criminal punishments—such as questions on the approval of the death penalty, television violence, and on a wide range of questions asking about the use of the military in international relations and support for America's involvement in wars. Differences tend to be somewhat smaller when dealing indirectly with

[1] The article reports an illustrative selection of 214 data points.

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military matters, such as asking about changes in defense spending. Finally, the smallest differences appear on items dealing with interpersonal violence, such as approval of hitting in certain specified situations and the spanking of children.

The partial exceptions where women favor the middle alternative over either the more or less forceful option are heavily concentrated in attitudes toward defense spending. This ambiguous pattern may occur in part because the issue of violence is not directly stated but only implied by these questions. In addition, women may have lower interest in or information about these issues than men and therefore opt for the neutral middle response. Also, three partial exceptions occur about Vietnam being a mistake. Indirect evidence suggests that this is probably because many people who called Vietnam a mistake were actually in favor of greater military involvement rather than for withdrawal.

Actual reversals are more scattered and in virtually every case of doubtful statistical significance. Four reversals occur on a question dealing with approval for a man punching an adult male stranger who "was beating up a woman." This suggestion that women overcome their disfavor of violence if the force is being explicitly used to protect their sex finds further support in the question on capital punishment that asks about applying the death penalty for murderers, traitors, hijackers, and rapists. While men are more in favor of applying the death penalty for all four crimes, the difference on rapists is less than half the magnitude of that for murderers, traitors, or hijackers.

Differences also tend to be larger when dealing with gray areas where there is no well-established social convention on the appropriateness of force or violence. For example, on both the interpersonal and police approval of hitting questions gender differences tend to be greater for items for which there is lack of consensus—that is, those items closer to 50/50 splits on approval. Similarly, on the item that asks about sending troops to eight countries, the gender differences are largest where opinion is most evenly divided.

The difference between men and women usually results from men choosing the proforce option (e.g., for capital punishment, for military intervention, against gun control, against procedures to restrict war) while women select the antiforce option *or* reply that they have no opinion.

Besides consistently differing in approval of force, men and women also differ in their propensity to give a substantive response to the questions. In 86 percent of the cases men have fewer don't knows than women, in 3–4 percent there are no differences, and in only 10 percent do women give fewer don't knows than men. Overall, the nonresponse is 3 percentage points lower for men than for women. Most of the exceptions come in interpersonal relations, which deals with intimate personal concerns rather than more remote and abstract political issues such as foreign affairs and law enforcement. The higher nonresponse levels, as well as a slight inclination to select middle options, suggests that women tend to be less interested in and opinionated about many of these issues.

Where do these differences between men and women on violence come from? They probably emerge from an intricate interplay of biology and sociology. While far from definitive, existing research indicates a greater inherent predisposition to the use of force among men than women (Seward and Seward, 1980; Davidson and Gordon, 1979; and Maccoby and Jacklin,

1974). Moreover, while the exact mechanisms are ill understood, it appears that socialization also encourages at least some uses of force among men more than among women. Training in the use of guns is heavily concentrated among males. Boxing is traditionally referred to as the "manly art of self-defense."

Overall, the evidence fails to show any impact of feminist ideology on the gender difference on violence. Differences have not appreciably changed since the women's movement was organized in the late sixties, and the gap is the same among profeminist men and women as it is among antifeminists of both sexes, nor do those differences vary by either age or education. In at least one area, socialization seems to completely explain the difference in attitudes. On the 1980 and 1982 General Social Surveys greater male opposition to gun control disappears when personal gun ownership is controlled for. Similarly some of the promilitary inclinations of men can be explained by their veteran status (Schreiber, 1979).

Yet in other cases socialization diminishes or even eliminates biological predispositions. Studies indicate that parents and teachers tend to discourage aggressive behaviors by both girls and boys and since boys tend to exhibit more of these behaviors, the socialization tends to standardize and pacify behavior in general. Similarly, socialization in general and education in particular may tend to reduce the impact of sex as a determinant of attitudes. By establishing moral and intellectual standards for judging the appropriateness of various policies and behaviors as well as by introducing other cultural determinants of action and attitudes, education and socialization clearly can modify bioligically based propensities. Gender differences on violence seem to decrease where a social norm exists and tend to increase in situations where society has not promulgated clear and established standards.

The data used in this article were gleaned mostly from published sources including Cantril, 1947; Mueller, 1973; Converse, 1980; Cantril and Strunk, 1951; Gallup, 1972, and Erskine, 1970. Special cross-tabulations were supplied by the Louis Harris Data Archive, University of North Carolina and the National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago. All studies are based on samples of 1,200 or greater except as noted. For the availability of these data please contact the appropriate survey organization or archive.

GALLUP—Gallup Poll
HARRIS—Louis Harris and Associates
NORC—National Opinion Research Center
NORC-GSS—NORC, General Social Survey
ROPER—Roper Organization
SRC—Survey Research Center, University of Michigan

International Relations and War

ROPER: Would you be willing to fight, or to have a member of your family fight, in case a foreign power tried to seize land in Central or South America? Would you be willing to fight, or to have a member of your family fight, in case the Philippines were attacked?

	Central or S. America		*Philippines*	
1/1936	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
Yes	22.4%	11.8%	29.6%	17.4%
No	69.5	78.7	62.0	72.3
Don't know	8.1	9.5	8.4	10.3

ROPER: The government is spending more than ever before on building warships and airplanes. Which is your attitude on this? (1) We should have a strong army and navy so that no one will dare attack us. (2) It is a bad policy because preparing for war is likely to lead to it. (3) It is a waste of money that should be spent for better things. (4) We should have an adequate defense, but at less cost.

10/1937	*Men*	*Women*
Strong army, navy	81.1%	73.6%
Leads to war	8.0	11.8
Spend elsewhere	10.1	13.6
Less cost	0.3	0.1
Don't know	0.5	0.9

ROPER: Should the democratic powers, including the United States, now stand firm together at any cost to prevent Hitler or Mussolini from taking any more territory at the expense of other nations?

1/1939	*Men*	*Women*
Yes	59.8%	52.8%
No	30.2	31.8
Don't know	10.0	15.4

GALLUP: In case Germany and Italy go to war against England and France, how far should we go in helping England and France? Should we send our army and navy abroad to fight Germany and Italy?

5/1939	*Men*	*Women*
Yes	17%	15%
No	83	85

GALLUP: In the present war, how far should we go in helping England, France, and Poland—should we send our army and navy abroad to fight against Germany?

8/1939	*Men*	*Women*
Yes	19%	12%

ROPER: If it is quite clear that the Allies are beating Germany, do you think they should stop if Germany asks for peace or do you think they should continue until Germany is so badly beaten that she will never again rise as a nation?

1/1940	*Men*	*Women*
Keep going	59.3%	54.9%
Stop	32.9	31.8
Don't know	7.8	13.3

ROPER: Do you think the time has come for us to take strong measures against Japan?

11/1940	*Men*	*Women*
Yes	56.4%	42.4%
No	27.1	21.4
Don't know	16.5	36.2

GALLUP: Do you approve or disapprove of using the new atomic bomb on Japanese cities? (Asked of 96% who heard or read about the atomic bomb)

8/1945	*Men*	*Women*
Approve	86%	83%
Disapprove	9	11
No opinion	5	6

NORC: Do you think the United States was right or wrong in sending American troops to stop the Communist invasion of South Korea? (Figures for whites only.)

	9/1950		*12/1950*		*2/1951*		*3/1951*		*4/1951*		*5/1951*	
	Men	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
Right	86%	80%	61%	52%	64%	51%	66%	55%	67%	62%	68%	53%
Wrong	10	15	34	37	28	36	27	34	25	26	25	34
No opinion	4	5	5	12	8	13	7	11	8	11	7	13

	8/1951		*12/1951*		*1/1952*		*3/1952*		*6/1952*	
	Men	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
Right	66%	56%	57%	54%	62%	51%	55%	46%	59%	50%
Wrong	28	31	35	36	32	37	38	41	34	42
No opinion	6	14	8	11	6	12	7	13	7	7

Adapted from Mueller, 1973: 142.

GALLUP: Do you think the United States made a mistake in going into the war in Korea? (Figures for whites only.)

	2/1951		*3/1951*		*4/1951*		*6/1951*	
	Men	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
No mistake	46%	37%	51%	37%	57%	37%	46%	34%
Made mistake	45	52	40	48	33	41	40	45
No opinion	8	10	9	15	11	21	13	19

	8/1951		*3/1952*		*10/1952*		*1/1953*	
	Men	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
No mistake	55%	42%	43%	32%	44%	31%	54%	46%
Made mistake	37	45	47	52	40	46	35	37
No opinion	8	13	9	15	15	22	10	17

Adapted from Mueller, 1973: 142.

GALLUP: A U.S. senator has suggested that the United States should pledge (promise) that we will never use the atomic bomb in warfare until some other nation has used it on us first. What is your opinion of this suggestion?

7/1949	*Men*	*Women*
Never use first	21%	25%
Disagree	75	69
Outlaw atomic bomb completely (vol.)	4	6

ROPER: There has been a good deal of discussion about what we should do about Russia. In which of these directions do you believe the next administration should go in dealing with Russia? (Hand respondent card.) (a) Adopt an even tougher policy of dealing with the Russians than we have up to now—even if it means taking some risks . . . (b) Keep on with about the same degree of toughness we have been pursuing in the last 2–3 years . . . (c) Try a somewhat friendlier approach in the hope that the Russians will in time learn to play fair when they know more about us and what we believe in.

10/1960	*Men*	*Women*
Tougher	60%	46%
The same	22	29
Friendlier	18	25

GALLUP: Suppose you had to make the decision between fighting an all-out nuclear war or living under Communist rule—how would you decide?

10/1961	*Men*	*Women*
Better dead	87%	75%
Better red	4	7
Undecided	9	18

GALLUP: In view of the developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam? (Figures for whites only.)

	8/1965		3/1966		5/1966		9/1966		11/1966		5/1967	
	Men	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
No mistake	63%	61%	65%	54%	54%	47%	56%	43%	58%	48%	60%	46%
Made mistake	26	22	26	26	36	37	33	37	29	31	31	36
No opinion	11	18	9	20	10	16	11	20	13	21	9	17

	7/1967		10/1967		12/1967		2/1968		4/1968		10/1968	
	Men	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
No mistake	52%	45%	49%	39%	48%	44%	43%	42%	41%	40%	42%	34%
Made mistake	40	42	45	48	43	45	51	48	51	49	51	55
No opinion	8	13	7	12	7	10	7	9	8	12	7	11

	2/1969		9/1969		1/1970		4/1970	
	Men	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
No mistake	42%	39%	35%	29%	35%	28%	41%	30%
Made mistake	51	51	55	56	54	56	49	51
No opinion	7	10	10	15	11	16	10	18

Adapted from Mueller, 1973: 143.

SRC: Do you think we did the right thing in getting into the fighting in Vietnam or should we have stayed out?

	Fall 1964[a]		Fall 1966		Fall 1968		Fall 1970		Fall 1972	
	Men	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
Yes	54.4%	42.2%	55.7%	40.9%	37.7%	25.0%	35.3%	28.0%	32.0%	26.3%
It depends	1.4	0.9	0.6	0.9	1.5	1.0	1.3	0.7	6.6	4.9
No	27.5	32.0	30.0	32.1	48.7	54.3	50.5	48.8	56.0	57.8
Don't know	16.8	24.9	13.8	26.1	12.1	19.7	12.8	22.6	5.4	11.0

[a] In 1964 and 1966 asked only of those answering "yes" to "Have you been paying any attention to what is going on in Vietnam? *N* for 1966 = 1,188.

GALLUP: People are called "hawks" if they want to step up our military effort in Vietnam. They are called "doves" if they want to reduce our military effort in Vietnam. How would you describe yourself, as a "hawk" or a "dove"?

	4/68		10/69	
	Men	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
Hawk	50%	32%	39%	23%
Dove	33	49	48	63
No opinion	17	19	13	14

GALLUP: Some people feel that war is an outmoded way of settling differences between nations. Others feel that wars are necessary to settle differences. With which point of view do you agree?

4/1975	*Men*	*Women*
Outmoded	37%	52%
Necessary	55	38
No opinion	8	10

GALLUP: In the event a nation is attacked by Communist-backed forces, there are several things the United States can do about it. As I read the name of each country, tell me what action you would want to see us take if that nation is actually attacked—send American troops, or send military supplies but not send American troops, or refuse to get involved.

4/1975	*Men*	*Women*
West Germany		
Troops	37%	18%
Supplies only	30	33
No involvement	26	39
No opinion	7	10

Japan		
Troops	24	9
Supplies only	35	35
No involvement	34	45
No opinion	7	11
India		
Troops	7	6
Supplies only	33	35
No involvement	51	44
No opinion	9	15
Thailand		
Troops	13	6
Supplies only	31	34
No involvement	47	45
No opinion	9	15
Nationalist China		
Troops	10	6
Supplies	28	27
No involvement	54	54
No opinion	8	13
Canada		
Troops	66	48
Supplies only	15	23
No involvement	10	18
No opinion	9	11
Saudi Arabia		
Troops	9	5
Supplies only	26	27
No involvement	55	54
No opinion	10	14
Turkey		
Troops	13	6
Supplies only	29	29
No involvement	48	50
No opinion	10	15

GALLUP: If such a referendum [by the UN] were held in the United States, how would you vote—for or against nuclear disarmament?

5/1981	*Men*	*Women*
For	63%	55%
Against	30	29
No opinion	7	16

NORC-GSS: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount?

The Military, Armaments, and Defense

	3/1973		*3/1974*		*3/1975*		*3/1976*		*3/1977*	
	Men	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
Too little	13.0%	10.8%	20.1%	16.3%	22.1%	14.1%	31.4%	20.9%	28.9%	22.8%
About right	43.9	51.5	42.7	54.2	44.1	53.2	38.0	51.1	44.3	54.1
Too much	43.1	37.7	37.3	29.5	33.8	32.7	30.6	27.9	26.8	23.1

	3/1978		3/1980		3/1982		3/1983	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Too little	33.1%	26.3%	64.6%	56.6%	33.3%	28.9%	29.8%	22.1%
About right	43.1	50.3	23.2	31.1	35.6	39.2	34.1	44.8
Too much	23.8	23.5	12.2	12.3	31.1	31.9	36.1	33.1

Social Control and Law Enforcement

GALLUP/NORC-GSS:[a] Are you in favor of the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?

In Favor

11/1937[b]		11/1953		3/1960		2/1965		6/1967		1/1969	
Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
69%	57%	77%	66%	64%	55%	58%	43%	66%	54.5	64%	48%

10/1971		2/1972		3/1972		3/1973		3/1974[c]		3/1975[c]	
Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
61%	47%	59%	51%	65%	50%	70%	57%	70%	63%	71%	59%

3/1976[c]		3/1977[c]		3/1978[c]		3/1980[c]		3/1982[c]		3/1983[c]	
Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
75%	63.5%	77.5%	67%	76%	66%	78.5%	66%	80%	73%	84%	71.5%

[a] Points prior to 3/1972 are Gallup, later points are NORC-GSS.
[b] Are you in favor of the death penalty for murder?
[c] Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?

GALLUP: Are you in favor of the death penalty for persons convicted of murder/of treason/of rape/of hijacking an airplane?

	3/1978		1–2/1981	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Murder				
Yes	70%	55%	71%	62%
No	22	32	22	28
No opinion	8	13	7	10
Treason				
Yes	45	28	46	33
No	45	55	44	52
No opinion	10	17	10	15
Rape				
Yes	34	31	40	34
No	54	57	50	55
No opinion	12	12	10	11
Hijacking an airplane				
Yes	44	30	26	19
No	45	58	65	71
No opinion	11	12	9	10

NORC-GSS: Are there any situations you can imagine in which you would approve of a *policeman* striking an adult male citizen?

	3/1973[a]		3/1975[a]		3/1976		3/1978		3/1980		3/1983	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Yes	77.0%	71.9%	78.9%	73.4%	82.4%	76.4%	84.0%	75.5%	81.6%	70.1%	85.1%	75.8%

Would you approve of a policeman striking a citizen who:

a) Had said vulgar and obscene things to the policeman?

Yes	22.6%	22.8%	23.4%	17.1%	21.7%	19.2%	20.5%	16.7%	14.2%	13.6%	17.7%	13.1%

b) Was being questioned as a suspect in a murder case?

Yes	8.0%	8.9%	9.8%	5.9%	8.4%	7.3%	7.2%	9.1%	8.3%	8.7%	9.3%	9.2%

c) Was attempting to escape from custody?

Yes	89.3%	87.0%	89.7%	88.0%	84.0%	78.5%	82.0%	74.2%	83.6%	75.5%	84.6%	73.1%

d) Was attacking the policeman with his fists?

Yes	96.7%	97.2%	98.7%	98.3%	95.3%	94.4%	95.0%	92.7%	96.5%	94.6%	95.2%	91.1%

[a] In 1973 and 1975 subparts a-d were asked only of those approving of hitting on the introductory question. In 1976–1983 the introductory question did not act as a filter.

NORC-GSS: Do you happen to have in your home (IF HOUSE: or garage) any guns or revolvers? IF YES: Do any of these guns personally belong to you?

	3/1980		*3/1982*	
	Men	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
% Personally owning firearm	51.8%	11.3%	48.9%	14.6%

GALLUP/NORC-GSS: Would you favor or oppose a law which would require a person to obtain a police permit before he or she could buy a gun?

Oppose

7/1959		*12/63*		*1/1965*		*8/1966*		*8/1967*		*10/1971*	
Men	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
30.2%	14.6%	25.6%	11.3%	35.3%	14.5%	40.1%	21.5%	34.6%	16.1%	34.1%	16.8%

3/1972		*3/1973*		*3/1974*		*3/1975*		*3/1976*	
Men	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
37.4%	17.6%	32.0%	19.3%	33.4%	15.3%	32.7%	17.6%	35.7%	20.7%

3/1977		*3/1980*		*3/1982*	
Men	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
35.6%	19.8%	36.4%	23.6%	31.6%	23.3%

GALLUP: Do you think there should or should not be a law which would forbid the possession of pistols and revolvers except by the police and other authorized persons?

	1975		*11/1979*		*12/1980*[a]		*6/1981*[a]	
	Men	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
Yes	35%	46%	25%	36%	31%	44%	34%	48%
No	62	49	71	59	62	40	62	46
No opinion	3	5	4	5	7	16	4	6

[a] "Handguns" instead of "pistols and revolvers."

Interpersonal Force

NORC: Are there any situations you can imagine in which you would approve of a public school teacher hitting a student? Would you approve if the student had been repeatedly disobedient and uncooperative? Would you approve if the student had destroyed school property? Would you approve if the student had hit the teacher?

3/1971	*Any Situation*		*Student Disobedient*		*Student Destroyed*		*Hit Teacher*	
	Men	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
Yes	60.4%	47.2%	49.8%	48.0%	47.0%	43.3%	71.8%	60.0%
No	39.1	52.0	49.5	51.2	52.1	55.9	27.5	38.6
No answer	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	1.4

GALLUP: Do you think teachers in grade schools should have the right to spank children at school?

8–9/1946	*Fathers*	*Mothers*
Yes	43%	34%
No	54	63
No opinion	3	3

Do you approve or disapprove of spanking children?

	Fathers	*Mothers*
Approve	73%	76%
Disapprove	24	22
No opinion	3	2

NORC: Are there any situations you can imagine in which you would approve of a teenage boy punching another teenage boy? Would you approve if the teenage boy had been ridiculed and picked on by the other boy? Would you approve if the teenage boy had been challenged by the other boy to a fist fight? Would you approve if the teenage boy had been hit by the other boy?

3/1971	*Any Situation*		*Ridiculed*		*Challenged*		*Hit*	
	Men	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
Yes	73.2%	64.2%	64.2%	60.7%	49.5%	39.3%	82.9%	76.7%
No	26.1	34.4	35.1	37.8	49.2	58.7	16.2	21.9
No answer	0.7	1.4	0.7	1.5	1.2	1.9	0.9	1.4

NORC-GSS: Are there any situations that you can imagine in which you would approve of a man punching an adult male stranger?

Approve

3/1973[a]		*3/1975*[a]		*3/1976*		*3/1978*		*3/1980*		*3/1983*	
Men	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
65.3%	68.1%	70.2%	72.6%	70.9%	67.8%	69.0%	64.0%	66.3%	63.9%	74.5%	68.1%

Would you approve if the stranger . . .

a) Was in a protest march showing opposition to the other man's views?

3/1973		*3/1975*		*3/1976*		*3/1978*		*3/1980*		*3/1983*	
Men	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
7.0%	4.8%	4.0%	2.2%	3.8%	2.6%	2.8%	3.6%	4.6%	4.1%	3.3%	3.7%

b) Was drunk and bumped into the man and his wife on the street?

10.8%	9.6%	10.2%	5.0%	9.8%	8.4%	10.5%	7.9%	10.7%	9.3%	11.3%	8.4%

c) Would you approve of a man punching a stranger who had hit the man's child after the child accidentally damaged the stranger's car?

56.6%	48.3%	58.6%	47.9%	55.4%	45.6%	57.5%	50.9%	52.4%	52.2%	63.7%	54.7%

d) Was beating up a woman and the man saw it?

85.2%	88.6%	83.9%	85.1%	80.4%	83.5%	79.7%	85.7%	84.5%	84.4%	87.3%	84.9%

e) Had broken into the man's house?

87.3%	85.8%	92.1%	90.0%	85.7%	82.6%	85.7%	83.3%	86.3%	81.2%	88.3%	81.5%

[a] In 1973 and 1975 subparts a–e were asked only of those approving of hitting on the introductory question. In 1976–1983 the introductory question did not act as a filter.

HARRIS: Do you feel that people are always, sometimes, or never justified in (READ LIST) using physical violence?

5/1969	*Men*	*Women*
Always justified	1.1%	0.4%
Sometimes justified	32.4	26.3
Never justified	63.8	70.2
Not sure	2.8	3.1

HARRIS: Do you feel it is justified or not justified to take the life of another person . . .

5/1969	*Men*	*Women*
A. In self-defense		
Justified	82.2%	68.2%
Not justified	12.5	19.0
Not sure	5.3	12.8
B. When fighting in a war		
Justified	82.2	75.0
Not justified	11.4	13.2
Not sure	6.4	11.7
C. When treason against the U.S. is committed		
Justified	57.8	43.7
Not justified	27.3	36.4
Not sure	15.0	19.9
D. When one person has murdered another in cold blood		
Justified	50.7	37.8*
Not justified	39.1	46.6
Not sure	10.2	15.6

HARRIS: Do you feel that it is always wrong for one human being to take the life of another under any circumstances, or do you think there are times when it is justified?

12/1969	*Men*	*Women*
Always wrong	11.4%	19.8%
Justified sometimes	85.3	74.3
Not sure	3.3	5.9

Let me ask you about some specific cases, and ask you for each if you think taking human life is justified or not:

12/1969	*Men*	*Women*
A. Executing a person who murders another in cold blood		
Justified	61.4%	48.5%
Not justified	29.6	37.9
Not sure	9.0	13.6
B. If a person kills another in self-defense		
Justified	86.0	82.1
Not justified	11.4	14.1
Not sure	2.5	3.8
C. If a policeman shoots a criminal in the course of duty		
Justified	79.5	73.1
Not justified	12.5	15.2
Not sure	8.0	11.7
D. If a soldier shoots an enemy in war		
Justified	91.6	86.1
Not justified	6.1	8.9
Not sure	2.3	5.1

E. Shooting civilians who are believed to be helping the enemy in war		
Justified	44.1	35.1
Not justified	40.6	42.9
Not sure	15.3	22.1

Television and Other

HARRIS: How do you feel about the amount of violence portrayed in television programs today, not including news programs—do you think that there is too much, a reasonable amount, or very little violence?

	10/1968		*12/1976*	
	Men	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
Too much	55.3%	63.0%	65.1%	76.3%
Reasonable amount	35.0	29.3	28.4	19.7
Very little	5.5	3.0	4.6	2.2
Not sure	4.3	4.7	1.9	1.8

Apart from the *amount* of violence, do you generally approve or disapprove of the kind of violence that is portrayed on TV?

	10/1968		*12/1976*	
	Men	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
Approve	30.6%	17.4%	29.0%	17.3%
Disapprove	57.1	70.5	66.4	75.3
Not sure	12.3	12.1	4.6	7.4

GALLUP: There has been a good deal of discussion lately about television programs that show violence, that is, gunplay, fistfights, and the like. Do you think there is a relationship between violence on television and the rising crime rate in the United States, or not?

	1/1977[a]		*3/1982*	
	Men	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
Yes	66%	73%	59%	72%
No	30	22	37	24
Not sure	4	5	4	4

[a] "Shows" instead of "programs" in 1977.

GALLUP: It has been proposed that all television programs which show violence be taken off television entirely. Would favor or oppose this?

	1/1977		*3/1982*	
	Men	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
Favor	32%	39%	28%	39%
Oppose	63	52	66	56
No opinion	5	9	6	5

GALLUP: A brain surgeon says that every blow a boxer gets on the head does some injury to his brain. Because of this he says boxing should be banned by law. Do you agree or disagree with his point of view that boxing should be banned?

6/1955	*Men*	*Women*
Agree	27%	51%
Disagree	62	29
Undecided	11	20

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With this issue, Tom W. Smith assumes the Editorship of The Polls section. Suggestions and ideas for future sections are welcome and should be addressed to him at NORC, University of Chicago, 6030 S. Ellis Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637.

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Race, Gender, and Opinion Toward Black and Female Presidential Candidates *Lee Sigelman and Susan Welch*

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Ballot Paper Cues and the Vote in Australia and Britain: Alphabetic Voting, Sex, and Title

JONATHAN KELLEY AND IAN McALLISTER

WHEN a voter comes to cast a ballot, it marks the culmination of a host of influences, ranging from the lifelong consequences of adolescent political socialization and the pervasive influence of social class, to more transitory factors such as the evaluation of a particular party leader or the impact of an election slogan. This study seeks to quantify the importance of three influences which are unique in that they are evident on the ballot paper itself and hence might be expected to influence some voters, especially those casual and uncommitted voters who have little other knowledge about, or interest in, the candidates. The ballot paper cues are the position of the candidate's name on the ballot paper, the candidate's sex, and whether or not the candidate uses an honorary or academic title.

These ballot paper influences have received varying but extensive treatments in the academic literature, beginning with Bain and

Abstract When a voter comes to cast a ballot, some information about the candidates is evident on the ballot paper itself. Using multiple regression techniques, this study provides quantitative estimates of the impact of such information in recent British and Australian elections. The results suggest that whether the candidate's name comes first, middle, or last on the ballot paper has no effect on the vote in Britain. But it does matter in Australia, partly because voters are more likely to choose candidates whose names come first, but mostly because the major parties believe voters will do so and select candidates accordingly. In addition, women candidates are at an electoral disadvantage in Britain and at an even greater disadvantage in Australia. Most, but not all, of this disadvantage comes about because major parties are reluctant to nominate women candidates. Finally, in Britain candidates with an honorary title garner an appreciable deferential vote although candidates with an academic title do not. These effects range in size from a modest 2.5 percent of the vote to a substantial 12.5 percent.

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Hecock's 1957 study of alphabetic voting. However, almost all the studies have been limited in at least one of four ways. First, some have simply examined one electoral system and ignored crossnational comparisons. For example, an extensive literature has developed on alphabetic voting in Australia, but none of it has attempted to apply the findings to comparable electoral systems elsewhere (see Hughes, 1970; Mackerras, 1963, 1970; Masterman, 1964; Solomon, 1970). When a comparative approach has been used, this has typically involved comparison only of different levels of voting within the same country (Upton and Brook, 1974) or the same electoral system over time (Bagley, 1964). Secondly, there have been experimental and laboratory studies which, though useful, cannot easily be extrapolated to the real world of electoral politics (Mueller, 197; Taebel, 1975). Third, and perhaps most crucial, there has been little attempt to analyze the nomination procedures of political parties, insofar as they themselves choose candidates with names high in the alphabet, or candidates of a particular sex, or those with titles. Finally, the analytic methods used have often been weak, sometimes neglecting to control for other relevant variables (such as party) and rarely permitting any clear statement of the magnitude of the effects involved.

This paper extends the existing literature in three ways: by examining the effect of ballot paper cues in two related but quite different polities, Britain and Australia; by evaluating the crucial role of major party nominations: and by providing statistically rigorous estimates of the magnitude of the effects involved in the British general elections of February 1974, and the Australian federal elections of 1974, 1977, and 1980.[1] The estimates are based on multiple regression procedures. The paper begins with a brief discussion of the theory involved, followed by a section on the data and the methods used, and finally an evaluation of the findings.

Theory

Alphabetic voting is predicated on the belief that electors without any strong preferences among the candidates will be more inclined to

[1] Australia and Britain were chosen for the analysis for a number of reasons. First, they share many common characteristics in their political systems, but have widely differing electoral arrangements, one important difference being that voting is compulsory in Australia and voluntary in Britain. Second, each has spawned a political science literature on alphabetic voting over the past two decades on which further, more methodologically sophisticated research can be based. The elections covered in the analysis were chosen so as to represent the voting trends in the two polities as near the middle 1970s as possible. The British general election of February 1974 was chosen in preference to the October 1974 general election because more candidates stood in the former election, and there was therefore more opportunity to test our main hypotheses; the 1975 Australian federal election was excluded because of its polarised nature.

vote for the one whose name appears first on the ballot paper. This is consistent with psychological research on positional effects which has shown, that, for example, if a list of nonsense words is flashed briefly on a screen, the first is more often perceived correctly and more often recalled subsequently. Although the relevance of positional effects in electoral behavior has been the subject of much research, little is clear beyond the fact that it does exist in some political systems. There is general disagreement about its magnitude. For example, after testing a variety of hypotheses in what they considered a "crucial test" of alphabetic voting, the recent study by Bakker and Lijphart (1980:525) could only confirm that the effect, though modest, did exist for elections to university committees in Leiden.[2] Of more relevance to national politics, Robson and Walsh (1974:203), in an analysis of Irish elections conducted under the single transferable vote method of proportional representation, concluded that there was a "distinct advantage" in being first on the ballot paper. By contrast, a study of the 1964 British general election found "no concrete grounds for believing that positional bias occurred" (Upton and Brook, 1974:189).

We would speculate that such seemingly trivial and accidental factors as a candidate's position on the ballot paper would matter only for electors who have no preferences among the candidates and virtually no information about them—if voters are indifferent, they might as well vote for the first name that comes to their notice. Such electors are, of course, common but in the British system they would tend to abstain. But in the Australian electoral system, where voting is compulsory, they would be required to vote by law. So positional effects should, we argue, be stronger in Australia than in Britain.

Whatever the actual importance of position on the ballot paper, politicians may think that it matters and therefore behave in such a way as to make it real in its effects. In electoral systems which arrange candidates alphabetically on the ballot paper, politicians will often go to great lengths to secure the top position. For example, in

[2] We would argue that Bakker and Lijphart's test is *not* "crucial," for two reasons. First, university committee elections in a single university were used as a case study, but such elections are hardly typical of local, regional, or national elections in any state, especially insofar as campaign styles and party affiliations are concerned. Nor do the authors present evidence to suggest that the Leiden elections *are* in any way typical. Second, the phenomenon of alphabetic voting is only one of a number of interrelated ballot cues: we show in this paper that the majority of the effect is attributable to party nomination, a consideration irrelevant to elections for university committees. Furthermore, our argument and results (see Hypothesis 4 below) imply that university elections are precisely the kind of low salience, low involvement elections where ballot paper cues would be important, in contrast with national elections where they would be expected to be weak or nonexistent.

Australia in the 1960s the Democratic Labor Party was well known for consistently nominating candidates with names high in the alphabet (see Mackerras, 1970), and it is clear that these considerations were not entirely absent among the other major Australian parties. Consequently, potential candidates with names high in the alphabet had a better chance of gaining party nomination. And because anyone with major party support has a great advantage over independent and minor party candidates, they could be expected to get more votes, even if the voters in fact paid no attention to the candidate's position on the ballot paper.

The influence of a candidate's sex on the vote is a matter of considerable interest and importance, given the growing role of women in politics in most western countries. Research has suggested that women candidates should receive more votes than men because they receive more public attention (Stokes and Miller, 1962; Tolchin and Tolchin, 1973) but, on the other hand, there is often a tendency to view women in politics as usurping a traditional male role, and perhaps as being less suited to politics by temperament and training, and for those reasons women could be expected to receive fewer votes than comparable males (Erskine, 1971; Ferrell, 1974). Such evidence as there is suggests that in Australia the major parties are less likely to nominate women but that, once nominated, women candidates fare neither better nor worse than men (Mackerras, 1980b:454). Evidence from the United States also suggests that a candidate's sex does not matter, controlling for incumbency and party (Darcy and Schramm, 1977:9).

Nonetheless, given the prevalence of traditional views on sex roles in the electorate, we would expect women candidates to be at a disadvantage. This should be particularly so among voters who have no strong preferences among the candidates or little other information about them, just as it is among such voters that the candidate's position on the ballot paper might matter. The candidate's sex should, we believe, also be more important to socially (as opposed to economically) conservative voters, who will generally have stronger stereotypes and more traditional views about sex roles. And, whether or not it is actually true that women candidates get fewer votes, in political circles it is widely believed that they do. So, we believe, major parties will be less inclined to nominate women, and, denied that advantage, women candidates will get fewer votes even if the electorate is indifferent to candidate's sex.

In contrast with the large literature on alphabetic voting and the growing literature on women candidates, there is no substantial literature on the effect of a candidate's title. Politicians seem to think

that it matters, and candidates with titles usually take care to ensure that it is included in election literature and, if it is allowed, on the ballot paper. We would expect some difference toward candidates whose prominent positions in society are indicated by titles (e.g. Sir) or whose high status occupations are so indicated (e.g. Dr), particularly among voters with no clear preferences between, and little knowledge of, the candidates. Deference seems especially likely in Britain, where democratic norms and procedures were grafted onto a political system and culture that stressed rigid social inequality and marked deference between one class and another. It would be surprising if some vestiges of deference did not remain, not just within the electorate itself, but within party nomination committees.[3]

The argument is summarized in Figure 1, which shows the way the three ballot paper cues are hypothesized to effect the decisions of party nomination committees and the way they are predicted to affect the vote both directly and indirectly through their influence on nominations. The results presented below are based on this model. Specifically, we test four hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Candidates with names higher in the alphabet are likely, other things being equal, to get more votes (a) because they are more likely to come first on the ballot paper, and (b) because they are more likely to be nominated by a major party.



Figure 1. Hypothesized Model Showing Predicted Effects (+ indicates a positive influence and — a negative influence)

*** Britain only**

[3] The deference hypothesis is not tested in Australia, first, because there is a paucity of titled candidates, and second, because Australian federal election law does not permit the inclusion of titles on the ballot paper.

Hypothesis 2: Women candidates will get fewer votes than male candidates, other things being equal, (a) because voters prefer male candidates, and (b) because women candidates are less likely to be nominated by a major party.

Hypothesis 3: Candidates with titles will, other things being equal, get more votes (a) because voters prefer them, and (b) because they are more likely to be nominated by a major party.

We have argued that these ballot paper influences will be greater among voters who have no preference among the candidates and little other knowledge about them. Such voters are likely to stay home on polling day in Britain but not in Australia, where voting is compulsory, and so the effects should be stronger in Australia, hence:

Hypothesis 4: Ballot paper cues will be more important, other things being equal, among voters who have little knowledge about the candidates and no clear preferences among them, and hence more important in Australia than in Britain.

We turn now to the data and methods with which these hypotheses are tested.

Data and Method

The data are from standard published sources for the British general election of February 1974, and the 1974, 1977, and 1980 Australian federal elections (Craig, 1975; Mackerras, 1975, 1980a; Australian Electoral Office, 1980). The candidate is the unit of analysis, and for each candidate six variables are defined as follows (see Table 1 for scoring, means, and standard deviations). *Name* is a variable reflecting the ordinal position of the first two letters of the candidates last name, scored so that the candidates in the first third of the alphabet get a score of approximately 1 and those in the last third get a score of approximately 0.[4] *Sex* is a dummy variable scored 1 for women candidates and 0 for men. *HonTitle* and *AcaTitle* are dummy variables reflecting the possession of an honorary or academic title, respectively. *Position* is position on the ballot paper (whether first, middle, or last). $Party_i$ are a series of dummy variables for each major

[4] This variable was scored continuously from 0101 (for names beginning Aa) to 2626 (for names beginning Zz) and then transformed as described in the notes to Table 1 by a linear transformation. The effect of this cosmetic transformation is to convert the results into a more intuitively meaningful metric. It has no effect on other coefficients in the model, or on the correlations or standardized partial regression coefficients involving name.

Table 1. Variables, Means, and Standard Deviations

Variables	Scoring	Means and Standard Deviations: Britain Feb. 1974 Mean	Britain Feb. 1974 SD	Australia 1974–1980 Mean	Australia 1974–1980 SD
Name	First two letters of name from 0101 (Aa) to 2626 (Zz) and rescored from 1 (= name in first third of alphabet) to 0 (= name in last third).[a]	.51	.43	.46	.42
Sex	1 = female; 0 = male	.07	.25	.11	.31
Honorary title	1 = yes; 0 = no	.03	.18	n.a.	n.a.
Academic title	1 = yes; 0 = no	.03	.17	n.a.	n.a.
Major party	1 = yes; 0 = no				
	Labo(u)r	.30	.46	.25	.43
	Conservative (Britain) or Liberal (Australia)	.30	.46	.22	.41
	National Country Party (Australia only)	—	—	.07	.26
Position on ballot paper	1 = first; .5 = middle; 0 = last	.50	.39	.50	.35
Number of candidates	Natural logarithm of actual number	1.23	.21	1.42	.27
Vote	Percentage of valid votes cast for each candidate (first preference votes in Australia)	29.9	16.4	25.0	21.7

SOURCES: February 1974 British general election results ($N = 2{,}087$ candidates); 1974, 1977, and 1980 Australian federal election results (combined $N = 1{,}505$ candidates).

[a] The raw scores were transformed so that, on the average, candidates in the first third of the distribution of names got a score of 1 and those in the last third got 0. The transformation is new score = (raw score − 336)/1602. This linear transformation is purely cosmetic, creating an intuitively simple metric while leaving all standardized coefficients unchanged.

party (Conservatives and Labour in Britain; Labor, Liberal, and the National Country Party in Australia). *Vote* is the proportion of valid votes received. In Australia, which has a preferential voting system, first preference votes are used, an appropriate and conventional choice. *NCands* is the natural logarithm of the number of candidates standing in the constituency; it is included in the analysis as a control variable since the vote a candidate gets will depend on, among other things, the number of other candidates in the race.[5]

The total effect of the various ballot paper cues is estimated from Equation 1:

[5] As an alternative to this method of controlling for the number of candidates, analyses were run using a simple count of the number of candidates (instead of the logarithm) and also run separately for contests with only two candidates, contests with only three candidates, etc. The results of these analyses were essentially identical to those reported in the text.

$$\text{Vote} = a + b\ \text{Name} + c\ \text{Sex} + d\ \text{HonTitle} + e\ \text{AcaTitle} + f\ \text{NCands} + \text{err} \quad (1)$$

where the term a is the intercept, the terms b through f are metric partial regression coefficients, and err is a random error term. These coefficients are estimated by ordinary least squares regression; assuming that the relations between variables are, to a reasonable approximation, linear and additive (as appears to be the case) and the error terms independent, such estimates are known to be statistically optimal (e.g., Kmenta, 1971). The total effects given below in Table 2, column 1, are simply the metric partial regression coefficients for the corresponding variables, the effect of sex, for example, being the coefficient c.

Indirect effects are calculated from Equations 2 and 3 using the methods of Alwin and Hauser (1975):

$$\text{Vote} = a' + b'\ \text{Name} + c'\ \text{Sex} + d'\ \text{HonTitle} + e'\ \text{AcaTitle} + f'\ \text{NCands} + g_i'\ \text{Party}_i + \text{err}' \quad (2)$$

$$\text{Vote} = a'' + b''\ \text{Name} + c''\ \text{Sex} + d''\ \text{HonTitle} + e''\ \text{AcaTitle} + f''\ \text{NCands} + g_i''\ \text{Party}_i + h''\ \text{Position} + \text{err}'' \quad (3)$$

For example, the indirect effect of sex through major party nomination is $c' - c''$ and its indirect effect through position on the ballot paper is $c' - c''$.

Table 2. Direct and Indirect Effects of Ballot Paper Cues on the Vote in Britain (February 1974) and Australia (1974, 1977, and 1980)[a]

		Indirect Effects		
Variable and Country	*Total Effect =(2)+(3)+(4) (1)*	*Via Major Party Nomination (2)*	*Via Position on Ballot (3)*	*Direct Effect (4)*
Position of name in the alphabet (high)[b]				
1. Britain	−.7ns	−.1	−1.5	.9ns
2. Australia	2.9*	1.7	1.3	−.1ns
Sex (female)				
3. Britain	−4.1*	−1.5	.0	−2.6*
4. Australia	−10.2*	−6.2	.1	−4.1*
Title (Britain only)				
5. Honorary title	11.3*	5.3	0	6.1*
6. Academic title	−2.2ns	−2.0	0	−.1ns

Statistical tests are for total and direct effects only: * = statistically significant at $p < .05$; ns = not significant even at $p < .10$; unmarked entries are significant at $p < .10$. All tests are one-tailed.

[a] Estimated increase or decrease in the vote obtained by candidates with the indicated characteristics, in percentages, using OLS regression techniques. Detail may differ from total due to rounding. See Table 1 and text for definitions of variables.

[b] Scored so that figures reflect the additional vote gained by candidates whose names are in the first third of the alphabet compared to candidates whose names are in the last third.

Findings

ALPHABETIC VOTING

Candidates having names in the first third of the alphabet get neither more nor fewer votes than other candidates in Britain (Table 2); alphabetic voting is not statistically significant either in all (column 1) or through its direct effect (column 4). Nor do the political parties make any attempt to select candidates on the basis of their name (see Appendix Table A). This is consistent with previous analyses of Britain (Upton and Brook, 1974:189).

There is, however, a statistically significant effect in Australia, where a candidate with a name in the top third of the alphabet can expect to obtain an additional 2.9 percent of the vote compared to his counterparts in the bottom third of the alphabet, other things being equal (Table 2, line 2). This is in accord with previous work on the "donkey vote" in Australia (Benn, 1970; Mackerras, 1963, 1970) and provides important new evidence on the decidedly modest magnitude of the effect. The effect is largely due to parties selecting candidates with names high in the alphabet; 1.7 percent of the advantage comes about in this way, compared to 1.3 percent which is attributable to the electorate voting for the first name on the ballot. It thus appears that the Democratic Labour Party's conscious electoral tactic of selecting candidates high in the alphabet was not unique. These findings show that while there is alphabetic voting in Australia, the largest component of the effect stems from a conscious attempt by the political parties to secure an advantage from it, by selecting candidates at least partly for their name. The importance of party nominations in alphabetic voting is something which has not previously been taken into account, and sheds a new light on the phenomenon. It seems that it is not so much the voters who are donkeys as the parties.

SEX

In both Australia and Britain, being a woman is a distinct electoral disadvantage (Table 2, lines 3 and 4). The total effect is much greater in Australia, where women candidates can expect to lose 10 percent of the vote compared to their male counterparts. In Britain, the total disadvantage is much less, at 4 percent of the vote. In both countries this total effect comes about in large part because of patterns of party nomination. In Australia, 6 percent of the 10 percent disadvantage is accounted for (other things being equal) by parties failing to nominate women candidates, and only 4 percent because the electorate is less likely to vote for a woman candidate, while in Britain the figures are a little under 2 and 3 percent, respectively. There seems, therefore, to

be overt discrimination within the electorate against women candidates, although discrimination within party nomination committees is equally real, and in Australia substantially greater. These results are not consistent with earlier, more limited analyses which suggested that women candidates were not at an electoral disadvantage (Mackerras, 1980b: 454; Sawyer, 1981). But they do strongly support Mackerras's important insight that most of the disadvantage faced by Australian women comes about in the party nomination committees, not in the electorate.

These findings should be qualified by the fact that there were a limited number of women candidates in the elections covered and that we know little about their characteristics or about those of the electorates for which they are nominated, and so the conclusions must remain tentative. It is likely that there are two offsetting biases in these estimates. On the one hand, if women candidates are not being nominated for as many potentially "winnable" seats as men (as is alleged in Australia), then the results presented here *over*estimate the electoral disadvantage of being a woman. On the other hand, if women candidates need to be superior to men to secure a party nomination in the first place (as feminists argue), then the present findings *under*estimate the electoral disadvantage of being a woman since the vote-mobilizing abilities of women candidates will be superior to those of men. Without further data it is impossible to assess the magnitude of those biases but it may well be that to some extent they will cancel each other out, leaving the present estimates approximately correct.

It is useful to calculate the electoral disadvantage of being a woman for candidates nominated by each of the individual political parties. It might seem that the prejudice of right-wing electors toward women would be greatest since the philosophy of conservatism values the family and the traditional domestic role of women. The philosophy of both the British and Australian Labo(u)r Party, by contrast, is motivated by equality of opportunity, and feminism has been an element within the parties almost since their inception. But on the other hand, belief in traditional sex roles is closely tied to education and to "socially" conservative views which are commonest among the working class, that is among Labo(u)r's traditional voters. In the event, it seems as though the characteristics of the electorate rather than the philosophy of the parties is crucial in Britain (Table 3, line 1). The disadvantage faced by a woman candidate is greater within the Labour Party—nearly 6 percent of the vote—while the disadvantages within the Conservative, Liberal, and minor parties are small and statistically insignificant. Party and elite philosophies to the contrary

Table 3. Total Effects of Sex and Title on the Vote in Britain and Australia Separately by Party[a]

Variable and Country	*Labo(u)r Party (1)*	*Conservative (GB) or Liberal/NCP (Australia) (2)*	*Liberal Party (GB only) (3)*	*Minor Parties (4)*
Britain (February 1974)				
1. Sex (female)	−5.9*	−1.6ns	−1.7	.1ns
2. Honorary title	5.8	6.9*	—[b]	—[b]
3. Academic title	−2.2ns	1.3ns	1.1ns	1.1ns
Number of cases	(622)	(623)	(519)	(323)
Australia (1974–1980)				
4. Sex (female)	−6.7*	−16.0*	—	0.1ns
Number of cases	(377)	(436)	—	(692)

[a] OLS regression estimates of the percentage of the vote obtained.

[b] Too few titled candidates for analysis. Data on titles available for Britain only.

Statistical tests: * = statistically significant at $p < .05$; ns = not significant even at $p < .10$; unmarked entries are significant at $p < .10$. All tests are one-tailed.

notwithstanding, it is no accident that Britain's first female prime minister is a Conservative. But in Australia, the pattern is reversed (Table 3, line 4). Women running on the Labor ticket face a disadvantage as great as their British peers. But the (relatively few) women running for the Liberals or the National Country Party—ideologically conservative parties in a long-established coalition—face an even greater disadvantage, some 16 percent. It is not obvious why this is so. It may be that the Australian Labor Party's clear ideological position on women has modified the Labor electorate's views, or that the conservative ideologies of the Liberal and National Country Party have influenced their electorate, or both or, indeed, something else entirely. Since Britain and Australia differ even though their parties take similar ideological stances and have broadly similar social bases, it would seem that neither party ideology nor the electorate's social characteristics alone determine how the electorate reacts to women candidates for political office.

In both countries women running as independents or on minor party tickets face no disadvantage, but they have no realistic chance of being elected either. It is tempting to speculate that voters are reacting to them on purely symbolic grounds (for which gender is irrelevant) rather than evaluating their fitness for office (for which gender will be relevant in some voters' estimation).

DEFERENCE

In Britain, a candidate's title appears on the ballot paper, ranging from honorary titles (such as knighthoods) to academic titles (professor, doctor) and these titles are also freely used in election literature.

Table 2 (lines 5 and 6) shows that an honorary title benefits a candidate by a substantial 11 percent of the vote, 5 percent of which is attributable to major parties nominating candidates with titles. This large effect is reduced, however, if incumbency is added to the regression equation, and it may well be that candidates receive honorary titles in part because they are successful electorally and for their party service—as occurs, for example, when an MP becomes a Privy Councillor—rather than being successful electorally because they have a title. So the advantage to be derived solely from the title is thus probably substantially less than the figures suggest.

Given the varied predispositions of the major British parties toward honorary titles, it might be expected that the advantage of a title would differ between them. For example, Conservative and to some extent Liberal political philosophy views titles in general and the House of Lords in particular as an integral part of the political system. The Labour Party, on the other hand, is ideologically opposed to the House of Lords and the type of deference exemplified by honorary titles. Table 3 shows the advantage of a title for the Labour and Conservative candidates in Britain. The results indicate that there is very little difference in the deference shown to their candidates by the electorate. Despite Labour's egalitarian policies an honorary title is no less of an advantage to a Labour candidate than to a Conservative candidate.

As regards academic title, there is bad news for academics viewing a political career as an escape from redundancy. An academic title has no significant influence on the vote, either in general (Table 2, line 6) or for any particular party (Table 3, line 3).

AUSTRALIA VERSUS BRITAIN

The fourth hypothesis states that ballot paper cues will have greater salience where voters have little information about the candidates and no clear preferences between them. This can be tested by comparing Australia and Britain, since everyone has to vote in Australia while voters with no strong feelings about the elections frequently do not bother to vote in Britain—some 21 percent did not vote in the election analyzed here. In the event, in both cases where Australia and Britain can be compared, the results support this hypothesis. Alphabetic voting exists in Australia but not in Britain. And the effect of candidate's sex, while significant in both countries, is three times as consequential in Australia. While each of these differences could perhaps be ascribed to other factors differentiating the two countries, it at least remains a plausible hypothesis that they are due to the fact that electors with no particular interest in or views about the candidates are forced to vote in Australia but not in Britain.

Discussion

The findings of this paper can be summarized briefly. First, the position of a candidate's name in the alphabet, and consequently his position on the ballot paper, is irrelevant in Britain. But candidates with names in the first third of the alphabet gain, on the average, an additional 3 percent of the vote in Australia. This is not so much because the electorate votes for the candidate at the top of the ballot (although the "donkey vote" does account for one percent of the advantage) as because the major parties think the electorate are donkeys and choose candidates with names high in the alphabet (that accounts for the remaining 2 percent of the advantage).

Second, women candidates are at an electoral disadvantage, getting a vote about 4 percent lower than men in Britain and 10 percent lower in Australia. In part this is because voters are less likely to vote for women candidates. That prejudice accounts for about 2.5 percent of the disadvantage in Britain and 4 percent in Australia. But the rest of the disadvantage is the political parties' doing: major parties are less likely to nominate women candidates. That accounts for almost two-thirds of the disadvantage faced by women in Australia, although only one-third in Britain. In Britain, it is Labour's women candidates who suffer most while Conservative women are at no appreciable disadvantage, but in Australia the reverse is true. Although Labor's candidates suffer, candidates from the Conservatives suffer even more.

Third, British candidates with honorary titles obtain a somewhat larger vote than untitled candidates. About half of this is because they are more likely to obtain nomination from the major parties. But, alas for academics, possession of an academic title is no electoral help whatsoever.

Finally, the effect of these ballot paper cues is much greater in Australia than in Britain. This may be because the Australian system of compulsory voting forces uninformed electors and those without any preference between the candidates to vote, and it is among such voters that the modest but visible clues on the ballot paper are salient.

In the context of electoral competition it could be argued that the aggregate effect of these ballot paper cues is small and relatively insignificant. After all, the major influences on voting behavior are considerably larger and more important. It is, however, worth noting that a large proportion of seats in Australia and Britain change hands on small electoral swings and are therefore susceptible to the three influences discussed in this paper. For example, of the 124 Australian federal electorates, 25 could have changed hands in the 1977 election

through a swing of 4.1 percent or less, and therefore could have been won or lost solely on the sex of the candidate. In Britain, 97 constituencies in the October 1974 general election could have been lost on a swing of 6.1 percent or less and could therefore have changed hands solely on the candidate's title—or lack of it. A further 35 British constituencies needed a swing of 2.6 percent percent or less to change hands, which could have been provided solely by the effect of sex. Bearing in mind the narrow majorities winning parties often possess, these effects are clearly of potential importance in determining electoral outcomes.

Perhaps the single most important factor outlined here, and one which has been ignored in previous research, is the role of the political party in its nomination of candidates. It appears that party leaders, particularly in Australia, often perceive that there is an advantage to be gained by putting forward a candidate with a name high in the alphabet, or a man in preference to a woman, and make their selection accordingly. Our findings indicate that the electoral effect of these selection procedures is often the major reason why women, and those with names low in the alphabet, do poorly in elections. The problems of alphabetic voting and sexual disadvantage rest less with the electors themselves than with the perceptions the party elites have of their electors.

Appendix Table A. Correlations for Britain (Above Diagonal) and Australia (Below Diagonal) (Decimals Omitted)[a]

Variable	*(1)*	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*	*(7)*	*(8)*	*(9)*	*(10)*
1. Note		−011	−066	128	−025	355	316	—	−037	−347
2. Name high in alphabet	073		021	−001	−025	013	012	—	701	−022
3. Sex (female)	−157	065		−015	001	−011	−036	—	005	004
4. Honorary title (GB only)	—	—	—	—	−031	−035	154	—	007	−015
5. Academic title (GB only)	—	—	—	—		−005	−037	—	−011	000
Party										
6. Labo(u)r	521	006	000	—	—		−425	—	021	−128
7. Conservative (GB) or Liberal (Australia)	415	037	−118	—	—	−306		—	−017	−124
8. National Country (Australia)	137	037	−039	—	—	−160	−146		—	—
9. Position on ballot (first/middle/last)	055	697	−021	—	—	−030	052	018		003
10. Number of candidates	−292	−025	023	—	—	−146	−090	−032	−021	

[a] See Table 1 for definitions of variables, means, and standard deviations. $N = 2,087$ candidates in the February 1974 British general elections and $N = 1,505$ in the 1974, 1977, and 1980 Australian federal elections.

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Race, Gender, and Opinion Toward Black and Female Presidential Candidates

LEE SIGELMAN AND SUSAN WELCH

ALTHOUGH the expressed willingness of the American public to vote for a black or a female candidate for president has increased steadily over the years, sizable minorities continue to say that they would not vote for a black or a female presidential candidate (Ferree, 1974; Schreiber, 1978). Until 1984, of course, the question "If your party nominated a black [a woman] for president, would you vote for him [her] if he [she] were qualified for the job?" was purely hypothetical, for until then there were no serious black or female challengers for the presidency. Trends in response to this question are nonetheless interesting for what they suggest about the extent to which blacks and women—who for a long time could not even aspire to high national office—have gained acceptance as legitimate potential contenders for the nation's highest office. Our purpose in this paper is to pinpoint the sources of opposition to a black and a woman presidential candidate. Whereas attempts have in the past been made to analyze the sources of opposition to a potential black presidential candidate or a potential female presidential candidate, to our knowledge these two

Abstract Using data from the 1974 and 1978 General Social Surveys, public opinion toward blacks and women as presidential candidates was explored. We tested the hypotheses that white males would be least likely to support presidential candidates from both groups, while black females would be the most likely to express this support. We found that although blacks in general were more supportive of black candidacies than were whites, women were not consistently more supportive of female candidates. While black women were more likely than black males to support female candidates, among whites few gender differences were found.

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issues have not been joined (see Peek and Brown, 1980, for a preliminary move in this direction).

When we think of the two issues jointly, four possibilities emerge, as indicated in Table 1. Cells I and IV contain the two polar opposite types—those who say they would vote for neither a black nor a woman, and those who say they would be willing to vote for both. Between the polar types fall the intermediate types—those who would be willing to vote for a black but not a woman (Cell III) and those who would vote for a woman but not a black (Cell II). Using this fourfold classification, we should be able to determine whether blacks and women are the targets of one set of individuals who are *generally* opposed to "outgroup" candidacies, or whether different types of people comprise the opposition to blacks and women.

Previous Research

Although there have been many studies of support for and opposition to women and blacks as political leaders, there are scarcely any attempts to look at the question of whether blacks and women are the targets of generalized anti-minority feeling or whether each group is a specific target. Hedlund, et al. (1979) found in a local survey of voters that liberals were more likely than conservatives to vote for black candidates but not female ones. They also found that women were more likely to vote for female candidates (with some exceptions) than were men, but were nearly as likely to vote for black candidates as for female ones. Older people were less likely to vote for either blacks and females than were younger people, but the age-based differences were small, as were those based on level of education. In an experimental study, Adams (1975) found that among college undergraduates black candidates received considerably more than their proportional share of the vote while women received only slightly more than their share. Support for women was greater for local than national races.

In another experimental voting study conducted with undergraduates, Sigelman and Sigelman (1982) found that while little overall bias

Table 1. Fourfold Classification of Respondents

		Vote for a Woman?	
		No	Yes
Vote for a Black?	No	I	II
	Yes	III	IV

existed against women and minorities, there were marked *subgroup* biases. White females displayed a strong profemale bias, while white males had a weaker bias in the opposite direction. The small number of blacks in the study tended to support black candidates, and black men did so very strongly when the black candidate was male. White males were more likely than white females to show an antiblack bias.

Sigelman and Sigelman's explanation for these patterns of support and opposition is that voters are drawn to candidates who are more like themselves. Consistent with this interpretation, Hershey (1980) found black students more likely than whites to vote for black candidates, and females for females. Aggregate data examined by Karnig and Welch (1981) confirm that blacks as a whole are predisposed to vote for blacks, and whites to vote for whites in city council races. On the other hand, Ferree (1974) found that men were more likely than women to say they would vote for a female for president during the 1960s, but this appears to be an anomaly in light of earlier patterns of higher female support (Spitze and Huber, 1980), and of later data showing little difference between men and women in support of a female presidential candidate (Schreiber, 1978).

This similarity-attraction perspective permits us to predict patterns of willingness to vote for women or blacks on the basis of the fourfold classification presented in Table 1:

1. A higher proportion of white males than of white females, black males, or black females should fall into Cell I of Table 1, because white males do not share either the race of the black candidate or the gender of the female candidate.

2. A higher proportion of white females than of any other group should fall into Cell II, because white females share the gender of the female candidate but not the race of the black candidate.

3. A higher proportion of black males than of any other group should fall into Cell III, because black males share the race of the black candidate but not the gender of the female candidate.

4. A higher proportion of black females than of any other group should fall into Cell IV, because black females share both the race of the black candidate and the gender of the female candidate.

The purpose of this paper is to test these expectations using the NORC General Social Survey data (Davis, 1980). After examining the patterns of support for women and blacks as presidential candidates among the four race/gender groups, we explore the effect of other subgroup characteristics on this support. The magnitude of the effects of race and gender will indicate the strength of outgroup sentiment, while the presence of significant effects of other variables will indicate the extent that other factors modify these ingroup-outgroup attitudes.

Data and Methods

The items on voting for a black or a woman for president have been used in most of the General Social Surveys that NORC has conducted since 1972, but only in 1974 and 1978 was the question about the black presidential candidate asked of black respondents. After preliminary analysis indicated that marginal frequencies and subgroup differences were stable across the two surveys, we combined the two data sets in order to simplify the presentation of findings and to enlarge the pool of black respondents.

The independent variables are, of course, race and gender. Those who did not classify themselves as black or white were excluded from the analysis. Race and gender are by no means the only factors that affect attitudes about the political role of blacks and women. For example, there are those who oppose an active role for women in politics. Some of these people also find it difficult to support a black for high office as well. Although the evidence on most of these traits is mixed, we might expect that older people, those with less formal education, conservatives, southerners, small-town dwellers, and frequent church attenders may be less favorably disposed toward both women and racial minorities (Schreiber, 1978; Thornton and Freedman, 1979; Welch and Sigelman, 1982, Hedlund, et al., 1979). Unless such factors are brought into the analysis as control variables, we run the risk of misstating the impact of race and gender upon the willingness to vote for a black and/or a female presidential candidate. Accordingly, our analysis includes a large set of such controls, described in conjunction with Table 3 below.

Findings

Table 2 summarizes the answers of the four sets of respondents to the two items on which our interest centers. Looking first at the marginal frequencies, we see that overall 73.0 percent indicated that they were willing to vote for a black or a female candidate for president; only 7.4 percent said that they would vote for neither a black nor a woman; another 8.6 percent claimed that they would vote for a woman but not a black; and the remaining 11.0 percent said that they would vote for a black but not a woman. Either a black or a female presidential candidate, then, would be a target of considerable opposition based solely upon race and gender: more than one respondent in four admitted that they would not vote for one or the other or both.

Looking across the columns in Table 2, we see that white males

Table 2. Intergroup Comparison of Potential Votes

Would Vote for:	*White Males*	*White Females*	*Black Males*	*Black Females*	*Total*
Neither a black nor a female (I)[a]	7.7%	8.3%	0.0%	2.8%	7.4%
A female but not a black (II)	10.6	8.4	0.8	3.3	8.6
A black but not a female (III)	9.4	11.4	21.9	10.5	11.0
Both a black and a female (IV)	72.2	71.8	77.3	83.4	73.0
	99.9 (1,123)	99.9 (1,366)	100.0 (128)	100.0 (181)	100.0 (2,798)

[a] Cell I in Table 1.

NOTE:

I Both white groups significantly different from both black groups.
II Both white groups significantly different from both black groups.
III Both white groups significantly different from black males; black females significantly different from black males.
IV Both white groups significantly different from black females.

White males – Black males = ns

were significantly more likely (7.7 percent) to oppose both black and female candidates than were either black males (0.0 percent) or black females (2.8 percent). This is not to say that black males were "equal opportunity" voters; in fact, fully 21.9 percent of the black males said that they would not vote for a female candidate—a proportion slightly (though nonsignificantly) higher than either of the white groups and significantly higher than black females. Black women were the most likely (83.4 percent) to say that they would be willing to vote for both a black and a female candidate. White women, however, were about equally hostile as white males to the prospect of voting for a female presidential candidate.

On the basis of these simple frequencies, two of our four hypotheses were partially confirmed while the other two were supported.

1. Counter to expectations, the proportion of white females is not significantly different from the proportion of white males in Cell I, opposing both female and black presidential candidates. Confirming expectations, however, the proportion of whites in Cell I is significantly larger than the proportion of blacks.

2. Counter to expectations, about the same proportion of white males as white females fall in Cell II, supporting females but opposing blacks. As predicted, more black women than black men appear in Cell II, though this difference is not statistically significant.

3. Consonant with expectations, a significantly higher proportion of

black males than any other group is found in Cell III, supporting blacks but opposing female candidates.

4. Consonant with expectations, more black females than any other group fit into Cell IV, supporting both black and female candidates; the proportion of black females in this group is significantly higher than that of either white group.

Because these intergroup differences may have been either inflated or suppressed by uncontrolled factors, it is necessary to reexamine the impact of race and gender with other factors held constant. For

Table 3. Discriminant Analysis Summary

	Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficient	
Predictor	*Function I*	*Function II*
Age	−.577	.377
Education	.352	.001
Occupational prestige	.021	−.048
City size (logged)	−.063	.111
Church attendance	.022	.642
Religion		
Catholic	.189	.022
Jewish	.141	.025
None	.168	.142
Other	−.027	.064
Region		
New England	.237	.357
Mid-Atlantic	.388	.479
East North Central	.405	.477
West North Central	.338	.318
South Atlantic	−.044	.257
West South Central	.180	.252
Mountain	.289	.174
Pacific	.415	.515
White female	.040	.233
Black male	.267	.587
Black female	.276	.209
Group Centroids		
I (Support neither)	−1.028	−0.082
II (Female +, black −)	−0.461	−0.459
III (Black +, female −)	−0.409	0.500
IV (Support both)	0.212	−0.012
Canonical Correlation	.354	.210

NOTE: The omitted religion is Protestant; the omitted region is East South Central (Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi and Tennessee). The omitted race-gender combination is white male. Detailed information on each predictor can be found in the codebook for the General Social Survey data. Age is expressed in years. Education is number of years of school completed. Occupational prestige scores are on a scale developed at NORC. Church attendance is a 9-point scale ranging from "never" to "several times a week." Regional demarcations can be found in the General Social Survey codebook.

this purpose we have used multiple discriminant analysis (Klecka, 1980); of the multivariate techniques now in use, discriminant analysis is best suited to nominal-level dependent variables containing more than two categories.

Table 3 shows the results of the discriminant analysis, in which the various race-gender combinations were used along with the control variables to predict membership in the four groups defined on the basis of willingness or unwillingness to vote for a black or a woman for president.[1] Examination of the group centroids (the mean positions on each function for each group) indicates that the first function discriminates between those who said that they would vote for neither a black nor a female presidential candidate, and those who said they would vote for both. By contrast, Function II discriminates between those who said they would vote for a woman but not a black (centroid= −.459) and those who said they would vote for a black but not a woman (centroid= +.500); the "neither" and "both" centroids fall into the middle range of the Function II scores.

The discriminant analysis largely confirmed the bivariate one. Blacks were more likely than whites to support "both" rather than "neither" type of candidate, while black males were substantially more likely than any other group to support blacks but not females. White males were the most predisposed to support females but not blacks.

Conclusions

Contrary to our predictions, white men are about as likely as white women to support female candidates. With this exception, our findings are largely consonant with the proposition that in voting for president, as in other aspects of social life, people are most favorable toward others like themselves. In this case, the salient group characteristics that we have examined are race and gender. These subgroup identifiers are reasonably good predictors of candidate preferences, which is especially noteworthy in this case where strong majorities of each group evidence the same predispositions.

The factor of race conforms to our expectations completely, with blacks being noticeably more supportive of black candidacies than are

[1] The discriminant analysis produced three functions (linear combinations of discriminating variables), but only the first two, which contained 73.7 percent and 21.0 percent, respectively, of the total discriminatory power, were statistically significant ($p < .01$). Further evidence of the relative superiority of Function I in discriminating among groups is provided by the canonical correlations of .354 for Function I and .210 for Function II.

whites. However, the factor of gender has the predicted impact only among blacks. Black women are more likely than black males to support female candidates, but the same is not true among whites. Compared to whites of both sexes, black females are somewhat more supportive of female candidates and black males slightly less supportive.

Our findings also permit the observation that among each group there is some prejudice. It is obvious that some whites are prejudiced against blacks, but it is equally obvious from our data that some black males are prejudiced against women.

A final observation is that we have analyzed only responses to a hypothetical question. Some respondents may, because of the social undesirability of presenting themselves as racist or sexist, have claimed that they would be willing to vote for a black or female candidate when in the actual event they would refuse to do so. On the other hand, the extent to which those disposed against a candidate of a particular race or gender would actually vote against him or her may depend on other factors. Just as in a classic study, many hotel owners who verbally expressed the policy of not accepting Asian travelers had, at an earlier time, accepted them as hotel patrons (LaPiere, 1934; see also Kutner, et al., 1952), many voters saying they would not vote for a black or female may in fact decide to do so on the basis of candidate qualifications, party loyalty, issue position, or attractive personality. That possibility awaits further study.

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Yea-Saying, Nay-Saying, and Going to Extremes: Black-White Differences in Response Styles

JERALD G. BACHMAN AND PATRICK M. O'MALLEY

IT HAS long been recognized that response styles, or response sets, can influence measures of abilities, attitudes, opinions, beliefs, and personality (Couch and Keniston, 1960; Cronbach, 1946, 1950; Hamilton, 1968; Oskamp, 1977). Oskamp defines response sets as "systematic ways of answering which are not directly related to the question content, but which represent typical behavioral characteristics of the respondents" (1977:37). One of the more widely studied response styles is agreement, or yea-saying—the tendency to agree with questionnaire or personality test items regardless of content. A related but less studied pattern has been termed the extreme response style—the tendency for some individuals to use the extreme ends of response scales (e.g., strongly agree, strongly disagree) while

Abstract This paper reports an important racial difference in patterns of responding to Likert-type items: blacks are more likely than whites to use the extreme response categories, particularly the positive end of agree-disagree scales. This finding appeared consistently in several large-scale nationally representative surveys of youth. Response style indexes (Agreement, Disagreement, Acquiescence, and Extreme Responding) display ranges of individual differences and cross-time stabilities comparable to commonly used personality measures. Response styles show no consistent differences by sex, and no appreciable correlation with indicators of family socioeconomic level or with educational accomplishments and aspirations. For both races, agreement tendencies are stronger among those in the South, especially in nonmetropolitan areas; however, controlling for geography does little to reduce overall black-white differences. The findings reveal potential pitfalls in dealing with racial differences in survey and personality measures, and illustrate the need for great caution in reporting and interpreting such differences.

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others are more likely to use the middle values (e.g., mostly agree, mostly disagree) (Hamilton, 1968). As Couch and Keniston pointed out, one perspective is to view such response styles as "primarily a statistical nuisance that must be controlled or suppressed by appropriate mathematical techniques," but another perspective treats response styles as "a manifestation of a deep-seated personality syndrome" (1960:151). Both perspectives are relevant for the present study.

For several years we have been aware of some fairly substantial differences between black and white high school seniors in their patterns of responding to Likert-type questionnaire items. Specifically, blacks are more likely than whites to agree in response to agree-disagree items, and to use the extreme ends of response scales. We did not originally set out to search for these differences in response styles; rather, we discovered them serendipitously in the process of making more general comparisons of blacks and whites across a wide range of questions tapping attitudes, opinions, and personality dimensions. But once aware of the overall differences in response distributions, we considered it worthwhile to investigate them further. The present paper, based on those further investigations, is intended to document the extent of black-white differences in response styles, to explore some possible explanations, and to illustrate some special problems and pitfalls facing those who analyze and report racial differences in attitudes and personality.

Methods

The data for this report come from the Monitoring the Future project, an ongoing study of high school seniors conducted by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan. The study design has been described elsewhere (Bachman and Johnston, 1978; Bachman, et al., 1983); briefly, it involves nationally representative surveys of each high school senior class, beginning in 1975, plus follow-up surveys mailed each year to a subset of each senior class sample.

SAMPLES AND SURVEY PROCEDURES

A three-stage national probability sample leads to questionnaire administrations in about 130 high schools (approximately 110 public and 20 private), and yields approximately 17,000 respondents each year. The response rate is generally about 80 percent of all sampled seniors.

The surveys of seniors involve questionnaires administered by professional interviewers from the Institute for Social Research during school hours, usually in regularly scheduled class periods. Five different questionnaire forms are used in each survey, thus providing coverage of a broad range of topics while keeping the questionnaires short enough so that most seniors can complete them within a single class period.[1]

In addition to the senior year, or base-year, data collections, annual follow-up surveys are mailed to representative subsamples of each base-year sample for a period which eventually will extend to 10 years following graduation. Follow-up questionnaires, which repeat most of the items which appeared in the base-year questionnaires, are sent by certified mail, along with a check for five dollars. This approach, coupled with reminders by mail and telephone when necessary, yields a follow-up response rate of 80 percent or better.

Results and Discussion

BLACK-WHITE DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSE DISTRIBUTIONS

We begin by providing some specific illustrations of the phenomenon which prompted this investigation. Table 1 displays several questionnaire items and the response distributions for black and white high school seniors (class of 1982). Each of the six items shows higher percentages of blacks than whites at both ends of the response scale; indeed, these particular items show about half again as many blacks as whites at the extremes. The first item in Table 1 could lend itself to several different interpretations, depending upon the biases (or carelessness) of the reporter: it could be the basis for saying that higher proportions of blacks would support some foreign interventions, or it could be cited to show higher proportions of blacks clearly disagreeing, or it could be used to indicate no clear differences between blacks and whites (since the *mean* responses for blacks and whites are virtually identical). Item 2, from the Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem scale, shows that blacks are substantially more likely than whites to state unqualified agreement; however, when we combine the "agree" and "mostly agree" categories we see that the proportions of blacks and whites choosing some positive response are virtually identical (about 9 out of 10). Furthermore, blacks are twice as likely as whites to show disagreement with this item, although the

[1] It should be noted that some respondents fail to complete questionnaires, and this occurs more frequently among black respondents than among whites. As we document later, this has not seriously distorted the findings reported here.

Table 1. Examples of Black-White Differences in Response Distributions in Agree-Disagree and other Likert-Type Scales: High School Seniors, Class of 1982

	Blacks[a]	*Whites*[a]	*B-W*[b]
1. There may be times when the U.S. should go to war to protect the rights of other countries (2A18b)[c]			
1. Disagree	35	24	+11
2. Mostly disagree	17	26	−9
3. Neither	13	17	−4
4. Mostly agree	16	22	−5
5. Agree	18	12	+7
(Weighted number of cases)	(401)	(2,763)	
2. I am able to do things as well as most other people (5D1d)			
1. Disagree	3	1	+2
2. Mostly disagree	4	2	+2
3. Neither	3	6	−3
4. Mostly agree	29	45	−16
5. Agree	61	46	+14
(Weighted number of cases)	(367)	(2,677)	
3. People who accept their condition in life are happier than those who try to change things (5D1g)			
1. Disagree	25	18	+6
2. Mostly disagree	16	27	−10
3. Neither	17	21	−4
4. Mostly agree	22	21	+1
5. Agree	20	13	+7
(Weighted number of cases)	(363)	(2,670)	
4. A lot of times I feel lonely (5D1k)			
1. Disagree	25	17	+8
2. Mostly disagree	16	32	−16
3. Neither	12	18	−6
4. Mostly agree	26	21	+4
5. Agree	22	12	+10
(Weighted number of cases)	(363)	(2,671)	
5. How closely do your ideas agree with your PARENTS' ideas about . . . how you spend your money? (4E7d)			
1. Very similar	17	12	+5
2. Mostly similar	27	37	−10
3. Mostly different	18	27	−9
4. Very different	33	21	+12
5. Don't know	5	4	+2
(Weighted number of cases)	(307)	(2,476)	
6. To what extent are there problems of dishonesty and immorality in . . . the Presidency and the administration? (2D4g)			
1. Not at all	8	4	+4
2. Slight	19	24	−5
3. Moderate	19	33	−14
4. Considerable	18	20	−3
5. Great	16	9	+7
8. No opinion	20	10	+10
(Weighted number of cases)	(333)	(2,606)	

[a] Entries are percentages. Due to rounding, values do not always add to 100.

[b] Entries are differences in percentages (percentage for blacks minus percentage for whites) computed before rounding. Due to rounding, values do not always add to zero.

[c] Indicates source is questionnaire Form 2, Part A, Item 18b.

percentages in both cases are very small. Clearly, self-esteem comparisons between blacks and whites can be affected substantially by the ways in which such items are scaled and scored—a point to which we return later. Items 3 and 4 show distinctly higher percentages of blacks than whites at both extremes of the scale, and also show some greater tendency among blacks to choose responses on the positive side of the scale (i.e., equal or greater proportions of "mostly agree" as well as "agree").

The last two items in Table 1 were included to illustrate the fact that the phenomenon of interest is not limited to agree-disagree scales. Item 5 shows that blacks are half again as likely as whites to report that their own and their parents' ideas about money are very similar, but also half again as likely to report that such ideas are very dissimilar. Item 6 shows still another type of response scale, and again there are higher proportions of blacks than whites at both extremes. Interestingly, there are also twice as many blacks as whites who select the "no opinion" response to this item.[2]

The items in Table 1 were not selected at random; on the contrary, we deliberately chose some of the more dramatic instances which first attracted our attention to black-white differences in response styles. When we set about to discover just how general a phenomenon this is, our first step was simply to compare black and white frequency distributions for all items in the Monitoring the Future surveys which employ Likert-type response scales. We included virtually all items which met the following criteria: (1) an ordinal response scale with at least four categories; (2) not part of a demographic segment (including parent's education, own future plans, political preferences, etc.); (3) not strictly factual reporting (e.g., how often one used drugs); (4) not an item dealing with racial attitudes (since we would, a priori, expect large racial differences that would very likely swamp any general differences in response style).

Just over 400 separate items met the above requirements as well as one additional criterion: they had appeared in each of the latest three Monitoring the Future surveys—those involving the graduating classes of 1980, 1981, and 1982. We examined these items to see

[2] We observed a tendency for higher proportions of blacks than whites to check "don't know" or "can't say" responses on a number of different item sets, provided such responses were located "off scale" (i.e., set somewhat apart from the other response categories). While we have not analyzed that tendency systematically, we note that it should operate somewhat against the tendency for blacks to be overrepresented at the scale extremes—simply because there are fewer blacks available to choose the extremes when larger numbers of them select "don't know" responses. (As Table 1 illustrates, our procedure was to *include* "don't know" and other such categories in our percentage calculations.)

whether there were larger percentages of blacks than whites at *each* end of the response distribution (apart from "off scale" categories such as "don't know") *for all three years*. The likelihood of any such occurrence purely by chance (assuming no real difference between blacks and whites) is somewhat smaller than 2 percent, probably smaller than 1 percent.[3] Nevertheless, out of a total of 404 items examined, 129 (32 percent) showed the pattern of greater percentages of blacks than whites at both scale extremes for all three years. When we focused specifically on those items using the agree-disagree format, we found the pattern in 48 percent (63 out of 130). We also searched for any instances involving the reverse phenomenon: higher percentages of whites than blacks at both scale extremes. We found not a single instance among the agree-disagree items for even one year, much less three. Among the other 274 items, only two showed greater percentages of whites than blacks at the extremes; these two items showed that effect for all three years (as well as most earlier survey years).[4]

We were able to examine response distributions in two other nationwide surveys of youth. The first is the National Center for Educational Statistics' "High School and Beyond, 1980" survey of more than 28,000 seniors in 1980 (National Opinion Research Center, 1980). Included in the questionnaire were six items measuring self-esteem and six measuring internal control, all employing the following response scale: "Agree strongly, Agree, Disagree, Disagree strongly, No opinion." (Note that this scale is different from that used in the Monitoring the Future surveys.) When response distributions were computed separately for blacks and whites (omitting all other

[3] If we assume no true difference between distributions for blacks and whites, then the likelihood of finding at least a slightly higher percentage of blacks than whites at one extreme of the scale would be about .5; and the likelihood of finding greater proportions of blacks at both scale extremes would be .5 squared, or .25, if the two events were independent. (They are not, so that probability would actually be smaller.) The likelihood of an event with probability of .25 occurring three times in a row (i.e., in 1980, 1981, and 1982) would be $.25^3$, or .0156. If the probability of a higher percentage of blacks at both extremes purely by chance were .2 for any given year, the likelihood of that happening all three years would be $.2^3$, or .008. Of course, one could do specific tests of the significance of differences on each of the more than 1,200 comparisons we undertook; fortunately, the findings are sufficiently clear and dramatic to make such an effort unnecessary.

[4] Both of the items showing greater percentages of whites at the extremes involved personal preferences about fractions of time worked by husband and wife, using a 4-point rating scale ranging from "not at all acceptable" to "desirable" (see items 2A9b and 2A10a in Bachman, et al, 1983). It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide further details on the various types of scales and items we examined, but the data are available in the Monitoring the Future reports of questionnaire responses (Bachman, et al., 1981, 1983; Johnston, et al., 1982).

racial/ethnic subgroups), we found that for 7 of the 12 items there were higher percentages of blacks than whites in both the "Strongly agree" and the "Strongly disagree" categories, and for the remaining five items there were more blacks than whites at one extreme but not the other. Only five other items in the survey used the agree-disagree response format, and these were somewhat factual (evaluations of various school programs). Higher percentages of blacks than whites selected the "Agree strongly" alternative in each case, but only one of the five items also showed a higher percentage of blacks than whites selecting the "Disagree strongly" category.

The other study we examined is the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) of Labor Market Experience (Center for Human Resource Research, 1981), which in 1980 interviewed more than 3,000 blacks and 7,000 whites between the ages of 15 and 23. A variety of Likert-type response scales were employed; a total of 64 items met our four criteria. The tabulations made available to us consisted of sex-by-race subgroups; therefore, our comparisons of blacks and whites were carried out for males and females separately.[5] Among males we found the phenomenon of higher percentages of blacks than whites at both scale extremes for 28 of the items, or 44 percent. Among females the phenomenon appeared for 19 items, or 30 percent. We then narrowed our focus to include only items which used an agree-disagree scale, specifically: "Strongly agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly disagree" (no "undecided" category was offered, and tabulations were limited to the four levels of agreement). A 10-item measure of self-esteem employed that response scale, and six of the items showed the phenomenon of greater percentages of black respondents at both extremes (true for both males and females). Eight other items dealing with "family attitudes" also employed the agree-disagree scale, and the phenomenon appeared for six of the items among males and two of the items among females. (There were substantial sex differences on a number of these items dealing with sex-role stereotypes.) The reverse phenomenon of higher percentages of whites than blacks at both extremes did not appear for any of the agree-disagree items; however, among the remaining items it did appear in four instances for the females and once for the males.

The NLS study permits us to generalize our findings not only to a broader age group, but also to a different survey method. Whereas both Monitoring the Future and High School and Beyond employ school-administered questionnaires, the NLS uses household inter-

[5] We are grateful to Dr. Joan E. Crowley, who kindly provided the tabulations from the National Longitudinal Surveys.

views, with respondents answering interviewer questions while referring to a card showing the response scale.

In sum, we have examined a large number of response distributions from three studies of youth, and all have provided clear evidence that blacks are more likely than whites to use the extreme response categories on Likert-type scales, particularly those employing an agree-disagree format. The pattern appears across a wide range of topic areas, and it appears (with roughly similar frequency) whether the methodology involves group-administered questionnaires or individual face-to-face interviews. Now we turn to a more detailed analysis of the Monitoring the Future data in an effort to extend our understanding of the extreme response style in general, and black-white differences in particular.

Quantifying Differences in Response Styles

The response distributions presented in the preceding section document overall black-white differences; but in order to examine these differences more systematically, we found it useful to quantify individual response tendencies. We limited the analysis to agree-disagree items because they display the black-white differences most clearly and consistently, because those items are most plentiful in the Monitoring the Future data set, and because they can readily be combined into meaningful composite measures of response styles. We experimented with several coding schemes and found highly similar results; we report here the one which seems simplest and most straightforward. Four indexes were computed for each individual respondent (excluding those with missing data on any of the agree-disagree items):

1. *Agreement*, defined as the proportion of "Agree" responses chosen among all agree-disagree items. (The procedure was to recode all such items so that the "Agree" response was coded 1 and the other four response categories—including "Mostly agree"—were coded 0; then a mean was computed, thus yielding scores with a possible range from zero to one.)

2. *Disagreement*, defined as the proportion of "Disagree" responses chosen among all agree-disagree items. ("Disagree" responses were coded 1 and all others were coded 0).

3. *Extreme Responding*, defined as the proportion of extreme scale responses—i.e., "Agree" *or* "Disagree"—chosen among all agree-disagree items. (This is simply the *sum* of the Agreement and Disagreement scores; possible scores range from zero to one.)

4. *Acquiescence* (or "net agreement") defined as the proportion of

"Agree" responses chosen minus (or "net of") the proportion of "Disagree" responses chosen. (This is the *difference* between the Agreement and the Disagreement scores; possible scores range from −1 to 1.)[6]

Table 2 presents means and standard deviations for blacks and whites on each of the four indexes. Since five different questionnaire forms are used in the Monitoring the Future project, each of these analyses was carried out five times with five different "samples" of agree-disagree items. We will note some of the differences among forms below but first let us concentrate on overall patterns, indicated by mean values computed across all five forms.[7] The summary data in

Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations for Response Style Indexes Based on Five Different Questionnaire Forms: Black and White Seniors in Classes of 1980, 1981, and 1982 (Combined)

	Form 1 (14 items)		*Form 2 (14 Items)*		*Form 3 (29 Items)*		*Form 4 (27 Items)*		*Form 5 (38 Items)*		*Total*[a]	
	Black	*White*	*Black*	*White*	*Black*	*White*	*Black*	*White*	*Black*	*White*	*Black*	*White*
N(wtd)	1,136	7,647	996	7,198	792	6,866	876	7,083	943	7,052		
Agreement index												
Mean	.363	.250	.246	.171	.380	.321	.331	.236	.325	.234	.329	.242
S.D.	*.176*	*.158*	*.166*	*.139*	*.130*	*.124*	*.164*	*.136*	*.147*	*.125*	*.157*	*.136*
Disagreement index												
Mean	.144	.127	.233	.194	.190	.158	.179	.173	.234	.184	.196	.167
S.D.	*.112*	*.115*	*.144*	*.127*	*.117*	*.108*	*.115*	*.112*	*.121*	*.115*	*.122*	*.115*
Acquiescence index												
Mean	.219	.124	.013	−.023	.190	.163	.152	.063	.090	.050	.133	.075
S.D.	*.203*	*.183*	*.209*	*.161*	*.150*	*.132*	*.191*	*.151*	*.160*	*.115*	*.183*	*.148*
Extreme response index												
Mean	.507	.377	.480	.365	.570	.479	.511	.409	.559	.418	.525	.410
S.D.	*.214*	*.207*	*.231*	*.212*	*.196*	*.192*	*.210*	*.199*	*.216*	*.211*	*.213*	*.204*

[a] Shown in this column are mean values (mean of the means, or mean of the standard deviations) computed across the five forms, with each form given equal weight.

[6] The measure we term "Acquiescence" is similar to the "Over-all Agreement Score" of Couch and Keniston (1960), although our computational approach ignores scale distinctions in the midrange. If we were to pattern our approach more closely after that of Couch and Keniston, we would construct the "acquescience" scale as simply a mean of the agree-disagree items as originally coded—i.e., a code of 5 for Agree, 4 for Mostly agree, 3 for Neither, 2 for Mostly disagree, and 1 for Disagree. Preliminary analyses indicated that results for such a scale would be highly similar to those obtained with the coding approach employed herein.

[7] We noted earlier that blacks are more likely than whites to fail to complete questionnaires. Since those with missing data on any of the agree-disagree items were assigned a missing data code on the indexes, higher proportions of blacks than whites were excluded from analyses involving the indexes. These problems varied somewhat from one questionnaire form to another, but when they were averaged across all five forms we found that 26 percent of blacks and 13 percent of whites had missing data on one or more of the agree-disagree ingredients, and thus were not included in the index computations. We carried out several explorations to learn whether these losses were distorting our findings. First, we computed new indexes based on only the agree-disagree items which appeared in the first half of each questionnaire form, and found

Table 2 show substantially more Agreement among blacks than among whites; 33 percent of all black responses were "Agree," contrasted with only 24 percent of all white responses ($p < .001$). Blacks also have higher Disagreement scores, although the difference is much smaller—about 20 percent contrasted with 17 percent ($p < .001$). Since our measure of Extreme Responding is simply the sum of Agreement and Disagreement scores, it is clear that racial differences occur here as well; about 53 percent of all black responses fell in either the "Agree" category or the "Disagree" category, compared with 41 percent of all white responses ($p < .001$).

The proportions summarized above leave a number of questions unanswered. For example, proportions alone cannot reveal whether the differences appear simply because relatively small numbers of blacks use very large proportions of "Agree" responses and "Disagree" responses. When we compare standard deviations for blacks and whites, however, it is clear that this is not the case. In particular, the standard deviations for Extreme Responding (averaged across all five forms) are nearly identical for whites and blacks, although the means differ by more than half of a standard deviation. An inspection of frequency distributions (not shown) confirmed that the response patterns are more or less normally distributed within both subgroups, a finding which fits well with views of response styles as personality variables.

One question of particular interest is whether those individuals with a strong tendency to use one extreme are also likely to use the other extreme—are "agreers" likely also to be "disagreers"? This is a matter of some theoretical importance. Couch and Keniston (1960) referred to "yeasayers" and "naysayers" as different kinds of individuals occupying opposite ends of a continuum reflecting an "agreement response set" or "acquiescence." To the extent that acquiescence, thus defined, is the most dominant response style dimension operating in our data, one would expect Agreement and Disagreement scores to be negatively correlated. On the other hand, if one conceives of a continuum of "extreme versus constricted responding," where individuals vary in terms of their willingness to use *either* end of a scale,

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that these "half-form indexes" suffered much smaller missing data rates: 6 percent of whites and 9 percent of blacks. Second, we compared "half-form index" scores for those who had missing data on the "full-form indexes" and those who had complete data, and found no appreciable differences for either whites or blacks. Finally, we replicated some of the correlational analyses (to be reported below) using the "half-form indexes" with their much smaller missing data rates, and found no important changes. Given these findings, we opted to continue our analyses and reporting based on "full-form indexes," in spite of the higher missing data rates, because the greater sampling of item content using the full forms was judged to be of value.

then to the extent that this response style is the dominant factor one would expect Agreement and Disagreement to correlate positively.

The correlations between Agreement scores and Disagreement scores, computed separately for blacks and whites on each of the five questionnaire forms, are presented in Table 3. We note first that all 10 correlations are positive, indicating that those above average in Agreement are also likely to be above average in Disagreement. There is, however, substantial variation in the size of correlations from one questionnaire form to another (and we discuss below some of the reasons for this variation). There are also substantial black-white differences across all five forms; the correlations for whites are about twice as large on average (.316) as those for blacks (.165). It thus appears that the extreme responding patterns occur with a higher level of consistency among whites than among blacks; it also seems that the tendency to use *qualified* responses ("Mostly agree" or "Mostly disagree" or "Neither") is a more consistent or "reliable" phenomenon among whites.

One possible interpretation of the correlations in Table 3 is the following: within both groups the extreme responding dimension "dominates" or "outweighs" the acquiescence dimension, and thus Agreement scores and Disagreement scores correlate positively rather than negatively; but among blacks this difference in "dominance" is less pronounced (presumably because the acquiescence dimension is more prominent among blacks than among whites). For reasons which will become clearer below, we are hesitant to place a great deal of emphasis on the absolute values of the correlations shown in Table 3; therefore, we do not want to argue strongly that one of the response styles is really more dominant than the other. On the other hand, the racial differences do seem quite consistent with the interpretation that acquiescence is *relatively* more prominent for blacks than for whites.

We noted above that the data in Table 3 show substantial variation from one questionnaire form to another in the tendency for Agreement scores to correlate with Disagreement scores. This illustrates a problem that has long been recognized in this sort of research—the confounding of item content with response style measures (see e.g.,

Table 3. Product-Moment Correlations Between Agreement and Disagreement Scores: Black and White High School Seniors in Classes of 1980, 1981, and 1982 (Combined)

	Questionnaire Form					*Mean*
	1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*Correlation*
Blacks	.057	.102	.267	.101	.300	.165
Whites	.129	.267	.361	.278	.544	.316

Couch and Keniston, 1960; Hamilton, 1968). We can think of our five questionnaire forms as providing five different "samples" of agree-disagree items, but they are far from random samples. Form 1 has only 14 agree-disagree items, and they cover a range of miscellaneous topics. Form 5, by way of contrast, has 38 agree-disagree items covering a number of dimensions including self-esteem, internal-external control, loneliness, independence, concern for others, and sex-role attitudes. Furthermore, each of the dimensions in Form 5 includes both positively and negatively scored items. For example, the self-esteem measure is a balanced scale such that high self-esteem is indicated by agreement with four items and disagreement with another four items; thus, an individual with high self-esteem would tend to use both scale extremes, and this would contribute to the positive correlation between agreement and disagreement. It is thus no accident that the Form 5 correlations shown in Table 3 are dramatically higher than the Form 1 correlations.

Substantial differences from one form to another are also evident in Table 2; Form 2 with a high proportion of controversial or unpopular statements prompts just about as much disagreement as agreement, whereas Form 3 and Form 1 both prompt about twice as much agreement as disagreement. (Form 3, incidentally, includes a series of statements to the effect that women should have equal opportunities for education, occupations, and political office. While most males are positive about these and related matters, the support is much stronger among females; as a result, on Form 3 females average higher on the Agreement and Acquiescence scales than males do.)

Correlates of Response Styles

Hamilton (1968) reported that a number of studies had found significantly more extreme responses among females than among males, although other studies had not. Our own preliminary analyses showed no consistent or important differences, and the first set of correlations in Table 4 confirm that. Hamilton's (1968) review also noted several studies which suggested that extreme response style may be negatively correlated with intelligence, education, occupational status, and social class. The Monitoring the Future data set was not specifically designed for such analyses, and thus we had to work within limitations. A measure of parental education provides a fairly good indicator of family socioeconomic level. And, although high school seniors do not differ in years of schooling completed, college plans provide some indication (albeit quite imperfect) of future educational and also occupational attainments. The Monitoring the Future mea-

Table 4. Correlations and Bivariate Regression Coefficients[a] Relating Response Style Indexes to Various Measures of Background and Aspirations: Black and White Seniors in Classes of 1980, 1981, and 1982 (Combined)

	Agreement		*Disagreement*		*Acquiescence*		*Extreme Response*	
	r	*B*	*r*	*B*	*r*	*B*	*r*	*B*
Sex (M = 1, F = 2)								
Blacks	.032	.011	.030	.008	.008	.003	.042	.018
Whites	.020	.006	−.031	−.007	.040	.013	−.004	−.001
Parent's education								
Blacks	−.098	−.001	−.000	−.000	−.081	−.001	−.074	−.001
Whites	−.054	−.001	.028	.000	−.068	−.001	−.022	−.000
College plans								
Blacks	−.069	−.010	.009	.001	−.063	−.011	−.047	−.009
Whites	−.032	−.004	.030	.003	−.051	−.007	−.005	−.001
College prep curriculum								
Blacks	−.057	−.020	.033	.009	−.068	−.028	−.024	−.011
Whites	−.047	−.014	.038	.009	−.069	−.022	−.011	−.005
High school grades								
Blacks	−.029	−.003	.030	.002	−.043	−.005	−.005	−.001
Whites	−.015	−.001	.014	.001	−.023	−.002	−.003	−.000

[a] Table entries are product-moment correlations (*r*) and regression coefficients (*B*) in which the response style indexes are treated as the dependent variables.

sures do not include any test of intelligence, ability, or achievement; however, self-reported average grades in high school are available, and other research has shown a reasonably strong association between self-reported grades and tests of intelligence and academic aptitude (e.g., Bachman, 1970:169). As the findings in Table 4 indicate, our efforts to link response styles to indicators of status, or to academic abilities and aspirations, did not meet with success. Even taking into account the limitations of the Monitoring the Future data set for this portion of our analysis, it still seems clear that the rather substantial racial differences we have observed in response styles could not be explainable in terms of these kinds of background and ability dimensions.[8]

Another possible explanation for black-white differences in response styles is that they are associated with subcultural differences in language use or style. Since nearly two-thirds of the blacks in our samples are in the South, contrasted with about one-quarter of the whites, it seemed useful to examine regional differences in the response style measures. We also examined several levels of urbanism,

[8] Although there is little relationship within racial groups, the racial difference in response styles could still be due to factors of status, academic ability, and aspirations if such factors varied substantially more between groups than within groups. However, this is not the case here; there is much more variance on such factors within groups.

specifically the 12 largest Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs), other SMSAs (areas with an urban center of at least 50,000), and non-SMSAs (nonmetropolitan or rural areas). The clearest finding to emerge was that individuals from the South, particularly those in nonmetropolitan areas, are more likely than those from other regions to use the "Agree" category. Specifically, among blacks "Agree" responses were chosen 36 percent of the time by those in the nonmetropolitan South, 33 percent by those in Southern SMSAs, and 30 percent by those in other region/urbanism categories; among whites, the comparable figures are 28 percent, 25 percent, and 23 percent. While it seems clear that there are some differences in response style associated with geographical area, it is also clear that *within* each area the black-white differences in Agreement scores remain at about 7 to 8 percent, which is only slightly lower than the 9 percent overall difference in Agreement reported earlier. (The analyses summarized above were carried out also with the Disagreement index, but no clear patterns emerged.)

One additional analysis step can be summarized briefly. We conducted one-way analyses of variance in which the school code number was entered as the independent variable. This provided an indication of the maximum possible effects which might be attributable to region, urbanism, racial composition, and all other cultural factors which might differ from school to school. There was very little clustering by school above and beyond that which could be attributed to region and urbanism.

Reviewing our analyses of the correlates of response style, we find no dimensions which would permit us to "explain away" the differences between blacks and whites. On the other hand, the geographical differences remain interesting and potentially important. The fact that the highest Agreement scores occur in the nonurban South, an area particularly important in the cultural heritage of most blacks, leaves open the possibility that black-white differences in response styles have their roots in subcultural differences in language use.

Cross-Time Stability of Response Styles

The follow-up component of the Monitoring the Future project provided us with an opportunity to determine whether the response patterns discussed here show the kind of stability across time that appears in other measures of personality characteristics. Hamilton's (1968) review of the literature on extreme response style reported that several studies found short-term (up to four weeks) test-retest corre-

lations (autocorrelations) of approximately .85. Our follow-up design permitted us to examine autocorrelations over intervals as long as four years. An examination of these autocorrelations failed to reveal any clear and consistent differences between blacks and whites; however, we had insufficient numbers of blacks in this phase of the analysis to provide statistically reliable data, thus we limit our present reporting to a brief summary of findings for whites.

Among whites we found autocorrelations for the indexes of Agreement and Extreme Responding were generally .5 or higher for two-year intervals and .4 or higher for intervals up to four years. Autocorrelations involving the other two indexes were somewhat lower. We were able to decompose the observed autocorrelations into their separate components of stability (defined as the correlation between two true scores measured at different times) and reliability (defined as the proportion of variance in the observed score which is due to the true score, which is the same as the squared correlation between the true and observed scores). Two computational approaches (Heise, 1969; Wiley and Wiley, 1970) led to very similar conclusions: across the five forms, reliability estimates ranged from .56 to .67 for the Agreement index and from .62 to .72 for the Extreme Responding index (with the higher reliabilities occurring for questionnaire forms with the larger numbers of Agree-Disagree items); stability estimates varied according to the number of years covered, but when converted to estimates of *annual* stability they ranged from .86 to .94 (with no systematic differences between the two indexes or the five forms). In other words, these estimates suggest that Agreement and Extreme Responding are rather stable personality traits; indeed, their estimated stabilities match or exceed those for self-esteem (O'Malley and Bachman, 1983) and for various dimensions of drug use (O'Malley, et al., 1984).[9]

Summary and Conclusions

There has already been a good deal of research focused on problems of response style as they affect personality scales and survey measures in general. Nevertheless, we think the findings reported above are noteworthy in a number of respects: (1) the samples of high school seniors are large and nationally representative; (2) the panel

[9] We have presented here a highly simplified summary of the key findings on stability and reliability across time. Much more extensive treatments of the strategies and controversies involved in developing such estimates, as well as more detailed reporting of how these are applied to the analysis of Monitoring the Future data, are provided in other reports (O'Malley and Bachman, 1983; and especially O'Malley et al., 1983).

analyses involve multiple measurements across a number of years; (3) the range of questionnaire content is quite broad, covering a number of personality dimensions as well as attitudes about a wide range of topics, and involving (in the first phase of analysis) a number of different Likert-type response scales; (4) the key finding was replicated clearly in the two other national surveys which were examined, one involving paper-and-pencil questionnaires and one involving face-to-face interviews; (5) the findings extend our knowledge about response styles in several respects; and (6) the black-white comparisons point to some important cautions in the interpretation of racial differences in survey data and personality measures.

The central finding reported here is that blacks are more likely than whites to use the extreme response categories on Likert-type scales. Put the other way around, whites are more likely than blacks to qualify their responses on such scales. While this is particularly true for positive or agreement ends of scales, higher percentages of blacks than whites also tend to appear at negative extremes, and at both extremes of scales which do not have any clear positive-negative dimension.

We were not able to "explain away" the race differences in terms of any more fundamental differences in academic achievements, educational aspirations, family socioeconomic level, or geographical area. We did, however, observe that for both blacks and whites there were higher scores on Agreement, but not Disagreement, among those in the South, particularly in nonmetropolitan areas.

An additional finding is that there are substantial and rather consistent individual differences in the tendency to use—or to avoid—extreme response categories. Among blacks, and to a greater extent among whites, we found that the yea-sayers are also likely to be nay-sayers—i.e., Agreement scores are positively correlated with Disagreement scores. We also found that Extreme Responding scores show a high degree of stability across time, about as much as we have found for personality dimensions such as self-esteem. Indeed, some of the observed stability in self-esteem scores may actually be attributable to stable differences in response styles, since extreme responding can systematically affect personality scores (even those based on so-called balanced scales, as we discuss below).

Our analysis and reporting strategy in this paper has been to focus primarily on black-white differences in extreme response style, while noting also the black-white differences in the acquiescence response style. But we also took pains to report our findings in sufficient detail so that the Agreement and Disagreement "components" of the Ex-

treme Responding and Acquiescence scales could be examined separately; and those data (see Table 2) clearly indicate that black-white differences are greater for Agreement than for Disagreement. Thus one could argue (as one reviewer did) that we should give greater emphasis to the tendency for blacks to be more acquiescent than whites. However, the evidence reported here raises the possibility that the extreme response dimension is in fact more prominent than acquiescence, at least when acquiescence is defined as agreement minus disagreement. We have already discussed the fact that Agreement and Disagreement scores correlate positively rather than negatively, which is consistent with the interpretation that the extreme response dimension tends to dominate the acquiescence dimension. As to which dimension is more important in interpreting black-white differences, it is noteworthy that the racial groups differ by only .058 on the Acquiescence index (less than .4SD) whereas they differ by .125 on the Extreme Response index (.6SD).

One question left unanswered by these analyses is the sort of interpretation one places on the black-white differences in frequencies of using extreme response categories. Do they represent some kinds of response "errors"—and, if so, does it mean that blacks "exaggerate" and/or that whites "inhibit" their responses? Alternatively, does it mean that blacks actually feel more strongly than whites on a very wide range of issues? Perhaps an intermediate position is to suppose that our data reflect differences in linguistic style—a greater willingness on the part of blacks to express themselves in unqualified terms, or (the other side of the coin) a greater caution or inhibition on the part of whites. We think there is little to be gained by treating these stylistic differences as merely response "errors" on the part of either blacks or whites. But beyond that we are not yet ready to tread; certainly the data we have analyzed do not suggest to us any single compelling interpretation.

We recognize that we have raised more questions in this paper than we have answered, and much room remains for further research. One sort of further research consists of replication. It would seem worthwhile to examine other samples to see whether the black-white differences observed among youth and young adults occur among other age ranges, and to extend the explorations to include other minorities (although we recognize that most samples, including our own, are limited in their sampling of such groups).

Another avenue of further research would focus on the *causes*—and the underlying *meaning*—of black-white differences in response styles. To say that differences in questionnaire response styles may

reflect subcultural differences in language usage seems almost tautological, yet it may suggest a useful direction for further inquiry. Our finding that Agreement scores average highest in the South, especially the rural South, might be a useful starting point for such an inquiry.

While more research remains to be done, the present findings are sufficiently clear and robust to indicate that there are some large pitfalls involved in reporting and interpreting black-white differences based on Likert-type scales. As Table 1 illustrates, one could describe blacks (in comparison with whites) as either hawkish or dovish, high or low in feelings of personal efficacy, lonely or not, similar or dissimilar to their parents, and critical or supportive of the president, depending on which ends of the scales one chose to emphasize.

We can offer two specific suggestions for dealing with the problems noted above:

1. For single-item measures of attitudes, opinions, etc., it is important to examine the whole distribution of responses. Focusing on just one extreme or the other, or even upon mean scores, has the potential for misleading.

2. In the case of multi-item scales, it is useful to explore alternative scoring methods, particularly versions which combine the extreme category with a less-than-extreme category. For example, we have found that blacks average higher than whites in self-esteem when the full agree-disagree scale is used as the basis of scoring, whereas the difference completely disappears when an alternative scoring is employed (i.e., when no distinction is made between the two positive alternatives, Agree and Mostly Agree, or between the two negative alternatives, Disagree and Mostly Disagree). Even though the self-esteem scale is "balanced," with equal numbers of positively and negatively scored items, the extreme response tendency can still influence self-esteem scores, because the majority of respondents make little use of the negative self-esteem responses—they differ primarily in the *extent* to which they rate themselves in positive terms (Bachman and O'Malley, in press).

The analysis of racial differences has been a popular undertaking for social scientists, perhaps because it is relatively easy to do and because differences are often in evidence. But some of the findings which emerge may have more to do with response styles than with substantive differences. Certainly the most important conclusion based on the present research is that those who report on racial differences—and those who make use of such reports—should do so with a great deal of caution.

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What Must My Interest in Politics Be If I Just Told You "I Don't Know"?

GEORGE F. BISHOP, ROBERT W. OLDENDICK, AND ALFRED TUCHFARBER

WE BEGIN with a well-known question about government and public affairs:

Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all?

This item from the American National Election Studies has long served as an indicator of the electorate's general interest in public affairs (see Miller, et al., 1980: Ch. 5). But how do people answer such a question? Our research, and that of others on social cognition (see, e.g., Wyer and Hartwick, 1980), would suggest that, when people are asked such a question, they do not perform an exhaustive

Abstract How much people think they follow what's going on in government and public affairs depends upon the context in which they are asked the question. If asked immediately after difficult questions about what they know of their congressman's record, they are much less likely to think they pay attention to public affairs than if they are asked, first, how interested they are in such matters. More important, data from two independent experiments show that this context effect cannot be eliminated, or significantly reduced, by interposing a buffer of questions on unrelated topics between the items that are known to affect one another. The authors discuss the psychological significance of these findings and their implications for survey research.

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search of their long-term memory for all pertinent political experiences and then give a considered response based upon that search. Nor do they appear to take even a representative sample of such experiences in saying, for example, that they follow politics "most of the time" or "only now and then." Instead, the evidence indicates that they respond largely with the *first thing that comes to mind* from their most relevant, *recent* experience. And that, we find, depends heavily on the immediate context in which the question is asked.[1]

In a previous experiment with this item, for example, we found that people were much less likely to say they follow what's going on in government and public affairs when asked about it immediately *after*, rather than just *before*, a difficult pair of questions about what they knew of their congressman's record (Bishop, et al. 1982). In another experiment, reported in the same article, we discovered that respondents, particularly the less informed, were more likely to see themselves as "very interested" in following the political campaigns (in 1980) when the question about campaign interest was posed *after*, instead of *before*, other items concerning the closeness and importance of the election. In neither case, moreover, did we contrive the experiment merely to demonstrate that such context effects could be created. On the contrary, we designed each experiment to test hypotheses about the causes of an apparently precipitous decline of interest in politics at the time of the 1978 American National Election Study. Both experiments confirmed our hypothesis: namely, that the decline was due to changes in question order and context.[2] The results thus have direct implications for the design of the biennial national election surveys.

What can we do about the problem? Methodologically, the solution seems to lie in separating questions that are known or suspected to affect one another. Indeed, probably everyone who designs survey items assumes that by interposing a buffer of questions on unrelated topics, context effects can be minimized, if not eliminated. But can they? To our knowledge, this conventional wisdom has rarely, if ever, been tested systematically.[3] Here we will describe the results of a

[1] For a review of the literature on context effects, see Schuman and Presser (1981), Ch. 2; see also McFarland, 1981; Sigelman, 1981; Smith, 1982.

[2] We do not wish to suggest that *all* of the apparent changes in political interest at the time of the 1978 election study were an artifact of changes in context. But the evidence we have presented elsewhere indicates that much of the change was indeed artifactual (see Bishop, et al., 1982).

[3] Recently, we learned that Howard Schuman and his associates had, independently, conducted such an experiment on a different topic—reciprocity for Communist and American reporters (see Schuman, et al., 1983), showing results much like those demonstrated here.

split-ballot experiment designed precisely to test that assumption, a replication of that experiment, and its implications for survey research.

Research Design

EXPERIMENT 1

The first experiment was carried out in November/December 1981 as part of an omnibus, random-digit-dialed telephone survey, conducted by the Behavioral Sciences Laboratory at the University of Cincinnati.[4] Respondents were randomly assigned to one of three question order conditions, two of which (Forms A and B) were partial replications of our previous experiment which had demonstrated a substantial context effect on responses to the Survey Research Center question about interest in government and public affairs.

Form A. Respondents in this group were asked the following sequence of questions at the *beginning* of the interview, all of which were adapted from the 1978 American National Election Study (see Miller, 1978):

Q1. Do you happen to remember anything special that your U.S. Representative has done for your district or for the people in your district while he has been in Congress? (IF YES): What was that?

Q2. Is there any legislative bill that has come up in the House of Representatives, on which you remember how your congressman has voted in the last couple of years? (IF YES): What bill was that?

Q3. Now, some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say that you follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all?"

Form B. Here we asked respondents, first, about their interest in government and public affairs (Q3.), and then about what they knew of their congressman's record (Q1. and Q2., respectively).

Form C. The first two questions on this form were identical to those on Form A—i.e., the political knowledge items—and asked in the exact same sequence. But unlike Form A, the question about the respondent's interest in government and public affairs did not appear

[4] The percentage of *fully completed* interviews with *known* households ($N = 1,511$) in this survey of Greater Cincinnati (Hamilton County) was 74.0 percent. The refusal rate was 14.4 percent. The remainder consisted of partially completed interviews (3.6 percent), potential interviews that were unable to be completed because of a language barrier, a hearing problem, illiteracy, senility, or physical illness (6.5 percent), or because the selected respondent was away on vacation, a business trip, etc. (1.5 percent).

until roughly 10 minutes later in the interview schedule, where it was asked after questions on the following topics: where respondents usually get their information about what programs to watch on television; their use of the local bus service; their opinions about how to deal with the rising costs of operating the bus system due to cuts in federal funding (raising fares vs. increasing taxes vs. cutting services); whether they had automobile transportation available to them; whether they had heard of Cincinnati Technical College, as well as their impressions and knowledge of that institution; whether they had ever smoked cigarettes, how much, and for how long; their plans for their children's college education, if they had any children; and, finally, a single question about how long the respondent had lived in Hamilton County.[5] This last item was asked immediately before the question on interest in government and public affairs. Altogether there were 27 items interspersed between the questions about the respondent's congressman and the question on interest in government and public affairs, more than enough material, we assumed, to erase the contents of the respondent's short-term memory (typically no more than 30 seconds) of his or her answers to the earlier questions.

This intervening buffer did include some items that might have affected a respondent's self-perception of his or her interest in public affairs: namely, the questions about how to deal with cutbacks in federal funding of the local bus system. We decided, however, that this would make the test more representative of the usual constraints in designing interview schedules and that, in any case, the effect would probably be minimal.

EXPERIMENT II

In June of 1982 we repeated the experiment, again as part of an omnibus, random-digit-dialed telephone survey.[6] Because it was an independent study, we could not exactly replicate the buffer items we had used with Form C in Experiment I. Yet there was some overlap

[5] Copies of the questionnaire(s) from this experiment and from Experiment II below are available from the authors.

[6] The percentage of *fully completed* interviews with *known* households ($N = 1,517$) in this Greater Cincinnati Survey study was 72.2 percent; the refusal rate, 15.4 percent. The rest were partially completed interviews (3.3 percent), potential interviews unable to be completed because of a language barrier, a hearing problem, illiteracy, senility, or physical illness (5.1 percent), or because the selected respondent was away on vacation, a business trip, or some other matter (4.0 percent). If indeterminate *no answers* (i.e., telephone numbers that have never resulted in a contact despite numerous calls—at least 10 attempts) are included in the results, the completion rate becomes 67.0 percent, a figure that is fairly representative for this particular omnibus survey.

with the buffer used in Experiment I,[7] because one organization—the local bus company—did repeat a few questions from the earlier survey while adding others on related topics. In brief, the buffer for Form C in Experiment II included a block of questions on respondents' use and knowledge of various forms of transportation (e.g., bus, carpooling); another block about their opinions on how to deal with the rising costs of operating the bus system, and its importance to the community in providing such services as transportation for the elderly and the handicapped; and a set of items concerning their residential history, their plans (if any) for moving in the future, and their reasons for doing so. Finally, as in Experiment I, respondents were asked how long they had lived in Hamilton County immediately before being asked about their interest in government and public affairs. There were about 28 questions in the buffer altogether, taking approximately 10 minutes to administer.

The difference between the two studies in the content of the buffer items used with Form C should not, however, be viewed as a limitation. For if the findings from Experiment I replicate under somewhat different conditions, we shall be all the more confident about their reliability. Let us turn now to the results.

Findings

SELF-PERCEPTION OF INTEREST IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS

The figures in Table 1 tell us that the sequence in which the questions are asked makes a sizable difference in how much respondents think they follow what's going on in government and public affairs. As would be expected from our previous experiment with these items (Bishop, et al., 1982), respondents who were asked about their interest in public affairs immediately *after* the difficult questions about their congressman's record (Form A) were much less likely to say they follow what's going on than those who were asked, first, about their interest in public affairs and then about their congressman's record (Form B).[8] And the difference between these two forms was, as we see, highly significant in both Experiment I ($\chi^2 = 64.76$, $p < .0001$) and Experiment II ($\chi^2 = 36.28$, $p < .0001$). The effect thus appears to be quite reliable.

But can it be eliminated, or at least minimized, by interposing questions on unrelated topics, as in Form C? Evidently, it cannot.

[7] These buffer items were purchased by other organizations. But we could not, in any case, afford to replicate them on our own.

[8] Over 80 percent of the respondents said "no" or "don't know" when asked these questions about their congressman's record (see Tables 2 and 3 below).

Table 1. Response to Question about Interest in Government and Public Affairs, by Form, by Survey

	Question Order					
	Survey I (Fall 1981)			*Survey II (Spring 1982)*		
Response	*Form A Knowledge/ Interest*	*Form B Interest/ Knowledge*	*Form C Knowledge/ Filler Items/ Interest*	*Form A Knowledge/ Interest*	*Form B Interest/ Knowledge*	*Form C Knowledge/ Filler Items/ Interest*
Follows most of the time	25.4%	43.4%	31.1%	24.4%	38.2%	22.6%
Follows some of the time	28.2	36.7	32.6	31.3	37.5	37.3
Follows only now and then or hardly at all	46.4	19.9	36.3	44.3	24.3	40.1
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
(N =)	(395)	(396)	(366)	(369)	(395)	(369)
	$\chi^2 = 65.67$, df = 4, $p < .0001$			$\chi^2 = 46.30$, df = 4, $p < .0001$		
	Form A vs. B: $\chi^2 = 64.76$, df = 2, $p < .0001$			Form A vs. B: $\chi^2 = 36.28$, df = 2, $p < .0001$		
	Form B vs. C: $\chi^2 = 26.88$, df = 2, $p < .0001$			Form B vs. C: $\chi^2 = 30.16$, df = 2, $p < .0001$		
	Form A vs. C: $\chi^2 = 8.08$, df = 2, $p = .017$			Form A vs. C: $\chi^2 = 3.02$, df = 2, $p = .221$		

Though there is some indication in Experiment I that the interpolated items helped reduce the size of the effect, much of it remains. The percentage differences between Forms B and C in Experiment I were substantial ($\chi^2 = 26.88$, $p < .0001$). Furthermore, this pattern replicated in Experiment II (χ^2 for B vs. C = 30.16, $p < .0001$). In fact, the results of Experiment II suggest that the buffer in Form C had virtually no effect.

One might also expect that respondents who are less well informed about politics would be more susceptible to such context effects than those who are better informed (see, e.g., Bishop, et al., 1982). But we found no evidence of any such conditional relationship (data not shown here).[9] Thus, our manipulation of context in this experiment

[9] We tested this hypothesis by controlling for a respondent's level of political knowledge, which was measured in each survey by questions on the following topics: (a) whether the respondent knew the names of the two United States senators from Ohio, (b) whether he or she knew how long the term of office is for a United States senator, and (c) whether he or she knew which party presently has the most members in the United States House of Representatives. Holding constant responses to these items, both separately and when combined into an index, did not make any significant difference in the pattern of context effects shown in Table 1. Nor were there any significant variations in these effects when we controlled for a respondent's age, race, sex, or education (data not shown). We also found that there was no significant difference in the results even when we controlled for whether the respondent said yes or no to the two questions which asked about knowledge of his or her congressman. The effect occurred, that is, among both those who could answer the questions and those who could not, indicating that the sheer difficulty of the questions made most respondents feel they were not that attentive to public affairs. In fact, very few of the small number of respondents who said yes to either of the knowledge items could, when probed about it, say anything about their congressman that might be regarded as factually correct (data not shown).

appears to have been rather powerful, and this may help explain why the effect persists after a substantial batch of buffer items—i.e., because of the *difficulty* of the knowledge-of-politics items.[10] Separating affected items, then, will not necessarily solve the problem of context effects. By the same token, it means that context effects probably exist in many surveys where we don't even suspect them—i.e., where we ask questions about the same, or closely related, subjects in different parts of the interview (cf. Schuman, et al., 1983).

Theoretically, these findings mean that survey respondents must answer such questions about their "inner states of mind" by using what self-perception theorists (Bem, 1978) call an *implicit self-selection rule*. In effect, they ask themselves: "What must my interest in politics be if I just told you I don't know what my congressman has done for the district or how he has voted on any legislation?" Furthermore, the fact that much, if not most, of the effect endures, despite a substantial buffer, means that their responses to the questions about their congressman must somehow be encoded and stored in long-term memory,[11] and then retrieved as the *first thing that comes to mind* from the "politics file" later in the interview when they are asked about their interest in public affairs. In other words, their *first* response was to think they did not follow politics that much because they were just *recently* (10 minutes ago) unable to answer some *relevant* questions on what they knew about government and public affairs. So too, we would speculate, the embarrassment many respondents may have felt on not being able to answer the questions about their congressman probably facilitated even further the encoding and storage of their responses into long-term memory, thus enhancing the effect.

SELF-PERCEPTION OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE

Does the sequence in which the questions are asked also affect respondents' perceptions of what they think they know about their

[10] One reviewer suggested that the magnitude of the context effects might be different if a less difficult set of questions were asked—e.g., a question about knowing the names of the major party candidates running for president. Indeed, we would expect the effects to vary with such changes in context. But we would predict that the underlying theoretical process would be the same: respondents would still answer the question about interest in public affairs by thinking of the most *recent*, rather than the most representative, instances of their knowledge of politics.

[11] The responses must be stored in long-term memory since short-term contents hardly ever last beyond 30 seconds (see, e.g., Loftus and Loftus, 1976: Ch. 3).

congressman? Yes, it does, at least for one of the two questions we asked them, though the magnitude of the effect was relatively small (see Table 2). Respondents who were asked, first, about their interest in public affairs (Form B) were more likely to say they knew something that their congressman had done for the district than those who were asked, first, about their congressman's record (Forms A and C). In both Surveys I and II the differences were statistically significant, particularly between Forms A and B. The difference between Forms B and C, however, was somewhat smaller and less reliable, reaching significance in Survey I ($\chi^2 = 5.28, p = .02$), but not in Survey II ($\chi^2 = 0.67, p = .414$). We cannot explain this fluctuation, and can only emphasize that it is small and probably due to sampling error.[12]

A similar pattern occurs in Table 3. Respondents who were asked, first, about how interested they were in public affairs (Form B) were more likely to say they knew something about their congressman (how he had voted on legislation) than those who were asked, first, about what they knew of his record (Forms A and C). But the size of the difference between forms was rather small in both surveys and did not reach statistical significance in either one. Nonetheless, these findings along with those in Table 2, seem to indicate that merely asking people how interested they are in government and public affairs may also make them think they "know" more about it.

Table 2. Response to Question on Whether Respondent Remembers "anything special that your U.S. Representative has done for your district or for the people in your district while he has been in Congress," by Form, by Survey

	Question Order					
	Survey I (Fall 1981)			*Survey II (Spring 1982)*		
Response	*Form A Knowledge/ Interest*	*Form B Interest/ Knowledge*	*Form C Knowledge/ Filler Items/ Interest*	*Form A Knowledge/ Interest*	*Form B Interest/ Knowledge*	*Form C Knowledge/ Filler Items/ Interest*
Yes (claims to remember	9.5%	16.7%	10.7%	6.6%	12.4%	10.3%
No, don't know	90.5	83.3	89.3	93.4	87.6	89.7
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
(N =)	(396)	(396)	(377)	(372)	(396)	(377)
	$\chi^2 = 11.03$, df = 2, $p < .01$			$\chi^2 = 7.42$, df = 2, $p < .024$		
	Form A vs. B: $\chi^2 = 8.58$, df = 1, $p < .01$			Form A vs. B: $\chi^2 = 6.78$, df = 1, $p < .01$		
	Form B vs. C: $\chi^2 = 5.38$, df = 1, $p = .02$			Form B vs. C: $\chi^2 = 0.67$, df = 1, $p = .414$		
	Form A vs. C: $\chi^2 = 0.21$, df = 1, $p > .50$			Form A vs. C: $\chi^2 = 2.81$, df = 1, $p = .093$		

[12] None of the effects in Tables 2 and 3 varied significantly when we controlled for a respondent's age, race, sex, education, or level of political knowledge (data not shown). Nor did the magnitude of association between responses to the question about interest in government and public affairs and those given to the items concerning the respondent's congressman differ significantly by form in either of the two surveys.

Table 3. Response to Question on Whether Respondent Remembers How Congressman Voted in Last Couple of Years on "any legislative bill that has come up in the House of Representatives," by Form, by Survey

	Question Order					
	Survey I (Fall 1981)			*Survey II (Spring 1982)*		
Response	*Form A Knowledge/ Interest*	*Form B Interest/ Knowledge*	*Form C Knowledge/ Filler Items/ Interest*	*Form A Knowledge/ Interest*	*Form B Interest/ Knowledge*	*Form C Knowledge/ Filler Items/ Interest*
Yes (claims to remember)	15.0%	17.5%	16.3%	9.7%	13.6%	10.1%
No, Don't know	85.0	82.5	83.7	90.3	86.4	89.9
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
(N =)	(396)	(395)	(376)	(370)	(393)	(376)
	χ^2=0.93, df=2, p>.50			χ^2=3.67, df=2, p=.159		
	Form A vs. B: χ^2=0.74, df=1, p=.389			Form A vs. B: χ^2=2.52, df=1, p=.112		
	Form B vs. C: χ^2=0.11, df=1, p>.50			Form B vs. C: χ^2=1.97, df=1, p=.16		
	Form A vs. C: χ^2=0.18, df=1, p>.50			Form A vs. C: χ^2=0.01, df=1, p>.50		

Conclusion

What does it all mean? It means that context problems cannot be avoided merely by separating items that are known, or expected, to affect one another, though that may help in some instances. Nor, conversely, can we presume that simply because two (or more) questions about a similar topic have been asked in different sections of the interview schedule, the responses to one do not influence the other. And neither should we delude ourselves into thinking that there is a "correct" location or context in which to ask a question.[13] For the meaning of any question is always dependent on the context in which it is asked. The "true" substantive task before us, then, is to learn what the questions mean to our respondents and how that meaning shifts in response to contextual cues. How, in other words, do they interpret the questions we ask them? We need, that is, to build a theory of the question-and-answer process, the rudiments of which we have presented here. Little we can think of could be more fundamental than that.

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The Use of Bounded Recall Procedures in Single Interviews

SEYMOUR SUDMAN, ADAM FINN, AND LINDA LANNOM

A MAJOR problem in asking respondents to report behavior during a short recent time period is telescoping, respondent error in remembering when an event occurred. It has generally been found that such memory errors are not random, but are consistently in the direction of remembering an event as having occurred more recently than it did so that it will be included in the reference period (see Sudman and Bradburn, 1974).

There are several solutions that have been suggested for telescoping. One is the use of records, if available (Sudman and Bradburn, 1974). The problem is that records may not be available for many kinds of behavior. Several methods are possible if panels are used, that is, if respondents report behavior over several time periods. The most accurate information is obtained from diaries. Diaries eliminate both telescoping and omissions as well as providing accurate information on details, but are expensive and may not be appropriate for infrequent events (Sudman and Ferber, 1979). For infrequently purchased durable goods, repeated inventories can be used to determine when an item was first found in a household (Pearl, 1978). Another possible method is to use the "last payment" principle. This is used for continuous types of expenditures such as electricity, gas, and other household utilities, usually billed on an intermittent basis not corresponding strictly to calendar months or other regular periods.

Abstract This note describes procedures for bounding recall in a single interview. The methods tested seem to be as effective as the more traditional panel procedures in reducing telescoping. No major administration problems are observed.

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The procedure asks for the amount of the last bill and the period which it covered (Pearl, 1978).

The best known and most widely used solution to telescoping is bounded recall, a method developed by Neter and Waksberg (1964). This procedure uses an initial interview with a panel to report events over some time period such as three to six months (or some other previous period.) Data from this initial interview are not included in the estimates, but are used as a bound on respondent memory. In each successive month, respondents are asked about behaviors that have occurred since the previous interview. The interviewer has the results of the earlier interviews so if the respondent incorrectly reports an event that was already reported earlier, the interviewer can question the respondent and omit the event from the current period.

The only serious problem with bounded recall methods is that they require a panel, and they are much more costly than single interviews. In theory, there is no reason why one could not attempt to bound respondent memory in a single interview by first asking about an earlier period and then about the more current period. In this paper we report two attempts to use bounded recall in a single interview. In both cases, the procedure appears to have been highly effective in reducing telescoping, although in the absence of outside validation information one cannot be certain about what error, if any, remains in the reported events.

Methods

A first question that arises is whether bounding can be made a natural part of the interview so that respondents are comfortable with the flow of questions. For most time periods, the answer seems to be yes. In the first study, a modified version of the Health Interview Survey, respondents were first asked about their health behavior in the previous calendar month, specifying the inclusion dates, and were then asked about the same events in the current calendar month. This seemed a natural sequence to respondents since the current month was not completed. If the interview were conducted on the last day of the month, the order might have appeared a little artificial, but even here it was unlikely that respondents would be unduly bothered.

In the second study, respondents were asked about snack food expenditures, first for the previous weekend and then for the current week since then. Again, this was a natural sequence. For comparison purposes, another group was first asked about the current week and then asked about the previous weekend. This was also perceived as a natural sequence. There have probably been many studies where

respondents are asked about behavior in two or more different periods where the information from all periods was used. In summary, there is no operational reason why bounding methods cannot be used on a single interview.

STUDY 1: HEALTH INTERVIEW

The sample for this 1981 study was a probability sample of 1,315 Illinois residents. A cooperation rate of 79 percent of the selected sample was achieved. As part of a larger experiment, half the households were interviewed face-to-face while half were interviewed by telephone. No differences were observed in the data by method of administration, even though the face-to-face procedure used a calendar, so that the procedures are combined in the analysis. Full details of the study are given in Sudman and Lannom (1982).

STUDY 2: SNACK EXPENDITURES

Eighty-three undergraduate students in the College of Commerce and Business Administration at the University of Illinois Champaign-Urbana filled out self-administered questionnaires in 1982 reporting on snack and drink purchases. These students were members of the Department of Business Administration's subject pool. One group filled out a questionnaire for the previous weekend first and then another questionnaire for the current week. All questionnaires were filled out on Wednesday or Thursday. The other group first filled out a questionnaire for the present week and then a questionnaire for the previous weekend. No direct validation is available, but earlier studies comparing diaries and recall have suggested that average recall overstatements of about 50 percent are likely for short period reports of grocery purchases (see Sudman, 1962).

Results

Table 1 compares the reported events per person day for illness days spent home, illness days spent in bed, doctor visits, and nights in

Table 1. Medical Events Reported for Bounded and Unbounded Months

Event	*(1) This Month (Bounded)*	*(2) Last Month (Unbounded)*	*Ratio (1)/(2)*	*NHIS Estimates*	*Standard Error of Difference*
Disability days	2.47	2.97	.83*	2.70	.25
Bed days	1.01	1.25	.81*	1.17	.12
Visit to medical care provider	1.79	1.91	.94	1.75	.09
Nights in hospital	.34	.42	.80*	.35	.02

* Significant at .05 level.

the hospital. It can be seen that bounded recall reduces reports by between 7 and 20 percent. Three of the four differences are statistically significant at the .05 level.

The events are reported per day because households reporting for the current month were reporting for less than a full month. Ratios are computed on the basis of number of days that the interview covered in the current month. This averaged 16.6 days. The number of days in the previous month was taken as 31.

The comparisons assume that there are no seasonal differences that would explain the results. The interviews were conducted in the early fall and no major seasonal changes are observed, looking either at the diary data from this study or at data from the National Health Interview Survey.

For comparison, Table 1 also includes estimates from the 1980 National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1981). These data were gathered from an unbounded two-week recall survey. Generally, the NHIS data fall between the bounded and unbounded estimates. This again suggests that our results are not a function of sampling error or possible sample biases, but do reflect memory error. It would appear that, for disability and bed days, the NHIS would probably produce slightly lower estimates if the period were bounded.

Table 2 compares the reported purchases of snacks using the first period as unbounded and the second period as bounded. The results are even more striking, probably because snack purchases are a less salient event and more likely to be confused by respondents. For weekday purchases, bounding reduces recall by about 30 percent, while for weekends the reduction is about 50 percent. Five of the six differences are statistically significant at the .05 level.

It is evident from these two examples that bounding in a single interview is effective. The reductions for snacks appear to bring the

Table 2. Snack Purchases for Bounded and Unbounded Periods

	Bounded	*Unbounded*	*Ratio*	*Standard Error of Differences*
Monday–Wednesday				
Average number of entries	4.0	5.6	.71*	.5
Average number of purchases	5.5	8.2	.67*	.6
Average dollars ($N = 34$)	3.96	5.32	.74	.79
Weekends				
Average number of entries	2.8	5.0	.56*	.5
Average number of purchases	3.9	7.2	.54*	.5
Average dollars ($N = 49$)	3.64	7.97	.46*	.96

* Significant at .05 level.

bounded data into line with that obtained from use of diaries, although exact validation is not possible.

Discussion

While it is evident that the use of bounded recall procedures in a single interview reduces telescoping, this research does not answer all the questions that could be raised. The only way that one could measure whether remaining errors exist is to conduct a study where simultaneous validation information is available. This is possible and should be the next step in testing this method.

A more difficult question is how bounded recall methods work. Is there actual improvement in memory, or do the bounding questions absorb the demand characteristics of the question? That is, respondents may feel some obligation to report activity on the initial bounding question because the question and interviewer appear to expect a positive response. Having fulfilled their obligations, there may be less need to respond positively to subsequent bounded questions. This latter explanation is also possible for bounded interviews that use a panel, but may be more likely in a single interview.

One suggested reason for the differences observed in this paper is respondent fatigue, but this seems very unlikely. The health interview reported here averaged only about 15 to 20 minutes and was on a very salient topic while the snack questionnaires took only between 5 and 10 minutes.

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The Polls: Regulation—Part I

ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO AND JOHN M. GILROY

ALTHOUGH government regulation of the economy has historically been an important and controversial issue in the United States, it has become an especially salient and pervasive one in the 1980s. This can be attributed to the weak state of the economy, reappraisals of the policies of the 1960s and 1970s, and President Reagan's strong support for deregulation. The issue's visibility is evident in the disruption and uncertainty caused by the deregulation of the airline and banking industries and by the dismantling of AT&T.

There are various indications that the American public in recent years has wanted less government intervention in economic and other matters. These indicators include reports in the media and observations by journalists and others, President Carter's and Reagan's criticisms of big government and their attempts (apparently with some success) to *lead* the public on this issue, Reagan's landslide victory itself, and recent shifts in public opinion found in national surveys.

But other evidence very clearly shows that there is substantial ambivalence in the United States about government regulatory policies. For example, there is not yet a clear consensus that the decisions concerning air travel, banking, and telephone service were good ones. In addition, no president since Franklin Roosevelt's administrations, when attempts to manage the economy were begun, has desired to end the federal government's involvement. Even President Reagan acknowledged—whether intentionally or not—in his 1983 State of the Union Address that the federal government had to take an active role in dealing with the nation's economic problems. This startled and, of course, pleased Speaker of the House Tip O'Neil as he led the Democrats and others in a standing ovation. Although not usually so unexpected, such ambivalence

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Part II of this report will appear in the Fall 1984 issue.

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might be found in government policy making in many areas. It might be both a cause and a consequence of the "new politics" and of the difficulties which have been encountered in governing the United States today (cf. Brown, 1983; Ronan, 1981).

Survey data provide further support for this conclusion, revealing that Americans' opinions have been ambiguous toward government economic regulations since the first scientific surveys were conducted in the 1930s—and probably much earlier. These attitudes have survived the Depression, World War II, and other periods of crisis. The public's opposition to regulation, and especially to *increased* regulation, has generally risen in the last 40 or more years, but the changes in opinion have been gradual and uneven. Overall, the public has had mixed attitudes toward government regulation, with opinions often appearing to be evenly divided. Americans have tended to accept existing policies and to oppose increased regulation. They have become more consistently opposed to government ownership and control of business and industry, while they have tended to support putting limits on the large and presumably excessive profits of companies. Recent increases in opposition to regulation, beginning slowly since approximately the mid-1970s, have not been as extensive as might have been expected on the basis of other available evidence. Moreover, the public has not turned against all forms of regulation nor warmed toward all its targets. There is still very substantial support for certain types of controls, such as those concerned with the safety of consumers and the environment, and with the unethical or dangerous practices of business and industry.

Lipset and Schneider (1979, 1983) found this ambivalence in their comprehensive studies of Americans' attitudes toward government, business, and labor. From all the available survey data they correctly inferred that the public supports free enterprise and competition and believes that there are benefits from business activity and deregulation. But Americans do not trust uncontrolled businesses and industries to protect the well-being of consumers, workers, and the nation as a whole, and they support regulation which maintains free enterprise and competition (e.g., antitrust laws, breaking up certain large industries). Business and industry are considered good for the country, provided that there are the minimum but *necessary* government controls.

This conclusion is compelling, but it is not new or surprising. Virtually the same commentary applied to economic life in America a century ago. Industrialization and economic growth were thought to be good for citizens and the nation, but according to historical and journalistic accounts, there was also an awareness that the benefits were accompanied by excesses and undesirable consequences which would have to be controlled in some way. With the Populist and Progressive political movements (e.g., Parkes, 1959) came the start of government regulation which evolved—with sizable impediments—into what it is today.

Thus Americans' attitudes toward regulation appear to have two characteristics. One is the underlying ambiguity and stability, which stems from what have perhaps been fundamental values in the United States: support for free enterprise and for certain protections for citizens (cf. Chong, et al., 1983). The second characteristic is that attitudes and opinions are not immovable, but that they change slowly, without wild fluctuations (beyond empirical sampling error), and when they do change, they respond in reasonable ways to events and changes in objective conditions. This seems to be true generally of virtually

all the public's preferences toward policies in the United States (see Page and Shapiro, 1982).

These movements in opinion and the public's ambivalence toward regulation are related to each other. How did the public come to be ambivalent and why have certain shifts in opinion occurred? One answer to this, which can be applied to any attitudes and opinions, is that, contrary to some arguments (cf., Lippmann, 1955; Almond, 1950), the public can be considered "rational." Citizens react to their social and economic environments in a way that is consistent with economic self-interest and the seeking of some benefit (or avoiding harm). At one level, individual citizens want the best balance of free market competition and regulation, and as conditions change they alter their choices among policies accordingly. This simple analysis is useful, but the process of opinion change is much more complex, since judgments may be based on more than individuals' self-interest (i.e., each citizen's *own* gain in income, quality of life, etc.): they may be based on the interests of *all* citizens, not just the holder of a particular opinion. Whether this is called altruism or a concern for the public interest, national interest, or collective interest (e.g., see Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979), it may be the driving force behind changes in public opinion and behind the public's original ambivalence toward regulation. These two forms of interest are not mutually exclusive, but the underlying theories concerning them have different normative implications. Some regulation issues may be perceived in terms of self-interest, others in terms of their widespread consequences, and others in terms of both. Some evidence suggests that collective judgments are more important influences on behavior than originally thought—more important than individual self-interest—but from aggregate survey data it is not possible to separate these two sources of opinion and opinion change (and individual-level data may not be much more helpful; see Kramer, 1983).

The public's ambiguity toward regulation may be unsettling, but it is consistent with American values and it is a reasonable response to changes in the economy, politics, and other conditions in the United States. Almost certainly it complicates the policy-making process in which the wants of citizens play some role (see Monroe, 1979, 1983; Page and Shapiro, 1983). One consequence of this is that elected officials and policy makers may misread public opinion unless they consider all its dimensions and subtleties. There is some evidence that the Reagan administration has done this on occasion in the case of environmental issues (e.g., Shabecoff, 1983). The public may be willing to have some restrictions relaxed as long as others protecting it from harm are left or are strenghtened.

The survey questions reported here were taken from the files of the Policy Change and Public Opinion Change Project at NORC, University of Chicago. This project was originally supported by the National Science Foundation, Grant #SES-7912969 A01. Its data were compiled from published sources, including Cantrill (1951), Lipset and Schneider (1983), and *Public Opinion* magazine, and with the assistance of the Roper Center, University of Connecticut; the Louis Harris Data Center, University of North Carolina; the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, University of Michigan; The New York Times/CBS News Poll; the NORC Library and the NORC General Social Survey. The sample sizes are at least 1,200, unless noted otherwise. Further information about these data can be obtained from the appropriate archive or survey organization.

CBS/NYT — Columbia Broadcasting System/The New York Times
CRI — Cambridge Reports, Inc.
GALLUP — Gallup Polls, American Institute for Public Opinion
HARRIS — Louis Harris and Associates
NORC — National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago
NORC-GSS — NORC's General Social Survey
ORC — Opinion Research Corporation
ROPER — Roper Organization

General Regulation of the Economy and Business

NORC, NORC-GSS: Some people think that the government in Washington is trying to do too many things that should be left to individuals and private businesses. Others disagree and think that the government should do even more to solve the country's problems. Still others have opinions somewhere in between. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up you mind on this?

		NORC 12/1973[a]	*NORC-GSS 3/1975*[b]	*NORC-GSS 3/1983*[b]
Government should do more	1	20%	25%	12%
	2	9	11	11
	3	10	29	36
	4	20	12	18
	5	14	16	16
	6	10	—	—
Government doing too much	7	14	—	—
Don't know		3	7	7

[a] Omitted "or haven't you made up your mind on this."

[b] A 5-point scale. The scale number 1 read: "I strongly agree that government should do more." Number 3 read: "I agree with both answers." Number 5 read: "I strongly agree that government is doing too much."

HARRIS: Now let me read you some statements some people have made about the way different levels of government should operate in this country. For each, tell me if you tend to agree or disagree.

The best government is the government that governs the least.

	9/1973	*3/1976*	*7/1976*	*1981*[a]
Agree	32%	38%	41%	59%
Disagree	56	48	48	35
Not sure	12	14	10	6

[a] Reported in *Public Opinion*, June/July 1981.

CRI: Some people have proposed a national economic planning council that would look at the economy and at our resources and would set general "goals" for the economy without actually managing or running business. Would you favor or oppose such a planning council?

	1975 (3rd qtr.)	*1976 (3rd)*	*1977 (4th)*	*1979 (2nd)*
Favor	58%	47%	51%	49%
Oppose	24	30	26	26
Don't know	18	23	23	24

CRI: Some people say the government should become involved in planning and managing the economy. Other people say more government planning would only make the economy worse. Do you favor or oppose more government involvement in planning and managing the economy?

	1975 (3rd qtr)	*1976 (3rd)*	*1977 (4th)*	*1979 (2nd)*
Favor	32%	29%	38%	33%
Oppose	51	53	42	42
Don't know	17	18	20	25

GALLUP, CBS/NYT: Now I'd like you to tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statements:[a]

The government has gone too far in regulating business and interfering with the free enterprise system.

	GALLUP[b] *1964*	*CBS/NYT 1/1978*	*CBS/NYT 11/1980*	*CBS/NYT 4/1981*
Agree	42%	58%	65%	65%
Disagree	39	31	27	26
No opinion	19	11	8	9

[a] In 1980 the question read: "I'd like to ask your opinion on the following statements. . . . Do you agree or disagree?" In 1981 the question read: "I'd like to ask your opinion on this statement . . . Do you agree or disagree?"

[b] In Loyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril, *The Political Beliefs of Americans* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1967), p. 190: "Now I'm going to read some things you sometimes hear people say and ask whether, in general, you agree or disagree. . . ."

ORC: In general, what is your attitude toward the federal government's regulation of business? Do you think there is a need for more government regulation of business, is the present amount about right, or do you think there should be less government regulation of business?

	6/1978	*8/1979*	*12/1980*
Less regulation	43%	47%	54%
Present amount	23	23	19
More regulation	25	24	19

CRI: In recent years, government regulation of all business has increased. Nearly everyone agrees that some regulation is needed, but some say there is now so much regulation it interferes with efficient business operation. Others say this regulation is needed to protect consumers. In your view, is there too much regulation of business or not enough?

	Spring 1978	*Spring 1979*	*Spring 1980*
Too much	31%	33%	42%
Not enough	27	29	22
About right (vol.)	25	21	20

GALLUP: Would you favor an amendment to the Constitution transferring to the federal government (the) power to regulate agriculture and industry?

	1/1936	*12/1936*[a]	*3/1937*[b]
Yes	43%	45%	58%
No	57	55	42

[a] Would you favor an amendment to the Constitution giving Congress the power to regulate agriculture, commerce, industry, and labor?

[b] Would you favor an amendment to the Constitution giving Congress greater power to regulate industry and agriculture?

GALLUP: During recent years the trend has been to give the federal government greater power to regulate business, industry, and agriculture. Are you in favor of this trend toward centralizing power in Washington?

	Early 8/1937	*Late 8/1937*[a]
Yes	39%	43%
No	45	46
No opinion	16	11

[a] Substitutes "business, labor, and agriculture" for "business, industry, and agriculture."

GALLUP: Do you think all companies doing business in more than one state should be required to get a license (permit) from the federal government?

	4/1938	*1/1939*[a] *Form A*	*1/1939*[b] *Form B*
Yes	44%	41%	46%
No	33	37	34
No opinion	23	22	20

[a] This question began: "To give the United States government greater control of business . . ."

[b] This question substituted "United States government" for "federal government."

GALLUP: During the next four years, do you think there should be more regulation or less regulation of business by the federal government than at present?

	5/1940	*Early 10/1940*	*Late 10/1940*
More regulation	23%	22%	22%
Less regulation	46	42	41
About the same	16	16	18
No opinion	15	20	20

GALLUP: During the next four years do you think business should be regulated to a greater extent by the federal government?

	5/1940	*5/1941*[a]
Yes	27%	44%
No	56	44
No opinion	17	12

[a] "During the next four years" omitted in 1941.

NORC: At the present time, do you think the government has too much or not enough control over our way of doing business in this country?

	8/1942	*11/1942*	*6/1943*	*1/1946*
Too much	19%	27%	29%	28%
About right (vol.)	34	36	35	35
Not enough	33	25	23	22
Don't know	14	12	13	15

GALLUP: Do you think the laws regulating business corporations are too strict or not strict enough?

	9/1961	*7/1962*	*2/1965*[a]	*1/1966*[a]
Too strict	9%	13%	18%	20%
Not enough	26	27	21	20
About right	32	29	32	32
Don't know	33	31	29	28

[a] The word "corporations" was omitted (based on information from the Roper Center and Gallup publications).

HARRIS: Now let me read you some statements some people have made about the way different levels of government should operate in this country. For each, tell me if you tend to agree or disagree.

The federal government should not run the life of the country, but should regulate major companies, industries, and institutions to be sure they don't take advantage of the public.

	9/1973	*3/1976*	*Voters 7/1976*
Agree	76%	77%	78%
Disagree	16	13	13
Not sure	8	10	10

HARRIS: Here are some statements which have been made about business. For each, tell me if you tend to agree or disagree.

While wrong-doing in business should be investigated and punished by government, a government which overregulates business hurts a healthy economy.

	11/1973	*6/1975*	*Voters 7/1976*[a]
Agree	74%	74%	75%
Disagree	11	10	9
Not sure	15	15	16

[a] The introduction read ". . . about business and politics."

HARRIS: Now let read you some statements about Ronald Reagan. For each, tell me if you tend to agree or disagree. . . .

He is right to want to get government out of business so that free enterprise can operate freely.

	12/1975[a]	*5/1979*	*10/1979*	*4/1980*
Agree	51%	59%	60%	69%
Disagree	20	29	29	26
Not sure	29	12	11	5

[a] ". . . about Ronald Reagan, former governor of California."

HARRIS: How serious a loss do you feel is would be if the federal government cut back its programs in . . . business regulation . . . by one third of what it is today—a very serious loss, only a moderate loss, or hardly a loss at all?

	3/1976	*8/1977*
Very serious loss	39%	25%
Only moderate loss	36	45
Hardly a loss	15	19
Not sure	9	11

HARRIS: Now let me ask you about some issues connected with what government should do about the economy. Do you favor or oppose . . .

	Voters	
	8/76	*10/76*
A bigger role of the federal government in the regulation of business . . .		
Favor	37%	29%
Oppose	49	57
Not sure	15	14
A cutting back in federal government regulation of business . . .		
Favor	44	50
Oppose	39	35
Not sure	18	15

HARRIS: Now let me read you some statements which have been made about the relation of business to government. For each, tell me if you tend to agree or disagree.

	11/73	*5/75*
If much of present government regulation of business were eliminated, the country would be much better off . . .		
Agree	43%	44%
Disagree	35	32
Not sure	22	24
The day is past when a big company can operate only in its own self-interest and can ignore the larger social issues of the day . . .		
Agree	67	68
Disagree	20	18
Not sure	13	13
There is a real plot by radical forces to use the federal government as an instrument to destroy free enterprise . . .		
Agree	38	39
Disagree	35	35
Not sure	27	26
Basically, most decisions about regulation of business by government are made to allow businesses to operate both at a profit, and also to see that the public interest is served . . .		
Agree	66	63
Disagree	15	16
Not sure	19	21

Regulation and Competition

HARRIS: In many countries, big companies are allowed to sit down with each other and work out how much they will produce, prices they will charge and what is needed in those countries to meet consumer demand and give jobs to people. In this country, our laws prohibit any such getting together by companies in the same industry, under our antitrust laws. As you understand these laws, do you think it does nore good than harm or more harm than good to have a law which makes it illegal for big companies in the same industry to get together for these purposes?

	7/1974[a]	*3/1976*
More good than harm	50%	49%
More harm than good	30	32
Not sure	20	19

[a] "In other countries, such as Europe or Japan" substituted for "In many countries."

HARRIS: If eliminating the antitrust laws in this country meant . . . Even though companies might be bigger, government could better regulate industry and demand that industry meet the public's needs better . . . would you favor or oppose eliminating those antitrust laws?

	7/1974	*3/1976*	*5/1977*
Favor	47%	47%	48%
Oppose	37	34	30
Not sure	16	19	22

HARRIS: If eliminating the antitrust laws in this country meant . . . Competition in many industries would be sharply reduced . . . would you favor or oppose eliminating those anti-trust laws?

	7/1974	*3/1976*	*5/1977*
Favor	21%	22%	17%
Oppose	64	63	64
Not sure	15	16	19

HARRIS: If eliminating the antitrust laws in this country meant . . . Smaller less efficient companies would go out of business and be bought up by bigger ones . . . would you favor or oppose eliminating those antitrust laws?

	7/1974	*3/1976*	*5/1977*
Favor	13%	15%	13%
Oppose	74	71	71
Not sure	13	13	16

HARRIS: If eliminating the antitrust laws in this country meant . . . Companies in the same industry could get together and set prices, subject to review by the federal government . . . would you favor or oppose eliminating those antitrust laws?

	7/1974	*3/1976*	*5/1977*
Favor	31%	29%	25%
Oppose	54	56	55
Not sure	15	15	20

HARRIS: If eliminating the antitrust laws in this country meant . . . In some industries, it would be found to be more efficient to have only a few big companies instead of a lot of small ones . . . would you favor or oppose eliminating those antitrust laws?

	7/1974	*3/1976*	*5/1977*
Favor	22%	22%	21%
Oppose	60	60	58
Not sure	18	18	21

HARRIS: If big business today were broken up into smaller companies, do you think the country would be better off, worse off, or would it mean little real change from what we have now?

	7/1974	*3/1976*	*5/1977*
Better off	42%	40%	44%
Worse off	21	23	20
Little real change	24	23	23
Not sure	12	14	13

HARRIS: If most industries were reorganized so that only a few big companies did most of the business in each industry, do you think the country would be better off, worse off, or would it mean little real change from what we have now?

	7/1974	*3/1976*	*5/1977*
Better off	10%	10%	9%
Worse off	61	60	60
Little real change	21	20	22
Not sure	8	10	10

HARRIS: Generally speaking, how do you feel about breaking up the oil companies—do you strongly favor it, somewhat favor it, somewhat oppose it, or strongly oppose it?

	12/1976[a]	*4/1977*	*5/1977*
Strongly favor	26%	26%	25%
Somewhat favor	23	25	28
Somewhat oppose	15	18	17
Strongly oppose	16	13	11
Not sure	20	19	19

[a] The response "strongly oppose" was offered before "somewhat oppose."

HARRIS: Here is a list of industries with very different products and offering very different services. How do you feel about breaking up the major companies in each industry, by their products and/or services—do you strongly favor, somewhat favor, strongly oppose, or somewhat oppose doing it?

	Percent "Favor"	
	3/1976	*5/1977*[a]
Drug industry	48%	48%
Automobile industry	46	47
Appliance industry	43	43
Airline industry	37	43
Newspaper business	43	41
Steel industry	46	49
Computer industry	38	42
TV manufacturing industry	42	42
Telephone industry	51	56
Electric utility industry	53	58

[a] I am going to read off some other industries whose major companies are organized to operate along similar lines as the major oil companies. How do you feel about breaking up the major companies in the ____ industry into smaller companies—do you strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose doing it? (Drug, Automobile, Electric appliance, Airline, Newspaper, Steel, Computers, Television manufacturing, Telephone, Electric utility.)

GALLUP: Would the country be better off if many small concerns took the place of the few large ones?

	7/1937	*1/1938*[a]
Yes	43%	45%
No	36	36
No opinion	21	19

[a] In your opinion would the country be better off if many small concerns took the place of the large corporations in the same fields?

ROPER: Now, here is a list of some different kinds of industries. Are there any industries on that list where you think there is too little competition—where too few companies dominate the industry? (If yes) Which?

	11/1973	*11/1974*	*11/1976*	*10–11/79*
Telephone	56%	55%	64%	60%
Electric power	45	48	58	57
Oil	33	39	41	50
Automobiles	14	15	16	15
Drugs	15	16	19	14
Metals (copper, aluminum steel, etc.)	12	12	12	13

	11/1973	11/1974	11/1976	10–11/79
Computers and data processing	22	13	16	12
Chemicals	9	9	11	11
Airlines	8	9	10	11
Food processing and manufacturing	—[a]	—[a]	10	19
Meat	11	12	9	9
Lumber and paper	9	8	8	7
None of them	12	9	11	10
Don't know	12	13	10	7

[a] Not asked.

ORC: I am going to read you some statements that have been made about large companies. On each one, please tell me whether you agree or disagree. Here is the first statement . . .

In many of our largest industries, one or two companies have too much control of the industry.

	Agree										
1959	61	63	65	67	69	71	73	75	77	79	81
57%	61%	59%	58%	60%	65%	68%	76%	82%	76%	80%	79%

ORC: There is too much power concentrated in the hands of a few large companies for the good of the nation.

	Agree										
1959	61	63	65	67	69	71	73	75	77	79	81
53%	57%	54%	52%	54%	61%	66%	74%	78%	72%	79%	76%

ORC: For the good of the country, many of our largest companies ought to be broken up into smaller companies.

	Agree										
1959	61	63	65	67	69	71	73	75	77	79	81
38%	41%	39%	37%	36%	45%	47%	53%	57%	55%	57%	53%

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The Portrayal of Blacks in Magazine Advertisements: 1950–1982

RONALD HUMPHREY AND HOWARD SCHUMAN

STUDYING the portrayal of blacks in advertisements increases our knowledge in two main ways. First, we can determine the image of blacks that advertisements present to Americans, both black and white, on the assumption that such media images have larger effects. Second, advertisements can serve as one type of barometer of the willingness of white Americans to accept blacks into the larger society. In this connection, it is useful to consider heuristically the models that may guide advertisers in their decisions as to when and how to include blacks in advertisements.

Possible Effects of Blacks in the Mass Media

Since many whites have little direct face-to-face contact with blacks, the mass media's depiction of blacks is likely to influence

Abstract This article compares the frequency and social characteristics of blacks and whites in advertisements in *Time* and *Ladies' Home Journal* during 1950 and 1980. The occupational level of blacks portrayed has risen considerably, and blacks are no longer presented as maids or servants. However, white authority figures are still frequently shown aiding poor blacks or supervising black children. Furthermore, ads show friendly and informal social relationships between individual whites much more frequently than they show such relationships between whites and blacks. Finally, in an extended analysis the frequency of black ads in 1980, 1981, and 1982 is examined for *Time*, *Newsweek*, and *LHJ*. Blacks are still somewhat underrepresented, and recent fluctuations in the use of black advertisements are considered. The article begins and ends with a discussion of three different models that might account for the way blacks are presented in advertisements in the United States.

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white attitudes heavily. For example, the Sears and Kinder (1971) survey of whites in the northern San Fernando Valley (a middle-class suburban area) found that 36 percent of the respondents had no contact at all with blacks in an average week and that another 58 percent had contact with blacks at most once or twice a week. Even more significantly, Greenberg (1972) found that many fourth- and fifth-grade white children reported that television is a greater source of information for them about blacks than are friends, parents, and personal contacts.

Greenberg also provides more direct evidence of a link between the mass media and white attitudes toward blacks. He found that black television personalities were a positive source of identification for both black and white children, and that high television watching of black performers was positively (though not significantly) related to favorable attitudes toward blacks in general. His findings are consistent with Bogatz and Ball's (1971) report that children who had watched the racially integrated children's show "Sesame Street" had more favorable attitudes toward minorities than did nonwatchers. In a more controlled experimental setting, Gorn, et al., (1976) report that white preschool children who were shown television inserts of minority children were more likely to want to play with minority children when given the chance than were children in a control group.

Greenberg's (1972) finding that black children overwhelmingly identified with black television performers indicates that mass media images are important to blacks as well as to whites. With such identification in mind, it is relevant to examine the age, sex, type of occupation, and other characteristics of blacks presented in advertisements.

Possible Models Influencing the Depiction of Blacks

In assessing how blacks are represented in advertisements, it is useful to start from models of how blacks might be portrayed in a society like our own. There are at least two models with claims to legitimacy. One is based on the assumption of equality of presentation, meaning that blacks and whites should be shown in exactly the same way, regardless of any differences that may currently exist in reality. Thus, if whites are presented largely as middle-class persons in middle-class settings, blacks should be pictured as middle-class also, ignoring actual differences in class distribution. There is some evidence that the creators of advertisements have recently had this model in mind in their portrayals of blacks.

A second model would use social reality as the basis for deciding on

racial presentation. Since blacks are more apt to be poorer or in lower status occupations than whites, ads might be expected to represent these differences in their presentation. It can even be argued that this model is needed not only to be true to reality, but to avoid glossing over the very real inequalities in our society. Some advertisements, especially those with social service goals, seem to be guided by this model.

There is a third model, however, that may capture more of what is going on: white attitudes toward blacks heavily influence how blacks will be depicted. We believe that this model actually fits better the portrayal of blacks in magazine advertisements in the recent past and the present than do either of the other two, though each model probably has some applicability. Thus, survey data indicate that whites are most willing to accept integration and equal treatment in the area of employment, less so in the area of close social contact and residential integration, and least so in the area of interracial marriage. If the image of blacks follows the profile of white attitudes based on surveys, ads should show a diminution of traditional presentation of blacks in lower occupational roles but still preserve social distance between blacks and whites in more informal and interpersonal ways. Furthermore, as Colfax and Sternberg (1972) point out, it seems likely that advertisers will attempt to make black advertisements less threatening to whites, for example, by using black children instead of black adults. These differences between whites and blacks in ads cannot easily be explained by either of the first two models.

Our argument is consistent with previous research, which shows that blacks were greatly underrepresented in magazine advertisements prior to the emergence of civil rights as a major issue for whites in the mid-1950s. Shuey (1953) found that in 1949–50 only one-half percent of the populated ads depicted blacks. He also found that advertisements with blacks presented them as skilled laborers or as professionals at only one-half of their true frequency in these occupations, although white ads considerably overportrayed whites in the upper professions. Cox (1969) replicated Shuey's categories for the 1967–68 period and reported some increase, though not a large one, in both the proportion and status of blacks in advertisements. Still later, Colfax and Sternberg (1972) found that the percentage of populated ads depicting blacks rose from 1.7 percent in 1967 to 7.3 percent in 1969, although even in 1969 only 4 percent of the total number of people in ads were black.

Although advertisers may pay some attention to reality, undoubtedly their main concern is selling a product, and it seems that they can best do this by appealing to the wants and desires of their

consumers, and by depicting their consumers as they want to be, not as they are. Since the overwhelming majority of consumers are white, it is probable that advertisers portray whites as they would like to think of themselves (i.e., upper-middle-class and at leisure), and portray blacks as whites find it easiest to think of blacks. In the research reported below, we extend into the 1980s the study of changes in the racial content of advertisements, and at the same time introduce additional analyses that will further test the fit of the three models outlined above.

Method

We began by coding the frequency and social characteristics of blacks in the first two issues of *Time* for each month in 1950 and 1980, and for each monthly edition of the *Ladies' Home Journal* (LHJ) for 1950, 1979, and 1980.[1] In each of these issues, all advertisements depicting blacks in photographs, cartoons, or true-life drawings were coded for a number of characteristics, including the type of sponsor, the number of people of each race, the sex and adult/child status of figures, the type of interracial contact, the relative status of blacks and whites, and the occupation and occupational prestige score of the most centrally located black adult in the ad. For purposes of comparison, the total number of both white and black ads in these same issues were counted, and the first white ad following each black ad was coded for the above social characteristics.[2]

[1] The earliest study of black magazine ads (Shuey, 1953) examined *Life*, *Saturday Evening Post*, *Time*, *The New Yorker*, *LHJ*, and *Colliers*. Later, Cox (1969) studied the same magazines (and replaced the defunct *Collier's* with *Look*). In another study, Colfax and Sternberg (1972) examined *Reader's Digest*, *Look*, *Life*, and *LHJ*. Of these magazines, only *Time*, *The New Yorker*, *LHJ*, and *Reader's Digest* have operated continuously from 1950 to 1982 using the same format. *Reader's Digest*, however, did not accept advertisements in 1950 and even now has only a few advertisements, these being mostly record and book club advertisements. In addition, *The New Yorker* appeals to a rather atypical and elite audience. For these reasons we decided to concentrate on *Time* and *LHJ*. *Time* is the nation's largest selling news magazine and *LHJ* is a leading family magazine.

[2] An ad is here classified as "black" if it includes *any* blacks, regardless of whether whites are included or not. Approximately four-fifths of the "black ads" in all magazines in all years included whites as well; one-fifth included only blacks. Since the ratio is constant over time and the numbers of all-black ads is small, our analysis below considers both mixed and all-blacks ads as a single category, except where otherwise indicated. In using the "yoking" strategy for selecting white ads, we are following the precedent set by previous researchers (e.g., Shuey, 1953; Cox, 1969). This does not yield a probability sample of white ads, strictly speaking, but there is no reason to expect results from such a sample to differ from ours since there is no evident or likely connection between one ad and another in these magazines. Moreover, our count of the proportion of ads containing blacks is based on *all* ads for the issues coded.

In a second stage, possible *regional differences* in advertisements in *Time* were examined, since in recent years *Time* has provided for regional variation in advertising. We coded copies of *Time* for the same 12 issues in 1981 from a mixed race Northern area (Detroit), from a largely white area (Portland, Oregon), and from a mixed Deep South area (Columbus, Georgia). No regional differences were found, but we did discover an unexpected shift in the frequency of black ads in *Time* between 1980 and 1981. Thus, in a third stage we went back and coded the frequency of blacks in *all* issues of both *Time* and *LHJ* in 1980, 1981, and 1982. Moreover, to test the generality of the fluctuations, we also coded the frequency of blacks in ads for all issues of *Newsweek* for the same period.[3] Except where otherwise noted, all our analyses employ likelihood-ratio chi-square tests.

Results and Discussion

THE FREQUENCY OF BLACKS IN ADVERTISEMENTS

We expected and found clear evidence of a long-term rise in the proportion of ads that included blacks, as can be seen in Table 1 when comparing 1950 and 1980 time points for both *Time* and *LHJ*. How-

Table 1. The Percentage of Populated Picture Advertisements with Blacks, by Year and Magazine

	Magazine		
Year	*Time*[a]	*LHJ*[b]	*Newsweek*
1950	1.3%	0.7%	—
	(1,040)	(1,788)	
1979	—	2.8%	—
		(772)	
1980	11.4%	2.6%	10.7%
	(1,425)	(659)	(1,724)
1981	7.4%	2.3%	7.7%
	(1,447)	(603)	(1,612)
1982	9.6%	4.2%	9.8%
	(1,421)	(594)	(1,560)

[a] For *Time*, 1950, only first two issues of each month were coded.

[b] The Oct. 1979 and the Jan. 1982 issues of *LHJ* were unavailable and thus were not coded.

[3] All the coding was done by a single coder. However, the reliability of the coding was checked by having a second person independently code over a quarter of the total number of black ads for occupational and social characteristics. The main coder found 89 percent of the black ads found by either coder, and the agreement on the various social codes ranged from 78 percent to 100 percent, and the majority of the codes were agreed upon more than 90 percent of the time.

ever, on a short-term basis our analysis of regional ads in 1981 showed an apparent *drop* in the level of blacks in advertisements during that year. As Table 1 shows, the 1981 proportion of blacks in advertisements was lower than the 1980 level for all three magazines (for Time, $\chi^2 = 13.43$, df = 1, $p < .001$; *LHJ*, $\chi^2 = 0.08$, df = 1, n.s.; *Newsweek*, $\chi^2 = 9.22$, df = 1, $p < .005$). Furthermore, a month-by-month analysis showed that for both *Time* and *Newsweek* the drop began abruptly in April 1981, with the April issues containing only half the number of black ads as the March issues.

Since previous research had shown that there was a sudden increase in the use of black advertisements during a period (1967–69) when there was great political emphasis on incorporating blacks into our society, it seemed possible that the downturn in April 1981 might have been due to the election of Ronald Reagan several months earlier. Perhaps advertisers perceived some government actions as hostile toward affirmative action, and accordingly decreased their use of blacks in advertisements. Another possibility, suggested by informants in advertising whom we contacted, was that either the beginning of or an expectation of an economic downturn might somehow have reduced the use of advertisements containing blacks. However, the total number of advertisements for *Time* held steady between 1980 and 1982 (although there were declines for *Newsweek* and *LHJ*), and furthermore in 1982 there was again a reversal of trend, with the proportion of blacks in advertisements rising to a level statistically higher than the 1981 figures and statistically indistinguishable from the 1980 level. Conceivably, this could mean that advertisers are highly sensitive to shifting political or economic winds when planning the racial content of ads, but it is difficult to see close connections between the 1980 to 1982 trends in Table 1 and either political or economic indicators over that full period. It may be that the changes in racial proportions simply demonstrate that this type of index is not very stable within brief one or two year intervals. In any case, although there can be little doubt about the increase in appearance of blacks in ads over the past three decades, more precise statements about the exact shape of the trend line would require much more dense coding by year and by magazine over a longer time span.

Regardless of which years we use, 1980, 1981, or 1982, it is still apparent that blacks are underrepresented in magazine advertisements. Although 11.4 percent of *Time*'s 1980 ads contain at least one black, only 5.7 percent of the total number of people shown in ads are black, whereas approximately 12 percent of the national population is black. This underrepresentation occurs because only about one-fifth of the ads containing blacks in both *Time* and *LHJ* are represented

solely by blacks. (*Newsweek* was not coded for this variable, nor for the rest of the variables to be discussed.) Indeed, in the ads containing both blacks and whites, white adults outnumber blacks by five to one. This predominance of whites over blacks has been noted by previous researchers (e.g., Colfax and Sternberg, 1972; Dominick and Greenberg, 1970), who argue that advertisers attempt to diminish the association of blacks with their products by surrounding them with whites. It is possible, however, that this ratio comes about simply because advertisers are more likely to notice the need to use blacks in an ad with seven or eight people than in an ad with only one or two people. Nevertheless, this latter interpretation has some trouble explaining why the average number of adults in all-black ads (*Time:* 0.8; *LHJ:* 1.25) is less than the average number of whites in all-white ads (*Time:* 2.3; *LHJ*: 1.6).[4] It seems more likely that advertisers avoid using a group of blacks because a group would more strongly identify blacks with a product than would a single individual.

AGE AND SEX OF BLACKS IN ADVERTISEMENTS

Colfax and Sternberg (1972) also hypothesized that advertisers would tend to use black adult females rather than males in all-black ads, reasoning that black males are more threatening to whites than are black females. Although their own data tend to support this hypothesis, our results show that in 1980 there is virtually no difference in the male/female ratio for blacks (1.8) and whites (1.9) in *Time* ($\chi^2 = 0.02$, df = 1, n.s.), and that while the difference for *LHJ* is in the expected direction (white M/F 0.6, black M/F 0.1), it is not significant ($\chi^2 = 3.16$, df = 1, $p < .10$), though this may be due to the small number of all-black cases ($N=8$). (We should note in passing that *Time* underrepresents females of both races and that *LHJ* underrepresents males).

A related issue has to do with the proportions of adults and children. Of the black ads in *Time* (1980) and *LHJ* (1979–80), 15 percent represent blacks solely by children, but only 5 percent of the white ads use only white children ($\chi^2 = 6.82$, df = 1, $p < .01$). Furthermore, 38 percent of the black children are shown under the exclusive supervision of white adults, but no white children are shown under black supervision. Indeed, the percentage of black children shown under adult black supervision, 31 percent, is less than the percentage of black children shown under white supervision (38 percent). In sharp

[4] The mean number of black adults in *Time* is less than 1.0 because of the large number of ads with only black children present.

contrast, two-thirds of the white children are overseen by adult whites, and all of the rest are unsupervised. Although these figures represent a decline from the levels of inequality reported by Colfax and Sternberg (1972) ($\chi^2 = 6.09$, df = 1, $p < .025$), who found that two-thirds of the black children were supervised by whites, they demonstrate that blacks are still being shown as subservient to white authority figures.

SPONSORSHIP OF ADS

We examined the percentage of ads sponsored by private industry, by nonprofit organizations, and by governmental agencies. Advertisements sponsored by private industry are probably better "barometers" of black acceptance into mainstream American society than are nonprofit service or governmental agency ads.

In *Time* (1980), blacks are seven times as likely as whites to appear in government-sponsored ads, and almost three times as likely to be in nonprofit ads, as are whites ($\chi^2 = 14.12$, df = 2, $p < .001$). Fully 31 percent of black ads fall in these two categories, but only 8 percent of white ads do. Although only two ads in our *LHJ* (1979–80) sample are sponsored by nonprofit or government agencies, both of them portray blacks.

SOCIAL AND OCCUPATIONAL STATUS

The broad occupational images of whites and blacks in ads are indicated in Table 2, using codes first suggested by Shuey (1953) and still valuable as measures of broad stereotypes. The majority of whites, across all magazines and years, are not shown engaged in an occupation, but instead are depicted as elegant and idle consumers. This, of course, reflects many advertisers' desire to associate their products with high status by showing well-dressed men and women at leisure using these products. In both *Time* (1980) and *LHJ* (1979–80), however, advertisers are considerably less likely to use blacks as their examples of high status consumers than they are whites—the difference between the percentage of whites and blacks in the idle category is 23 percent for both magazines.[5] If only private industry ads are considered, the difference between the black and white per-

[5] Although the overall difference in the codes is not statistically significant for *LHJ*, a simple comparison of the number of whites and blacks in *LHJ* in the idle category versus the other categories lumped together does produce a significant difference: $\chi^2 = 7.47$, df = 1, $p < .01$.

Table 2. Shuey Occupational Codes, by Race and Magazine

	Time (1980)		*LHJ (1979–80)*	
Codes	*White*	*Black*	*White*	*Black*
Idle	58%	35%	74%	51%
Entertainment	5	4	3	10
Professional sports	1	7	–0–	3
Professionals, students	18	24	–0–	8
Skilled labor	2	6	–0–	–0–
Maids, cooks	–0–	1	–0–	3
Cowboy, soldier	1	2	3	–0–
Other laborers	2	2	–0–	–0–
Africans	–0–	5	–0–	–3–
Slums, shacks	–0–	5	–0–	–0–
Unclassified	12	10	21	23
	99%[a]	101%[a]	101%[a]	101%[a]
	(83)	(84)	(39)	(39)
	$\chi^{2b} = 21.95$, df = 10, $p < .025$		$\chi^{2b} = 11.00$, df = 7, n.s.	

[a] Percents do not add to 100 because of rounding.

[b] A small number (0.1) was added to all cell values to eliminate problems caused by zero cell values in the calculation of the χ^2.

centages is 17 percent for *Time* (1980) and 20 percent for *LHJ* (1979–80).

Furthermore, this impression is likely to be accentuated by the large number of ads, however well-intentioned, depicting blacks living in poverty either in this country or in Africa. In *Time* (1980), for example, 10 percent of the black ads represent blacks as Africans or Americans in poverty. These ads, which are primarily sponsored by nonprofit organizations, occasionally depict poverty-stricken whites and blacks together in the same ad; however, none of the ads in our sample depicts only destitute whites.

Blacks are also overrepresented as sports figures, with 7 percent of the black ads in *Time* (1980) and 3 percent of the ads in *LHJ* (1979–80) depicting professional black athletes. In contrast, only one all-white ad shows a professional sports personality (for *Time* and *LHJ* combined: $\chi^2 = 5.12$, df = 1, $p < .025$).

At the same time, there has been a dramatic shift in the portrayal of blacks in occupational terms from 1950 to 1980. In 1950, *all* the black ads were in the low-skilled labor category, with 75 percent of the ads representing blacks as cooks, servants, and porters, and 25 percent representing blacks as African or Island laborers. By 1980, however, only 14 percent of the black ads fell in the low-skilled labor categories, and although this figure is still three times greater than that for whites, it represents a substantial shift in the portrayal of blacks.

In comparison, the occupational portrayal of whites has not changed noticeably.[6]

In our analysis so far we have focused on status-related traits, such as being elegantly idle or living in poverty, which are only indirectly related to the occupational portrayal of blacks. In what types of occupations are whites and blacks depicted if we exclude such extensive categories? To answer this question, the most centrally located adult in all ads depicting people in work settings or in clearly identifiable work roles was assigned both an occupational code and a corresponding Hodge-Siegel-Rossi (1964) prestige score.[7]

As expected, blacks are no longer presented in blatantly stereotyped work roles. For *Time* (1980), the mean prestige score for blacks, 52, is approximately equal to that for whites, 54. Since scores in the range of 50–55 are typical for managers and lower professionals, both blacks and whites are shown in solid middle-class occupations. Blacks are shown in the higher professions as well, with four of the ads presenting blacks as doctors.

The picture is roughly the same in *LHJ* (1979–80), where the eight ads showing blacks in work roles have an average prestige score of 50. However, because only one white is shown in a work role, a direct comparison between white and black prestige scores cannot be made. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that in *LHJ* blacks are eight times as likely to be shown in work roles as are whites, and are thus relatively unlikely to be shown in the idle category or interacting informally with others.

The 1980 prestige scores present a dramatic change from those of 1950, when for *Time* and *LHJ* combined the average prestige score for whites, 47, is more than twice that for blacks, 20 ($t = 5.58$, df = 24, $p < .001$). Moreover, in 1950 there was no overlap at all in the occupational portrayal of blacks and whites, with the lowest prestige score for whites being six points above the highest score for blacks.

BLACKS AND WHITES TOGETHER

Thus far we have focused primarily on comparing the traits of blacks in one ad with those of whites in another ad. When blacks and

[6] For the three-way interaction among race, time, and occupation: $\chi^2 = 11.01$, df = 2, $p < .005$. Occupations were classified into three levels: idle, high-skilled (entertainment, sports, professionals, skilled labor), low-skilled (maids, cowboys, other laborers, Africans, and slum-dwellers).

[7] The occupational codes are a reduced version of the Census codes, with just under a thousand categories, while the prestige scores are based on survey respondents' estimates of the general social standing of the occupations.

whites are presented together in the same ad, it is possible for them to be in equal status roles or in a dominant-subordinate role relationship, as when one employs the other or when one is a customer and the other is in a service role.

The 1950 ads present blacks in subordinate role relationships with whites 62 percent of the time, and they *never* present blacks in dominant roles.[8] Although eight ads in 1950 are listed under the equal status code, the eight ads do not actually show blacks engaging in face-to-face interaction with whites in the ad, although possibly such a relationship might be inferred. By contrast, 89 percent of the ads in 1980 show blacks and whites in equal status role relationships, and 65 percent of these show face-to-face interaction. Even though blacks in 1980 are still presented more frequently in subordinate relationships than are whites (8 percent as compared to 3 percent), the difference is small and not statistically significant.

Finally, we should also consider whether the interracial interaction is businesslike or intimate, or whether the whites and blacks in an ad are even shown interacting together at all. This is important because an ad showing a black and a white working together on an assembly line, or in a large business office, is likely to convey an entirely different impression than an ad picturing the same two people relaxing together in a restaurant or over a home-cooked meal.

Table 3 compares the type of white-black interactions in 1950 in mixed-race ads with the white-white interactions in the all-white ads

Table 3. Type of Interactions, by Race, Year, and Magazine

	Time Magazine				*Ladies' Home Journal*			
	1980		*1950*		*1979–80*		*1950*	
Interaction	*White–White*	*Black–White*	*White–White*	*Black–White*	*White–White*	*Black–White*	*White–White*	*Black–White*
None	16%	30%	12%	46%	15%	50%	29%	100%
Formal	21	44	38	54	15	12	–0–	–0–
Informal	63	26	50	–0–	69	38	71	–0–
	100%	100%	100%	100%	99%[a]	100%	100%	100%
	(43)	(69)	(8)	(11)	(13)	(34)	(7)	(10)
	$\chi^2 = 14.98$,		$\chi^2 = 7.69$[b],		$\chi^2 = 5.24$,		$\chi^2 = 10.86$,[b]	
	$df = 2$, $p < .001$		$df = 2$, $p < .025$		$df = 2$, $p < .08$		$df = 1$, $p < .001$	

[a] Percents do not add to 100 because of rounding errors.

[b] In calculating the chi-square, a small number (0.2) was added to all cells.

[8] Since we wanted to measure only unambiguous status differences between the races, we adopted the rule that if *any* white is shown in the same role as a black, the ad is coded under the equal status code. The coding probably underestimates the number of times blacks are shown in subordinate relationships to white authorities, but it allows us to make clear distinctions between the 1950 and 1980 levels of status inequality.

depicting two or more people. Although the majority of white-white interactions are of an informal nature, the 1950 ads never show blacks and whites interacting informally together. Indeed, *LHJ* (1950) shows no direct interaction whatsoever between the races, while *Time* (1950) shows only formal interactions between blacks and whites. In 1950, then, ads present a picture of a largely segregated world in which blacks come into contact with whites only through their work-related roles as porters, cooks, and servants.

By 1980, this picture had changed dramatically in that blacks are no longer presented as servants. Furthermore, a simple comparison of the white-black interactions in 1950 with those in 1980 shows a substantial percentage of black-white informal interactions in the latter year (for *Time* and *LHJ* combined: $\chi^2 = 14.30$, df = 2, $p < .001$).

However, as Table 3 also demonstrates, the picture of a segregated world has not entirely disappeared. In *LHJ* (1979–80), for example, half of the mixed-race ads show no contact between whites and blacks, as against only 15 percent of the all-white ads that show no interaction. Likewise, *Time*'s mixed-race ads are almost twice as likely to show no interaction between the races as the all-white ads are to show no interaction between two or more whites. In terms of formality, only one-quarter to two-fifths of the 1980 mixed-race ads present whites and blacks together in an informal social setting. By comparison, approximately two-thirds of the white-white interactions are of an informal social character.

The above figures refer, as previously mentioned, to ads that portray both blacks and whites in the same advertisement. Another way of looking at the same issue is to express these figures in terms of the percentage of the total number of ads (i.e., all-white, all-black, and mixed-race ads combined) that show contact between the races. Expressed in this way, only 6.6 percent of all coded ads in *Time* (1980), and 1.1 percent of the coded ads in *LHJ* (1979–80), show interracial contact. Likewise, only 2.5 percent of the ads in *Time*, and 0.8 percent of the ads in *LHJ*, depict informal interracial contact. In general, then, 1980 ads do little to alter the notion of a segregated social world.

Conclusions

In general, these results support our expectations. White attitudes towards blacks in work settings have improved considerably over the last three decades, and so have advertisers' portrayal of blacks in work roles. In fact, advertisers now portray blacks at work in equal status with whites, even though this is clearly not the case in reality.

In other ways, white attitudes towards blacks are less favorable, and thus ads show blacks as dependent on whites: white authorities are disproportionately shown aiding poor blacks or supervising black children. Furthermore, white attitudes toward social relations with blacks are less favorable than are those with regard to occupational equality, and have improved only slowly; advertisers have also moved more slowly in portraying whites socializing with blacks. In this latter case, the data cannot clearly distinguish between whether advertisers are simply reflecting white attitudes towards blacks or mirroring reality—both yield the same predictions. Moreover, the relative lack of blacks in ads depicting wealthy people at leisure may stem as much from advertisers' desire to have believable ads as to their desire to be in tune with white attitudes. Nevertheless, since in general neither whites nor blacks are realistically portrayed in ads, the most parsimonious model is that advertisements usually portray whites as whites like to think of themselves and blacks as whites like to think of blacks.

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The Effects of Public Ownership on Newspaper Companies: A Preliminary Inquiry

PHILIP MEYER AND STANLEY T. WEARDEN

A FUNDAMENTAL change is taking place in the ownership pattern of newspapers in the United States. Once almost entirely owned by individuals and families or by small groups of investors in closely held corporations, newspaper companies are increasingly going public. By late 1983, shares were being publicly traded in 13 companies that accounted for nearly 23 percent of total daily circulation in the U.S. Two more companies were in the process of going public: the giant Tribune Co., which by itself accounted for close to 5 percent of U.S. daily circulation, and the smaller Park Communications, Inc.

The current trend can be traced to the early 1960s. Dow Jones, publisher of the *Wall Street Journal* went public in 1963. Times Mirror Co., which had been a closely held family corporation with stock traded over the counter, was listed on the New York Stock exchange in 1964. Gannett Co. made its move in 1967. Knight-

Abstract The trend toward ownership of major newspaper groups by companies whose stock is publicly traded raises questions about the impact of investor influence on the management of the affected newspapers. A hypothesis is developed and tested: that the managers of publicly held newspaper companies will hold attitudes more like those of financial analysts than will their counterparts in private companies. Although the hypothesis is not sustained, the circumstances justify a watch for further opportunities to test it in the future.

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Ridder's predecessors, Ridder Publications and Knight Newspapers, became public companies in 1969, as did the *New York Times*. The step was not confined to the larger firms. Media General went public in 1967 and Lee Enterprises in 1969. Companies going public in the following decade included the Washington Post and Multimedia in 1971, Harte-Hanks in 1972, and Affiliated Publications in 1973. Meanwhile, Capital Cities Communications, a broadcasting company which had been publicly held since 1957, became a major newspaper publisher by acquiring the *Fort Worth Star-Telegram* in 1974 and the *Kansas City Star* in 1977. In this decade, A. H. Belo Corp., publisher of the *Dallas Morning News*, joined the ranks.

Why this trend toward public ownership? The tax code has something to do with it. A company whose shares have a market value that is set by public trading can be kept intact after its original owner dies while its shares and their proceeds are fairly distributed to the heirs and the Internal Revenue Service. But it is convenient in other ways. The money raised from the sale of shares can be used for investment in new technology or expansion, and the liquidity of the shares provides a convenient means of rewarding employees with an equity position in the company through discounted stock purchase plans and stock appreciation rights.

The change suggests a new research agenda for students of the media who have long been preoccupied with a search for differences between newspapers that are solely owned and those that are owned by groups.

The time now appears ripe for an investigation into the effects of public ownership and the new players in the institutional arena, the Wall Street analysts who influence the price of newspaper shares by advising investors on their worth. We have found no systematic research in this area beyond a discussion by Kuczon (1978) of the many possibilities for research that are opened by public ownership. Bagdikian (1983) argues that pressure from the financial community makes newspaper companies less socially conscious and more profit-oriented, although he does not draw a sharp distinction between publicly held and privately held companies in this respect. There is, however, some reason to believe that a different process is at work. Managers of public companies may want long-run profitability as much as anyone else, but they also want immediate recognition for their efforts in the form of a high valuation on the company's shares. A high valuation confers prestige, it makes the managers' own holdings and stock appreciation rights more valuable, and it strengthens the company's hand in making acquisitions which are often accomplished by swapping shares rather than with cash transactions.

This desire for higher share prices, it can be argued, makes corporation managers sensitive to the desires of stock analysts, and those desires have short-term orientation because the market system encourages frequent trading and concentration on near-term results.

Time, Inc., for example, under the management of founder Henry Luce, could let a publishing innovation run for years at a loss on the basis of Luce's belief that it would eventually pay off. The losses of *Life Magazine*, founded in 1936, were "staggering," according to Luce's biographer, before it began to pay its owner back (Swanberg, 1972:144–45). But Wall Street applauded when Time, now a publicly held company, dumped its latest innovation, a magazine called TV-Cable Week, after only five months. "There is no ego trip at Time anymore," said one analyst. "The market appreciates management that doesn't tinker with losers if they are clearly going to remain losers," said another (Grangenois, 1983).

A case has been made that sensitivity to investor concerns yields socially undesirable effects among American businesses in general. Hayes and Abernathy (1980) suggest that corporations have begun to fear risky or long-term investments in favor of policies that produce steady, low-risk increases in earnings. Such policies, they argue, are not adequate for maintaining a competitive edge against foreign business which invests more readily in new products and technologies with long-term or uncertain payoffs.

Behr (1982) echoes this sentiment. He suggests that too many U.S. companies are looking for safe short-term benefits rather than vital long-term gains:

> The driving force throughout . . . business in the past two decades was a push for immediate profits, an allegiance to short-term success that too often obscured the necessity of building for the future . . . The battle plan in much of business during the '60s and '70s was play it safe; take the shortest, surest route to instant profits; avoid risks and sacrifice investments in uncertain technology or unproven new products if they threaten achievement of the goals at hand.

John Morton (1981), a security analyst who specializes in newspaper companies for Lynch, Jones & Ryan, says this short-term emphasis is as true of newspaper corporations as any others:

> If I were to put my finger on the thing that probably has the biggest impact on the newspaper companies, it is the sensitivity that being a public company develops in the company's managers toward its earnings performance. Rightly or wrongly, Wall Street tends to judge companies on their earnings performance, on its predictability, on its steadiness. . . . Institutional investors . . .

like not to be surprised. . . . They like investments that they don't have to worry about. . . . And so . . . the system tends to reward companies that have fairly predictable earnings performance.

Predictability in earnings has not been a strong point in the newspaper business. Depending as it does on local advertising for most of its revenue, it tends to be subject to the business cycle—meaning that while it does very well overall, it has good and bad years. Wall Street observers, including Morton, give credit to Allen H. Neuharth, chairman of Gannett Co., for demonstrating to the financial community that a newspaper company could overcome this cyclical affliction. Gannett did it by specializing in medium-size monopoly markets which are less subject to cyclical variation in the first place and where management has the flexibility to practice earnings management—a term that emcompasses a variety of techniques. In general, it means holding earnings down in good years by concentrating on improvements while holding back rate increases and then riding out recessions with economy moves and the postponed rate increases. Gannett became known as the company with "never a down quarter," posting steady gains in earnings through good times and bad. Wall Street rewarded it by bidding the stock up to the highest price-earnings ratio among newspaper companies. This distinction was forfeited by Gannet when it departed from the pattern with the risky and long-term investment in *USA Today*, but not before other public newspaper companies saw the results and began their own efforts at earnings management.

For some newspaper companies, the experience of being publicly held has not been so happy. If its shares are not highly valued by the market, a company may be vulnerable to an unfriendly takeover. The pressure for consistent earnings increases may hamper efforts to attain long-term goals. In the spring of 1984, Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc., announced a plan to return to private ownership after a dozen years as a public company. The group of officers and heirs of the company's founders proposed to buy the outstanding shares, saying they were worth more than the value placed on them by the stock market. A spokesperson for the group said that as a private company it would be able to seize investment opportunities without "the pressure for consistent and predictable quarterly earnings growth" that the market expects of publicly held companies (SNPA, 1984).

Also in 1984, Dow Jones & Co., one of the newspaper companies most favored by the market, obtained permission from its shareholders to create a new class of stock that could not be traded publicly.

The new arrangement was designed to prevent an outsider from taking control. Chairman Warren H. Phillips (*Wall Street Journal*, 1984) said the move would protect "the long-term environment of journalistic independence on which the company's success stands." A similar arrangement has been in effect at the Washington Post Co. since it first went public.

Hypotheses

If pressure from the financial community is causing the managers of publicly held newspaper companies to distort their behavior in ways that are detrimental to their industry or to society or to both, the behavior changes should surface in some systematic way that can be measured. The phenomenon, if it exists, may involve a very long chain of causation, and it may be too new for indicators of long-term output—such as survival of individual newspapers, investment in new technologies, improved services for readers or the lack of them—to be operationalized. At this early stage, an attitude measure seems safest. If financial analysts are going to effect long-term changes in the behavior of newspaper managers, the newspaper people will have to eventually change their attitudes. And the baseline is fairly straightforward, as exemplified by remarks made to the analysts by the late John S. Knight, who was at the helm of Knight Newspapers when it went public in 1969. Knight recalled the incident in a 1978 interview with Daniel H. Neuharth (1981):

> I made the first talk at the financial security analysts—the last talk I ever made—I was never invited again. My opening line was, "Ladies and gentlemen, I do not intend to become your prisoner."
>
> I told them why. I said that as long as I have anything to do with it, we are going to run the papers, we are going to spend money sometimes that they wouldn't understand why we were spending it, for future gains, and we did not intend to be regulated or directed by them in any respect. That's pretty challenging, isn't it? It was the right thing to say, too.

But that was 15 years ago, and Knight himself is dead. Large institutions do not change their ideals and their goals overnight, but, we reasoned, some slow and even unconscious changes might be taking place. We could think of three ways that such changes might be manifest if, in fact, they have occurred:

1. In terms of the standards used for evaluating the success of a newspaper company, the people running publicly owned companies would develop attitudes more like those of the security analysts than would people running companies that are still privately owned.

2. Publishers of publicly owned companies, being closest to the analysts, would be affected first and therefore have attitudes more like the analysts than would their own editors or news staffs.

3. If the new attitudes moved down the chain of command, editors would, at any given point in the process, have attitudes closer to those of the analysts than would their staffs.

Methodology

We were able to collect data from each of the necessary sources. The first survey consisted of telephone interviews of a random sample of security analysts interested in newspaper companies. It was conducted in the spring of 1982 under a research grant from the University Research Council of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Names were randomly chosen from two sources: the 1980 membership list of the Printing & Publishing Industry Analysts Association, and a mailing list maintained by the investor relations department of a cooperating public company. A sample of 94 was drawn from a pool of about 250, and 51 responses were obtained.

The second survey, conducted in the summer and fall of 1982 under the sponsorship of the American Society of Newspaper Editors with financial support from the John and Mary R. Markle Foundation, consisted of a questionnaire mailed to newspaper publishers, editors, and staff. Probability of selection for this survey was made proportionate to the size of a newspaper's circulation so that the sample is generalizable to the management of papers read by a cross-section of U.S. newspaper readers (Meyer, 1983: xi–xii).

Personnel at each of 331 newspapers were contacted, and the response rate was 71 percent for publishers, 78.2 percent for editors, and 72.5 percent for staff members. Among other things, each of these surveys asked the respondents to rate, on a scale of 1 to 10, a list of possible "yardsticks" for evaluating newspaper companies. A score of 1 meant the yardstick was unimportant and a score of 10 meant the yardstick was extremely important.

The yardsticks were chosen to include what we believed were the salient standards for both groups. For newspaper people, the selection was based on our own experience plus the findings of social science research, particularly Johnstone's (1976) report that journalists attach more importance to the excellence of their work than to "concrete rewards and benefits" (p. 149). For analysts, the selection was based on conversations with analysts, perusal of some of their publicly available reports, and published interviews in *The Wall Street Transcript*. The resulting list contained these items: earnings consis-

tency, management quality, readiness to adopt new production technology, involvement with new electronic information systems, community service orientation, newspaper editorial quality, overall product quality, overall company image, financial health as represented by the balance sheet, and readiness to introduce new products. This study is based upon a comparison of the responses to these questions.

Results

Column one of Table 1 summarizes the responses of the securities analysts. The scores in this column, as well as in the others, are mean responses. Thus earnings consistency received a mean rating of 7.76 from the security analysts. The three yardsticks most important to the analysts were management quality, financial health as represented by the balance sheet, and earnings consistency. The least important yardsticks were community service orientation and editorial quality. Newspaper people, in general, rated product quality, editorial quality, and management quality as the three most important yardsticks. Publishers of both privately and publicly owned newspapers, and editors of publicly owned newspapers, felt that earnings consistency and

Table 1. Mean Scores and Rankings of All Ten Yardsticks

		Publishers		*Editors*		*Staff*	
	Analysts (N = 51[a])	*Public (N = 74)*	*Private (N = 155)*	*Public (N = 81)*	*Private (N = 175)*	*Public (N = 70)*	*Private (N = 166)*
Earnings consistency	7.76 (3)[b]	7.84 (9)	8.21 (9)	6.79 (10)	8.31 (8)	6.91 (10)	7.14 (9)
Management quality	8.51 (1)	9.64 (3)	9.58 (2)	9.52 (3)	9.42 (3)	9.04 (3)	9.19 (3)
Production technology	7.10 (5)	8.33 (6)	8.37 (7)	8.10 (6)	8.44 (6)	8.01 (5)	7.93 (5)
Electronic information	6.67 (7)	7.29 (10)	7.23 (10)	6.94 (9)	7.95 (9)	7.82 (6)	7.74 (6)
Community service	3.88 (10)	7.96 (8)	8.45 (6)	7.16 (8)	8.34 (7)	7.19 (8)	7.18 (8)
Editorial quality	4.94 (9)	9.71 (2)	9.51 (3)	9.90 (1)	9.75 (1)	9.29 (2)	9.59 (1)
Product quality	6.69 (6)	9.71 (1)	9.59 (1)	9.83 (2)	9.72 (2)	9.57 (1)	9.57 (2)
Company image	6.16 (8)	8.41 (5)	8.59 (5)	8.20 (5)	8.60 (4)	8.03 (4)	8.09 (4)
Financial health	8.14 (2)	8.66 (4)	8.68 (4)	8.29 (4)	8.61 (5)	7.27 (7)	7.64 (7)
New products	7.27 (4)	8.30 (7)	8.33 (8)	7.90 (7)	7.86 (10)	7.03 (9)	6.77 (10)

[a] Unweighted frequencies.

[b] The number in parentheses in each cell is the rank (first through tenth) accorded a given "yardstick" by a given group. For example, the first cell (the one corresponding to analysts' rating of earnings consistency) indicates that analysts rated earnings consistency third overall.

involvement with new electronic information systems were the least important yardsticks. Editors of privately owned newspapers and staff members for both types of newspapers rated readiness to introduce new products and earnings consistency as least important.

Our initial strategy for analysis was a simple comparison of mean scores. We discovered, however, that analysts generally ranked everything lower than did newspaper people. For example, the mean score for the analysts on their highest ranked yardstick, management quality, was 8.51. No other group gave its "most important" category such a low mean score. Likewise, the analysts' lowest ranked yardstick, community service, received a much lower mean score than did the lowest ranked yardsticks for other groups. For this reason, we decided that the rank order of the yardsticks within each group is a more useful measure for analysis.

This approach also presented a minor problem. The reader will note that public publishers' mean scores on editorial quality and product quality are identical (9.71). Similarly, private publishers' mean scores on management quality and product quality are only one one-hundredth of a point apart (9.58 versus 9.59). The first and second ranked categories for private editors and for private staff members also are nearly identical. Rankings had to be assigned in all four of these cases, so that a rank-order correlation could be performed. The reader should be aware, however, that the difference between the first and second ranked yardsticks for these four groups is rather arbitrary. This is not a major problem, because reversal of any of the rankings would cause only a very slight change in the correlations reported below.

Table 2 shows the rank-order correlations among the various survey subgroups. The most striking finding here is the size of the

Table 2. Rank Order Correlation Using All Ten Yardsticks

		Publishers		*Editors*		*Staff*	
	Analysts (N = 51[a])	*Public (N = 74)*	*Private (N = 155)*	*Public (N = 81)*	*Private (N = 175)*	*Public (N = 70)*	*Private (N = 166)*
Analysts	1.000						
Public publishers	.067	1.000					
Private publishers	.022	.867	1.000				
Public editors	−.022	.911	.778	1.000			
Private editors	−.022	.822	.778	.822	1.000		
Public staff	−.067	.689	.644	.689	.689	1.000	
Private staff	−.156	.600	.556	.689	.778	.911	1.000

[a] Unweighted frequencies.

NOTE: Correlations in this table were derived using the Kendall's Tau rank order correlation technique. None of the coefficients in the first column were found to be significant at the .05 level. All other coefficients in the matrix were found to be statistically significant.

divergence between the analysts' views and those of all the newspaper groups. Public publishers' attitudes are the most highly correlated with those of the analysts (Kendall's Tau = .067), but this group is much more highly correlated with every other group in the matrix than it is with the analysts.

At first glance, this table might seem to reveal some support for the first hypothesis. As predicted, both public publishers and public staff seem to resemble analysts more closely than do private publishers and private staff (there is no apparent difference between public and private editors). On closer examination, however, this seeming support disappears for three reasons. First, had the first and second rankings for public publishers been reversed (the mean scores were identical), the correlation between analysts and public publishers would have been .022—identical to the correlation between analysts and private publishers. Second, none of the correlations between analysts and newspaper groups are significant; so discussion of differences among these correlations is meaningless.

Nor can support be found for the second and third hypotheses. Again, a first glance appears to show that public publishers look more like analysts than do public editors or public staff, and public editors look more like analysts than do public staff. The correlations between newspaper personnel and analysts are so uniformly low, however, that it may make more sense to say that publishers' views are less foreign to the analysts than are those of editors and staff, and that editors are less unlike analysts than are editorial staff members. And, because the first hypothesis failed so markedly, the view that analysts' attitudes are diffusing downward through the newspaper hierarchy is not supported.

Given the large number of items used to measure opinions in this study, we felt that it might be useful to see whether the yardsticks rated by the respondents measured a single dimension of opinion about newspaper performance, or if they tapped more than one dimension. Table 3 shows the results of a factor analysis (Principal Components Method) of the 10 yardsticks. The rotated factor matrix indicates that the yardsticks measure opinion along three dimensions. Management quality, community service, editorial quality, product quality, and company image load most heavily on the first factor. The second factor comprises earnings consistency and financial health. The third factor is composed of new production technology and new electronic information systems. We chose to call these factors the quality factor, the financial factor, and the innovation factor, respectively.

We then constructed indices from the related sets of variables by

Table 3. Rotated Factor Matrix of the Ten Yardsticks

	Factor I	*Factor II*	*Factor III*
	Quality Factor	*Financial Factor*	*Innovative Factor*
Management quality	.6007	.3711	.1341
Community service	.4600	.1871	.4002
Editorial quality	.8939	−.0022	.1141
Product quality	.9081	.0222	.1301
Company image	.4973	.4009	.3056
Earnings consistency	.0113	.8175	.2040
Financial health	.1684	.8819	.0944
New production technology	.2840	.2451	.7981
Electronic information systems	.0733	.1065	.9086
New products	.1812	.4980	.4643

NOTE: This rotated factor matrix was generated using the principal-components technique.

using the mean score of all nonmissing variables within each factor. In other words, if a respondent rated all four yardsticks composing the quality factor, he was given the mean of these four ratings as his quality index measure. If, however, he failed to rate some of the four yardsticks, his index score became the mean of all the ratings he did provide. (Since the new products yardstick did not appear to load clearly on any one factor, this measure was excluded from the construction of indices.) Table 4 shows the results of the index construction. Again, as with the rank order correlation in Table 2, the major finding here is that all the newspaper people appear to be quite different from the analysts. All the newspaper survey subgroups gave the quality index the highest rating of the three. The analysts, on the other hand, rated the financial index highest, and the quality index lowest, of the three. Other interesting findings here are that both private and public publishers rated the financial index second highest,

Table 4. Mean Scores and Rankings of Constructed Indices

		Publishers		*Editors*		*Staff*	
	Analysts (N = 51[a])	*Public (N = 74)*	*Private (N = 155)*	*Public (N = 81)*	*Private (N = 175)*	*Public (N = 70)*	*Private (N = 166)*
Quality index	6.04 (3)[b]	9.09 (1)	9.11 (1)	8.92 (1)	9.17 (1)	8.63 (1)	8.72 (1)
Financial index	7.96 (1)	8.25 (2)	8.46 (2)	7.54 (3)	8.45 (2)	7.16 (3)	7.39 (3)
Innovation index	6.88 (2)	7.81 (3)	7.80 (3)	7.56 (2)	8.19 (3)	7.91 (2)	7.84 (2)

[a] Unweighted frequencies.

[b] The number in parentheses in each cell is the rank (first, second, or third) accorded a given factor by a given group. For instance, in the first cell (corresponding to analysts' rating of the Quality Factor), we see that analysts rated the Quality Factor third overall.

while all other newspaper subgroups, except private editors, ranked the financial index lowest. Again, this is at least consistent with the second hypothesis.

Thus far our findings seem to indicate that working for a publicly held newspaper corporation is not likely to make publishers, editors, and staff members more oriented toward short-term financial considerations than personnel of privately owned papers. This finding may be confounded, however, by the fact that some of the private newspaper companies are also groups or chains. Although these groups are privately owned, they may face internal pressures which parallel those imposed by the financial community on publicly held groups. For this reason we decided to analyze personnel of group and nongroup privately owned newspapers separately.

When we thus controlled for group versus nongroup status among the private papers, we continued to find that no group of newspaper respondents came close to resembling the analysts. And again the hypothesis failed. Public group publishers were less like the analysts than private group publishers. However, responses of group publishers, regardless of ownership, were somewhat more correlated with those of the analysts than the nongroup publishers. We are reluctant to make very much out of this, however, because all of the correlations among analysts and newspaper people were quite low. The differences between group and nongroup and public and private companies were not so great as to demand a theory to explain them.

Finally, Table 5 shows the mean scores and rankings for the three indices, controlling for group versus nongroup differences. This, in more succinct form, is the basic information in Table 3. All categories of newspaper people gave the quality index the highest ranking of the three. Analysts ranked the financial index highest and the quality index lowest. Publishers ranked the financial index second and all other newspaper categories, except group editors, ranked the financial index last.

Table 5. Means and Rankings of the Three Constructed Indices Controlling for Private Group versus Nongroup Ownership

		Publishers			*Editors*			*Staff*		
	Analysts (N = 51)[a]	*Public Group (N = 74)*	*Private Group (N = 105)*	*Private Nongrp. (N = 50)*	*Public Group (N = 81)*	*Private Group (N = 118)*	*Private Nongrp. (N = 57)*	*Public Group (N = 70)*	*Private Group (N = 107)*	*Private Nongrp. (N = 59)*
Quality index	6.04 (3)[b]	9.09 (1)	9.09 (1)	9.15 (1)	8.92 (1)	9.15 (1)	9.21 (1)	8.63 (1)	8.76 (1)	8.65 (1)
Financial index	7.96 (1)	8.25 (2)	8.59 (2)	8.17 (2)	7.54 (3)	8.57 (2)	8.17 (3)	7.16 (3)	7.43 (3)	7.33 (3)
Innovation index	6.88 (2)	7.81 (3)	7.75 (3)	7.93 (3)	7.56 (2)	8.15 (3)	8.30 (2)	7.91 (2)	7.86 (2)	7.79 (2)

[a] Unweighted frequencies.

[b] The number in parentheses in each cell is the rank (first, second, or third) accorded a given index by a given group. For example, the first cell (the one corresponding to analysts' rating of the quality index) indicates that analysts rated the quality index third overall.

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Summary and Conclusions

We found no evidence to indicate that publishers, editors, or staff members of publicly held newspaper companies are more likely to have short-term orientations than are their colleagues at privately owned papers. We measured short-term orientation by comparing newspeople's ratings of yardsticks for judging newspaper performance with those of financial security analysts. Our major finding was that no newspaper employees, regardless of position or type of paper, agreed very much with the analysts.

Product quality, editorial quality, and managerial quality seem to be the chief concerns of newspaper people, whether their papers are privately owned or publicly owned. Analysts, on the other hand, were most concerned with financial considerations.

Our findings on publishers were even more interesting than this overall difference between newspeople and analysts. Since publishers are much more attuned to the business side of the newspaper industry than are editors and news staffers, it seemed reasonable to expect that they would be much closer to the analysts in their views than would the news people. We found only slight support for this idea, however, and, overall, publishers resembled news personnel much more closely than they resembled analysts.

These findings should not be construed as a complete negation of the fears expressed by Bagdikian (1980, 1983). The phenomenon of public ownership is new, and large institutions do not change direction suddenly. Most of the people now running the public companies were initiated into the values and folkways of the newspaper business when their companies were still private, and many can be expected to be as direct as Jack Knight when they consider the issue of analyst influence. John Morton (1981) believes that these traditions have some resilience:

> I've heard of some industries where there s one analyst who practically runs some company because they're so afraid of what he's going to say. There isn't really that kind of relationship in the newspaper industry. For one thing, I think most newspaper companies, more so than any other industry I can think of, are sensitive to the ethical questions that are raised by that kind of a relationship. . . . I don't think you'll find any publishing executives who are that close with any analysts.

That an institutional change could come to pass is clearly a concern of some present-day newspaper executives. When Lee Hills (1981), former chairman of Knight-Ridder, left active participation in the

management of the company, his farewell address to the shareholders contained a warning against becoming seduced by Wall Street:

> One priority clearly stands above orderly profit growth and all other requirements. That is the long-range health of our company.
>
> It isn't always easy as a public company in America today—in any industry—to keep this top priority in mind. Many big traders in the stock market and their advisors decide to buy or sell depending on how this quarter's results compare with the previous quarter and the last year.
>
> I happen to think this short-term investor pressure is unhealthy for American business . . . the short-term temptations must be resisted.

We therefore sound the call for further research with more urgency than is usual. The effects of investor influence may manifest themselves in subtle ways or in unexpected places. They may be felt in nonpublic actions or in the absence of actions—an innovation not tried, for example.

Future studies could examine the amount of contact between news personnel and the investment community; they could test newspeoples' knowledge of investment strategy; they could design other instruments for measuring short-term orientation; they could examine differences in morale, skill, or educational background at public versus private papers. The effect of public ownership on editorial quality (rather than attitudes) should also be examined, perhaps via content analysis of publicly owned versus privately owned papers (controlling for other variables known to affect quality). In short, while we have found preliminary evidence that public ownership of newspapers does not change the way news personnel evaluate company performance, we are reluctant to leave it at that. The general question of possible effects of public ownership on newspaper companies deserves to remain on the research agenda.

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Social Conservatism, New Republicans, and the 1980 Election

JEROME L. HIMMELSTEIN AND JAMES A. McRAE, JR.

IN THE 1980 election, Ronald Reagan won the presidency by keeping the allegiance of most traditionally Republican voters and gaining substantial support from "New Republicans," voters who in 1976 had voted Democratic or had not voted at all. Who were these "New Republicans?" One answer to this question is that they were disproportionately white lower to middle strata voters who switched to the Republican Party on the basis of a profound "social conservatism"—manifested in opposition to abortion and the Equal Rights Amendment and in general concern over the decay of morality, family, and religion. These voters were more religious than the average American and more likely to be alienated from and angry at a federal government that they viewed as the source of secular, liberal values and programs. They were, in short, a constituency of what has

Abstract Using data from the 1980 National Election Study, we examine the claims (1) that those voters who shifted to Ronald Reagan in 1980 ("New Republicans") were drawn disproportionately from the lower to middle strata of the population; (2) that they were social conservatives motivated by issues like abortion and ERA; and (3) that they were more religious and alienated from the federal government than average. Our results strongly suggest that all of these assertions are false and thus question the emergence of a "neopopulist" or "Middle American Radical" political constituency on the right wing of American politics. Our findings also have implications for prominent theories about conservative political movements and about the changing nature of party politics in a postindustrial society.

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been variously called "Middle American Radicals" or "neopopulists," similar to those who supported George Wallace in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Phillips, 1982; Warren, 1976; Whitaker, 1982).

Drawing upon the 1980 National Election Study (NES) of the Center for Political Studies, we argue that this social conservatism theory is largely wrong. The "New Republicans" were not drawn disproportionately from the middle to lower strata of the population; their conservatism was not more marked on social issues than on economic issues; they were neither more religiously oriented nor more alienated from government than other voters; finally, they bore little similarity to the constituency that provided the core support for Wallace in 1968.

Although much has been written about the 1980 presidential election, the issues just raised have yet to be adequately examined. Most analysis of the election has focused on the Reagan vote as a whole, rather than just on those voters who shifted to Reagan in 1980. Because the 1980 NES asked its respondents for whom they voted in 1976, it allows us to distinguish this pivotal group of voters. We compare these New Republicans to those who voted Republican in both 1976 and 1980 (Old Republicans) and to those who did not vote Republican either time (Non-Republican).

The social conservatism theory has been advanced most prominently by the New Right and its religious allies in the Moral Majority. Impressed by the inroads made by Wallace into traditionally Democratic constituencies, these groups have sought to build a conservative majority by appealing to lower to middle strata white voters on the basis of social issues and anger at the federal government (Viguerie, 1980). After the 1980 election, they were quick to credit Reagan's victory to their strategy and to argue that newly recruited Republican voters were indeed social conservatives and Middle American Radicals (Schlafly, 1981; Whitaker, 1982; Phillips, 1982).

Such a perspective on the 1980 election, however, is more than a matter of partisan politics. It follows as well from prominent sociological theories about conservative political movements and about the changing nature of party politics in a postindustrial society, insofar as these theories are applied to the 1980 election.

The notion of social conservatism itself is rooted in the theory of conservative political movements elaborated by Lipset and Raab (1970). They argue that because support for different kinds of conservatism is located in different sectors of the population, a successful conservative political movement must effect a marriage between very different constituencies drawn to conservatism on the basis of very different issues. Specifically, it must bring together affluent, high

status persons who are conservative on economic issues, but liberal to moderate on social issues, with lower and middle strata persons who may be liberal to moderate on economic issues, but who are reliably conservative on social issues like civil rights, law and order, civil liberties, political protest, lifestyle and morality. The upper strata are viewed as the "natural" constituency of a conservative party, because their material interests predispose them to oppose high levels of government spending on social services and government regulation of the economy. Elements of the lower and middle strata, whose interests lead them to support a more active role for government, can be won over to the conservative cause only with noneconomic social appeals.

Although Lipset and Raab (1981) do not apply this theory of class marriage to the 1980 election, it nonetheless has clear implications for that election. If Reagan represents a successful conservative political movement and if traditionally Republican voters consist largely of a "natural" upper strata conservative constituency, then one would expect "New Republicans" to be a disproportionately middle to lower strata constituency converted by appeals to their social conservatism.

The particular relevance of social conservatism to contemporary American politics is derived from theories of the United States as a postindustrial society. According to these theories, postindustrialism produces a new political alignment in which liberal upper strata face conservative lower strata with social issues as the main battleground.

The argument runs as follows (Harris, 1973; Inglehart, 1977; Ladd, 1978 and 1979; Ladd and Hadley, 1975; Phillips, 1975; Scammon and Wattenberg, 1971): The important features of postindustrial society are a broad affluence, the growth of education, the expansion of service-providing and information-processing sectors of the economy, and the attendant proliferation of employment in government, universities, and communications. Increasing affluence mutes the economic issues that once divided conservative upper strata from liberal lower strata. A broad consensus develops on a role for government in managing the economy, and the achievements of the New Deal are assumed.

While the old-style economic conflict subsides, postindustrial society creates a new basis for conflict by transforming both upper and lower strata. The growth of education and structural changes in the economy create a "new class" of college-educated professionals, whose work requires the use of trained intelligence. The composition of the upper strata thus is transformed from primarily managerial/business to professional. The affluent, educated New Class is likely to be concerned with more than just making a living: Its members seek self-expression, self-fulfillment, freedom, and participation. They are

likely to be critical of existing social arrangements, concerned with broad issues of justice and equality, and open to social change. Thus, they are likely to be liberal on a host of social issues: lifestyle issues like sexuality, social issues like women's rights and minority rights, and so on. Because they are directly or indirectly reliant on government funds for their livelihood, they also favor a growing social engineering role for government. Finally, they are likely to be secularized and hence have little attachment to traditional religion. By creating a New Class, then, postindustrial society generates a socially liberal constituency within the upper strata.

At the same time, postindustrial society turns the lower strata into a bastion of social conservatism. With growing affluence, large segments of the working class gain a foothold on economic security, a degree of respite from subsistence worries. This dampens their economic liberalism, but intensifies their social conservatism: Social change threatens those whose economic security is but recently won and quite tenuous. They become conservative on matters of values, lifestyle, and social order. They also become more and more alienated from and distrustful of a federal government that promotes social liberalism in the form of busing, affirmative action, women's rights, and permissive legislation on drugs and pornography. Finally, they reject the secular culture they see as intimately tied to social liberalism.

By making the upper strata more liberal and the lower strata more conservative, postindustrial society in effect creates a new kind of class struggle—what Harris calls "Karl Marx Upside Down" (1973:52)—in which the upper strata become the proponents of change and the lower strata the defendants of the status quo. The first inklings of this new struggle, it is argued, came in the late 1960s and early 1970s as the scions of the upper strata flocked to the antiwar movement and counterculture, while the offspring of the lower strata entered the Wallace movement. This struggle has since blossomed in conflict over nuclear power, the ERA, abortion, environmentalism, busing, and affirmative action. Furthermore, it has contributed to political dealignment (Ladd and Hadley, 1975; Ladd, 1982), or perhaps realignment (Phillips, 1975), as lower-strata social conservatives defect from the Democratic Party (at least in presidential elections) and upper-strata social liberals leave the Republican Party. The clear implication of this theory of postindustrial politics for the 1980 elections is thus that New Republicans should have been lower to middle strata voters attracted away from the Democrats or from the ranks of the nonvoters by the social issues, religious conviction, and anger at big government.

In short, theories of class marriage and of postindustrial politics

reach conclusions about the New Republican constituency in the 1980 election similar to those of New Right political strategy. We can operationalize these conclusions as follows:

1. *New Republicans were social conservatives.* That is, what drew them to Reagan was conservatism primarily on social and not economic issues. This suggests two sets of comparisons. Compared to Old Republicans, New Republicans should have been as or more conservative on social issues, but more liberal on economic ones. Compared to Non-Republicans, they should have been more conservative on social but not on economic issues.

2. *New Republicans were especially religious.* Compared to either Old Republicans or Non-Republicans, New Republicans should have been more likely to give religion an important part in their lives.

3. *New Republicans were especially angry at and alienated from government.* Compared to either Old Republicans or Non-Republicans, New Republicans should have been more likely to distrust government and feel powerless to influence it.

4. *New Republicans were drawn disproportionately from the middle to lower strata of the white population.* This proposition is vaguer than the previous ones and thus harder to operationalize. Proponents of the social conservatism theory are alternately exasperatingly vague or excruciatingly detailed in describing this constituency. They vary in what dimensions of stratification they employ and where they locate the likely New Republican constituencies. It seems reasonable, however, to distinguish four dimensions of social stratification—occupation, income, education, and class.

The more important question is to whom we should compare the New Republicans. The hypothesis suggests that New Republicans should be from lower strata than some other group, but it doesn't specify which one. No doubt, New Republicans are of lower SES than Old Republicans, but this is hardly interesting. A more vigorous prediction would be that New Republicans are of a status equal to or lower than Non-Republicans. In other words, of those persons who did not vote Republican in 1976, those who switched to Reagan should not be of higher status than those who did not switch.

Data

We test these hypotheses using data from the 1980 National Election Study, not only because this study asks how respondents voted in 1976 and 1980 but also because it contains a variety of questions on currently important political issues, attitudes toward religion and government, and the various dimensions of socioeconomic status. Our

sample consists of the second wave of a panel begun shortly before the 1980 election. Of the 1,614 respondents who completed the preelection survey (C3), 1,408 or 87 percent also completed the post-election survey (C3PO). Of these, we are by necessity concerned only with those who were of voting age in 1976. We restrict our analysis to whites, since the theories under investigation address political behavior in the white population, and in any event, very few blacks voted Republican in either 1976 or 1980: 91.3 percent of blacks in the sample were Non-Republicans (compared to 48.5 percent of whites), and only 4.3 percent or 6 were New Republicans. Our sample of whites eligible to vote in 1976 consists of 1,039 respondents.

Respondents are categorized into voting groups as follows: Old Republicans voted for the Republican presidential candidate in both 1976 and 1980; New Republicans did not vote Republican in 1976, but did in 1980; Defecting Republicans voted Republican in 1976, but not in 1980; and Non-Republicans did not vote Republican either time.[1] Although Defecting Republicans might well be an interesting group, they are not included in the analysis because they are not germane to the theory being examined.

Questions on abortion and the ERA, certainly two of the most pivotal social issues, measure social conservatism. Two questions measure economic conservatism: One (Domestic Spending) asked whether the respondent supported cuts in government-provided services (including health and education) in order to reduce government spending or favored maintaining such services even if this meant no reduction in spending. The other item (Guaranteed Job) asked whether government should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living or should let each person get ahead on his own.

Two measures of religiosity are used. The first (Importance of Religion) asked how much everyday guidance religion provides; the second (Born-Again Experience) asked whether or not the respondent has had a born-again experience. Three questions investigate anger at government: can federal officials be trusted to do the right thing (Trust in Government); how much attention does government pay to what people think when it makes policy (Government Responsiveness); and do people "like me" have any say about what government does (Say in Government).[2]

[1] As they are defined here, both the New Republican and the Non-Republican categories include nonvoters (in 1976 for the former, in 1976 and 1980 for the latter). Preliminary analysis suggested that deleting nonvoters made little difference. To maintain a larger sample size, they were included.

[2] The Importance of Religion measure combines responses to two NES questions.

Standard items measure income, occupation, and education. The measure of class distinguishes those who work for others and do not supervise (employees), those who work for others and do supervise (supervisors), and those who work partly or solely for themselves (owners).[3]

Results

The comparisons between New Republicans and Old Republicans on social and economic issues show no consistent pattern (see Tables 1 and 2). New Republicans were more likely than Old Republicans to oppose abortion, but less likely to oppose ERA. The differences on abortion, moreover, were limited to the issue of abortion on demand. New Republicans were only half as likely as Old Republicans (15.7 percent vs. 27.9 percent) to favor no restrictions on abortion. There were no other significant differences on abortion between the two groups. In regard to economic issues, New Republicans were less likely than Old Republicans to oppose government-guaranteed liveli-

Table 1. Test Statistics for Hypothesis of Independence of Vote and Selected Economic and Social Issues

		Old Republicans Contrasted with New Republicans		*Non-Republicans Constrasted with New Republicans*	
Issue	*d.f.*	L^2	*P*	L^2	*P*
Abortion	3	12.32	<.01	16.58	<.01
ERA	3	9.75	<.05	15.62	<.01
Guaranteed job	6	12.96	<.05	16.32	<.05
Domestic spending	6	5.85	n.s.	40.34	<.01

The first asks whether or not the respondent considers religion to be an important part of his or her life with options yes or no. The second asks those who answered yes to the first question whether religion provides some guidance in day-to-day living, quite a bit of guidance, or a great deal of guidance. The resulting measure has four categories: religion is not important; religion offers some guidance; religion offers quite a bit of guidance; and religion offers a great deal of guidance. The response categories for Trust in Government were dichotomized as follows: "Always" and "most of the time" were combined as "usually," and "some of the time" and "none of the time" were combined as "not usually." Unless otherwise noted, we used NES items as they appeared on the survey.

[3] Income is family income for those who live with others and personal income for those living alone. Farm laborers are excluded from the analysis of occupation because there were only two of them. The measure of class combines responses to two questions. The first asks whether the respondents work for someone else or for themselves. The second asks those who worked for others whether or not they supervised any workers or employees as part of their job.

Table 2. Voting Groups and Conservatism on the Issues

Issue	*Old Republicans*	*New Republicans*	*Non-Republicans*	*Percentage Differences*[a]	
				New vs. Old	*Non vs. New*
Oppose ERA	62.8%	46.9%	32.3%	−15.9	−14.4
Oppose all abortion or favor only if life & health of women is endangered	56.8	58.2	55.1	+1.4	−3.1
Support cuts in government domestic spending[b]	57.4	49.9	23.9	−7.5	−26.0
Oppose government-guaranteed livelihood[b]	70.2	58.6	42.2	−11.6	−16.4

[a] We also examined odds and odds ratios, and they confirm the picture conveyed by percentage differences here and in subsequent tables.

[b] This option combines the three most conservative of seven responses.

hood, but were not significantly different on the politically salient issue of cutting government domestic spending and services. The New Republicans thus were not consistently more conservative on social issues and more liberal on economic issues than the Old Republicans. The two groups do not correspond respectively in any direct way to social conservative and economic conservative constituencies. Compared to Non-Republicans, New Republicans were significantly more conservative on both social and economic issues. They were more likely to oppose the ERA and complete legalization of abortion but they were also more likely to favor cuts in domestic spending and to oppose government-guaranteed livelihood. Again, they do not fit the image of a constituency that is conservative solely on social issues.

New Republicans also do not appear to be especially religiously oriented or angry at government (Tables 3 and 4). They were not significantly more likely than either Old Republicans or Non-Republicans to assert that religion plays an important role in their lives or to claim a born-again experience. Nor were they more likely to say that federal officials could not be trusted to do the right thing, that government was unresponsive, or that they had no say in government. Indeed, New Republicans were actually *less* likely than Non-Republicans to claim a lack of voice in government (34.1 percent vs. 46.5 percent).

Table 3. Test Statistics for Hypothesis of Independence of Vote and Both Religiosity and Anger at Government

		Old Republicans Contrasted with New Republicans		*Non-Republicans Contrasted with New Republicans*	
Issue	*d.f.*	L^2	*P*	L^2	*P*
Importance of religion	3	2.72	n.s.	3.63	n.s.
Born-again experience	1	1.49	n.s.	.98	n.s.
Trust in government	1	2.22	n.s.	.07	n.s.
Government responsiveness	2	1.32	n.s.	0.56	n.s.
Say in government	1	.79	n.s.	6.80	<.01

In regard to socioeconomic status, New Republicans fall somewhere between Old Republicans and Non-Republicans (Tables 5 and 6). Compared to Old Republicans, they are not significantly different regarding income and class, but they tend to be less well educated and of lower occupational status. Compared to Non-Republicans, New Republicans are significantly better educated and wealthier, but no different regarding occupation and class.[4] The first result fits the

Table 4. Voting groups, Religiosity, and Anger at Government

Issue	*Old Republicans*	*New Republicans*	*Non-Republicans*	*Percentage Differences*	
				Old vs. New	*New vs. Non*
Religion offers quite a bit or a great deal of guidance	60.1%	53.3%	48.9%	−6.8	−4.4
Born-again experience	31.1	38.0	32.6	+6.9	−5.4
U.S. government officials not trusted to do the right thing	81.6	75.4	74.2	−6.2	−1.2
Government pays no attention to what people think	43.2	41.3	44.5	−1.9	+3.2
People like me have no say in government	29.8	34.1	46.5	+4.3	+12.4

[4] A more refined analysis reveals some exceptions and additions to this characterization. First, although New Republicans tend to be better educated than Non-Republicans, they are very underrepresented at the highest educational level, those with postgraduate training. Second, compared to *both* Old Republicans and New Republicans, Non-Republicans tend to be disproportionately employees; compared to *both* New Republicans and Non-Republicans, Old Republicans tend to be disproportionately owners. Third, if we allow the contrast of Old and New Republicans to vary linearly across income categories, New Republicans are significantly lower in income than are Old Republicans.

Table 5. Test Statistics for Hypothesis of Independence of Vote and Socioeconomic Variables

		Old Republicans Contrasted with New Republicans		*Non-Republicans Contrasted with New Republicans*	
SES	*d.f.*	L^2	*P*	L^2	*P*
Education	5	23.63	<.01	26.40	<.01
Income	6	10.91	n.s.	17.65	<.01
Occupation	8	18.12	<.05	11.63	n.s.
Class	2	4.59	n.s.	4.55	n.s.

theory under scrutiny, but is hardly news. As we noted earlier, one would expect Old Republicans to be from higher strata than any other group. The second result clearly does not fit: New Republicans tend to be of similar or higher SES than Non-Republicans, not lower.

If the New Republicans were not social conservatives, why did they switch to Reagan? Several studies have argued that the 1980 election was at least partly a referendum on (and rejection of) President Carter and the Democratic Party (A. Miller and M. Wattenberg, 1981; W. Miller, 1981; Pomper, 1980). In the late 1970s, moreover, the public ceased to view the Democratic Party as more able than the Republicans to keep the country prosperous (Schneider, 1981: 232). Perhaps, then, New Republicans differ quite sharply from Non-Republicans in their assessment of Carter, his administration, and his handling of economic problems.

Tables 7 and 8 show that this is the case. By 1980, Carter was unpopular among most voters, but distinctly more so among New Republicans than among Non-Republicans. The former were much more likely to disapprove of his overall performance as president (84.8 percent vs. 44.8 percent), as well as his handling of both infla-

Table 6. Voting Groups and Socioeconomic Status

	Old Republicans	*New Republicans*	*Non-Republicans*	*Percentage Differences*	
SES				*Old vs. New*	*New vs. Non*
Some college or more	54.1%	35.5%	30.1%	−18.6	−5.4
Family income greater than $20,000	68.6	53.9	38.5	−14.7	−15.4
White-collar occupation	67.3	52.6	46.8	−14.7	−5.8
Supervisors or owners	55.4	49.6	42.8	−5.8	−6.8

Table 7. Test Statistics for Hypothesis of Independence of Vote and Attitude toward Carter

		Old Republicans Constrasted with New Republicans		*Non-Republicans Constrasted with New Republicans*	
Attitude	*d.f.*	L^2	*P*	L^2	*P*
General performance as president	3	24.99	<.01	80.93	<.01
Handling of inflation	3	4.14	n.s.	38.77	<.01
Handling of unemployment	3	4.38	n.s.	56.15	<.01
Feeling toward Carter	3	.48	n.s.	60.64	<.01

tion (91.6 percent vs. 67.7 percent) and unemployment (89.1 percent vs. 55.6 percent). New Republicans were also more likely to feel negatively toward Carter himself (52.1 percent vs. 19.2 percent). In most of these respects, they were hardly different from Old Republicans.

Conclusion

The image of the New Republicans that emerges from our data analysis differs strikingly from that presented at the beginning of this paper. First, the New Republicans were not social conservatives who shifted to Reagan primarily on social issues. New Republicans were more conservative than Non-Republicans on all issues; they did not differ from Old Republicans in any consistent way. Second, New

Table 8. Voting Groups and Approval of Carter

	Old Republicans	*New Republicans*	*Non Republicans*	*% Differences*	
Attitude				*Old vs. New*	*New vs. Non*
Disapprove of Carter's general performance	88.5%	84.8%	44.8%	−3.7	−40.0
Disapprove of handling of inflation	95.0	91.6	67.7	−3.4	−33.9
Dissapprove of handling of unemployment	85.9	89.1	55.6	+3.2	−33.5
Cold feeling toward Carter[a]	55.6	52.1	19.2	−3.5	−32.9

[a] Scores of 0–49 on a 100-point thermometer scale.

Republicans were neither more religious nor less likely to trust government than the other voting groups. Third, although New Republicans were of lower SES than Old Republicans, they tended to be of higher SES than Non-Republicans. In this sense, they can hardly be characterized as "lower to middle strata."

In thus challenging the established images of those voters who shifted to Reagan in 1980, we must also question the relevance to the 1980 elections of the political strategy of the New Right, the class marriage theory of successful conservative movements, and the theory of postindustrial politics.

The New Right's explicit strategy was to win over to the Reagan banner a supposedly disaffected group of lower to middle strata Democrats and nonvoters on the basis of social conservatism and anger at government. Since the actual New Republican constituency was not especially socially conservative, angry at government, or from the lower to middle strata, we must conclude that the New Right's strategy was wrong-headed, that its efforts were irrelevant to Reagan's success in 1980, and that contrary to its own self-concept (Whitaker, 1982), it is not the vanguard of a new and qualitatively different social movement of "neopopulist" or "Middle American Radicals." These conclusions are consistent with a variety of other data on the lack of importance of the New Right in the 1980 elections (Lipset and Raab, 1981; Pomper, 1980; Schneider, 1981).

The theory of class marriage pictures successful conservative movements as the alliance of two quite distinct constituencies—economically conservative upper strata and socially conservative lower strata. We do not claim that this theory is wrong in general, but it does not seem to fit Reagan's 1980 victory.

Finally, the theory of postindustrial politics argues that politics in postindustrial society pits socially conservative lower strata against socially liberal upper strata and thus leads to either dealignment or realignment on the basis of social issues. Again, our data are not inconsistent with this theory in its entirety: It would be folly to deny that traditional political alignments have broken down in recent years or that on many social issues there is an inverse relationship between certain measures of socioeconomic status and conservatism (Knoke, 1979; Himmelstein and McRae, 1983). What we must question, however, is the claim that realignment/dealignment is rooted in the rise of a new kind of class conflict over social issues. This does not appear to have been the case with the 1980 election.

The relative insignificance of social issues in 1980 is confirmed by several other findings: They were not mentioned prominently in the New York Times/CBS exit polls (Clymer, 1980); they were not

stressed in Reagan's campaign (Malbin, 1981; Hunt, 1981); and they have declined in general importance since the early 1970s in Gallup Polls (Public Opinion, 1980). In the late 1960s and early 1970s, social issues at times did vie with economic issues as the important problems facing the United States. By 1979, however, a solid 70 percent of Americans identified economic issues as most important, while less than 10 percent identified social issues as such.

The sharp differences between New Republicans and Non-Republicans in their assessment of Carter's performance as president confirm the observation that the 1980 election was partly or largely a plebiscite.

Underlying all the ideas we have criticized is a common tendency to draw misleading analogies from the politics of the late 1960s and early 1970s. At the time, social issues broadly defined were much nearer the center of political consciousness, and American society seemed to be rent by conflicts pitting liberal upper strata against conservative lower strata. It thus is tempting, but probably wrong, to see American politics in the early 1980s as a simple continuation of the themes and conflicts of that earlier period. In fact, the distinctive conflicts of the late 1960s and early 1970s have been in part muted and in part transformed as the economy has worsened and economic problems have come to the fore.

The sixties, in short, are over. Any understanding of American politics in the 1980s must realize that fact.

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Preelection Polling in the 1982 Illinois Gubernatorial Contest

RICHARD DAY AND KURT M. BECKER

RECENT primary and general gubernatorial election projections based on preelection surveys have differed from the final voting outcome in several instances (New York, New Jersey, California, and Illinois). Further, some nationally reported research efforts were embarrassed in 1980 when they projected a presidential contest too close to call and the voters delivered a rather large victory to Ronald Reagan. Burns Roper, a past President of the American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR), in reviewing the 1982 election polls in several states, is "very concerned" about "a consistent failure in the opinion polls. Almost without exception, the indicated front-runner in the polls fared worse than the polls said he would" (Roper, 1983). Such negative scrutiny of public opinion polling, though unpleasant, affords survey researchers an opportunity to gain valuable insights into their craft.

Research on public opinion polls in the political arena has focused on the need to segment voters from nonvoters (Perry, 1973). Faulty techniques which distort data have been identified, and the effects of a sometimes unsettled climate of public opinion (Field, 1979) have been discussed.

Abstract All the polls in advance of the 1982 Illinois gubernatorial election proved incorrect in their prediction of a substantial victory for James Thompson, the Republican. After examining some of the popular explanations for the "missed call," this paper shows that while the voters "preferred" Thompson, there was a very substantial increase in the number of straight party ballots cast for the Democrats, compared to 1978. This paper concludes that in those states where straight party vote is an option, the poll takers probe for the possibility of a party line vote. Information used in this paper to examine five hypotheses stems from a preelection poll of 1,200 Illinois voters.

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This paper focuses on the Illinois gubernatorial election in 1982 and discusses five explanations of why the polls yielded errant projections. Support for one of these explanations provides an important methodological consideration for future survey research in other elections and in other states.

Reported polling results for the 1982 election for governor of Illinois are reported in Table 1. Two firms undertook procedures to project the final outcome by assigning the undecided voters on the basis of demographic and partisan information (Table 2). There was no difference in projections between the Gallup survey and the RDR survey. The RDR survey also tested for variation between the 10/31 results and the 11/1 results and found no significant shifts over the two days before the election.

First, a most basic criticism of polling needs to be addressed: faulty procedures. Errant information could stem from several sources: samples were too small or improperly drawn; interviewing was conducted at times of the day when certain types of people were more likely to be at home; random digit dialing was not employed in areas where there is a high concentration of unlisted numbers; callbacks were not made to contact those more difficult to reach (younger, higher income, more educated individuals). Such sources of error have been reviewed (Perry, 1979; Field, 1979) and are known. The

Table 1. Polling Results for the 1982 Election for Governor of Illinois

Dates	*Client/Firm*	*% Thompson*	*% Stevenson*	*% Undecided*
10/22–24	Chicago Tribune/ Market Facts, Inc.	53	34	13
	CBS Affiliate (WBBM-TV)/Market Shares	58	38	4
10/28–29	Chicago Sun-Times and NBC Affiliate (WMAQ-TV)/Gallup	55	40	5
10/31–11/1	ABC Affiliate (WLS-TV)/Richard Day Research, Inc.[a]	55	38	7
11/2	Election day actual vote	50.07	49.93	

[a] Of a sample size of 1,200, 780 were used for statewide purposes and 420 represented an oversample in Cook County. For Cook County, the appropriate sample size is 737. In every instance, weighting was by area and percentage of the vote in the 1978 election. There was an even distribution of males and females.

Table 2. Projections of Final Voting Outcome

Dates	*Firm*	*% Thompson*	*% Stevenson*	*(N)*
10/28–29	Gallup	58	42	(2,562)
10/31–11/1	Richard Day Research, Inc.	58	42	(770)

need in preelection polling to screen properly for those registered voters who are likely to turn out has also been clearly identified (Perry, 1973; Traugott and Tucker, 1982).

The survey by RDR and surveys by the Gallup Organization addressed such sources of error.[1] The authors have no knowledge of methods used by other firms. However, as Kohut comments, "When a half-dozen polls come up with the same erroneous answer, the chances are that there is some systematic factor that transcends traditional polling methodology" (Kohut, 1983).

Hypotheses

Five dominant hypotheses emerged from the popular press and politicians to explain this variation between preelection polls and the final outcome:

A. Voters decided late. As a result, the polls were unable to detect a last-minute trend to Stevenson. Criticism of past polling efforts has been rooted in such an explanation before (Perry, 1979).

B. There was an abnormally large turnout from heavily Democratic Chicago. The samples of polls were stratified based on previous election turnout patterns, and therefore did not account for this unusual turnout.

C. The survey estimates were accurate throughout the state with the exception of Chicago (Kohut, 1983).

D. The composition of the turnout changed. Democratic voters were more likely than in 1978 to vote.

E. The polls failed to accurately measure the amount of straight ticket voting. Polls measured the attitudes of the voters in their preference for Thompson, yet some of these Thompson supporters punched a straight Democratic ticket in the voting booth.

[1] Gallup's interviewing was conducted Thursday and Friday (October 28 and 29), between 6:00 and 10:00 P.M. Sample size was 2,562. The survey used random digit dialing and a three-callback format. The accuracy would not vary ± 3 percent at the 0.05 level. The RDR sample survey was of 1,200 registered voters, likely or very likely to vote; random digit dialing was used in the six county Chicago Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA); interviews were conducted by trained professional (10/31) interviewers working during the day (11 A.M.–9:30 P.M.) on Sunday and during the evening (5 P.M.–9:30 P.M.) on Monday (11/1). Each number was called up to three times. The accuracy of such a survey would not vary more than ± 3 percent.

These hypotheses have been offered to explain the Illinois election outcome in 1982, and similar theories may be put forth to explain errant "calls" in other instances. What follows is an examination of these theories in light of the Illinois case.

A. LAST-MINUTE SHIFT

There is little support for this hypothesis in the Illinois example. For months, the polls had projected a victory for Thompson. The Gallup Organization reported on October 25 that Thompson was widening his lead.

The last Illinois preelection poll by Richard Day Research, Inc. interviewed respondents on the Sunday and the Monday evening preceding the opening of the polls on Tuesday. This survey found evidence for a shift toward George Dunne in the volatile race for Cook County Board President (Table 3). While Table 3 provides evidence of a shift to the Democratic candidate in the contest for Cook County board president, no such significant shift to Stevenson is measurable in the governor's race. The final vote tally on the Dunne-Carey race showed 63.8 percent for the Democrat.[2]

By the time of the RDR polling, the precinct canvassers had completed their tasks and voters had been exposed to debates, endorsements, interviews, editorials, news stories, advertisements, and campaign appearances. It is doubtful that such a large bloc of voters changed their minds on the governor's race between Monday evening and Tuesday (with so little movement from Sunday to Monday).

Table 3. Last Preelection Poll by Richard Day Research, Inc. (October 31–November 1, 1982)

	Sunday 11 A.M.–9:30 P.M.	*Monday 5 P.M.–9:30 P.M.*	*Overall*	*Outcome*
Cook County board president				
Dunne—D	52	63	56	63.8
Undecided	11	11	11	
Carey—R	37	26	33	36.2
Governor				
Stevenson—D	37	39	38	49.93
Undecided	8	5	7	
Thompson—R	55	56	55	50.07
(*N*)	(459)	(721)	(780)	

[2] RDR projected a Dunne win with 64 percent of the vote.

B. DISPROPORTIONATE CHICAGO VOTE

Many postelection reports commented extensively on the large turnout from the City of Chicago. This unexpectedly high turnout from a predominately Democratic region was argued to have invalidated poll data weighted on past turnout trends.

Usually, in survey research, the best predictor of future patterns are turnout patterns *in the most recent similar election*. In fact, the turnout patterns in the 1978 race reflect very nearly those in the 1982 race (Table 4).

Although more votes did come out of the City of Chicago in 1982 than in 1978, this Chicago increase is proportional to increased turnout in other areas of the state. Statewide turnout rose from 3,342,985 in 1978 to 3,856,875 votes in 1982. This represents a 7.2 percent increase in the voter turnout rate from one off-year election to the next, but the *proportion* of votes from each region remained stable.

In conclusion, this hypothesis has little to support it. Although turnout increased statewide, and hence more votes came from the traditional Democratic stronghold of Chicago, the *proportion* of the statewide turnout coming from Chicago remained the same and did not overwhelm the vote from other areas. Since there were not appreciable shifts in the proportion of turnout from the regions of the state, this factor should have been accurately reflected in the major polls.

C. INACCURATE CHICAGO POLLING

Andrew Kohut outlined an explanation of why Gallup's preelection polling was incorrect:

> Chicago—not Illinois—was Gallup's problem. Outside the city, Gallup showed Thompson ahead by 63% to 37%, compared to the 59% to 41% margin he actually achieved. . . . Chicago was another matter. Our final poll missed Stevenson's vote by 18 percentage points (in Chicago) (Kohut, 1983).

Table 4. Comparison of Voting Turnout Patterns in Illinois

	1978	*1982*
Cook County		
Chicago	27.3	27.5
Suburbs	20.5	19.5
Metropolitan collar counties (DePage, Kane, Lake, McHenry, Will)	13.9	13.8
Downstate 96 counties	38.2	39.1
	100%	100%

Kohut goes on to suggest a number of factors which may account for the discrepancy, such as black voting in increasing numbers and a resurgence of straight-ticket voting in Chicago orchestrated by the Democratic Party.

But the notion that a particular segment of the Chicago electorate was systematically excluded from surveys does not adequately explain why the projections were incorrect when Republicans were projected winners and generally accurate when Democrats were projected winners. For example, the same Gallup survey cited above led to a projection of a Democratic win with 54 percent in the attorney general's race (within 3.5 percent of the 57.5 percent he received). The RDR survey made the same inaccurate projections of big Republican wins in the statewide races for governor and secretary of state, but was within 1 percent in projecting the Democratic winners for Illinois attorney general and comptroller and president of the Cook County board.

As we shall see, the best explanation does not revolve around sampling and screening questions, that is, systematic inclusion or exclusion of segments of the electorate. But rather, the critical error stems from not properly measuring the behavioral intentions of those polled.

D. CHANGE IN THE COMPOSITION OF VOTER TURNOUT

Table 5 portrays changes from 1978 to 1982 in the vote for the Democratic and Republican candidate for governor. It shows a substantial increase in the number of Democratic votes, but notice also that, for the most part, these "new votes" in 1982 do not come from the Republicans. The Republicans' vote even increases in two of the four areas, but the Democratic gains come in all areas and are more dramatic.

Across all the regions of the state, the Democratic percentage gains dwarf Republican gains by at least a factor of four (Table 6). In two areas, Chicago and Suburban Cook County, some of the Democratic

Table 5. Illinois Vote Change for Governor (from 1978 to 1982)

	Governor Raw Vote Change	*Democratic Raw Vote Change*	*Republican Raw Vote Change*
Chicago	+160,446	+231,310	−70,864
Cook County suburbs	+ 58,433	+101,954	−43,521
Collar counties	+ 73,230	+ 55,693	+17,537
Downstate	+212,201	+158,936	+53,265
State	+501,310	+547,893	−43,583

Table 6. Percent Change in Vote for Governor by Party (1978 to 1982)

	% Change in Vote for the Democrat	*% Change in Vote for the Republican*
Chicago	+46.5%	−21.4%
Cook County suburbs	+57.6	− 9.1
Collar counties	+52.2	+ 5.4
Downstate	+33.0	+ 7.3
Statewide	+43.3	− 2.3

increase comes at the expense of the Republican's vote. But in all areas, the Democratic vote is increasing over 1978 at a faster rate than the Republican vote.

These numbers can be analyzed with hypothesis B—an abnormal turnout from one region of the state. For that hypothesis, there was little support. In all regions of the state, Democratic increases over 1978 dwarf increases in the Republican vote, while the regional proportions remain constant.

This indicates an unusual intensity on the part of Democratic voters. These Democratic rates of turnout were reflected in sharp gains in the state legislature. Democrats added three seats to their majority in the state senate and took control of the lower house with 70 of the 118 seats (59.3 percent) as opposed to 88 of the previous 177 seats (49.7 percent). Democrats also gained two congressional seats.

There appears to be evidence of a change in the composition of the vote in 1982 compared to 1978. The increase in the vote overall came largely from mobilized Democrats.

However, the last preelection poll was correct in the contests where Democrats were projected winners. In essence, the polls were able to accommodate the changing composition of voters in nearly all cases. The problem came when Republicans were projected.

E. STRAIGHT-TICKET VOTING

There is reason to support the contention that some voters "preferred" the Republican candidates for governor and secretary of state in "head to head" questions over their Democratic opponents, but they voted straight party. For example, wherever Democrats were projected as winners statewide, the projections were correct. In various congressional races downstate this was also the case.

There was ample evidence that neither of the two candidates for governor of Illinois, Adlai Stevenson and James Thompson, was very popular with the voters (earlier privately conducted RDR polls). Incumbent Governor Thompson, however, was slightly more popular than Mr. Stevenson.

In essence, when the same poll was very accurate wherever Democrats were projected and very inaccurate when Republicans were projected, it points to straight-ticket votes for the Democrats and not to a vote by vote calculation in each race by the electorate.

A number of Illinois counties have punch card ballot formats which report the number of straight tickets cast. Voting districts which had such systems in place in the 1978 off-year election provide a basis of comparison to the 1982 results (Table 7).

While the Republicans post gains in straight-ticket voting, the Democratic gains are much more striking. This evidence is fragmentary (due to the county by county nature of adoption of the punch card voting system), but it supports the conclusion of a sharp upsurge in straight-ticket voting.

Chicago election officials do not report straight-ticket vote totals. Estimates of the shift in straight-ticket votes in Chicago can be made by comparing 1978 and 1982 votes for the lowest Democratic vote getter in the low-profile, University of Illinois Trustee elections. Such a comparison points to an increase of 178,000 straight Democratic votes in Chicago, and such a measure is consonant with the increase across the state.

A substantial portion of Chicago Democratic organization funds were funneled into a "Punch 10" (straight Democratic vote) media campaign. The substantial lines at polling places—in part due to the increased turnout and in part due to institution of a new voting mechanism and an unusually long ballot—put added pressure on voters to speed their voting process with a straight ticket.

Table 7. Change in Straight-Ticket Votes Cast (1982–1978)

	Republicans		*Democrats*	
	Votes 1982–1978	*% Change*	*Votes 1982–1978*	*% Change*
Cook suburbs	+ 8,619	+ 6	+ 58,489	+ 72
Lake County	+ 9,697	+60	+ 9,112	+154
Macon (Decatur included)	+ 1,848	+68	+ 6,669	+197
Peoria County and City	+ 3,833	+74	+ 8,928	+175
Winnebago County (included Rockford)	+ 2,297	+51	+ 4,318	+172
Chicago (estimates)	−47,822	−27	+178,387	+ 34

Conclusion

This paper has explored five hypotheses as to why the preelection polls concerning the 1982 gubernatorial contest varied from the actual results. The most reasonable hypothesis is that there was a sharp upsurge in Democratic straight-ticket voting, even among voters who indicated in a poll that they preferred the Republican.

The 1982 gubernatorial election and the polls surrounding it have provided an opportunity for media critics and professional politicians to chide survey research endeavors. For survey researchers, the events surrounding this gubernatorial election provide a signal toward one critical area which forecasts based on preelection polling need to incorporate: A measure of the degree in which straight-ticket voting occurs in the electorate and questions which will alert the researcher to straight-ticket votes.

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The Poll as a News Event in the 1980 Presidential Campaign

JAMES GLEN STOVALL AND JACQUELINE H. SOLOMON

REPORTING public opinion poll results has become an integral part of the news coverage of election campaigns. The use of poll results as journalism is a natural outgrowth of the "precision journalism" movement and has become a vital component of the picture journalists draw of a political campaign. This use also fits in with a natural tendency on the part of journalists to cover the "horserace" aspects of a campaign and to ignore the more substantive issues.

The use of public opinion polls by journalists has been the target of much comment and criticism. Bill Kovach (1980:567), Washington editor of the *New York Times*, says that polls have become so "completely factored" into the decision-making process of the media that he has difficulty remembering "how we worked before we had this tool." Mendelsohn and Crespi (1970:13) have written that the use of polls by journalists satisfies "the public's curiosity about the world in which it lives."

But the public opinion poll is not a neutral factor in the campaign. Polsby and Wildavsky (1980) repeatedly assert that reporting the outcome of polls affects the behavior of the candidates and party leaders by giving them information about the state of an election. They and many others have pointed out the ease with which poll results may be distorted or misinterpreted by journalists, especially those who are unfamiliar with scientific polling techniques.

Abstract Public opinion polls made up 15 percent of the news events covered during the 1980 presidential election campaign, but news stories generated by polls were no more likely to receive better play in the 50 newspapers studied than other stories about the campaign. Horserace polls were popular with editors during the last two weeks of the campaign.

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Still other critics have decried the increasing tendency of news organizations to commission their own polls. Whereas polls were once the preserve of private firms that sold their results to the news media or other interested parties, now news organizations themselves are commissioning public opinion polls in order to have exclusive rights in reporting their results. Defenders of this practice say that such polls give the news organization added insight into the results and more assurance that the polls are conducted legitimately. Critics point out that news organizations are laying themselves open to the charge of creating news, overplaying their own poll results while underplaying others, and unduly intruding into the political process. Cockburn and Ridgeway (1981:96) suggest some darker motives on the part of these news organizations, calling media-sponsored polls "pure media events designed to sustain interest in the 12-month body watch known as a presidential election."

While coverage of elections, particularly presidential election campaigns, has been a source of much scholarly activity, few of those students have focused on the public opinion poll as a news story in itself. Broh (1980) analyzed 65 *New York Times* articles, 57 national news stories, and 8 national newsmagazine stories about polls during the 1976 presidential campaign and found a strong tendency for journalists to emphasize the horserace and forecasting elements of polls. Using poll results for issue analysis was not something that appealed to journalists.

Beyond examinations such as Broh's, we know little about the dynamics of the public opinion poll as a news event during the political campaign. How much news does a poll generate? Does news about polls dominate election campaign coverage? How strong is the tendency for journalists to emphasize the horserace and forecasting aspects of polls? Will editors choose poll stories over other stories about the campaign? Will they play poll stories more prominently? This study on the poll as a news event during the 1980 presidential campaign seeks to shed some light on these questions.

Methods

The findings presented here are based on a content analysis of coverage of the 1980 presidential election campaign in 50 daily newspapers. The sample of newspapers was selected systematically based on circulation and came from the 1979 Editor and Publisher Yearbook. The sample included newspapers from every region in the country, including Alaska and Hawaii, and newspapers with a wide

variety of circulation sizes, from the *Los Angeles Times* (c. 1,018,490) to the Belle Fourche, S.D. *Post* (c. 3,335).[1]

Each issue of each newspaper was coded for the entire period of the general election campaign, from September 2 to November 4. Only news stories were coded. The definition of a "news event" formulated by Danielson and Adams (1961) was used to categorize these news stories. Included in this coding were each story's length, placement in the paper, headline size, number of pictures, size of pictures, and source of story. Analyses, profiles, editorials, commentaries, columns, and letters-to-the-editor were not included in the coding.

This coding produced a list of 757 campaign news events covered in 6,062 news stories. The events were then divided into two major categories: party and nonparty events. Party events were those whose source was one of the candidates or parties involved in the campaign in a partisan way. Nonparty events were those whose source was not one of the candidates or parties involved in the campaign and whose subject matter was not partisan. An example of this second type of event would be the announcement by the League of Women Voters of plans for a debate. Stories about public opinion polls also fell into this category.

The party events were divided into two groups: campaign events and issues events. Campaign events were those in which the major thrust of the story was the campaign itself: for example, a candidate's prediction of the outcome, criticism of an opponent's tactics, com-

[1] The data are taken from a sample of newspapers on the basis of circulation sizes. A list of the nearly 1,700 daily newspapers and their circulation figures was drawn from the E & P Directory. (The *Wall Street Journal* was excluded from the sample because of the special nature of its content and circulation.) The papers were listed by state alphabetically and then by city alphabetically within each state. The information was processed by computer and a running total was produced from the circulation figures. The final total was divided into 50 intervals. The figures occurred at these intervals of the running total:

Anchorage Times, Camarillo Daily News, Los Angeles Times, Oakland Tribune, Sacramento Union, San Gabrial Valley Daily Tribune, New Haven Register, Boca Raton News, Miami News, Panama City News-Herald, Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Clinton Daily Journal, Bicknell-Knox County News, New Albany Tribune, Webster City Daily Freeman Journal, Henderson Gleaner, Somerset Commonwealth Journal, Springfield Morning Union, Detroit News, Muskegon Chronicle, St. Paul Dispatch, Kennett Daily Dunklin Democrat, Lincoln Journal, Hackensack Record, Vineland Times Journal, Kingston Daily Freeman, New York News World, Nyack Journal News, Charlotte Observer, Moorhead Forum, Cleveland Press, Lake County News Herald, McAlester New-Capital & Democrat, Portland Oregonian, Roseburg News Review, Landsdale Reporter, Philadelphia Inquirer, Washington Observer Reporter, Belle Fourche Daily Post, Del Rio News-Herald, Laredo News, Salt Lake Tribune, Aberdeen Daily World, Charleston Daily Mail, Milwaukee Sentinel, Denver Post, Chicago Tribune, Baltimore Evening Sun, Boston Globe, and Washington Post.

ments about the candidate's or his opponent's character, and so on. Issues events were divided into three categories: economic issues (stories about taxes, inflation, and any governmental programs designed to affect the general economy); domestic issues (stories dealing with noneconomic, nonforeign affairs/defense subjects, such as governmental programs like social security); and foreign affairs (any stories about diplomacy, treaties, defense, relationships with allies or adversaries, and so on).

The nonparty events were divided into three groups: public opinion polls, debates (those events not included in the party events), and miscellaneous.

The breakdown of these events can be seen in Table 1. Campaign events which came from party sources made up more than half of all the events; there were twice as many campaign events of this type as issues events. Candidates and journalists were more interested in talking about the campaign itself than about the issues raised in the campaign.

Polls as News Events

Each of the news events generated a certain number of news stories which ran in the 50 newspapers in this study. The objective of this study is to examine the way in which these events and their stories were handled by the nation's editors. The figures in Table 1 reveal that public opinion polls made up an important, though not dominant part of the news menu from which editors could choose in the 1980 election campaign. About 15 percent of the events designated for coverage consisted of public opinion polls.

Table 1. News Events of the 1980 Presidential Election Campaign

	Number of Events	*% of Total Events*
Party events		
Campaign events		
Comments about opponents	118	15.6
Comments about campaign	241	31.8
Endorsements	44	5.8
Issues events		
Foreign affairs	114	15.0
Domestic	62	8.2
Economic	26	3.4
Nonparty events		
Public opinion polls	110	14.7
Debates	21	2.8
Miscellaneous	21	2.8
Total events	757	100.0

These poll events were then broken into two major categories: horserace polls and other polls. Each of these categories was then divided into subcategories. Two kinds of horserace polls were identified: those dealing with general public opinion about the candidates and those emphasizing the count of electoral votes. Other categories of poll stories included perceptions of candidates; regional and state polls; polls of, about, or for special interest groups; polls about debate winners and losers; polls on various issues in the campaign; and polls on electorate behavior patterns. Table 2 shows how these categories of events compared to each other and to the total number of campaign events. Not surprisingly, polls examining the head-to-head race between the candidates constituted the largest number of events.

Table 3 sets forth several aspects of the news story coverage generated by the public opinion poll events. This coverage is then compared to the coverage of the "average" campaign story. In almost every category of coverage, poll news stories received less coverage than the average story. Moreover, the 593 stories about polls of all types in the 50 coded newspapers represent only 9.9 percent of the total number of stories (6,062), a considerably lower percentage than the 14.7 percent we find when examining the poll as a news event.

Horserace poll stories were more likely to be run than other poll stories, but these stories did not receive better treatment in the papers than other poll stories. Stories emphasizing the horserace aspects of the election made up 59.7 percent of all poll stories. Perhaps more important is the fact that the average number of papers running horserace poll stories was about 7.5. Only one other group of polls stories had a higher average — debate poll stories at 7.8. Regional poll stories were also run in an average of 7.5 newspapers.

Treatment of horserace poll stories tended to be about the same as

Table 2. Polls as News Events in the 1980 Presidential Election Campaign

	Number of Polls Events	*% of Total Poll Events*	*% of Total Campaign Events*
Horserace polls			
General public opinion	31	27.9	4.1
Electoral vote emphasis	16	14.4	2.1
Other polls			
Perceptions of candidates	9	8.1	1.2
Special interest groups	16	15.3	2.2
Debates	11	9.9	1.5
Issues	5	4.5	.7
Electorate behavior	1	.9	.1
Regional polls	2	1.8	.3
State polls	19	17.1	2.5
Totals	110	100.0	14.7

Table 3. Newspaper Coverage and Play of Various Types of Polls Stories

	Total Stories	*Average number of Newspapers Running Stories*	*% on Page 1*	*Average Length (in Words)*	*% with 3-Column or Larger Head*
Horserace polls					
General public opinion	249	8.0	27.7	417.5	52.6
Electoral vote emphasis	105	7.0	22.9	409.0	52.1
Other polls					
Perceptions of candidates	16	1.7	25.0	490.0	57.1
Special interest groups	50	2.9	10.5	564.4	51.1
Debates	86	7.8	18.8	361.1	59.2
Issues	28	5.6	14.3	526.4	40.7
Electoral behavior	4	4.0	0.0	807.5	25.0
Regional polls	15	7.5	33.3	369.3	75.0
State polls	37	1.9	27.0	347.6	54.8
All polls	590	5.3	23.3	422.6	53.0
All campaign stories (including poll stories)	6,062	8.0	27.8	394.6	53.6

treatment of the average campaign story in terms of placement, length, and headline size. However, there is considerable variation in treatment when poll stories of other types are compared with horserace poll stories. Poll stories about the debates, for example, were run in more newspapers and with larger headlines than horserace poll stories, but they were shorter and less likely to be run on page 1. Stories about state polls, on the other hand, were much less likely to be run and were shorter than horserace poll stories; however, they received about the same number of "larger" headlines and approximately the same percentage of front-page treatment.

One final aspect of public opinion poll news coverage was considered: the data were examined to see if this coverage changed during the last two weeks of the campaign. Intuitively, we assumed that poll stories, particularly horserace poll stories, would become increasingly important in terms of coverage and treatment as the campaign neared its end. The data supported the assumption of increased importance in terms of coverage but not treatment. Whereas polls made up 14.7 percent of all events during the entire coded period, in the last two weeks of the campaign, poll stories were 18.1 percent of the total. Horserace polls, which constituted 6.2 percent of all events for the entire period, made up 11.9 percent of all events during the last two

weeks. Also, although horserace poll stories accounted for 42.3 percent of all poll stories for the entire period, that figure jumped to 65.5 percent in the final two weeks. However, Table 4 reveals that newspapers were less likely to run poll stories than other stories toward the end of the campaign. The average number of papers running any story was 8.8; for a poll story it was 7.0.

There is little support for the idea that poll stories get significantly better treatment in terms of placement, length and headline size toward the end of the campaign. In fact, the opposite is true. The average length of all stories was 434.4 words; for poll stories, it was 429.4 words during the last two weeks. As for the front-page stories, 36.3 percent of all stories made page 1; only 29.6 percent of poll stories got front-page play. Finally, 59.1 percent of all stories had a three-column or larger headline, but only 56.8 percent of the poll stories did.

Conclusions

This study shows public opinion polls to be an important part of the news coverage which American newspaper journalists give to a presidential election campaign. Polls by no means dominate this coverage, however. Many other kinds of events are part of the presidential campaign coverage, and the American news consumer is by no means overwhelmed by news about polls.

News consumers get more information about horserace polls than about any other type of poll. Journalists are interested in telling their readers who is ahead and who is behind and speculating about who

Table 4. Newspaper Coverage and Play of Poll Stories and All Stories in the Last Two Weeks of the 1980 Presidential Election Campaign

	Poll Stories	*Horserace Polls*	*Total Campaign Stories (Including Poll Stories)*
Total number of stories in 50 newspapers	203	116	1,401
Average number of papers which ran stories on these events	7.0	6.1	8.8
Percentage of stories on page 1	29.6	30.8	36.3
Average length of news stories (in words)	429.4	393.5	434.4
Percentage of news stories with 3-column head or larger	56.8	56.7	59.1

will win the election. They are not as interested in using polls as the basis for issue analysis, a finding which parallels those of Broh (1980).

Not only are public opinion poll events not a dominant part of election campaign coverage, but editors do not give any special favor to poll results as stories. In fact, they are less likely to play a poll story as prominently as other campaign stories. This tendency holds true even during the last two weeks of the campaign, when public opinion poll results might be considered a major news item of the campaign. The tendency also remains strong even though more newspapers are conducting their own polls and have some proprietary interest in their display.

These findings lead us to ask why editors should behave as they do. First, the fact that not every editor had access to reports on every news event, including every public opinion poll, should be acknowledged. The pool of news from which most editors had to choose was not complete. Apart from that, one reason editors did not treat polls as news as often or as well as we might have anticipated may be that in general they feel that there is enough said about poll results and that more would be unnecessary. Editors may themselves be confused about what polls really mean during an election campaign and thus may shy away from using them more. It is also possible that the public opinion poll may not have the credibility with editors that it might have had at an earlier time. The failure of public opinion polls as predictors or forecasters during an election may have damaged their salience as news stories.

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Passive Learning: When the Media Environment Is the Message

CLIFF ZUKIN WITH ROBIN SNYDER

"LEARNING" has most commonly been treated as an *active* process, where individuals are assumed to be goal-directed and a "means-end" relationship is assumed to exist. However, the acquisition of information by those with little interest in politics has long been demonstrated in a range of political communication settings, including national elections (Blumler and McQuail, 1969), network news programs (Wamsley and Pride, 1972), television documentaries (Fitzsimmons and Osburn, 1969), and specific events such as the televised Watergate hearings (Robinson, 1974). The mere absence of resistance, rather than the presence of motivation and purposive involvement, is all that is necessary for learning to occur.

This form of learning may be said to be largely *passive* in that neither motivation nor interest is a prerequisite for the attainment of knowledge (Krugman and Hartley, 1971). Although the knowledge

Abstract This article investigates the phenomenon of "passive learning," or how people may acquire information from the mass media despite lacking the motivation to do so. A unique data source allows us to overcome the "saturation effect" that generally makes the study of this phenomenon difficult. Saturation conditions commonly occur because exposure to political programming is virtually universal. With interest controlled, two groups receiving different media messages are compared over two elections. Those who had no interest in an election, but who lived in a media-rich environment were 40 percentage points more likely to have acquired information than their uninterested cohorts living in a media-poor environment.

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gained may in fact be used when triggered by later events or situations, it is unrelated to immediate needs or situations.

The tremendous expansion of the information environment over the past two decades, coupled with habitual exposure to local and national television news, has fostered a climate in which passive learning can flourish. This is particularly true in the case of the electronic media. After the decision to be exposed to a particular broadcast is made, people exercise little control over the specific information they encounter.

The phenomenon of passive learning is important, for it may well describe how a substantial segment of the population acquires information. But while undeniably important, passive learning has been most difficult to study. As is the case with many media effects studies, there is the chronic problem of having no natural control group. This is particularly true with regard to television. The medium is ubiquitous. It is often possible to find individuals who have not been exposed to political programming during a particular information campaign.

The implications of this saturation condition are clear insofar as passive learning is concerned. If people learn through simple exposure, and if everyone is exposed, there is no base from which to judge the extent of learning, or the contribution made by the mass media. A logical consequence of this is that studies attempting to attribute variation in attitudes or behavior to media exposure yield null findings as there is little or no variation in the population to be explained. A growing number of studies have warned that exposure measures may obscure more than they reveal, given saturation conditions, arguing that "more exposure" should not be expected to produce "more effects" (Iyengar, 1979; McLeod, et al., 1977; Zukin, 1977). Relying on the amount of media exposure to explain substantive effects is a risky strategy.

We use a data source drawn from a unique media environment which affords us a natural control group and allows us to conduct preliminary tests of the nature and extent of passive learning. This data source is described in the following section, which also details the media environment and political setting, and sets forth the empirical tests.

Research Design, Setting, and Questions

THE MEDIA ENVIRONMENT

The data we used to furnish evidence of passive learning come from cross-sectional surveys of the New Jersey public. New Jersey has a

unique media environment, which makes it an ideal laboratory for some kinds of media effects questions. As one of only two states in the country without an in-state commercial VHF television station (at the time of the study), residents in the more densely populated northern part of the state are served by stations located in New York City. About one-quarter of the state's population lives in southern New Jersey, which is served by Philadelphia television. This unique media environment overcomes the saturation problem discussed earlier. With regard to subnational politics, the two regions of the state receive very different messages from television. The electronic media environment is kept pure by radio listening habits that are also oriented toward the major metropolitan areas outside the state. Two-thirds of those living in the northern part of the state report listening predominantly to New York based stations; 70 percent of those living in the southern portion generally tune in Philadelphia radio.[1]

In contrast to their use of the electronic media, most New Jerseyans read newspapers published in the state. Overall, 70 percent report reading a New Jersey paper, 20 percent read an out-of-state paper, while most of the remainder report reading both. The state's newspapers are primarily local in their orientation; there is no single paper that covers the entire state. Thus, the media environment is well suited to our concern of providing a natural control group. The electronic media, where exposure may be largely accidental and where passive learning may more readily occur, is heavily tilted to news of New York and Philadelphia. With regard to print, where exposure is more purposive, the news is heavily tilted to information about New Jersey.

STUDY PARAMETERS AND THE POLITICAL SETTING

The data used in this analysis were collected by the Eagleton Poll of Rutgers University's Eagleton Institute of Politics, and come from interviews conducted with random samples of the voting age population of New Jersey in September of 1977 and 1981. One thousand persons were interviewed on each survey.[2] In 1977 and 1981, New Jersey was having elections for governor, while neighboring New York City was holding elections for mayor. Information was collected

[1] Moreover, direct, unmediated experience with out-of-state politics is low. Somewhat contrary to popular belief, New Jersey is not a commuter state. Only 9 percent of the chief wage earners in New Jersey households commute to New York; 4 percent work in Philadelphia.

[2] Background information about the study can be found in the Appendix. Additional information may be obtained by writing the senior author.

about New Jerseyans' awareness of both sets of candidates, interest in both races, exposure to newspapers, and whether respondents lived in the New York or Philadelphia media environment. If knowledge of New York candidates, but not New Jersey candidates, showed sharp regional differences, with interest held constant, there would be evidence of passive learning. This would be confirmed to the extent that the pattern of citizen reactions to both elections was consistent.[3]

Interviewing was conducted in September of each year, immediately following the New York primary elections. The New Jersey candidates had been selected in primaries held the preceding June and had been campaigning in the three months before the study. Thus there was a far better chance for respondents to become informed about the election in their own state. Moreover, there was also more incentive: New Jerseyans were naturally more interested in their own election for governor than in a neighboring city's election for mayor.

THE MEDIA ENVIRONMENT

The media environments for northern and southern New Jerseyans were quite different in each type of election. The electronic media received by residents of the north were full of information about the New York mayoralty election. The race was accorded high prominence on local news stations in the best fashion of horserace journalism, and candidates advertised heavily on television and radio. Philadelphia's electronic news media all but ignored New York's race for mayor, and there was of course no candidate advertising. Residents of southern New Jersey could pick up little information about the mayor's race from their electronic media environment, motivation notwithstanding. Television and radio public affairs programming in

[3] As case studies, the elections of 1977 and 1981 were quite different, and represent situational extremes. In 1977, New Jersey saw the incumbent governor, Brendan Byrne, seeking re-election. His challenger was former Senate President Ray Bateman. Both candidates had won contested primaries the previous June. In New York, the real contest was in the Democratic primary. In a race that received prominent local media coverage, Edward Koch and Mario Cuomo advanced to the Democratic runoff, over incumbent Abe Beame and Bella Abzug. Koch defeated Cuomo in the subsequent runoff held on September 19. Interviewing was conducted between September 20 and 27.

The situation was reversed in 1981. Ed Koch was the four-year incumbent, while the New Jersey gubernatorial candidates, Representative Jim Florio (D) and former Assemblyman Tom Kean (R), were relatively unknown. The postponement of the New York primary put us in the unfortunate position of interviewing during New York's primary election. Interviewing was conducted between September 15 and 27, while the New York primary was held on September 22. Respondents were simply asked if they could name any of the candidates running for mayor, ignoring party affiliation of the candidates.

both Philadelphia and New York gave scant attention to New Jersey's gubernatorial election. New Jersey newspapers gave that race prominent attention and both candidates made extensive use of spot advertisements.

Measurement

The data were not collected with the explicit purpose of testing hypotheses bearing on passive learning. Accordingly, not all indicators are optimal, and there are minor differences between the 1977 and 1981 surveys. This section describes the variables used and discusses some of their limitations as a test of passive learning.

KNOWLEDGE

The dependent variable of "knowledge" in both cases is respondents' ability to spontaneously name the candidates running in each election. In 1977 and in the 1981 New Jersey gubernatorial election respondents received scores of 0, 1, or 2 depending on the number of candidates named. Because of the timing problem of the New York primary in 1981, responses were categorized as being able to name 0, 1, 2 or more candidates. We think it is important to note that this is a limited test of passive learning. We are investigating but one component of knowledge — the ability to name candidates for visible public offices. While this is certainly an important bit of information, many other types of information are equally or perhaps more relevant to individuals.

INTEREST

In 1977 interest in each election was measured by the straightforward questions: "How interested are you in the outcome of the election for (governor of New Jersey/mayor of New York City) — very, somewhat, or not at all interested?" The 1981 question offered respondents four options "very, somewhat, not very, or not at all interested." Thus interest is specifically related to the elections at hand, not a general indicator of interest in politics.

MEDIA

The "media environment" variable is a simple classification of whether respondents live in the area served by New York or Philadelphia electronic media. Because of the heavy media attention given by New York stations to their campaign, those served by New York media can be said to be living in a media-rich environment, while those attending to Philadelphia stations would be in a relatively

media-poor one. In 1977 respondents were simply asked whether they watched TV stations located in New York or Philadelphia. The less than 5 percent able to receive both were asked which they watched more often.[4] Thus the media environment measure is based on neither exposure nor attention; simply on the contextual environment.

Findings

THE 1977 ELECTION

The data presented in Table 1 provide clear evidence of passive learning from the media environment. At a constant level of interest, those in the media-rich environment were considerably more knowledgeable than those in the media-poor environment. Comparing by media market, 63 percent of those New Jerseyans served by New York television could identify the mayoralty candidate in contrast to only 15 percent of those served by Philadelphia television, despite similar levels of interest. Five percent of those living in southern New Jersey reported being "very interested," compared to 18 percent of northern New Jerseyans. The differences in identification by television area are striking and persist with interest held constant.

These data also give some insight into the extent of learning that has taken place.[5] Despite very different degrees of interest, New Jerseyans living in New York media environment were as knowledgeable about the New York mayor's race as they were about their own

Table 1. Percentage in Each Media Environment Able to Name Candidates, Controlling for Interest, 1977

	Election—Candidates/Media Environments					
	N.Y. Mayor (D)		*N.J. Gov. (R)*		*N.J. Gov. (D)*	
	N.Y.	*Phil.*	*N.Y.*	*Phil.*	*N.Y.*	*Phil.*
Total	63%	15%	58%	55%	69%	62%
Interest						
None	50	9	19	22	29	20
Some	67	23	52	47	67	57
Lot	77	—[a]	76	77	86	85

[a] Insufficient number of cases for analysis. A table of n-sizes can be found in the appendix.

[4] This question was not asked in 1981, and the surrogate measure of "area code" was used. Evidence from a third survey indicates that the surrogate measure fits quite closely. Among the 1,125 persons for whom data is available from a 1,200 person sample, 96 percent of those living in the 201 area code watched New York television and 91 percent of those in the 609 area code watched Philadelphia television.

[5] We wish to reemphasize that we are dealing with a limited indicator of knowledge. By "extent of knowledge" we refer mainly to the *breadth* of penetration of the population, rather than depth.

state's gubernatorial election. The statewide interest figures are mirror images: 41 percent were very interested, 46 percent somewhat interested, and 13 percent not interested in the gubernatorial election. Only 14 percent were very interested in the mayoralty race, with 44 percent somewhat interested, and 42 percent not interested. Yet in the region of the state serviced by New York media, more people could identify the Democratic candidate for mayor than the Republican candidate for governor. The Democratic gubernatorial candidate, a four-year incumbent seeking reelection, was named by only 6 percent more than the mayoralty candidate in this area of the state.

The most relevant data testing the passive learning hypothesis are in the comparison between respondents in each media environment having no interest in the mayoralty election. If motivation is in fact a necessary precondition for learning we would expect little difference between media markets. However, fully half of the uninterested living in the media-rich environment knew the candidate's name. This compares to only 9 percent of the New Jerseyans living in the media-poor environment. While it should be recognized that knowledge of a candidate may be one of the items most easily learned through osmosis, it is clear that there was a great deal of passive learning from the media environment.

Knowledge has been regressed on interest, media environment, exposure to newspapers,[6] and education, the results of which are displayed in Table 2. While the proportion of the variance in knowl-

Table 2. Knowledge of New York and New Jersey Candidates as Explained by Education, Interest, Newspaper Exposure and Media Environment, 1977

	Knowledge	
	New York	*New Jersey*
Media environment	−.37[a]	−.06
Newspaper exposure	.23	.30
Education	.18	.13
Interest	.16	.30
R^2	.29	.28
Multiple R	.53	.53

[a] Negative coefficient indicates New York media market.

[6] In addition to being a measure of media exposure in its own right, the newspaper exposure variable is treated as a surrogate for purposive motivation for learning. This assumption is based on the realization that individuals exercise a great deal more control over the information to which they are exposed in print than through electronic media. We acknowledge that this is clearly a more gross differentiation than exists in the real world, but must also acknowledge the real world limitations of our data. In the regression analysis that follows, newspaper exposure is treated as a yes-no dichotomous variable. It is included to separate the active learning component from the general media environment.

edge explained is quite similar in both elections, the component variables have very different weights. The dearth of coverage accorded New Jersey politics by both the New York and Philadelphia electronic media (particularly television) is almost certainly the reason the different media environments contributed nothing to learning. In this case both markets were information-poor. Given the difficulty of drawing information from this environment it is hardly surprising that the indicators of "active learning," exposure to newspapers and interest, were the best predictors of knowledge. However, with regard to New Jerseyans' knowledge of New York candidates, the "media environment" variable was the best predictor of the four variables in the equation. The beta for media environment was .37, compared to .23 for newspaper exposure and only .16 for interest. In this case it was the media environment rather than the desire to acquire information that was the critical determinant of knowledge.

THE 1981 ELECTION

The observations drawn from the 1977 data also held true in 1981. Table 3 displays data on the relationship between knowledge of the candidates and the media environment, with interest in each race held constant. There is again a major difference in awareness of the New York candidates between the northern and southern New Jerseyans having no interest in the election. Half of those living in northern New Jersey could name at least one candidate, generally Koch. In comparison, only about 1 in 10 of the uninterested living in the media poor-environment could name a candidate, even though Koch had been mayor for four years.

Once again we note that despite being more interested in their own state's election, more New Jerseyans living in the New York media market could name a candidate for mayor of New York than a candidate for governor of New Jersey. Moreover, the evidence of passive learning is not found simply among those devoid of interest in the New York race. The independent effects of both interest and the media environment can be seen in Table 3. While the relationship between interest and knowledge is monotonic and strong, knowledge

Table 3. Percentage in Each Media Environment Able to Name Candidates, Controlling for Interest, 1981

	Election—Candidates/Media Environment																			
	New York Mayor										*New Jersey Governor*									
	New York					*Philadelphia*					*New York*					*Philadelphia*				
Knowledge	*0*	*1*	*2*	*Total*	*(N)*	*0*	*1*	*2*	*Total*	*(N)*	*0*	*1*	*2*	*Total*	*(N)*	*0*	*1*	*2*	*Total*	*(N)*
Total	28	58	15	101%	(759)	74	24	2	100%	(260)	48	19	32	99%	(739)	40	24	36	100%	(260)
Interest																				
None	49	43	8	100	(178)	89	11	0	100	(124)	71	16	13	100	(80)	64	30	6	100	(30)
Little	35	56	9	100	(118)	63	33	4	100	(65)	65	14	21	100	(117)	54	24	22	100	(44)
Some	18	63	20	101	(286)	60	38	2	100	(46)	50	21	29	100	(269)	39	35	26	100	(83)
Lot	14	68	18	100	(155)	43	48	9	100	(19)	31	20	49	100	(256)	25	14	61	100	(100)

NOTE: Knowledge is the number of candidates respondents were able to name.

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of the New York candidates was greater among northern than southern New Jerseyans at all levels of interest.

Knowledge has been regressed on the interest, education, and media environment variables in Table 4. The results from the 1981 data closely parallel the 1977 findings.[7] Interest was clearly the most powerful predictor of knowledge in the 1981 New Jersey gubernatorial election. The area of the state in which respondents lived and their educational background were relatively unimportant factors. Interest in the New York mayoralty election was also an important predictor of candidate awareness. The beta between interest and awareness was .26 in the New York contest, and .30 in the New Jersey election. However, the strongest predictor of knowledge in the New York election was again simply which media environment New Jerseyans lived in.

Conclusions

Our data provide a solid base of evidence demonstrating the phenomenon of passive learning. Those New Jerseyans who had no interest in the New York election, but who lived in the media-rich New York market, were 40 percentage points more likely to be aware of candidates than their counterparts living in a media environment where election news and advertising were sparse. This difference held in both 1977 and 1981. At all levels of interest, the media environment was a critical variable. Clearly, citizens learned passively, from the simple availability of information.

The New Jersey media structure is of course unique, but this uniqueness did not manufacture artifactual data. Rather, the unusual media environment of New Jersey enabled us to get a good look, for

Table 4. Knowledge of New York and New Jersey Candidates as Explained by Education, Interest, and Media Environment, 1981

	Knowledge	
	New York	*New Jersey*
Media environment	−.31[a]	.06
Education	.09	.13
Interest	.26	.30
R^2	.22	.12
Multiple R	.47	.35

[a] Negative coefficient indicates New York media market.

[7] Questions about exposure to newspapers were not included on the 1981 interview schedule. In order to make direct comparisons possible, the regression equation for 1977 has been recomputed with exposure to newspapers left out of the model. In this three-variable solution the statistics are as follows:

N.J.: interest (.41), media env. (-.04), education (.14), R^2 (.20), multiple R (.45).
N.Y.: interest (.19), media env. (-.35), education (.19), R^2 (.23), multiple R (.48).

perhaps the first time, at the nature of passive learning and this is the more significant aspect of the study. Admittedly, the test case of candidates' "name recognition" is quite narrow. The consequences, however, may be quite broad indeed. Passive learning clearly is a widespread process, and one that seems to characterize much citizen learning about politics.

Appendix

A. All data reported in this article were collected by the Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University. The data come from telephone surveys, each conducted with 1,000 New Jersey residents of voting age. Telephone numbers were randomly selected in geographic proportion to their statewide distribution. A constant was added to the final digit (random digit dialing) to include unlisted numbers and numbers of those who had recently moved.

The sample was stratified on sex, and weighted slightly on education and age in accordance with known population parameters. Interviewing was conducted, under supervision, from a centralized facility. Calls were made on weekday evenings from 6:00 P.M. to 10:00 P.M., and 10:00 A.M. to 10:00 P.M. on weekends. Three calls were made to working numbers before they were replaced.

B. The percentages shown in Table 1 are based on the following N sizes.

	Media Environment					
	N.Y. Mayor (D)		*N.J. Gov. (R)*		*N.J. Gov. (D)*	
	N.Y.	*Phil.*	*N.Y.*	*Phil.*	*N.Y.*	*Phil.*
Total	(743)	(244)	(743)	(244)	(743)	(244)
Interest						
None	(273)	(145)	(94)	(37)	(94)	(37)
Some	(341)	(87)	(349)	(99)	(349)	(99)
Lot	(128)	(9)	(299)	(105)	(299)	(105)

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Recalling Attitudes: An Analysis of Retrospective Questions on the 1982 GSS

TOM W. SMITH

RETROSPECTIVE survey designs are commonly used in many areas of the social sciences. These include oral histories, life histories, patient histories and studies of fertility and contraception, child development, the attainment process, voting and partisan affiliation, medical care, consumer purchases and finances, readership, and public opinion. Respondents are asked to recall attributes, events, behaviors, and attitudes from the immediate to distant past. Both experimental work in cognitive psychology on memory and reliability checks on actual retrospective survey data find notable error from forgetting and memory distortion. Three general errors are common: (1) forgetting—a failure to report a given fact; (2) time displacement—associating events and behaviors with the wrong period, usually telescoping events; and (3) distortion—the changing of facts usually to fit into a more consistent or standard pattern. Errors occur most frequently about the details of events, unimportant events and about repetitive events which are easily confused.

Most studies of the reliability of retrospective surveys have focused on a relatively short period (several days to about a year) and demographics attributes (e.g., residence, employment, marital history) or behaviors (medical care, use of alcohol, voting). Improvements in

Abstract Research using the General Social Surveys suggests that retrospective reporting of attitudes may frequently produce inaccurate distributions. In addition, the evidence also indicates that correlations between recalled attitudes and other items may be distorted.

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recall have been achieved through various refined data collection techniques such as bounded recall, positive feedback, and diaries. The general consensus is that while all retrospective data are flawed by memory errors, when an optimum design is executed results are sufficiently accurate and reliable for most applications.[1]

For attitude recall the situation is less clear. Despite the widespread use of various forms of attitude recall, there are few studies of the reliability of attitudinal data. There is, however, a general belief that the recall of attitudes is less reliable than the recall of behaviors and events (Wenar and Coulter, 1962; Dankin and Rennant, 1968; Thompson, 1978; Hindley in Moss and Goldstein, 1979) and some go so far as to state, "There are very strong reasons for rejecting the idea that subjective experiences, like emotions, can be recalled at all" (Moss and Goldstein, 1979:111).

Most studies of attitudinal recall deal with panel studies of child development. Haggard, et al. (1960) compared the recall of vital, behavioral, and attitudinal information over 6-month and 8-year intervals for 17 Norwegian mothers. They found that reliabilities fell as the interval increased and that "hard facts" were recalled most accurately, followed by general wishes and attitudes, and lastly by anxiety scales. Differences in distributions were not considered. Robbins (1963), studying a panel of approximately 40 parents recalling child care behavior typically two to three years earlier, found substantial inconsistencies and an overreporting of socially desirable responses. Wenar and Coulter (1962), using 25 mothers, examined child care behaviors and attitudes over a three- to six-year period and found large inconsistencies but no bias in recall. Inconsistencies tended to be greater for items with high affective content. Yarrow et al. (1970), looking at child and maternal recall of nursery school experiences from 3 to 30 years earlier, found low correlations between contemporary and retrospective measures, frequent systematic shifts toward positive responses, and little difference between vital, behavioral, and attitudinal questions.

Studies of attitude recall in other areas are few in number and diverse in content. Powers, et al. (1978), using a panel of elderly Iowa males, examined recall over a 10-year span. They found that the

[1] The single best source on the reliability of retrospective survey data is Moss and Goldstein (1979). On memory research in cognitive psychology see Loftus (1979) and Klatzky (1980). On time period distortion see Sudman and Bradburn (1974). Examples of studies in particular areas are: oral histories—Thompson (1978) and Cutler (1970); life histories—Davis and Smith (1980), and Smith and Klaeser (1982); voting—Smith (1982), Himmelweit, et al. (1978) and Traugott and Katosh (1979); consumer finances—Ferber (1966); health care—Andersen, et al. (1979), and Cannell, et al., (1981); and miscellaneous—D'Andrade (1974), Metzner (1949–50), and Belson (1962).

percentage agreeing to seven items ranged from 88 to 23 percent, but that there were no notable differences between attitudes and factual questions. Errors tended to enhance self-images. While recall was often inconsistent and showed bias, there was considerable agreement between associations based on the recall data and the original data and variables on the 1974 panel wave. Gutek (1978), using a national adult sample, looked at recall of encounters with bureaucracies over five periods ranging from the last three months to 12 years or longer. She observed that the correlations between recalled attitudes did not vary appreciably with recall interval and concluded that the data were equally reliable over all five recall periods. No criterion was available to evaluate distributions. Dakin and Tennant (1968), with an elite sample of 59, compared responses a year apart that inquired about activities in organizations and personal demographics one to five years prior to the initial interview. They found that attitudes were less consistently reported than demographics and that consistency declined as the recall period increased. They did not examine the question of bias. Duncan (1975) and Duncan, et al. (1973) found in the Detroit Area Survey that when reports of parental child-rearing values were compared to an earlier cross section, the traditionalism of parents was overestimated, but the association between early age cohorts and traditionalism was replicated by the parental recall data. Finally, studies of partisan preferences come close to attitudinal recall, but differ in that there are typically pronounced behavioral clues and events that can serve as indicators of party identification (voting and registration affiliation). Andersen (Nie, et al., 1976) has used recall data to reconstruct party affiliation distributions up to 32 years earlier and was able to match distributions from contemporary surveys 15 years earlier, but Ritter (1980) offers evidence that the recall may be in error for many respondents. He argues that many respondents are merely projecting their current affiliation backwards and that such solidly Democratic groups as blacks and Jews fail to mention Republican leanings prior to the New Deal.

In brief, while existing studies tend to question the reliability of attitudinal recall they are ambivalent on whether bias is present and whether retrospective attitudes are less reliable than recalled demographics and behaviors. In addition, their conclusions are limited by (1) the small, unrepresentative samples frequently used; (2) a typical failure to distinguish between test/retest unreliability and recall unreliability (i.e., most studies assume that the differences between panel waves are due to recall unreliability but do not actually demonstrate this); and (3) their concentration in the area of child development.

To test the reliability of attitudinal recall we added three modified

questions to the 1982 General Social Survey. (The General Social Survey consists of personal interviews with a full probability sample of the adult, noninstitutionalized population of the contiguous United States. For details see Davis and Smith, 1982.) Immediately after asking about current attitudes toward Communism, school busing, and racial intermarriage we asked respondents what their opinion had been 10 years earlier, in 1972 (see Appendix for question wording). Respondents were then weighted by birth cohort to simulate the adult population at the earlier reference point,[2] and the 1972 General Social Survey (or 1973 in the case of the Communism item) was used to validate in the aggregate the retrospective attitudes. Busing was chosen to represent items showing little or no aggregate change over the 1972–82 period. This we thought would represent an easy case for recall since the stability of the aggregate distribution may indicate relatively stable attitudes among individuals and therefore make recall of a constant attitude easy. (The literature on recall finds that errors are more common when the attributes being reported on have changed in the interim (see Dakin and Tennant, 1968; Himmelwait, et al., 1978). In addition, even if no meaningful recall took place, the early distribution could be reconstructed if most respondents projected their current position and some respondents randomly changed their opinion in both directions. On Communism and racial intermarriage, on the other hand, significant true change occurred over the last decade. Chance reconstruction would not reproduce the earlier distributions and presumably more individual change occurred on these items, thereby reducing possible reliance on constant attitudes.

On school busing the retrospective data closely reconstructs the marginal distribution in 1972 (see Table 1). On racial intermarriage the recall data significantly overestimates (7.7 percent) support for antimiscegenation laws. While support for antimiscegenation laws did decline between 1972 and 1982 (39.3 to 32.9 percent), this change was entirely due to cohort turnover. With cohort controlled for there was no significant change in support for intermarriage between 1972 and 1982 (39.3 to 40.5 percent). Thus the recall data do correctly point out the direction of the change, but by overestimating the intracohort change the data significantly overestimate the magnitude of the change (actual change equals −6.4 percent versus recall of change −14.1 percent). On Communism, by contrast, even the direction of the change is misestimated by the recall data, and the percentage believing that Communism is the worst form of government is overestimated by 26.5 percent. Respondents thought they were more

[2] Birth cohorts in the 1982 survey were weighted to reproduce their relative population share in the 1972 or 1973 survey.

Table 1. Distributions on Communism, Racial Intermarriage, and School Busing in 1972–3 GSS and as Reconstructed from 1982 GSS

Attitudes Toward:	*GSS*	*Recall*	
Communism	*1973*	*1982*[a]	
Worst form of government	44.2%	70.7%	
Bad, not worst	27.5	17.8	
All right for some	25.1	10.2	
Good form	3.1	1.3	
	(1,445)	(1,421)	$\chi^2 = 218.8$ prob. = .0001
Racial intermarriage (whites only)	*1972*		
Favor laws forbidding	39.3	47.0	
Oppose laws forbidding	60.7	53.0	
	(1,309)	(1,309)	$\chi^2 = 15.9$ prob. = .0002
School busing (all)			
Favor	20.3	20.6	
Oppose	79.7	79.4	
	(1,544)	(1,419)	$\chi^2 = 0.1$ prob. = .79
School busing (whites only)			
Favor	13.5	16.6	
Oppose	86.5	83.4	
	(1,294)	(1,282)	$\chi^2 = 4.8$ prob. = .027

[a] Weighted to match distribution of birth cohorts in 1972–73.

opposed to Communism in the early 70s, when in fact the warm glow of détente made people less hostile to Communism at that time (Smith, 1983). Perhaps people are focusing on the highly visible anti-Communism of the McCarthy era (circa 1948–1955) rather than the period of détente. In sum, we find that only in the "easy" case of school busing did recall accurately reconstruct attitude distributions 10 years earlier. On racial intermarriage the correct direction was pointed out, but the magnitude was significantly distorted. On Communism even the direction is wrong and the magnitude of the misestimate is substantial. The common thread that seems to run through these and other examples (Duncan, 1975, and Powers, et al., 1974) is a tendency to overreport conservative positions and traditional values.

To examine the discrepancies between the original and reconstructed marginals, we ran crosstabs with educational attainment. We hypothesized that the educated might be better able to reconstruct their past attitudes than the less educated. As Table 2 shows, there were significant interactions with education in each case, but only once in the hypothesized direction. Using Davis's *d*-systems (1975), we first test the null hypothesis that no difference exists between years. Next the hypothesis that all differences are constant across educational groups is tested. In each case both hypotheses are rejected indicating an interaction.

Table 2. Original Attitudes by Reconstructed Variables by Education

School busing	*Original*	*Reconstructed*	*Original-*
% Favoring	*1972*	*1972*	*Reconstructed*
Less than H.S.	22.3%	21.3%	1.0%
H.S. ed.	17.9	13.1	4.8
Greater than H.S.	19.9	27.2	−7.3

Original vs. reconstructed	*Hypothesis*	*Model*	χ^2	*df*	*prob.*	*Decision*
	1. no diff.	d=0	11.1	3	.011	reject
	2. Constant diff.	d=c	11.1	2	.004	reject

Racial intermarriage	*Original*	*Reconstructed*	*Original-*
% Favoring antimiscegenation	*1972*	*1972*	*Reconstructed*
Less than H.S.	58.6%	69.5%	−10.9%
H.S. ed.	33.6	47.5	−13.9
Greater than H.S.	22.3	23.0	−0.8

Original vs. reconstructed	*Hypothesis*	*Model*	χ^2	*df*	*prob.*	*Decision*
	1. No diff.	d=0	29.1	3	<.001	reject
	2. Constant diff.	d=c	10.2	2	.006	reject

Communism	*Original*	*Reconstructed*	*Original-*
% Communism is worst	*1973*	*1973*	*Reconstructed*
Less than H.S.	54.6%	75.1%	−20.5%
H.S. ed.	48.8	73.5	−24.7
Greater than H.S.	27.6	64.1	−36.5

Original vs. reconstructed	*Hypothesis*	*Model*	χ^2	*df*	*prob.*	*Decision*
	1. No diff.	d=0	261.1	3	<.001	reject
	2. Constant diff.	d=c	15.4	2	<.001	reject

On racial intermarriage the reconstructed figures for the college-educated matched the original figures, while the estimates for the less educated groups were substantially off. On the other two questions, the college-educated estimates are the furthest off. Because of these interactions the reconstructed associations between education and the attitudes differ substantially from the actual associations. The original busing data showed a shallow v-shaped relationship with opposition to busing highest among the less educated. The reconstructed data, on the other hand, have a v-shaped relationship with opposition highest among the college-educated. On racial intermarriage both the original and reconstructed data show an association between education and opposition to antimiscegnation laws, but it is significantly more pronounced in the reconstructed data. Both surveys also show that opposition to Communism is greatest among the less educated, but while the difference between the less educated and the college-educated is 27.0 percentage points in the original data, it is only 11.0 percentage points in the reconstructed data. In brief, recall interacts with education on all three variables, and the reconstructed associ-

ations substantially distort the relationships described in the original data.

We examined several other variables (region, party identification, sex, religion, and residence (rural, town, city, suburb, metro) at age 16) to see if similar interactions occurred.[3] The results were quite opposite to those suggested by education. Only one of the 12 associations between original and reconstructed attitudes significantly interacted (busing with religion). These results argue that associations are often faithfully reconstructed by retrospective data. In part, this may merely mean that concurrent associations which have not changed in the aggregate since 1972 are being reproduced in the recall questions.[4] Also, since we have no way to predict which associations will be accurate and which will differ, it would be difficult to accept recall attitudes as a reliable indicator.

At best, attitude recall appears a hazardous enterprise. Those attitudes which were firmly held by an individual and perhaps fixed by verbal expression (in arguments, debates, etc.) or other conscious activity can probably be recalled almost as reliably as current attitudes. But most attitudes are not fixed and stored as discrete facts, like birthdate, zipcode, or name of first U.S. president, subject to fairly direct recall. Rather, most opinions are expressions of incomplete memory scans of relevant experiences, predispositions, and emotions. To recall a typical attitude a person must try to remember these various bits of cognition and assemble them as one would have at an earlier point. Such a mental exercise may be impossible and undoubtedly is difficult. Rather than successfully fulfilling this task most respondents probably adopt a simpler strategy, either (1) projecting backward current attitudes,[5] (2) divining attitudes from exter-

[3] To be sure that any changes are due to recall and not to changes in the independent variable, fixed variables which have not changed for the respondent should be used such as sex and residence at age 16. Because the range of such fixed variables is limited, we also included several variables which are known to be relatively stable among adults (region, party identification, and religion) and for which we doubted any *change* would be associated with attitudes towards the questions of interest.

[4] On racial intermarriage the association between education and tolerance did increase between 1972 and 1982. The reconstructed 1972 association is closer to the 1980 association than the original 1972 association.

[5] Evidence of backward projection comes from the high level of agreement between the concurrent and retrospective 1982 questions (percent agreeing: busing=91.9 percent; racial intermarriage=93.3 percent; Communism=83.5 percent uncollapsed, 87.1 percent dichotomized). These rates of agreement are all above figures from test/retest comparisons over approximately a four- to six-week period in the 1972 and 1973 GSS (test/retest percent agreement: busing=85.5 percent; racial intermarriage=86.3 percent; Communisim=80.6 percent collapsed; see Smith and Stephenson, 1979). Given that true change should probably be greater over 10 years than six weeks, it appears that

nal clues such as known or perceived changes in national or community attitudes, or (3) adopting an attitude from some point of salience in the past which may or may not match the period for which recall is requested.

While these and other possible strategies may help respondents come up with the correct answer, they will often lead to notable distortion. Several types of bias frequently contaminate recall data. (1) A social desirability bias leads to the overreporting of proper and positive attitudes and behaviors (typical of the child development and voting recall studies). As time passes people seem to either weed out the bad memories and retain the good, change memories to maintain more positive self-images, or replace forgotten events and predispositions with socially favored reconstructions (not remembering whether he voted or not, a person may assume that he did the desired behavior, i.e., voted, rather than admitting no recollection or not voting, both undesired attributes). (2) A conservative or traditional bias increases support for the positions of the old guard and thus exaggerates the magnitude of change between the past and the present. This may result from a type of telescoping effect (bring the distant past into the near past), a contrast effect (making the difference between the past and present seem greater), or basing recall of past attitudes on perceived changes in the aggregate attitude (which could be especially errant when cohort turnover rather than intracohort change was the source of aggregate change).

These two biases may even combine to create a doubly distorted picture of the "good old days" in which both the degree of pleasantness and the traditionalism of the past are overstated. There is also a tendency to draw the past to the present, since the degree of reported consistency over 10 years seems much higher than other figures indicate are likely. In addition, recall can interact with other variables, especially education, so that one cannot be assured of correctly reconstructing associations between variables.

In sum, the nature of most attitudes and the difficulty of recall in general combine to seriously undermine the reliability of attitude recall. Bias is a frequent, perhaps even normal, feature of attitude recall. While useful in carefully regulated situations, attitude recall is an inherently weak foundation for social science research.

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there is more correlated error in the retrospective data in the form of backward projection. (This may be heightened by the appearance of the concurrent question immediately before the retrospective question. The bias of the reconstructed marginals does not substantially arise from this cause, however, since the reconstructed distributions would have been closer to the actual 1972 distributions if concurrent 1982 data weighted by birth cohorts had been used instead of the weighted recall data.)

Appendix: Question Wordings

38. Thinking about all the different kinds of governments in the world today, which of these statements comes closest to how you feel about Communism as a form of government? CODE ONE.

(a) It's the worst kind of all	1
(b) It's bad, but no worse than some others	2
(c) It's all right for some countries	3
(d) It's a good form of government	4
Don't know	8

39. What about ten years ago, that is in 1972, which of these statements came closest to how you felt about Communism as a form of government? CODE ONE.

(a) It's the worst kind of all	1
(b) It's bad, but no worse than some others	2
(c) It's all right for some countries	3
(d) It's a good form of government	4
Don't know	8

65. A. Do you think there should be laws against marriages between (Negroes/Blacks) and whites?

Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	8

B. Now, thinking about ten years ago, that is in 1972, did you then think there should be laws against marriages between (Negroes/Blacks) and whites?

Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	8

61. A. In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of (Negro/Black) and white school children from one school to another?

Favor	1
Oppose	2
Don't know	8

B. Now, thinking about ten years ago, that is in 1972, did you then favor or oppose the busing of (Negro/Black) and white school children from one school district to another?

Favor	1
Oppose	2
Don't know	8

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Effects of an Advance Telephone Call in a Personal Interview Survey

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WHETHER or not to telephone sample members in advance to schedule an appointment for a personal interview is a common dilemma for survey researchers. On the one hand an advance phone call can reduce unproductive visits. On the other hand it may be easier for a sample member to refuse an interview when the initial contact is made by telephone rather than by personal visit. The choice depends on the magnitude of the tradeoffs; that is, how much greater will the refusal rate likely be and what will the savings be, if advance phone calls are used?

Related Research

We found only two earlier studies, both conducted during the 1960s and showing conflicting results. In a survey to determine consumer

Abstract During October and November 1982, 1,260 Medicare-eligible senior citizens were interviewed in a survey focusing on health care of the elderly. As part of the survey, an experiment was conducted in each of the three survey sites to determine the effects of an advance telephone call to schedule an appointment for a personal interview. One random half sample in each site was sent a lead letter, followed by a telephone call to schedule a personal interview. The other half sample was sent a lead letter followed by a personal contact, with no intervening telephone call. Telephoning to arrange an appointment for a personal interview resulted in a 20 percent saving in data collection costs with only a 1 percent decrease in response rate.

The authors are staff members of the Research Triangle Institute. Jane Williams Bergsten is a Senior Research Statistician, Michael F. Weeks is a Senior Survey Research Specialist, and Fred A. Bryan is a Senior Health Systems Analyst. This project has been funded in part with federal funds from the Department of Health and Human Services under contract number 500–81–0017. However, the opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Department of Health and Human Services and no endorsement by DHHS should be inferred.

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reaction to four pharmaceutical products, Brunner and Carroll (1969) reported refusal rates that averaged 59 percent for the advance-phone-call groups compared to 25 percent for the no-phone-call groups in a household personal interview survey conducted in two urban areas in Maryland. However, this was a survey conducted by students in a marketing research course and may have been less rigorous than those typically conducted by professional survey research organizations.

Another study, reported by Seymour Sudman (1966), showed no difference in cooperation rates between lead-telephone and no-telephone groups in a nationwide study of adolescents. An 81 percent response rate was obtained for each group. The data collection effort required by the two groups differed substantially, however. The average number of visits per completed case was 1.7 for the phone-appointment group compared to 2.3 for the no-phone group, a saving of about 0.6 visits per completed case. This saving was primarily due to the fact that a greater proportion of the telephone-appointment group was interviewed on the first visit, 61 percent as compared with 41 percent for the no-phone group.

Method

An experiment was planned to test the comparative effectiveness of two interview approaches in a health-related survey of Medicare beneficiaries 65 years of age and older conducted in three geographic areas in the United States. This federally sponsored survey was designed to assess the effectiveness of Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) demonstration projects that were being carried out in the three sites. In these projects, Medicare contracted with HMOs to provide health care to Medicare-eligible senior citizens at a per capita prepaid rate. Enrollees in the program were charged a small monthly premium by the HMOs to cover costs above those paid by Medicare.

The survey, conducted during October and November 1982, assessed various aspects of health care, including patient out-of-pocket cost and utilization of medical services. It focused on the comparison of two groups of senior citizens, those who had joined a special HMO plan (enrollees) and those who were living in the same geographic area but who had not joined (nonenrollees).

The samples of enrollees and nonenrollees were selected from Medicare computer files maintained by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), stratifying on age, sex, and location of home address. The samples in the three sites were sufficient to yield an expected 1,800 enrollee and 1,200 nonenrollee interviews. Because

probabilities of selection varied across strata, compensating sample weights were computed and used to produce unbiased population estimates.[1]

All enrollees received an advance phone call to schedule an appointment for a personal interview. Articles describing the upcoming survey appeared in HMO newsletters prior to the survey, and a mailing containing a letter from the HMO director as well as one from the HCFA project officer was sent to each sample member in advance of the lead phone call. Given the relevance of the survey to the enrollees and with this type of lead effort, we felt that an advance phone call would be well received and would result in little or no detrimental effect on the response rate. The response rate for enrollees turned out to be better than 95 percent, bearing out our initial optimism.

For nonenrollees we were uncertain about the risk associated with an advance phone call. Because nonenrollees would have less involvement in the subject matter of the survey and would have less advance conditioning, they could be more likely to refuse to be interviewed when initially approached by telephone than if approached in person. In order to measure the comparative effects of the two approaches, an experiment was conducted.

In each of the three sites a random half of the nonenrollee sample received a lead letter, followed by a phone call a few days later to schedule an appointment for a personal interview. The other half of the nonenrollee sample received a lead letter followed directly by a personal visit, without the intervening telephone contact.

The data collection effort in each site was directed by a professional field supervisor with extensive related experience on similar surveys. The supervisors recruited interviewers who, with few exceptions, also had considerable survey research experience. The field staff attended a three-day training conference that included thorough coverage of all field procedures. During the fieldwork all refusals encountered by the interviewers were referred to the responsible field supervisor, who made an in-person or telephone follow-up contact with the nonparticipating sample member in an effort to persuade him or her to grant the interview.

[1] The percentages and averages presented in the text and tables of this article were computed using properly weighted data. They cannot be reproduced by simply manipulating sample frequencies, as such a procedure would fail to reflect the unequal probabilities of selection used in the sample design and would therefore yield biased estimates.

Results

The results of our experiment show notable savings in data collection costs with little or no adverse effect on the response rate when an advance phone call was used to schedule an appointment for a personal interview.

The results presented in Tables 1 to 3 are shown separately for each of the sites, since a combination of the three does not constitute any meaningful population. In fact, the sites were quite diverse in character. Marshfield is a small city of about 20,000 population in east-central Wisconsin, Worcester is a medium-sized metropolitan area of about 300,000 population in Massachusetts, and Minneapolis-St. Paul is, of course, a large metropolitan area of about 2,000,000 population in Minnesota. In each site, the enrollee and nonenrollee samples were selected from the HMO catchment area which included the central city and the immediate surrounding area.

Because we had only the name and address of the sample member, the interviewer had to obtain phone numbers from telephone books or Directory Assistance. As can be seen in Table 1, in 10 to 15 percent of the cases in the three sites, the interviewer was not able to secure a telephone number for the sample member and therefore had to make a personal visit for an initial contact. In 6 to 10 percent of the cases, it was determined from the telephone contact that the sample member was ineligible for the survey.[2] For 58–66 percent of the cases, an

Table 1. Final Result of Telephone Effort by Site

	Marshfield	*Worcester*	*Minneapolis*
No telephone number obtained	11.3%	15.3%	9.6%
Interview promised, appointment made	61.1	66.4	57.8
Other positive reception	8.0	1.7	4.7
Refused	3.3	4.7	10.3
Unable to contact	2.7	2.4	3.1
Other	4.1	3.4	6.6
Ineligible[a]	9.5	6.1	7.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
(Number of cases)	(275)	(232)	(372)
Average number of telephone calls per case	2.2	1.7	3.0

[a] Subjects who were deceased or institutionalized or who had moved from the area.

[2] Ineligibility could occur for one of three reasons: (1) death, (2) institutionalization, or (3) the sample member had moved from the area.

interview was promised and an appointment was scheduled, and for 2–8 percent another positive response was obtained.

As one would expect, refusal rates to the telephone contact itself varied by the urbanization characteristics of the sites, 3 percent for Marshfield, 5 percent for Worcester, and 10 percent for Minneapolis. The average number of phone calls made was 2.2 for Marshfield, 1.7 for Worcester, and 3.0 for Minneapolis.

Sex groups and age groups were compared and no consistent differences in response behavior across the three sites were found. Those differences that were found came as no surprise. For example, larger proportions of females and of older senior citizens were classified as "phone number not obtained;" a larger proportion of the older group was also found to be ineligible for the survey, which is to be expected because of their higher death rates and rates of institutionalization.

How does the result of the telephone call relate to the final survey result? With the exception of one case that was found to be ineligible for the survey, for every one of the 465 telephone cases where an interview was promised and an appointment made, an interview was obtained. Of those cases for whom no phone number could be obtained, from one-fourth to one-third were eventually determined to be ineligible for the survey. It is of particular interest to note the success rate in converting refusals. The total number of refusals to the lead telephone call was small (58 in all), but 34 (about 60 percent) were eventually converted and interviewed. The additional effort spent on refusal conversion was obviously quite successful.

When the final survey response results are considered, little difference is found between the telephone group and the no-telephone group in any of the three sites. As can be seen in the upper portion of Table 2, roughly 80 percent of the cases were interviewed, 6 percent were not interviewed, and 14 percent were survey-ineligible. (There were no cases for which eligibility status could not be determined.)

The final survey results, omitting the ineligibles, are presented in the lower portion of Table 2. When considering only those sample members who were survey-eligible, we see that the response rates varied from 91 percent to 98 percent.[3] The response rate for the telephone group was slightly lower than for the no-telephone group in Worcester (90.5 percent compared with 93.2 percent) and in Minneapolis (90.7 percent compared with 93.1 percent). However, the differences are on the order of one standard error and are not statisti-

[3] The "interview completed" percentages reflect the response rates obtained. The method used to compute the response rates was that recommended by the Council of American Survey Research Organizations (Frankel, et al., 1982), the ratio of interviewed subjects to eligible subjects.

Table 2. Final Survey Outcome by Type of Lead Effort and Site

	Marshfield		*Worcester*		*Minneapolis*	
Final Outcome	*Tel.*	*No Tel.*	*Tel.*	*No Tel.*	*Tel.*	*No Tel.*
All cases						
Interview completed	83.6%	83.7%	78.2%	81.1%	77.8%	80.8%
Refused	1.0	0.5	4.6	2.4	5.4	4.9
Other non-interview	1.1	1.4	3.6	3.2	2.5	1.1
Ineligible[a]	14.3	14.4	13.6	13.3	14.3	13.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(*N*)	(275)	(252)	(232)	(211)	(372)	(335)
Eligibles						
Interview completed (response rate)[b]	97.6	97.8	90.5	93.2	90.7	93.1
Refused	1.2	0.6	5.4	2.8	6.3	5.7
Other non-interview	1.2	1.6	4.1	4.0	3.0	1.2
Total eligible	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(*N*)	(220)	(201)	(187)	(167)	(297)	(270)

[a] Ineligibles were subjects who were deceased or institutionalized or who had moved from the area.

[b] Ratio of the sum of weights for subjects interviewed to the sum of weights for all eligible subjects, all multiplied by 100.

cally significant. Response rates for the telephone and no-telephone groups for Marshfield were virtually identical, just under 98 percent.

Refusal rates appear to be slightly higher for the telephone group than for the no-phone group in each site. While the refusal rates averaged slightly over 1 percent higher for the telephone group than for the no-lead-telephone group, none of the differences is statistically significant, being approximately one standard error or less in size.

Table 3 shows the average number of personal visits for all cases and for all interviewed cases. For both types of averages, the average number of personal visits is about 0.6 of a visit less for the telephone group than for the no-phone group, which interestingly is identical to the finding reported earlier by Sudman. As for the ratios of the rates, the telephone group had on the average about two-thirds the number of visits of the no-telephone group. Note that for those interviewed, the saving was principally due to the very large percentage of people in the telephone group who were interviewed during the first personal visit.[4]

[4] The saving for the telephone group in determining ineligibility is also noteworthy. For half to two-thirds of the ineligibles in the telephone group, ineligibility was established without having to make a personal visit.

Table 3. Average Number of Visits and Distribution of Visits by Type of Lead Effort and Site

	Marshfield		*Worcester*		*Minneapolis*	
	Tel.	*No Tel.*	*Tel.*	*No Tel.*	*Tel.*	*No Tel.*
All cases						
Average number of visits per sample case	1.39	1.84	1.15	1.84	1.06	1.66
Number of sample cases	275	252	232	211	372	335
Respondents						
Average number of visits per respondent	1.51	1.95	1.28	1.96	1.11	1.78
Number of respondents	213	196	172	157	270	252
Number of visits						
0	—	—	—	—	—	—
1	64.7%	46.6%	84.0%	49.7%	88.2%	52.4%
2	22.2	30.6	9.1	29.6	8.1	25.8
3+	13.1	22.8	6.9	20.7	3.7	21.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

How does this saving in visits translate into dollars and cents? From a review of field cost records for this study, we estimate that the saving in the variable cost per case was approximately $3.48, including mileage allowance and interviewer time. This represents a saving of about 20 percent of the average direct interviewer cost per case for the HMO study. The sample for this study was heavily concentrated within the survey sites. The cost variance would be even more pronounced in a sample involving a less dense distribution of cases.

Conclusions and Implications

From our experience with the HMO survey, it seems clear that an advance phone call to schedule a personal interview is not likely to greatly increase the refusal rate, at least for surveys of senior citizens. If the experiment were repeated, our best guess is that the refusal rate for the lead-telephone groups would be about 1 percent greater than the refusal rate for the no-telephone groups. The odds are 5 to 1 that it would be no more than about 2 percent greater. On the other side of the ledger, the use of the telephone to make appointments can be appreciably less expensive than the no-phone approach.

If one were to attempt to generalize these findings to other types of surveys involving different populations and different areas, four major

points should be kept in mind. First, the subject matter of our survey was, no doubt, of particular interest to the population being surveyed. Senior citizens have more health problems and, with their fixed incomes, are more vulnerable to the effects of inflation than those in other age groups. A survey focusing on medical-care utilization and costs was in all likelihood very appealing to them, as indicated by the unusually high response rates obtained. Second, we placed great emphasis on the recruitment of experienced interviewers, thorough training, close field supervision, and intensive followup of nonrespondents. This strategy would seem to be especially important in survey designs using lead telephone calls. Third, for all sample selections there was an advance mailing prior to any contact with the respondent, preparing the way for the interviewer. Without an advance mailing the results might have been much different.[5] Certainly the response rates for all groups might well have been lower. Fourth, the population under study was one more likely to be at home than the general population, and our sample was quite heavily concentrated, which made personal interview data collection particularly efficient. In a more typical survey, the cost differences might well be considerably greater.

In conclusion, our results strongly suggest that use of an advance phone call to schedule an appointment for a personal interview holds great potential for reducing data collection costs with little risk of increase in refusal rate.

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[5] This could be particularly true of the lead telephone group, since prior research has shown that an advance letter can significantly reduce the refusal rate in a telephone survey (Dillman, et al., 1976).

The Polls: Regulation—Part II

ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO AND JOHN M. GILLROY

PART I of this report appeared in the Summer 1984 issue. Part II presents the rest of the survey data concerned with Americans' attitudes toward government regulation.

The survey questions were taken from the files of the Policy Change and Public Opinion Change Project at NORC, University of Chicago. This project was originally supported by the National Science Foundation, Grant #SES-7912969 A01. Its data were compiled from published sources and with the assistance of the Roper Center, University of Connecticut; the Louis Harris Data Center, University of North Carolina; the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, University of Michigan; The New York Times/CBS News Poll; the NORC Library and the NORC General Social Survey. The sample sizes are at least 1,200, unless noted otherwise. Further information about these data can be obtained from the appropriate archive or survey organization.

CRI — Cambridge Reports, Inc.
GALLUP — Gallup Polls, American Institute for Public Opinion
HARRIS — Louis Harris and Associates
NORC — NORC, University of Chicago
OPOR — Office of Public Opinion Research
ORC — Opinion Research Corporation
ROPER — Roper Organization
SRC/CPS — Survey Research Center/Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan
YSW — Yankelovich, Skelly, and White

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Regulation of Profits

ORC: In all industries where there is competition, do you think companies should be allowed to make all the profit they can, or should the government put a limit on the profits companies can make?

	1946	*1948*	*1953*	*1955*	*1962*	*1971*	*1973*	*1975*	*1976*	*1979*	*1981*
No limits	61%	53%	65%	66%	61%	55%	48%	36%	39%	34%	*
Limit profits	31	40	28	28	25	33	40	55	55	60	51%
No opinion	8	7	7	6	14	12	12	9	6	6	*

* Not available.

ORC: Do you think business as a whole is making too much profit, a reasonable profit, or not enough profit?

	1965	*1967*	*1969*	*1971*	*1973*	*1975*	*1977*	*1979*	*1981*
Too much	24%	28%	38%	26%	35%	45%	50%	51%	51%
Reasonable	58	56	47	54	50	39	37	38	*
Not enough	6	5	4	6	3	6	9	8	*
No opinion	12	11	11	12	12	10	4	3	*

* Not available.

HARRIS: Some companies have been told their profits have been too high. Is it your impression there have been too many companies who have been told to cut back their profits, too few, or about the right number?

	June 1972	*Voters/October 1972*	*December 1972*
Too many	4%	3%	4%
Too few	61	59	59
About right number	15	21	19
Not sure	20	17	19

NORC, GALLUP: In general do you think business profits are about where they should be, too high, or too low?

	GALLUP Feb. 1937[a]	*NORC May 1943*	*NORC Sept. 1943*
Too high	48%	28%	39%
Too low	3	7	7
About right	26	36	30
No opinion, don't know	23	29	24

[a] Do you think that profits made by big business concerns are too little, too big, or about right?

Protection Against Other Excesses of Business

HARRIS: Here are some statements which have been made about business. For each tell me if you tend to agree or disagree.

All government regulation of business should be based on what is best for the country as a whole and not on what is best for business.

	November 1973	*June 1975*	*Voters/July 1976*[a]
Agree	91%	88%	82%
Disagree	4	5	7
Not sure	5	7	11

[a] The introduction read ". . . about business and politics."

GALLUP: Would you say that you yourself have been better off or worse off as a result of government control and regulation of the business practices of large corporations?

	1966	*1970*	*1977*	*1981*
Better off	37%	43%	28%	24%
Worse off	21	15	26	40
No difference	18	22	26	17
Don't know	24	20	20	19

HARRIS: Now let me read some statements which have been made about big business in this country. For each, tell me if you tend to agree of disagree.

	7/74	*3/76*
Big business if left unchecked would stifle competition . . .		
Agree	81%	76%
Disagree	11	13
Not sure	8	10
Big business operates on the principle that the individual customer does not matter . . .		
Agree	54	51
Disagree	37	38
Not sure	9	11
Big business would take over government and nearly everything else if left unchecked . . .		
Agree	71	71
Disagree	20	19
Not sure	9	10
Big business, if left alone, would be greedy and selfish and would make profits at the expense of the public . . .		
Agree	82	78
Disagree	11	12
Not sure	7	10
If strictly regulated by the federal government, big business can make this country greater than it has been . . .		
Agree	43	50
Disagree	40	33
Not sure	17	17
Big business is the source of most of what's wrong with the country today . . .		
Agree	43	38
Disagree	43	46
Not sure	14	16
If strictly regulated, monopolies would be good for the country . . .		
Agree	19	26
Disagree	65	55
Not sure	17	19

ROPER: There are also differing opinions about how far we've gone with environmental protection laws and regulations. At the present time, do you think environmental protection laws and regulations have gone too far, or not far enough, or have struck about the right balance?

	10/73	*10/74*	*10/75*	*10/76*	*9/77*	*9/79*	*9–10/80*	*9/81*
Too far	13%	17%	20%	15%	20%	24%	25%	21%
Right balance	32	44	37	35	39	36	33	38
Not far enough	34	25	31	32	27	29	33	31
Don't know	21	15	12	18	14	11	10	10

Consumer Protection

YSW: (Hand respondent card) Here is a set of statements I'd like you to read. After reading each statement, please select the item on the scale on this card that best describes the extent of your agreement or disagreement with the statement . . . Despite everything, big business is overly concerned with profits at the expense of good service and good products.

	1968	*1971*	*1972*	*1975*	*1976*	*1977*	*1979*
Agree[a]	44%	49%	47%	57%	58%	52%	50%
Disagree[b]	20	19	19	14	16	15	18
No strong opinion[c]	36	32	34	29	25	32	31

[a] Strongly agree and agree.
[b] Strongly disagree and disagree.
[c] Not sure but probably agree, and not sure but probably disagree.

CRI: There are two theories of how consumers can best be protected. One says that it is the free enterprise competitive system, that is, that the best protection for the consumer comes from firms competing with each other for your business. The other theory says that this idea about free competition is nice, but it never works out in reality—that on the contrary, business gets together and devises ways to make a profit at the consumer's expense, in some cases by all the businesses getting together to fix prices and product quality. These people say the only answer is a strong government watchdog role to keep business honest. Which general position would you say you lean toward?

	1975	*Later 1975*	*1979*
Free competition	56%	53%	56%
Strong government watchdog	27	34	26

GALLUP: In your opinion, should there be more government regulation of consumer products and how they are sold, or less regulation than there is now?

	1970	*1977*	*1981*
More regulation	55%	38%	43%
Less regulation	14	30	37
Same as now (vol.)	17	17	8
Don't know	14	14	12

HARRIS: Some people want the federal government to set up a new consumer protection agency. Those in favor argue that it will give consumers a bigger voice in shaping government decisions. Those who are against it say that we already have plenty of government agencies for protecting consumers. On balance, do you strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose a new federal consumer protection agency?

	November 1976	*June 1977*	*February 1978*
Strongly favor	19%	26%	25%
Somewhat favor	32	29	32
Somewhat oppose	18	15	14
Strongly oppose	17	14	14
Not sure	14	16	15

ROPER: There is at present a proposal before the government for the creation of a Federal Consumer Protection Agency. This agency would have the power to act on behalf of the consumer in any kind of ruling by another government agency or in a court case where the Consumer Protection Agency believes consumer interest is involved.

Some people say such an agency is a good idea because there would be much more action in protecting consumer interests. Others say such an agency is not a good idea

because the government is into too many things now and consumer interests can be better protected and at lower cost by private and independent groups such as now exist.

What do you think—that all things considered, the creation of a Federal Consumer Protection Agency is a good idea or not a good idea?

	May 1974	*May 1975*	*June 1977*
Good idea	55%	48%	50%
Not a good idea	29	31	29
Good in some ways, not other (vol.)	10	11	13
Don't know	6	10	8

ROPER: Now I'm going to name some things, and for each one would you tell me whether you think there is too much government regulation of it now, or not enough regulation now, or about the right amount of government regulation now? First, automobile safety . . .

	Percentage "Not Enough"				
	Feb. 1974	*Feb. 1975*	*Feb. 1977*	*Feb. 1979*	*Feb. 1980*
Automobile safety	31%	23%	26%	33%	37%
Manufacture and sale of barbituates	63	58	62	57	64
The honesty and accuracy of claims that are made by advertising	60	60	60	56	60
The interest rates banks can charge for loans, mortgages, etc.	34	37	31	35	42
The safety of prescription drugs	44	42	48	48	51
The price of oil and gas	—[a]	—[a]	47	45	55

[a] Not asked.

ROPER: There is much talk these days about the need for consumer protection on products made by industry and sold to consumers. I'm going to name some different kinds of products, each of which has some kind of government regulations now—on safety or quality or price. Thinking of the majority of those products available on the market, would you tell me for each one whether you think there should be more government controls on them than there are now, or whether you think the government controls on them are adequate now? First, automobile.

	Percent "More Controls Needed"		
	May 1974	*May 1975*	*April/May 1978*
Automobiles	43%	40%	39%
TV sets	23	20	17
Canned foods	38	40	32
Prescription drugs	57	53	56
Gasoline	58	50	44
Repair services	52	48	49
Cereals	29	32	31

ROPER: There are many problems facing our nation today, all of which the federal government must be concerned with. But at certain times some things are more important than others, and need more attention from our government than others. I'd like to

know for each of the things on this list whether you think it is something the government should be making a major effort on now, or something the government should be making some effort on now, or something not needing any particular government effort now. . . . Trying to establish more controls to protect consumers on the products and services they buy.

	6/74	6/75	6/76	6/77	7/78	6/79	6/80
Major effort	58%	62%	59%	51%	47%	51%	43%
Some effort	30	26	30	33	34	34	40
Needs no particular effort now	9	9	7	12	15	13	15
Don't know	3	3	3	3	3	2	3

HARRIS: Some people have suggested that the federal government should develop more extensive standards for safety. Do you favor or oppose the federal government developing more extensive standards for product safety?

	February 1974	March 1975	January 1977
Favor	78%	74%	76%
Oppose	17	20	18
Not sure	6	6	6

HARRIS: I would like to read you some statements people have made on the subject of product safety[a] and safety control. For each statement please tell me whether you tend to agree or disagree.

	2/74	3/75	1/77
If the federal government doesn't protect the consumer on product safety, then people will continue to risk many serious health and accident dangers on products they buy . . .			
Tend to agree	85%	83%	80%
Tend to disagree	13	15	14
Not sure	2	3	6
The way to solve the product safety problem is not to ban products, but to require that health warnings be put on the packages of products, such as is required for cigarettes and drugs . . .			
Tend to agree	73	73	65
Tend to disagree	22	22	27
Not sure	4	5	8
Companies start out agreeing to safety standards on products, and get the government to set those standards, but then find ways to get around them . . .			
Tend to agree	79	75	73
Tend to disagree	14	16	14
Not sure	7	9	13
Most products are safe, but a lot of people do not read the directions or misuse products, so it is unfair to put all the safety blame on manufacturers . . .			
Tend to agree	88	88	84
Tend to disagree	9	10	10
Not sure	3	2	6

[a] The February 1974 survey substituted the word "testing" for "safety."

Government Control—Ownership of Business and Industry

HARRIS: Would you favor or oppose . . .
The federal government taking over and running most big business in this country?

	July 1974	*November 1975*	*May 1977*	*May 1979*[a]
Favor	10%	10%	12%	6%
Oppose	84	83	80	92
Not sure	6	7	9	2

[a] A federal government takeover of most *businesses* in the country.

SRC/CPS, NORC: Around election time people talk about different things that our government in Washington is doing or should be doing. Now I would like to talk to you about some of the things that our government might do. Of course, different things are important to different people, so we don't expect everyone to have an opinion about all of these.

"The government should leave things like electric power and housing for private businessmen to handle." Do you have an opinion on this or not? (If yes) Do you think the government should leave things like this to private business?

	SRC/CPS			*NORC N = 390*
	1956[a]	1958	1960	1973[b]
Agree strongly	43%	43%	47%	37%
Agree but not very strongly	16	17	16	22
Not sure. It depends	10	9	8	4
Disagree but not very strongly	11	11	9	13
Disagree strongly	21	20	20	24

[a] Around election time . . . about all of these.
I would like you to look at this card as I read each question and tell me how you feel about the question. If you don't have an opinion, just tell me that; if you do have an opinion, choose one of the other answers.
"The government should leave things like electric power and housing for private businessmen to handle."

[b] Now I would like to talk to you about some of the things that our government in Washington might be doing. Of course, different things are important to different people, so we don't expect everyone to have an opinion about all of these. I would like you to look at this card as I read each question and tell me how you feel about the question. If you don't have an opinion, just tell me that; if you do have an opinion, choose one of the other answers.

ROPER: Here is a card listing 4 different views as to the best way for people to get good quality products at reasonable prices from various large industries in this country. Which one would you agree with for the *steel industry*?
The card read: The best way to get good quality products or services at reasonable prices would be: a. Break up the large companies into smaller ones, b. Have a government-run company to compete with the private companies, c. Have the government take over and run the whole industry, d. Keep the present system as it is.

	May 1975	*Dec. 1975*	*Dec. 1976*	*Dec. 1977*
Break up the large companies	28%	31%	29%	28%
Have a government-run company compete	6	5	6	9
Have the government take over and run	4	3	4	4
Keep the present system	42	47	44	44
Don't know	21	13	17	15

With which one would you agree for the automobile industry?

	May 1975	*Dec. 1975*	*Dec. 1976*	*Dec. 1977*
Break up the large companies	22%	26%	22%	27%
Have a government-run company compete	7	7	6	7
Have the government take over and run	5	3	3	3
Keep the present system	48	52	54	52
Don't know	19	12	15	11

With which for the oil industry?

	May 1975	*Dec. 1975*	*Dec. 1976*	*Dec. 1977*
Break up the large companies	30%	37%	32%	34%
Have a government-run company compete	10	10	10	10
Have the government take over and run	11	12	10	10
Keep the present system	27	27	33	31
Don't know	22	15	16	16

And with which for the chemical industry?

	May 1975	*Dec. 1975*	*Dec. 1976*	*Dec. 1977*
Break up the large companies	17%	21%	20%	20%
Have a government-run company compete	6	5	6	8
Have the government take over and run	6	5	6	6
Keep the present system	39	48	46	45
Don't know	32	20	23	21

ROPER: Here is a card listing 6 different views as to the best way for people to get good quality products at reasonable prices from various large industries in this country. Which one would you agree with for the *steel industry*?

The card read: The best way to get good quality products or services at reasonable prices would be: a. Have the government take over and run the whole industry, b. Break up the large companies into smaller ones, c. Have a government-run company to compete with the private companies, d. Have more government control and regulation over private companies, e. Keep the present system as it is, f. Have less government control and regulation over private companies.

	Dec. 1977	*Dec. 1978*	*Dec. 1979*
Have the government take over and run	7%	4%	3%
Break up the large companies	16	20	15
Have a government-run company compete	7	4	5
Have more government control and regulation	12	12	10
Keep the present system	23	26	26
Have less government control and regulation	21	20	27
Don't know	14	13	14

With which would you agree for the automobile industry?

	Dec. 1977	*Dec. 1978*	*Dec. 1979*
Have the government take over and run	5%	4%	3%
Break up the large companies	16	16	17
Have a government-run company compete	4	5	5
Have more government control and regulation	14	16	12
Keep the present system	32	31	27
Have less government control and regulation	18	17	23
Don't know	11	11	13

With which for the oil industry?

	Dec. 1977	*Dec. 1978*	*Dec. 1979*
Have the government take over and run	12%	10%	11%
Break up the large companies	19	21	22
Have a government-run company compete	7	5	6
Have more government control and regulation	16	20	19
Keep the present system	16	17	11
Have less government control and regulation	15	15	17
Don't know	15	11	13

OPOR, GALLUP: In connection with our national defense program, do you favor increasing or decreasing government regulation and control of industry?

	OPOR July 1940	*GALLUP December 1940*
Increase	53%	51%
Decrease	17	12
No change	14	24
Don't know	16	13

GALLUP: Do you think that in wartime the federal government should take over all business and industry?

	January 1937	*October 1939*	*October 1939*[a]
Yes	42%	43%	48%
No	41	40	36
Don't know, no opinion, qualified answer	17	17	16

[a] A separate cross-section was asked in October 1939: Do you think that, if the United States is at war, the federal government should take over all business and industry?

GALLUP, ROPER, ORC: Do you prefer public ownership or private ownership of the *electric power industry*? (A = A-form, B = B-form, T = T-form, K = K-form)

Roper

	1/37	1/38[a] A	1/38[b] B	3/39[c]	7/40[d] T	7/40[e] K	6/45[f]	9/45[g] T	9/45[h] K	1/47[i] T	1/47[j] K
Government ownership	59%	56%	54%	44%	31%	32%	29%	28%	26%	27%	28%
Private ownership	29	34	35	42	50	49	50	60	63	66	66
No opinion, don't know, undecided	12	11	12	14	19	20	21	12	11	7	6

	3/47[k] T	3/47[l] K	5/47[m] T	5/47[n] K	*early* 6/47[o] T	6/47[p] K	*late* 6/47[q]	5–6/48[r] T	12/48[s] T	12/48[t] K
Government ownership	23%	26%	26%	27%	36%	41%	23%	21%	25%	23%
Private ownership	62	58	66	65	51	50	59	69	58	63
No opinion, don't know undecided	14	16	8	7	13	9	17	9	17	14

ORC-Voters

	9/53[u]	3/55[v]
Government	18%	25%
Private	69	68
No opinion	12	7

[a] Would you prefer public or private ownership of the electric power industry?

[b] Would you prefer public ownership or private ownership of the electric power industry?

[c] Do you think that the government should produce and sell all, some, or none of the nation's electric power? Of the 44% favoring government ownership, 20% responded "all," and 24% replied "some."

[d] Do you think the electric companies should be owned by the Government, or by private business?

[e] Do you think the Government should own the electric companies?

[f] Should the government own the electric power companies in this country?

[g] Do you think the government should own the following things in this country: Electric power companies. Coal mines. Railroads. Banks.

[h] Same as footnote g, but: Banks. Railroads. Mines. Electric power companies.

[i] Do you think the United States government should own the following things in this country: Electric power companies. Coal mines. Railroads. Banks.

[j] Same as footnote i, but: Banks. Railroads. Coal mines. Electric companies.

[k] Do you think the government should own the electric power companies in this country or should they be owned by private business firms?

[l] Do you think the government should own the electric power companies in this country?

[m] Do you think the United States government should or should not own the following things in this country: Railroads. Banks. Coal mines. Electric power companies.

[n] Same as footnote i, but: Railroads. Banks. Coal mines. Electric power companies.

[o] As between government and business companies, who do you think should own the electric power companies?

[p] As between government and private companies, who do you think should own the electric power companies?

[q] Do you think the government should own the electric companies in this country?

[r] Do you think the U.S. government should or should not own the following things in this country: Railroads. Banks. Coal mines. Electric power companies.

[s] Same as footnote r, but: Electric power companies. Coal mines. Banks. Railroads.

[t] Same as footnote r.

[u] Do you think the United States government should or should not own the following things in this country: How about: The electric power companies. The coal mines. The banks. The railroads.

[v] What do you think about the government ownership and operation of the following kinds of business: Are you for or against government ownership of . . . How about the electric companies?

GALLUP: Do you think the government should own the following things in this country: Electric power companies. Coal mines. Railroads. Banks. (T = T-Form, K = K-Form)

	Coal Mines										
	11/36[a]	*9/45* T	*9/45*[b] K	*1/47*[c] T	*1/47*[d] K	*5/47*[e] T	*5/47*[f] K	*5–6/48*[g] T	*12/48*[h] T	*12/48*[g] K	*9/53*[i]
Yes	27%	28%	25%	30%	30%	31%	31%	27%	27%	23%	15%
No	64	61	64	65	65	63	63	65	58	64	72
No opinion	9	11	10	6	5	6	7	8	15	13	13

[a] Do you favor government ownership of coal mines?
[b] Banks. Railroads. *Mines*. Electric power companies.
[c] Substitutes "United States government" for "government."
[d] Banks. Railroads. Coal mines. Electric power companies. And substitutes "United States government" for "government."
[e] Do you think the United States government should or should not own the following things in this country: Railroads. Banks. Coal mines. Electric power companies.
[f] Railroads. Banks. Coal mines. Electric power companies. And substitutes "United States government" for "government."
[g] Same as footnote f, but substitutes "U.S." for "United States."
[h] Same as footnote g, but: Electric power companies. Coal mines. Banks. Railroads.
[i] Do you think the United States government should or should not own the following things in this country: How about: The electric power companies. The coal mines. The banks. The railroads.

GALLUP, ORC: Do you favor government ownership of *banks*?

	11/36	*12/36*	*7/37*	*8/37*[a]	*6/45*[b]	*9/45*[c] T	*9/45*[d] K	*1/47*[e] T	*1/47*[f] K
Yes	36%	37%	45%	40%	27%	23%	26%	22%	26%
No	56	49	40	42	61	65	64	71	69
No opinion	8	14	15	18	12	11	10	7	5

	5/47[g] T	*5/47*[h] K	*5–6/48*[i] T	*12/48*[j] T	*12/48*[i] K	*9/53*[k]	*ORC Voters 3/55*[l]
Yes	25%	21%	19%	23%	20%	14%	16%
No	68	71	72	64	67	76	77
No opinion	7	8	10	13	14	10	7

[a] Would you like to have the government own and control the banks?
[b] Do you believe the government should own the banks?
[c] Do you think the government should own the following things in this country: Electric power companies. Coal mines. Railroads. Banks.
[d] Same as footnote c, but: Banks. Railroads. Mines. Electric power companies.
[e] Do you think the United States government should own the following things in this country: Electric power companies. Coal mines. Railroads. Banks.
[f] Same as footnote e, but: Banks. Railroads. Coal mines. Electric companies.
[g] Do you think the United States government should or should not own the following things in this country: Railroads. Banks. Coal mines. Electric power companies.
[h] Do you think the United States government should own the following things in this country: Railroads. Banks. Coal mines. Electric power companies.
[i] Same as footnote h, but substitutes "U.S." for "United States."
[j] Same as footnote i, but: Electric power companies. Coal mines. Banks. Railroads.
[k] Do you think the United States government should or should not own the following things in this country. How about: The electric power companies. The coal mines. The banks. The railroads.
[l] What do you think about the government ownership and operation of the following kinds of business: Are you for or against government ownership of the banks of this country?

GALLUP, ROPER, ORC: Do you believe the government should take over the railroads? (T = T-form, K = K-form)

	Roper 1/36	11/36[a]	12/36[a]	12/37[b]	*Roper* 5/38[c]	7/38[d]	*Roper* 3/39[e]	6/45[f]	9/45[g]
Yes	27%	30%	28%	25%	26%	28%	34%	19%	25%
No	52	60	55	57	53	58	53	64	65
No opinion, don't know, undecided	22	10	17	18	22	14	14	17	10

	9/45[h] K	1/47[i] T	1/47[j] K	5/47[k] T	5/47[l] K	5–6/48[m] T	5–6/48[n] T	12/48[o] T	12/48[p] K
Yes	23%	24%	25%	26%	24%	19%	22%	23%	20%
No	64	69	70	66	67	71	67	62	64
No opinion, don't know undecided	10	7	5	7	9	9	1	15	16

		ORC-Voters	
	9/53[q]	3/55[r]	2/73[s]
Yes	14%	15%	38%
No	75	78	46
No opinion, don't know, undecided	11	7	17

[a] Do you favor government ownership of railroads?

[b] Do you believe the government should buy, own, and operate the railroads?

[c] Do you think the government should take over the railroads?

[d] Do you think the federal government should buy, own, and operate the railroads?

[e] Do you think the government should own and operate all, some, or none of the railroads? Of the 34% favoring ownership, 22% replied "all" and 12% responded "some."

[f] Do you think the U.S. government should or should not take over permanent control and operation of the railroads?

[g] Do you think the government should own the following things in this country: Electric power companies. Coal mines. Railroads. Banks.

[h] Same as footnote g, but: Banks. Railroads. Mines. Electric power companies.

[i] Do you think the United States government should own the following things in this country: Electric power companies. Coal mines. Railroads. Banks.

[j] Same as footnote i, but: Banks. Railroads. Coal mines. Electric power companies.

[k] Do you think the United States Government should or should not own the following things in this country: Railroads. Banks. Coal mines. Electric power companies.

[l] Do you think the United States Government should own the following things in this country: Railroads. Banks. Coal mines. Electric power companies.

[m] Do you think the U.S. government should or should not own the following things in this country: Railroads. Banks. Coal mines. Electric power companies.

[n] Do you think the U.S. government should or should not take over permanent control and operation of the railroads in this country?

[o] Do you think the U.S. government should or should not not own the following things in this country: Electric power companies. Coal mines. Banks. Railroads.

[p] Same as footnote o, but: Railroads. Banks. Coal mines. Electric power companies.

[q] Do you think the United States government should or should not own the following things in this country: How about: The electric power companies. The coal mines. The banks. The railroads.

[r] What do you think about the government ownership and operation of the following kinds of business: Are you for or against government ownership of . . . How about railroads?

[s] As you know, many railroads in the country are facing major financial difficulties. Do you think the federal government should or should not take over and run the railroads?

GALLUP: Do you think the railroads would be run more efficiently if the government owned and operated them?

	December 1937	*February 1973*[a]
Yes	31%	38%
No	54	46
No opinion	15	16

[a] Substituted "federal government" for "government."